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The article analyzes the statements expressed by the leaders of the German Security Police in Occupied Serbia regarding their actions and war crimes. Dr. Wilhelm Fuchs, Commander of the Einsatz Group for Yugoslavia (1941), then August Meyszner, Senior SS and police leader in Serbia (1942-1944), and Dr. Emanuel Schäfer, Commander of the Police and Security Service in Serbia (1942-1944), were selected for analysis. The introductory part presents the contextualization of international legislation, which was in force during the Second World War. The development of the German Security Police in occupied Serbia was explained, to understand the positions of Fuchs, Meyszner and Schäfer. In the central part, the article specifically analyzes the phenomenon of crime denial. The analysis of their statements is divided by phenomena – command or personal responsibility, management of camps, abuse of prisoners and reprisals. At the very end, a brief comparison is offered with the statements expressed at the Nuremberg trial by Ernest Kaltenbrunner, a key figure of the Security Police from 1943 to 1945. So, the results of this analysis present an overview of the transfer of mostly shared responsibility. The review offers a look at how they often shifted responsibility to each other, or often denied it without any significant grounds. All of this is complemented by the results of official historiography, as well as a summary of Kaltenbrunner’s defense, which confirms that it was a kind of framework of denial of responsibility after the Second World War.

The issue of collaboration has provoked much debate since the end of the Second World War. Appearances of collaboration, diversity depending on geographical location, plans of the Third Reich for a particular country and others were some main phenomena analyzed. However, to adequately study the form of collaboration, it is necessary to start from the legal framework that defined the phenomenon itself. In the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Belgrade City Administration was part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The institution of the same name was formed after the beginning of the occupation in 1941. However, it was established in multiple violations of The Hague Conventions and following the decisions of the Third Reich. Organizational changes made to the Belgrade City Administration adjusted it to the occupation system. All of this was against the provisions of The Hague Conventions, which were supposed to determine the form of occupation and be compulsory for Germany. The purpose of this article is to examine the establishment and functioning of the Belgrade City Administration under occupation from the perspective of international law. The legal framework is put in the context of the historical facts and used to analyze comparative experiences in the case of France and Belgium. Thus, the global context of the plans of the Third Reich and the executive practice in the creation of occupation systems in the west of Europe, are compared to the establishment of the Belgrade City Administration, as an occupation institution of domestic origin.

Чланак анализира нацистичку окупациону доктрину и праксу која је из ње произашла у погледу положаја и важности једног по броју становника малог града. У том смислу, чланак представља покушај реконструкције утицаја идеологије на егзекутивну праксу окупираног Лесковца. Осим тога, анализира и главне задатке окупационе управе, као и утицај отпора који је постојао у тој области окупиране Србије. Управо ови фактори диктирали су окупациону праксу у граду, која се у свом финалном облику базирала на реквизицијама и репресивном полицијском поступку. Односно, у генералном погледу, чланак представља општу анализу нацистичких планова према Лесковцу, као и егзекутивне праксе, која је диктирана условима на локалном простору.

Чланак анализира познате податке о атентату у хотелу „Парк“ у Нишу 3. августа 1941. године, али такође и идеализовану слику ове акције у периоду Социјалистичке Федеративне Републике Југославије. Разматра шта је истинито, али и преувеличано у сећању на овај догађај, као и шта су конкретни резултати овог напада. први део чланка кратко уводи у реалност комунистичког покрета отпора у окупираној Србији, а након тога друга два дела конкретно анализирају фактографске податке о атентату, као и његову митологизацију током три деценије након рата.