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The article focuses on the concept of "de-moralizing ethics," which challenges the traditional use of moral concepts in ethical theorizing. Topics include the critical evaluation of moral concepts like "right" and "wrong," the influence of cultural and historical frameworks on ethical ideas, and alternative approaches emphasizing virtue and rational reasoning over moral obligation.

In Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence , John Tillson argues that initiating children into religion is morally wrong. His argument overlaps and intersects at various points with my own argument against confessional religious education in schools. In this brief reply I consider two notable differences between our arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties—the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others' right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view—have failed to answer the two questions satisfactorily. I then introduce my proposal, which holds that we wrong others when we fail to treat their status as moral agents as a source of stringent constraints on our action. I call it the moral neglect account. Once we have identified a common aim of corrective duties (counterbalancing moral neglect), we can fill their content in the various contexts in which wronging has occurred. I conclude by observing that it is not the primary role of corrective justice to assign responsibilities for damage reparations; in fact, requests for compensation make more sense if framed in distributive rather than corrective terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congress has a long menu of ways to reduce the growth of Social Security's future benefit costs. These include increasing the full retirement age, means testing benefits, reducing cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), and modifying the benefit formula. Choosing from that long menu is totally a political matter, without obvious right and wrong answers. Something must be done before too long to solve Social Security's financial problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tactics to deter deviant consumer behaviour have received limited attention in the literature despite deviance being an ongoing problem in the marketplace. Across two studies, the findings suggest there is a heterogeneous response to the rules placed on consumers' behaviour, which manifests from an absence of consensus among consumers on what is right and wrong behaviour undermining the it's wrong, don't do it approach to deterrence. Further, risk perceptions of being caught and punished are low, if not absent, undermining the you will be caught and punished approach to deterrence. Alternate underlying mechanisms were tested and found to influence deviant consumer behaviour (perceived prevalence, perceived outcomes and moral identity), which could underpin alternate deterrence tactics, including social proofing, moral triggers and humanising the victim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a theoretical and doctrinal explanation of how the but-for test links gains to the wrong that produced them. Gain-based damages cases focus on the gain resulting from the defendant's tortious behaviour. In these cases, the contrastive aspect of the but-for test, requiring the factfinder to consider the hypothetical result that would have occurred had the right thing happened instead of the defendant's wrongdoing, is not confined to the question of reasonability, as it is in negligence cases. Rather, in gain-based damages cases, the factfinder faces the open-ended normative task of determining the hypothetically appropriate scenario that contrasts with the wrongdoing that happened in reality. For this reason, in gain-based damages cases, the normative sensitivity of the but-for test is revealed in full. The article explains how this sensitivity influences the result of the but-for test expressing the amount of gain causally attributed to the defendant's wrongdoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deviant consumer behaviour in the marketplace is an ongoing problem causing harm to the organisation, employees, and other consumers. To address this problem, this study explores consumer perceptions of right and wrong using the novel concept of a deviance threshold – the mental line in the sand dictating right and wrong. Using consumer-based interviews with a card-sort activity, findings supported and extended dimensions proposed to explain why some behaviours are perceived as more serious or unethical than others. Moreover, why specific neutralisation techniques are used and how they affect categorisations of behaviours within an individual’s deviance threshold is explained. This study offers alternative strategies tailored to challenging consumer justifications to curb deviance. Implications support abandoning the universal approach to deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay replies to three critics of my book Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration. First, in response to Kit Wellman, I defend the claim that states sometimes have a right against external interference even when their decisions depart from the requirements of social justice. This "right to do wrong" is grounded in respect for a legitimate procedure of collective self-determination, in which the state's members have an important interest. Second, I reply to Michael Blake's concern that there is an inconsistency in my treatment of people's actual wills in politics. I clarify that my view places weight on the actual wills only of "cooperators" (a technical term), and that cooperators' actual wills matter because they have claims against alien rule. There is no inconsistency in treating political annexation differently from immigration since immigrants rarely threaten to impose alien rule on cooperators. Finally, I address Adom Getachew's concerns about the imperial dimensions of the states system, arguing that my book contains resources for theorizing remedial claims to land in settler colonial societies and other reparative duties of global justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Morally convicted attitudes—attitudes grounded in core beliefs about fundamental right and wrong—play