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The human respiratory system mainly consists of four parts namely trachea, main bronchi, bronchioles and alveoli respectively. The alveoli in the lungs are responsible for the transfer of oxygen and carbon-dioxide through capillaries blood vessels leading to the pulmonary vein. A person cannot breathe properly during Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) due to abnormal transfer of oxygen and carbon-dioxide. Artificial ventilation is recommended for a person who suffers from COPD with no breathing or abnormal breathing, to manually preserve intact brain function. So, the blood oxygen level required for the person should be continuously monitored using pulse oximeter and controlled automatically using artificial ventilation. Hence, in this paper human respiratory system is modelled as analogies electrical model by using RLC parameters. The analogous electrical model parameters are represented as resistance, inheritance and compliance respectively. Using this analogous electrical model of human respiratory system, time domain and stability analysis are performed to identify COPD condition.

International audience; I develop a model of activism and polarization in the context of electoral competition. Two candidates simultaneously announce policy platforms and seek the support of ideologically inclined activists. Activists compete to influence electoral outcomes by expending costly support for their respective candidates. The presence of activists always moderates the platform choice of candidates, compared to the case of no activism. The central finding of the paper is that the relationship between partisanship of activists and polarization is ambiguous. As activists become increasingly partisan, polarization of candidate platforms reduces or widens depending on the costs of activism. I present normative conditions under which the presence of activism and increased partisanship among activists are both welfare-improving for voters. Finally, introducing a public funding option for candidates increases polarization in the political process.

Calculating square root is an important mathematical operation which has wide applications. The design of square rooter in hardware needs to achieve low power, low area and high speed. Often there can be a trade-off among the three metrics. As the current technology aims for low power, designs require major architectural modification. This paper presents a low power binary square rooter using reversible logic. It uses reversible logic to achieve low power. The binary square rooter is designed and implemented using RCSM (Reversible Controlled Subtract Multiplexer).For further development such as number of quantum cost, garbage outputs and the constant inputs , binary square rooter is implemented using SRG (Samiur Rahman Gate).Binary square rooter using non-restoring algorithm is designed using both SRG and conventional approach. Simulations are carried out using ModelSim software and the power is obtained using Synopsys Design Compiler The power obtained for SRG and conventional technique are compared. The gate count has been reduced to 35 from 75. Power improvement of 20% is obtained.

I study incentives for information transmission and collective decision-making between multiple players in an alliance. Within an alliance, i) players have private information; ii) actions exhibit substitutability; iii) action sets are constrained; and iv) preferences are heterogeneous. The main result derives conditions for full information aggregation under any public communication protocol. Full information revelation ensues as long as players' biases are sufficiently cohesive with respect to constraints on the action set. I derive precise conditions on the minimal action set under full information revelation. Differences in the size of action sets across players is exacerbated by two variables: i) individual biases over outcomes, and ii) degree of interdependence between the actions of players. The results are discussed in the context of collective decision-making in international organizations and climate change alliances.

In the classic Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic communication between an informed Sender and uninformed Receiver, perfect information transmission is never achieved as an equilibrium outcome. I present a modified version of the CS cheap talk game with the following two innovations: (i) both players take actions, and\ud (ii) actions are strategic substitutes. In contrast to the CS setup, the modified game can facilitate perfect information revelation. I characterize the conditions under which a full information revelation\ud equilibrium exists. When these conditions are violated, only partial revelation equilibria exist. Under partial revelation, the Sender reveals information up to a threshold state and pools beyond this threshold, resulting in some loss of information. Welfare analysis suggests that partial revelation equilibria with a higher threshold pareto dominate those with lower thresholds. Crucially, a higher threshold equilibrium is also interim efficient – every Sender type at least weakly prefers this over a lower threshold equilibrium.

I develop a model of activism and polarization in the context of electoral competition. Two candidates simultaneously announce policy platforms and seek the support of ideologically inclined activists. Activists compete to influence electoral outcomes by expending costly support for their respective candidates. The presence of activists always moderates the platform choice of candidates, compared to the case of no activism. The main finding is to provide conditions under which as activists’ ideological partisanship increases (decreases), polarization of candidate platforms reduces (widens) - meaning candidates may compromise even though their supporters become more extreme. I precisely characterize the conditions under which the presence of activism and increasing partisanship among activists are both welfare-improving for voters. Finally, I identify a novel crowding out effect of big money on the demand for activism. My analysis suggests public funding of elections as an important institutional reform that could mitigate the pernicious effects of high polarization.

I study the role of communication and commitment between an informed and an uninformed agent. The two agents contribute to a joint project such that (i) the agents’ actions are substitutable, and (ii) the actions are constrained. In the absence of commitment and when decision-making is simultaneous, there is full information revelation as long as constraints are not binding. The presence of binding constraints results in only partial revelation of information in equilibrium. The most informative equilibrium is strictly pareto dominant. When decisions are sequential, information revealed is unchanged but the actions of the agents change, resulting in higher welfare. Finally, I characterize the ex ante optimal commitment mechanism for the uninformed agent. Providing greater commitment power strictly raises welfare of both agents and leads to greater overall efficiency.

I develop a model of activism and polarization in the context of electoral competition. Two candidates simultaneously announce policy platforms and seek the support of ideologically inclined activists. Activists compete to influence electoral outcomes by expending costly support for their respective candidates. The presence of activists always moderates the platform choice of candidates, compared to the case of no activism. The central finding of the paper is that the relationship between partisanship of activists and polarization is ambiguous. As activists become increasingly partisan, polarization of candidate platforms reduces or widens depending on the costs of activism. I present normative conditions under which the presence of activism and increased partisanship among activists are both welfare-improving for voters. Finally, introducing a public funding option for candidates increases polarization in the political process.