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International audience; The present contribution delves into a recent development of the dialogical rules for proof-theory penned by Ansten Klev that arose from Per Martin-Löf's take on assertoric knowledge as involved in the correctness criterion for assertion. The main aim of our paper is to set out the central steps towards a new Dialogical Framework called Immanent Reasoning II, which on the one hand integrates some of the CTT-rules developed by Klev, but on the other, develops further the general tenets of the dialogical perspective on meaning and logic. In contrast to Klev's approach, IR-II contains rules that indicate how to develop plays and winning strategies for a thesis.

This study examines an Islamic dialectical objection called kasr, or "breaking," as treated by the dialecticians and legal theorists Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083 CE) and Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 1081 CE). Kasr has both legitimate and illegitimate applications, and we confront the fallacious modes denounced by our theorists with deontic paradoxes and puzzles falling under the rubric of logical extrapolation fallacy. Our primary claim is that, whereas logical extrapolation produces fallacies or paradoxes by unsafely applying inference rules of standard alethic and/or logical necessity to the deontic realm, the fallacies generated by illegitimate modes of kasr in Islamic legal theory (wherein logical rules are expressed dialectically) constitute a genuine source for reflecting on what patterns of reasoning should be endorsed for determining causality in legal-and, perhaps, natural-epistemological contexts. Ultimately, this is the first step towards a larger study of kasr, which will compare it with other dialectical objections and treat relevant critical discourses from later Muslim legal theorists and dialecticians.

International audience; The present study, focused on Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, develops some preliminary explorations on his remarkable epistemology of presence, in light of his postulate of the priority of the experience of unity by presence. Furthermore, the paper should pave the way for responding to the challenges of Tony Street and others on the compatibility of Suhrawardī's critique of Ibn Sīnā with the development of a temporal and modal syllogism that seems quite close to that of Ibn Sīnā. Suhrawardī's modalities are to be understood as the different ways a predicate relates to its subject rather than as propositional operators. Necessarily necessary modality relates unconditionally the subject-term with the predicate-term; in contrast, necessarily contingent modality relates conditionally these terms. Moreover, necessarily necessary predication either admits simple conversion (corresponds to definition) or not (corresponds to genus). Necessarily contingent predication can also be declined in admitting simple conversion (corresponds to proprium) and not admitting this conversion (corresponds to accident). Necessarily contingent predication includes acquired potentialities or capacities such as literacy; and natural or not-acquired, such as breathing. Whereas predicating a not-acquired capacity of an actual individual involves time as focusing in one particular individual-e.g. laughing/breathing is necessarily but contingently said of humans since there must be at least one time when laughing is present, and one when it is absent concerning each individual; predicating an acquired capacity amounts to asserting such a contingency with regard to the whole genus-e.g., predicating literacy of humans assumes that at least one individual in at least one time actualizes literacy iff there is another human who does not-there are some variants related to commitment to either strong or Weak Plenitude (only acquired capacities seem to admit Weak Plenitude). We will put this at work in Suhrawardī's own (sketchy) framework for syllogism.

In several texts, some authored by himself alone and some in collaboration N. D. Belnap proposed a pragmatist approach to predictions and further speech acts such as promising, betting, and wondering, in an indeterministic setting within a branching structure that shapes the future course of events. In the joint paper "Future Contingents and the Battle Tomorrow", M. Perloff and N. E. Belnap discuss Aristotle's famous example in the context of STIT-logic. In particular, the paper studies the pragmatics of predictions of future contingents under the background of the 480 BCE battle of Salamis: the general commanding the Greek Athenian fleet predicts that a battle will be fought on the sea while the Spartan general denies it. According to Perloff and Belnap's analysis, this kind of prediction is neither true nor necessary at the moment of utterance, but can be vindicated or impugned, retrospectively. The central thought of the present paper is that vindication is a dialogical process associated to statements made. In the particular case that the statement expresses a prediction, the dialogical process involves plays on the settled past truth of the predicted contingent future. This way of analysing Tomorrow's Sea Battle highlights the interplay of the ontological perspective and the linguistic perspective, where vindication or impugnment of the predictions are under scrutiny.