an important role in political psychology, public opinion, and political behavior. Extant research suggests that these attitudes are intensely held, likely to evoke strong emotional responses, more stable and less amenable to compromise, and perceived to be universally true. Despite a large body of research on how morally convicted attitudes affect behavior and choice, several open questions remain about their antecedents. There are two questions central to this article: First, can the news media effectively communicate a sense of moral conviction to the mass public? Second, if so, what are the factors that cause these attitudes to become morally convicted? Drawing on framing theory, appraisal theory, and research in political communication, we hypothesize that moral conviction can be effectively communicated using episodic (as opposed to thematic) frames, and also, that emotional reactions to such frames contribute to the development of moral conviction. Using four survey experiments and two replications, we find some support for our hypotheses, but we also find that treatment effects are likely context dependent. We close with a discussion about avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is wrong with imposing pure risks, that is, risks that don't materialize into harm? According to a popular response, imposing pure risks is pro tanto wrong, when and because risk itself is harmful. Call this the Harm View. Defenders of this view make one of the following two claims. On the Constitutive Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk constitutes diminishing one's well-being viz. preference-frustration or setting-back their legitimate interest in autonomy. On the Contingent Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk has harmful consequences for the risk-bearers, such as psychological distress. This paper argues that the Harm View is plausible only on the Contingent Claim, but fails on the Constitutive Claim. In discussing the latter, I argue that both the preference and autonomy account fail to show that risk itself is constitutively harmful and thereby wrong. In discussing the former, I argue that risk itself is contingently harmful and thereby wrong but only in a narrow range of cases. I conclude that while the Harm View can sometimes explain the wrong of imposing risk when (and because) risk itself is contingently harmful, it is unsuccessful as a general, exhaustive account of what makes pure imposition wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses about the non-identity problem. Topics of discussion includes some actions may be morally wrong by affecting future people's identities but they are worse for nobody. It further states that the lesser known solution to the problem is not because of what they do or produce is because of why they were performed.

Whistleblowers who need to decide whether or not they should report wrongdoing usually experience several anxieties and pressures before making a final decision. As whistleblowers continue to attract the attention of a wide range of stakeholders, more research is necessary to understand the effects of the perceived seriousness of threats (PST) and perceived seriousness of wrongdoing (PSW), as well as the effect of the rationalization process on the intention to blow the whistle. We make the original proposal that the rationalization process can affect how PST and PSW trigger whistleblowing intentions. We tested our model using employees of tax offices operating in an emerging economy. We suggest several research findings, which can be summarized as follows: (i) PST reduces individuals' intention to blow the whistle. That is, the greater the threat perceived by whistleblowers, the higher the likelihood they will choose to remain silent; (ii) we find evidence of a positive relationship between PSW and whistleblowing intention, whereby PSW increases individuals' intention to blow the whistle. That is, the more serious the wrongdoing perceived by potential whistleblowers, the more likely they are to choose to blow the whistle; and (iii) we find evidence of the important role of rationalization in moderating the relationships between PST, PSW, and whistleblowing intention. The implications of these findings for business ethics scholars, managers, and end-users interested in whistleblowing are also presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a 2020 article in Analysis , Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the moral equality account of the hypocrite's lack of standing to blame fails. To object to this account, Lippert-Rasmussen considers the contrary of hypocrisy: hypercrisy. In this article, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality account, it is also a problem for Lippert-Rasmussen's own account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame. I then reflect on the hypocrite's and hypercrite's standing to self-blame , which reveals that the challenge hypercrisy poses for accounts of standing is different from the challenge Lippert-Rasmussen articulates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What reasoning processes do consumers use to support public figures who act immorally? Existing research emphasizes moral rationalization, whereby people reconstrue improper behavior in order to maintain support for a transgressor. In contrast, the current research proposes that people also engage in moral decoupling, a previously unstudied moral reasoning process by which judgments of performance are separated from judgments of morality. By separating these judgments, moral decoupling allows consumers to support a transgressor's performance while simultaneously condemning his or her transgressions. Five laboratory studies demonstrate that moral decoupling exists and is psychologically distinct from moral rationalization. Moreover, because moral decoupling does not involve condoning immoral behavior, it is easier to justify than moral rationalization. Finally, a field study suggests that in discussions involving public figures' transgressions, moral decoupling may be more predictive of consumer support (and opposition) than moral rationalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Polonica is the property of Instytut Jezyka Polskiego PAN and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the 'right kind' and the 'wrong kind'. