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We consider a manufacturer and an e-platform where the manufacturer sells products through offline and e-platform channels under the cap-and-trade scheme. The interaction between the two channels produces the cross-channel effect (CCE). This manufacturer cooperates with the e-platform in the agency or reseller mode. In addition, the platform shares its observed data with the manufacturer and the blockchain can achieve traceability and high transparency of these data. We formulate a Stackelberg game to derive the following results: In the agency mode, the optimal service level is independent of (decreases with) CCE without (with) blockchain. CCE positively affects the optimal service level in the reseller mode and the optimal service level has no impact on (increases with) the cap in the agency (reseller) mode. Second, when the platform-enabled power is high (low), the platform is (not) willing to adopt blockchain. Third, coordination of the manufacturer and platform only can be achieved in the agency mode when CCE is low with blockchain. The reseller mode can (cannot) achieve coordination of the two firms with (without) blockchain. We also consider the cases where the manufacturer serves as the leader and the omni-channel strategy is adopted to check the robustness of the coordination results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The promotion of reuse and resale has been receiving extensive attention worldwide for the sake of sustainability. The current research provides insights into this area and identifies a "reuse and resale cycle," whereby consumers are more willing to resell products they originally obtained second hand, compared to products they obtained brand new. One potential mechanism that accounts for this effect is the relatively weak connection consumers form with the second-hand items they own. Six studies confirmed this effect across various product categories. Study 1 tracked consumers' actual resale of the possessions they owned in real life. Subsequent studies provided further empirical evidence for the proposed effect, uncovered the underlying mechanism concerning the strength of the connection with the product, and showed that the effect diminished among consumers who chronically have a high tendency to link themselves with their possessions. This research advances the understanding of resale behaviors. It has implications for consumers to avoid retaining excessive possessions and for the second-hand market to develop in a healthy manner, eventually contributing to society's sustainability in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we consider fixed time delays in auctions with resale. The time delay may impact the bidders' valuations of the object. In particular, the auction's winner may obtain some value by depleting the object, either by consuming it or exploiting it, over the interim period and the loser may lose some value by virtue of the object being depleted by the winner. Our main result is that fixed time delays lead to asymmetric bid distributions. For a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Umsatzsteuer-Rundschau is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The South African Copyright Amendment Bill (CAB) was passed by parliament on 29 February 2024. From the formal commencement of the legislative process for the enactment of the CAB, by way of its introduction to parliament in 2017 to its eventual passage and afterwards, there has been very serious debate about whether or not the CAB will live up to the objectives it is formulated to achieve. The debate has mainly been centred around the limitations and exceptions the CAB seeks to introduce into the copyright regime in South Africa. This debate has the effect of blurring other key proposals in the CAB that are geared towards ensuring and promoting fair remuneration for creators and performers in South Africa's creative industries. Building on previous work and based on desk research, this report undertakes an in-depth analysis of key clauses in the CAB relating to equitable remuneration and fair royalty, reversionary right, licensing of orphan works, artist resale royalty and regulation of collective management organisations (CMOs) in order to illuminate and ignite debate on the CAB's proposals aimed at ensuring fair remuneration for South African creators and performers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine how monitoring influences reseller slackness. We try to answer the following: (1) How do monitoring (behavior monitoring and output monitoring affect reseller slackness? (2) What is the mechanism by which monitoring affects reseller slackness? Methodology/approach: The study proposed a theoretical framework using behavior monitoring, output monitoring, and channel conflict as the antecedents, as well as reseller slackness as a consequence. To validate the model, we collected data from resellers across multiple industries in China and analyzed data from 222 valid responses using multiple regression methods. Findings: Supplier behavior monitoring decreases reseller slackness, whereas supplier output monitoring increases it. In addition, channel conflict mediates the impact of monitoring on reseller slackness. Research implications: Based on the expectation that the partnership will grow in the long term, both partners should minimize channel conflict, and resellers need to curb their slack behavior. While output monitoring can give resellers more freedom to make decisions, this study shows that output monitoring can exacerbate inter-firm conflict and promote reseller slackness. Therefore, managers should be cautious about using output monitoring strategies for reseller slackness management. Practical implications: Our findings suggest that behavior monitoring can mitigate channel conflict and reduce reseller slackness. However, output monitoring can facilitate channel conflict, promoting reseller slackness. As a result