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Wireless local area networks remain vulnerable to attacks initiated during the connection establishment (CE) phase. Current Wi-Fi security protocols fail to fully mitigate attacks like man-in-the-middle, preamble spoofing, and relaying. To fortify the CE phase, in this paper we design a backward-compatible scheme using a digital signature interwoven into the preambles at the physical (PHY) layer with time constraints to effectively counter those attacks. This approach slices a MAC-layer signature and embeds the slices within CE frame preambles without extending frame size, allowing one or multiple stations to concurrently verify their respective APs' transmissions. The concurrent CEs are supported by enabling the stations to analyze the consistent patterns of PHY-layer headers and identify whether the received frames are the anticipated ones from the expected APs, achieving 100% accuracy without needing to examine their MAC-layer headers. Additionally, we design and implement a fast relay attack to challenge our proposed defense and determine its effectiveness. We extend existing open-source tools to support IEEE 802.11ax to evaluate the effectiveness and practicality of our proposed scheme in a testbed consisting of USRPs, commercial APs, and Wi-Fi devices, and we show that our relay attack detection achieves 96-100% true positive rates. Finally, end-to-end formal security analyses confirm the security and correctness of the proposed solution., Comment: 13 pages

Within 1-2 decades, quantum computers are expected to obsolesce current public-key cryptography, driving authorities such as IETF and NIST to push for adopting quantum-resistant cryptography (QRC) in ecosystems like Internet Protocol Security (IPsec). However, IPsec struggles to adopt QRC, primarily due to the limited ability of Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), which establishes IPsec connections, to tolerate the large public keys and digital signatures of QRC. Many solutions (e.g., IETF RFCs) are proposed to integrate QRC into IKEv2, but remain largely untested in practice. In this paper, we measure the performance of these proposals over the Internet by designing and implementing a novel, scalable, and flexible testbed for quantum-resistant IPsec, and we expose the serious shortcomings of existing proposals for quantum-resistant IKEv2 when deployed in constrained (e.g., lossy, rate-limited) networks. Through experimental deployments ranging from cloud-based virtual networks to hardware-in-the-loop wireless links between software-defined radios, as well as deployment on the international FABRIC testbed for next-generation networks, we show that today's solutions for quantum-resistant IPsec are insufficient, necessitating development of better approaches.