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the moral wrongness of joke theft. Working through a trove of real‐world cases, and using the sitcom The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel as a touchstone, I argue, ultimately, for a pluralist approach, contending that there are several wrongs that may be present in any case of joke theft, but which cannot be reduced to each other and which are collectively irreducible to any sort of "superwrong." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, the moral sense theory of Shaftesbury, who is one of the British philosophers of the eighteenth century, is discussed. Suggesting that the moral sense is a natural sense, Shaftesbury claims that one is able to know what is right or wrong thanks to this sense, and that is why the moral sense is the basis of morality. According to Shaftesbury, the moral sense is a natural faculty as faculties of sight and hearing. He thinks preventing the moral sense from degeneration due to various reasons and improving its competence is only possible with a thorough education. Also, he does not deny the fact that individuals want to act for their own interests, however, he supports the idea stating that self-interest and society's interest are in accord with each other and moral goodness exists thanks to this accord. Opposing the egoist morality and malicious human nature mentality, Shaftesbury believes that morality is objective and autonomous. The moral sense theory of Shaftesbury, who is acknowledged as the pioneer of moral sentimentalism, is significantly different from the following theories of emotive morals. Because, besides regarding the moral sense as the basis of morality, he also thinks that reason should be involved in order for emotion to be functional. The moral theory of Shaftesbury is particularly significant since it approaches human holistically within the context of emotion-reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consent that is voluntary, informed and given by a competent person sometimes transforms a wrong into a right act. How does consent that meets these requirements change the moral property of an act, namely that of being a wronging of a person? This is the question this paper will deal with. Some authors argue that valid consent changes the moral property of an act by changing the reasons which speak against the act. This account of the normative force of consent will be critically examined and rejected. An alternative model will then be put forward and defended according to which consent changes the moral property of an act if and only if the wrong‐making property of the act is that it is not consented to. The upshot will be that consent does not eliminate the wrong‐making property if the unconsented act is wrong for other reasons than not being consented to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How wrong is it to deceive a person into having sex with you? The common view seems to be that this depends on the nature of the deception. If it involves something very important, such as your identity, then the wrong done is very serious. But if it involves something more trivial, such as your natural hair colour, then the wrong seems less great. Tom Dougherty rejects this view. He argues that sexual deception is always seriously wrong. In this paper, I present a response to Doughterty's argument. I propose an analysis of the wrongness in deception according to which acts of deception, in sexual relations and elsewhere, may differ in their degree of wrongness, and some may not be seriously wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A series of our experimental studies show that some actions which consequentialists would treat as morally right or wrong were not regarded by ordinary people as a matter of morality. These results suggest that there is a divide between the moral and the non-moral that ordinary people intuitively believe in but that consequentialism seems unable to accommodate. We argue that the root of this conflict lies in the inclusion of non-moral value in the consequentialist theory of the good, which causes consequentialism to deny, in all cases involving primarily non-moral value, a moral/non-moral divide. We argue further that there is no good theoretical reason (other than that which motivates consequentialism) to think that such a divide is unjustified. Therefore, consequentialism faces a problem: any version of consequentialism that allows non-moral value into the theory of the good will be at odds with a substantial number of seemingly justified intuitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present article I argue that there is a class of conspiracy theorists that pose a threat to liberal democratic regimes, who tend to subscribe to potentially harmful conspiracy theories and can be regarded as unreasonable in two ways: i) do not accept the burdens of judgment; ii) are not motivated by a sense of justice. If we endorse political liberalism, we ought to partially exclude these citizens from the legitimation pool. The qualifier "partially" is important here, as I only endorse their exclusion qua bearers of an unreasonable conception. To the extent that they can employ other arguments, they will continue to be a part of the legitimation pool. Towards the end of the paper I investigate a potential counterargument to my position, which could be addressed by someone who postulates a Waldronian right to do wrong. I show that Quong's distinction between a right to do wrong and a non-right to be unreasonable can be extended in this instance and thus invalidate this potential criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We extend the experimental analysis of sorting and effort effects of high‐powered contracts on welfare to situations with negative externalities. Participants solve brainteasers from Raven's matrices. The difference between right and wrong answers represents our measure of welfare per capita. We compare two contract schemes: fixed‐wage and bonus contracts that reward subjects for the number of correct answers, regardless of the number of wrong answers. With fixed wages, selfish individuals have no effort incentive. With bonuses, they have incentives to answer as many questions as possible. The