of these findings, suppliers can better manage reseller slackness by understanding the effects of different types of monitoring. Originality/value: This study makes two contributions to existing literature. Firstly, it empirically examines the role of behavior and output monitoring on reseller slackness, thus enriching the existing literature on reseller slackness. Secondly, it further clarifies the specific pathways through which monitoring affects reseller slackness and lays the foundation for future research on managing it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Computer und Recht is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Customers frequently gravitate toward unique products, and firms increasingly utilize mass customization strategies allowing customers to self-customize products according to their unique preferences. While existing research shows that customers are willing to pay extra for this uniqueness, the present investigation points to a potential cost of self-customization that has been largely overlooked thus far. Specifically, the authors argue that what creates value for the individual consumer-designer (i.e., the original customer of the self-customized product) might conversely be detrimental to potential customers on the secondhand market, particularly in the context of aesthetic (vs. functional) customization. Results of three distinct data sets (including an analysis of more than 500,000 preowned car sales listings) support this uniqueness-hurts-resale hypothesis and provide a series of more nuanced findings. Consistent with the theorizing and empirical studies, three follow-up experiments show that although consumer-designers' valuations are positively affected by uniqueness, uniqueness indeed negatively affects secondhand-market customers' willingness to pay. This is because the more unique a given configuration is to a given consumer-designer, the lower the likelihood that said design will meet secondhand-market customers' taste preferences. The findings point to a tension between maximizing utility at first purchase and minimizing the related cost of aesthetic customization at resale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In e‐commerce, online intermediaries give suppliers ready access to consumers and have thereby become an important distribution channel. They can operate as resellers (under a reselling contract) or marketplaces (under an agency contract) for suppliers. This study analyzes the most effective contract arrangement between an online intermediary and two competing suppliers. The suppliers receive online reviews of their products and also be affected by the spillover effect of the intermediary's channel on their own direct sales channels. The intermediary can offer a reselling contract to one supplier and an agency contract to the other or offer the same contract type to both suppliers. We find that when the cross‐channel spillover is positive or only moderately negative, the intermediary offers different contract types if the difference in the review ratings of the two suppliers' products is considerable; otherwise, a reselling contract is offered to both. However, when the cross‐channel spillover is highly negative, the intermediary may offer an agency contract to both suppliers. Our research provides practical guidance for intermediaries on the most effective contract strategies to use when collaborating with suppliers who receive varied online reviews, depending on the cross‐channel spillover scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumer-to-consumer resale platforms (CRPs) facilitate redistribution of used products. After getting rid of their used items, consumers may repurchase new items from the retailer, obtaining an additional utility due to their dependence on the retailer's products. The retailer can capitalize on this behavior by embracing CRPs to encourage repeat purchases and drive revenue. This article constructs a two-period analytical model of an e-commerce marketplace comprising a retailer (new-product market) and a CRP (used-product market), to examine the implications of CRPs for the retailer and forward-looking consumers. Consumers are heterogeneous in two aspects: utility dependence from repeat purchases and perception of used-product quality levels. Our findings show that utility dependence mitigates the direct competition posed by the CRPs to the retailer. The retailer leverages consumer heterogeneity to exacerbate intertemporal price discrimination, generating enhancement and cannibalization effects on revenue. The enhancement effect dominates to increase the retailer's revenue, except when new-product consumption yields a high value to consumers and the CRP's commission rate is high. Counterintuitively, consumers and the retailer can be better off or worse off simultaneously. Coupled with the CRP's revenue reaped from used-product transactions, social welfare is likely to improve with the addition of this entity. Moreover, the retailer can be better off as an external CRP sets the commission rate to maximize its own revenue, while it can further benefit from self-managing a CRP when the marginal operating cost is low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The endowment effect is a behavioral bias; postulating people demand more to part with an object they own than they would offer to acquire the same object owned by others. Recent experimental research, however, suggests that this effect applies to consumption goods rather than exchange goods. Given that housing is a mix of consumption and exchange goods, it presents a unique opportunity to examine whether the effect exists in the real world through a quasi-experiment. Based on a policy change that relaxed the resale constraints of shared ownership housing in Hong Kong, we found that more constrained homeowners were more likely to sell their homes compared to those with fewer constraints when granted the right to exchange, all other factors affecting