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This paper evaluates the efficiency of the Japanese fiscal authority’s revenue projections from 1960 to 2020 using real-time data. Revenue projections are not efficient, primarily due to the conditioning projections of output growth. By adjusting the forecasts based on the results of real-time forecast evaluations, this paper finds that the out-of-sample accuracy of the one-year-ahead projections could be significantly improved by a magnitude of up to 10 percent in root mean squared errors. The analysis of the disaggregated series suggests that corporate tax projections are the least efficient. The fiscal authority’s loss function is estimated to be asymmetric, making the underprediction of revenues more common., the Taiwanese Ministry of Science and Technology’s grant (110-2410-H-004-183)

Vietnam, a one-party socialist state dominated by the Communist Party of Vietnam, has in recent years moved towards a pragmatic growth-oriented approach to economic policy. Early reform measures in 1986 with the doi moi, or new way, introduced a series of market-oriented reforms in industry and trade, as well as agriculture. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 hastened the pace of reform, as the authorities intensified monetary, banking, and structural reforms and set the stage for substantial trade and investment liberalization, and as Vietnam's arrears with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were settled in 1993. Key lessons that emerge from the Vietnam study include: a) the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) process is strengthened through rigorous analytic underpinnings (for example, Vietnam development reports, public expenditure reviews, and other analytical and advisory services) that provide a shared vision of the development agenda and a menu of policy actions linked to the thematic pillars of the poverty reduction strategy; b) even in a context of high government commitment, fostering a connection to an external anchor (such as world trade organization accession) can help maintain momentum in the PRSC process and reform generally; c) PRSCs can function as an effective complement to, and catalyst for, sector operations including the development of sector-wide approaches and sector budget support; and d) with large numbers of international and government participants, it becomes increasingly important for both Government and the Bank that responsibilities for coordinating inputs and consultation and maintaining a policy overview be closely linked, defined, and adequately funded.

The level of revenues pocketed by a government during the fiscal year often deviates from that projected by this government in its budget. Despite a flourishing literature on, for example, the technical or procedural determinants of such forecast errors, little is yet known about how political stratagems may affect forecast errors. In the present paper, we analyse whether differences in the level of government fragmentation are useful in explaining local government tax revenue forecast errors – controlling for various other factors. Using data on 242 Flemish municipalities for the period 1992-2002, we find that two-party governments are more optimistic than single-party governments. In contrast to our initial expectations, governments with at least three parties are significantly more careful (or less optimistic) in their revenue projections than single- or twoparty governments. Die Einnahmen einer Regierung während eines Steuerjahres weichen oft von den vorherigen Budgetkalkulationen dieser Regierung ab. Diese Prognosefehler sind zwar schon bezüglich ihres technischen und institutionellen Kontextes empirisch erforscht worden, allerdings fehlt es bisher an Kenntnissen, was den Effekt politischer Variablen betrifft. In der vorliegenden Veröffentlichung wird untersucht, ob die politische Fragmentierung der lokalen Regierungen einen wichtigen Faktor zur Erklärung von Prognosefehlern darstellt, dabei immer kontrollierend für verschiedene andere Elemente. Unsere empirische Analyse von 242 der 308 flämischen Gemeinden im Zeitraum 1992-2002 zeigt erstens, dass Regierungen mit zwei Parteien eher optimistisch ihr Budget planen. Sie setzen mehr Einnahmen voraus, als sie während des Steuerjahres bekommen. Im Gegensatz zu unserer Hypothese zeigt die Analyse aber auch, dass ab 3 Parteien in einer Regierung die Überschätzung der Einnahmen geringer wird.