two contract schemes are further separated depending on whether participants self‐select or are randomly assigned to a contract. The self‐selection treatments correspond to cases where countries do not regulate contracts. The random assignment treatments mimic situations where countries either offer only bonuses or ban them. We find that bonuses generate lower welfare per capita than fixed wages as the higher effort incentives are outweighed by the detrimental effect of answering too many questions. However, due to productivity sorting, a general ban on bonuses does not increase welfare per capita compared to offering both contract schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We operate under norms of evaluating actions as good and bad, right and wrong, or reasonable and unreasonable. What justifies the authority of these norms? Christine Korsgaard takes the constitutivist position and argues that self-constitution, as the standard for what constitutes action, is the source of normativity. David Enoch argues that it is impossible for any constitutivist model to justify normative standards, and that realism is the best solution. In this paper, I demonstrate that the best solution to the tensions Enoch raises is not realism, but an original coherentist-constitutivist model of normativity rooted in Korsgaardian constitutivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tourism Tribune / Lvyou Xuekan is the property of Tourism Institute of Beijing Union University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to Pessimism about moral testimony, it is objectionable to form moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates Pessimism about another source of moral knowledge: propositional memory. Drawing on a discussion of Gilbert Ryle's on forgetting the difference between right and wrong, it argues that Internalism about moral motivation offers a satisfying explanation of Pessimism about memory. A central claim of the paper is that Pessimism about memory (and by extension, testimony) is an issue in moral psychology rather than moral epistemology. That is because it is best explained by appeal to claims about the constitution of moral knowledge as a state of mind, rather than requirements on belief formation. The paper also provides reason to suspect that the focus on testimony is something of a red herring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mackie (Ethics: inventing right and wrong, Penguin Books, London, 1977) famously argued for a moral error theory on the basis that objective moral values, if they existed, would be very queer entities. Unfortunately, his argument is very brief and it is not totally obvious from what he says exactly where the queerness of moral values is supposed to lie. In this paper I will firstly show why a typical interpretation of Mackie is problematic and secondly offer a new interpretation. I will argue that, whether or not we have reason to live in the morally correct way, what seems queer about moral properties is that there is a morally correct way in which to live in the first place. This interpretation makes sense of Mackie's claim that theism might be able to solve the queerness problem; the notion of an objectively correct way to live may make sense if theism is true, but not otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commentary addresses several issues raised in Charles Levin and Dawn Skorczewski's probing and insightful paper (this issue) on the tragic story of Anne Sexton's sexual relations with her analyst. Highlighted are (1) the nature of the betrayal in sexual boundary violations, that being the lie; (2) the false dichotomy of real and unreal analytic love; and (3) the ways in which Sexton attempted to be heard, even through unconscious emanations, as in her poetry. Speculative inquiry is offered about Duhl and others involved in her tragic story. Finally, and in accord with Levin and Skorczewski's rendering, I aim to celebrate Sexton and her poetry, returning her voice to her in both conscious and unconscious expressions. Atonement and repair are offered in truth-telling – a righting of her legacy that hopefully will be helpful to others as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research investigated the role of contemplation, conversation (conceptualized as social contemplation), and explanation in right-wrong decisions. Several theories suggest that contemplation or morally oriented conversation will promote ethical decisions and that immediate choice or self-interested conversation will not; other theories suggest that individuals' explanations will reinforce their decisions. An experimental task tempting people to lie supported all of these predictions. In addition,truth tellers viewed the situation as morally oriented, and non-truth tellers viewed it as oriented around self-interest, both before and after their decisions. These findings provided the basis for a new process model of moral decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a theory of why some people who witness or learn about acts of mistreatment against others in organizations are more likely to recognize this injustice and become personally involved. Drawing from theories of moral identity, moral intuitions, and self-regulation, we explain third parties' morally motivated responses to mistreatment and consider the role of power and belief in the disciplinary system in this process. We discuss implications of the theory and propose future research directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how the philosophy of classic natural right was used to promote the proslavery argument in antebellum Virginia. The author suggests slavery was regarded as a necessary evil by some but as a positive good by others. The views of philosopher Leo Strauss regarding changes in the doctrine of natural right are discussed. Influences on former U.S. vice president John C. Calhoun's political thought are noted. College professor Albert Taylor Bledsoe attacked later forms of natural right based on their origins in the work of philosopher John Hobbes. College professor George Frederick Holmes criticized the concept of natural liberty and supported concepts of philosopher Aristotle regarding slavery. College professor Robert Lewis Dabney cited the Bible to justify slavery.