liquidity being held constant. This marks the first field study revealing that the endowment effect diminishes when a good enhances its exchange nature, such as being given an exchange right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document provides a summary of a court case in France involving the unauthorized resale of Chanel products. The court ruled that distributing free samples of the products does not give permission to sell them, and the trademark owner's rights are not exhausted. The court also determined that selling cosmetic products without their original packaging damages their condition and allows the trademark owner to oppose further marketing. The defendant's actions were classified as parasitic, as they involved comparing prices and inviting customers to test the products at the plaintiff's authorized retailer before purchasing them at a lower price from the defendant's shop. The appeal court upheld these rulings, dismissing the appeal and ordering the defendant to pay the costs. [Extracted from the article]

Consider a single-unit auction with resale and two risk neutral bidders. The ranking of the valuations is known to both the bidders—that is, the bidders know the identity of the highest and lowest valuation bidders. We show that, when the value-rankings are revealed, the classic result of "bid symmetrization" does not hold. Surprisingly, the bidder with the lowest valuation produces a stronger bid distribution than the bidder with the highest valuation. We also show that the revelation of value-rankings in auctions with resale asymmetrizes the bidding strategies. Finally, for a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Students often find kidney function confusing and somewhat counterintuitive, yet existing lab demonstrations often incompletely explain the process (e.g., by misrepresenting the role of filtration). I show how three easy exercises can be combined to demonstrate water recovery and reuptake of ions, as well as ultrafiltration. Materials are generally inexpensive, available through online resellers, and many are recoverable after lab. I then discuss extensions and limitations to this model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sneaker industry is continuing to expand at a fast rate and will be worth over USD 120 billion in the next few years. This is, in part due to social media and online retailers building hype around releases of limited-edition sneakers, which are usually collaborations between well-known global icons and footwear companies. These limited-edition sneakers are typically released in low quantities using an online raffle system, meaning only a few people can get their hands on them. As expected, this causes their value to skyrocket and has created an extremely lucrative resale market for sneakers. This has given rise to numerous counterfeit sneakers flooding the resale market, resulting in online platforms having to hand-verify a sneaker's authenticity, which is an important but time-consuming procedure that slows the selling and buying process. To speed up the authentication process, Support Vector Machines and a convolutional neural network were used to classify images of fake and real sneakers and then their accuracies were compared to see which performed better. The results showed that the CNNs performed much better at this task than the SVMs with some accuracies over 95%. Therefore, a CNN is well equipped to be a sneaker authenticator and will be of great benefit to the reselling industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Umsatzsteuer-Rundschau is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We examine the impact of a cycle path on the trading of a copyable information good in a network experimentally. A cycle path in a network allows a buyer to become a reseller who can compete against existing sellers by replicating the good. A theoretical prediction considers that the price of the information good, even with the first transaction where there is not yet a reseller competing with the original seller, will be lower in networks with a cycle path than otherwise. However, our experiment reveals that the observed price for the first transaction is significantly higher in networks with a cycle path. An additional experiment that enhances competition also does not support the theoretical prediction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Umsatzsteuer-Rundschau is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A manufacturer selling its products via an offline channel and a capital‐constrained platform is considered in our work. The agency or reseller mode is operated by the platform. Affected by the delivery time, the offline demand is affected by the online channel, which is called the cross‐channel spillover effect (CCSE). Building game models for analysis, we derive the following major results: First, how the commission rate affects the optimal production quantity depends on CCSE. CCSE has no impact on (decreases) the platform's optimal delivery time in the agency (reseller) mode. Besides, the platform's optimal profit decreases with a positive CCSE but increases with a negative CCSE in the agency mode. But in the reseller mode, it always increases with CCSE. Second, the financial constraint decreases the optimal production quantity and extends the optimal delivery time. Third, the agency mode always leads to a larger market share and longer delivery time than the reseller mode. The manufacturer should choose the reseller mode (agency mode) under a high (low) slotting fee. Last, the manufacturer and platform cannot realize coordination by using only the agency or reseller mode. However, considering the manufacturer‐led Stackelberg game, the reseller mode can do so, while the agency mode cannot. Further, considering a retailer and a third party under the omnichannel strategy, the reseller mode can always coordinate them, and the agency mode can only do so at a low interest rate of the loan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Realidad Economica is the property of Realidad Economica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With escalating environmental concerns worldwide, the shift towards second-hand car markets has emerged as an eco-friendly alternative to reduce the carbon footprint associated with manufacturing new vehicles. However, the lack of accurate and efficient price prediction mechanisms may impede the growth and efficiency of these markets. This study, focusing on the Turkish second-hand car market, contributes towards addressing this gap by introducing a unique, comprehensive dataset gathered from various online markets across Turkey, thereby offering a broad spectrum of data pertaining to different vehicle types, specifications, and resale conditions. The study employs both classical machine learning methods, specifically decision trees, and deep learning models to predict used car prices. This comparative analysis aims to assess the potential of these methods in improving the predictability and transparency of resale price determination. Despite the superior performance of decision tree models, the study found that deep learning techniques achieved comparable results, indicating their potential for further optimization and enhancement. The accurate prediction of resale prices could streamline the operations of second-hand car markets, increasing their appeal to potential buyers and sellers. This could also contribute to environmental sustainability by significantly reducing the demand for new cars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Manufacturers and their resellers generally employ online intermediaries to sell their products. These intermediaries often possess superior demand information and decide whether to share it with their sellers. In practice, the manufacturers can employ two possible selling formats: reselling (R S), under which they sell the products to the intermediaries who subsequently resell to customers and agency selling (A S), under which they sell the products to customers through the intermediaries by paying a proportional fee. Additionally, the manufacturers can also sell the products to their resellers who subsequently resell to customers through the intermediaries. We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate an e-commerce supply chain in which an online intermediary first decides whether to disclose information option to a manufacturer and/or reseller; thereafter, the manufacturer selects between the R S or A S format. Regardless of the information-sharing decision made by the intermediary, the manufacturer's selling format selection remains qualitatively unchanged. However, the intermediary can compel the manufacturer to change his selling format by sharing information with only the manufacturer or reseller in certain market environments. When the intensity is small but the proportional fee is intermediate, the intermediary should share information with only the manufacturer to compel him to change his selling format choice from A S to R S. When both the intensity and fee are intermediate, the intermediary should share information exclusively with the manufacturer (or reseller) to prompt a change in the manufacturer's selling format, switching from R S to A S (or from A S to R S), contingent upon whether the magnitude of demand fluctuation is small or large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the common inclusion of resale restrictions in contemporary art contracts, particularly for emerging artists, to prevent speculation-driven resales. It mentions while some believe these clauses may be invalid or unenforceable under English law, the author challenges this consensus, providing reasons for a different interpretation.

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A resale value guaranteed (RVG) strategy has emerged as a novel way to alleviate EV purchasers' resale anxiety. However, certain questions, such as when to initiate a RVG strategy and whether to share information with supply chain partners, are unanswered. In this study, we aim to investigate the impacts of a RVG strategy and reliability of a RVG decision on EV adoption and supply chain performance. We develop analytical models to analyze the optimal RVG strategy in asymmetric versus symmetric information situations, using the traditional business model as a benchmark. The results indicate that a RVG strategy can be an effective way to increase supply chain profits for products that are subject to a degree of resale anxiety, trade-in cost, and the reliability of the manufacturer's commitments. Incentives provided by one party to the other can be utilized to encourage information sharing. However, information sharing does not necessarily lead to higher sales volume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The artist’s resale right has been recognized by countries around the world in an effort to protect artists. However, despite having one of the largest art markets in the world, China has not yet established the resale right. During the last revision of the Copyright Law, although the resale right was introduced in a draft amendment, this legislative attempt ultimately failed. Considering China’s important position in the world art market, there is still controversy surrounding the question of whether China needs to introduce this right. Tracing back the causes for China’s legislative failure, it can be seen that the main reason is that China misunderstood the rationale for the legitimacy of the resale right. According to the ‘balance among authors’ theory and considering the need to protect the interests of artists, China should introduce this right. Moreover, since China already has a strict regulatory mechanism for the art market, the country meets the conditions for the successful implementation of the resale right, which means that it can be introduced relatively easily in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resale