An article coming from my pen has met with opposition. If the critics are to be believed, I put forth an erroneous conception on how to calculate the present value of a forest mill's total assets, including soil and standing timber. This reproach, however, is untenable. In fact, the economically correct solution brings to light that the principle of sustainable maximum yield is productively efficient and at the same time most lucrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alcohol is the most commonly abused drug by young adults across North America. Although alcohol consumption itself incurs a risk of neurological damage, it is also a significant risk factor for traumatic brain injury (TBI). TBI among young adults is described as a modern healthcare epidemic. The drastic changes occurring within their neurological networks put young adults at greater risk for developing long-term post-traumatic deficits. Contradictory findings have been indicated regarding the effects of alcohol consumption on TBI outcomes in adults, with some studies demonstrating detrimental effects, whereas others suggest neuroprotective abilities. However, little is known about the effects of alcohol consumption on TBI outcomes during the sensitive stage of early adulthood. Young adult female Sprague–Dawley rats were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions: Pre-injury alcohol+TBI; Pre-injury alcohol+Sham; Pre- and Post-injury alcohol+TBI; Pre- and Post-injury alcohol+Sham; No alcohol+TBI; No alcohol+Sham. Alcohol consumption groups received an amount of 10% v/v ethanol solution based on the animals' weight. Following the injury, the rats were subjected to a behavioral test battery to assess post-concussive symptomology. Overall, chronic binge drinking significantly improved TBI outcomes related to motor coordination and balance, whereas binge drinking in general significantly decreased anxiety-like behaviors. Additionally, in many cases, chronic binge drinking appears to return the TBI animal's behavioral outcomes to levels comparable to those of the no alcohol sham animals. Thus, the results suggest that alcohol may exhibit neuroprotective abilities in the context of early adulthood TBI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While broadly speaking the framework of separation of power is not fully executed which has caused institutional tangle in the history of Pakistan, however, the main objective of this research paper is to re-investigate the relationship between the civil and military leadership in the period 2013-2018. The elemental premise of this article is that the civilian and military leadership has generally squabbled during the civilian rule. This paper contends that this wrangle has left a majority of people of Pakistan with undelivered promises and their woes have generally multiplied. Generally speaking, perception abounds that form over substance approach proliferates in the present democratic set-up. There is an impression that the military schemes surreptitiously to destabilize the civil governments if the latter does not play to the whims of the former. The relations between the two power-centres embittered during the period 2013-2018 and it is generally believed that such tensions led to events like the dharna (sit - in) by the PTI/PAT, Tehreek-i-Labbayak protests/sit-ins and the disputed election results of 2018. Right or wrong, but there is an impression that military has generally tried to transgress its limits and meddled in the affairs of the civil administration in order to punish the 'corrupt civilians' for their corrupt practices. The relationship of civilian and military leadership in this article discusses specifically the instances which created tussles between both the leadership during the 2013-2018 periods. Again, the civilian leadership is facing the charges of corruption and since the matter is subjudice, this paper constraints from considering these politicians corrupt or innocent but the main argument of the paper is that whether it is direct or indirect military interference the main allegation against the politicians is corruption. Therefore, this paper will try to find the answer to the following queries: what is the conduct of the civil governments how the civilians irritate the military and other institutions why the military takes interest into the civilian matters and why military needs to policing the civil governments and what factors caused the downfall of Mian Nawaz Sharif government. The underlying hypothesis of the study is that the theory of separation of power is not fully implemented in Pakistan which has been causing institutional clash and powerful institutions overpower the weaker and in case of Pakistan's parliament is the weakest institution. However, this paper will like to recommend to go for the basics of democracy 'Separation of power' to ensure continuation and consolidation of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we will present the linguistic perspective about learning foreign languages, and will be structured in two parts: the first part will explain the distinction made by E. Coşeriu between two important aspects of languages, and the second part will approach the linguistic theories in teaching foreign languages. In teaching the Romanian language as a foreign language, it is important to take account, firstly, of the distinction between the sistem and normă by Eugeniu Coşeriu. This is an essential element for understanding and exemplifying the learning/teaching process of Romania as a foreign language. The language has multiple possibilities to form plural, for example, but the grammar only accepts one of those possibilities. The confusions between the right form and the wrong one are explained by this distinction made by E. Coşeriu. In the second part of this article, we will discuss the theories offered by Coşeriu in teaching languages that are directed towards a teaching using a language that both student and teacher speak, avoiding the direct method. We will discuss E. Cassirer's theory, because both theoretical visions develop and capitalizes in different ways the Humboldt's understanding of language as creative activity, not just an instrument that humans use to communicate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fox, Dov, I Birth Rights and Wrongs: How Medicine and Technology Are Remaking Reproduction and the Law i (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), ISBN 9780190675721, 248 pp. Fox guides the reader through his analysis of cases and responses of courts across America. [Extracted from the article]

Since 2014 the (relatively) calm waters of the EU's trade policy have been roiled by wide-spread popular opposition to the EU's trade negotiations with the United States and Canada and the apparent spread of anti-globalization populism. The Commission's 'balanced and progressive' trade strategy is a response to these developments. This article assesses whether the response is adequate. It concludes that the strategy is unlikely to address the identified problem, because it largely reflects continuity with past practices that did not prevent or resolve the politicization of trade policy. It also concludes that the Commission's assessment of the politicization of trade policy is exaggerated. Thus, two wrongs may have produced the 'right' policy, at least in the narrow sense that EU trade policy is unlikely to be as politically fraught in future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The brain's performance monitoring system monitors ongoing actions and signals the need for cognitive control to optimize behavior under uncertainty. In the lab, performance monitoring has been studied using the flanker task, wherein a single optimal behavior exists. However, in the real world, the majority of performance monitoring occurs in contexts where there is not a single best option, and these uncertain contexts may be especially aversive for some individuals. To that end, the present study sought to examine performance monitoring in the context of certain and uncertain responses in 62 adults. Specifically, we modified the flanker task such that, in addition to arrows pointing left or right, we explicitly instructed participants that they would have to respond to some stimuli for which there would be no right or wrong responses (i.e., ambiguous trials). Neural indices of performance monitoring were examined in both the temporal (error-related negativity (ERN), correct-response negativity (CRN), and stimulus-locked N2) and spectral domains (theta and delta power). Associations between intolerance of uncertainty (IU) and performance monitoring were also assessed. Ambiguous trials elicited a relative negativity in the event-related potential waveform that was smaller than both the ERN and CRN. However, these ambiguous trials elicited increases in both theta and delta power relative to correct responses. Increased inhibitory IU was uniquely associated with diminished performance monitoring on ambiguous trials. These findings indicate ongoing performance monitoring and execution of cognitive control under conditions where the accuracy of our actions is neither known nor important. • Uncertainty about optimal behavior engages performance monitoring and control. • These conditions elicit increases in time-domain neural activity. • These conditions also elicit increases in both theta and delta frequency activity. • Performance monitoring engagement is associated with intolerance of uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study focuses on José Manuel Caballero Bonald's poetic work entitled Entreguerras in which the biographical experiences merge into the linguistic ones. The poetry characterized by elements of antithesis and negativity presents a self-criticism based on oppositions and a poetic word against itself. Moreover, it is an anti-biography in which an ensemble of places in the memory becomes imaginary and textual no-places. It is not the past which builds the selfwriting and memory. Rather, it is the poetic duration, which implies the saying-now, that impulses the poet to create and progress along with the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people have invested resources into an endeavor, they typically persist in it, even when it becomes obvious that it will fail. Here we show this bias extends to people's moral decision-making. Across two preregistered experiments (N = 1592) we show that people are more willing to proceed with a futile, immoral action when costs have been sunk (Experiment 1A and 1B). Moreover, we show that sunk costs distort people's perception of morality by increasing how acceptable they find actions that have received past investment (Experiment 2). We find these results in contexts where continuing would lead to no obvious benefit and only further harm. We also find initial evidence that the bias has a larger impact on judgment in immoral compared to non-moral contexts. Our findings illustrate a novel way that the past can affect moral judgment. Implications for rational moral judgment and models of moral cognition are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Doing the right thing at school involves moral reasoning about right and wrong that interplays with a sense of responsibility as children move towards being active citizens. In the current study, we investigated how 124 Australian children's understanding and reasoning about doing the right thing changed over the early years of primary school (age 5–6 years through to age 7–8 years). This study included children's ideas about how they knew what was right and wrong and how they worked out for themselves what was right and wrong at school. The main finding suggests that children did not believe they were engaged in personal decision-making or reflections about what was right and wrong at school as they progressed through Year 1 to Year 3. Instead of developing autonomy and personal decision-making, children came to rely more on external authorities for knowledge. The implications from these findings point to the need to support children to become active citizens through participatory pedagogies and a focus on democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work studies the success probability of key recovery attacks based on using a single linear approximation. Previous works had analysed success probability under different hypotheses on the distributions of correlations for the right and wrong key choices. This work puts forward a unifying framework of general key randomisation hypotheses. All previously used key randomisation hypotheses as also zero correlation attacks can be seen as special cases of the general framework. Derivations of expressions for the success probability are carried out under both the settings of the plaintexts being sampled with and without replacements. Compared to previous analysis, we uncover several new cases which have not been considered in the literature. For most of the cases which have been considered earlier, we provide complete expressions for the respective success probabilities. Finally, the full picture of the dependence of the success probability on the data complexity is revealed. Compared to the extant literature, our work provides a deeper and more thorough understanding of the success probability of single linear cryptanalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many researchers in moral psychology approach the topic of moral judgment in terms of value—assessing outcomes of behaviors as either harmful or helpful, which makes the behaviors wrong or right, respectively. However, recent advances in motivation science suggest that other motives may be at work as well—namely truth (wanting to establish what is real) and control (wanting to manage what happens). In this review, we argue that the epistemic experiences of observers of (im)moral behaviors, and the perceived epistemic experiences of those observed, serve as a groundwork for understanding how truth and control motives are implicated in the moral judgment process. We also discuss relations between this framework and recent work from across the field of moral psychology, as well as implications for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

History becomes a blur when recounted, written or discussed long after events have occurred. Governments, publishing houses and other media promote multimodal texts according to their political, religious or other doctrinal dispositions and objectives. As such, to most minds, both young and old alike, abstract entities such as truth and falsehood, or right and wrong, become a matter of interpretation based on the selected representation of facts, and/or their personal exposure to indoctrination. In their attempts to present a judicious account of history, partisan or indeed neutral writers conduct their research on the basis of the available versions of information and then abandon the recipients of the same to discern the truth for themselves. However, this approach does not necessarily facilitate knowledge acquisition or the growth of humanity in general. This is because rampant confusions typically remain due to a persistent lack of application of the principles of neutrality, logic and justice surrounding the interpretation of events on the part of the lazy or ill-informed reader. Therefore, it seems that as misperceptions linger or increase, often leading to bitter and enduring conflicts, there is an ever-compelling need to discuss incidents based on universal values of humanity, and accepted principles of reason and simple logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes God's freedom, divine foreknowledge and the arbitrary use of power and its relation to values and justice from the perspective of Scottish Catholic priest Duns Scotus. Topics discussed are relations between God's omniscience and omnipotence and His foreknowledge of the future, difference of freedom of God from freedom of man, distinction between a rightful act according to the ordained being and the power to act absolutely.