platforms such as Swappa and ThredUP, which provide a channel for product‐holders to sell used products, have become common. Interestingly, in the presence of resale platforms, some firms, such as Apple, set lower rebates for the trade‐in‐for‐upgrade (TU) mode instead of implementing the trade‐in‐for‐upgrade‐and‐cash (TUC) mode as Huawei does. In this paper, we build game‐theoretical models to explore how a firm should adjust its trade‐in strategy (e.g., choose pricing and mode selection between TU and TUC) in reaction to the emergence of third‐party resale platforms. We derive several insights. First, we find that using the TU mode helps to encourage consumer repurchases, whereas the TUC mode may have a greater promotion effect on consumers' first purchases. Second, we show that in the TUC mode, the amount of the trade‐in rebate is not affected by the presence of the resale platform. Differently, in the TU mode, whether the firm should provide a more generous trade‐in rebate depends on the unit product cost when the resale platform is present. Third, in response to the resale platform, the firm should choose the TU mode to take advantage of the platform's promotion effect if the unit product cost is high and choose the TUC mode to avoid the platform's cannibalization effect if the unit product cost is low. To verify the robustness of our findings, we consider the effects of reduced consumer uncertainty and the dynamic pricing mechanism in the extended models. Our main findings concerning trade‐in rebate and mode selection remain valid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of relationship digitization benefits on reseller profit. The authors hypothesized two pathways by which the digitization benefits improve reseller profitability: direct and indirect. The direct pathway is via enhancing the reseller's digital resources and capabilities and the indirect pathway is by improving the relationship with a focal manufacturer by reducing inequity and enhancing interorganizational trust. Design/methodology/approach: The authors use the survey methodology to attempt to understand the interorganizational dynamics of digitization. The authors survey more than 200 resellers in the computer and computer components industry. Findings: Overall, the pattern of results generally supports the framework for direct and indirect effects of digitization benefits on the bottom line of the reseller, as well as the idea of examining the benefits structure components of benefit magnitude and benefit asymmetry. Sales benefit magnitude improves reseller profit directly, as enhanced digital resources result in a more efficient and effective reseller salesforce. The indirect effects flow through to profitability via inequity and trust. Originality/value: The authors are not aware of any prior research that uses the asymmetry and magnitude framework to approach the digitization phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effects of resale on bidders' entry decisions, social welfare, and seller's expected revenue in a second‐price auction with two‐dimensional private information on values and participation costs. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. We show that when resale is allowed, the low‐cost bidders become more aggressive on entry, while the high‐cost bidders are less likely to enter. Furthermore, our analysis also suggests resale allowance can increase the social welfare under a sufficient condition, which depends on the magnitude of bargaining power, and its effect on expected revenue is ambiguous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Brazilian Review of Economics & Agribusiness / Revista de Economia e Agronegócio is the property of Brazilian Review of Economics & Agribusiness / Revista de Economia e Agronegocio and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines how people price the resale of durable goods in systematically biased ways. We show across four studies that the anchoring effect of durable goods' prior sales prices on subsequent valuations is discontinuous at psychologically salient round number reference points (e.g., $10,000 increments) because these numbers create qualitative differences in how people perceive values below them versus values at/above them. Resellers set disproportionately larger subsequent prices when previous prices move from just below round number thresholds (e.g., $349,000) to those at or just above these thresholds (e.g., $351,000). The findings show that buyers who pay a price just below a round number, therefore, may sacrifice money because they receive disproportionately less when reselling the good. Market forces only partially attenuate this pricing bias, but valuator experience seems to play a moderating role. Archival data show that home buyers who previously paid just under a $10,000 reference point subsequently listed their homes for about 1.8% (over $3,700) less on average than did buyers selling comparable homes who previously paid at or above a round number threshold. This drop is observable controlling for home characteristics and the general relationship between previous and current prices. Three experimental studies looking at housing and used car markets replicate these findings, highlight the mechanism, and increase confidence in causality. Market mechanisms and the negotiation process attenuate discontinuities by about 30%, but lower initial listing prices persist to final sales prices. We find additional weak evidence suggesting that valuator experience may attenuate intergenerational pricing bias. Conflict of Interest: This manuscript was submitted, revised, and accepted prior to the nomination and appointment of Lamar Pierce as Editor-in-Chief. Funding: This project was supported by the University of Southern California Marshall School of Business Behavioral Laboratory. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1632. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the interpretation of European Union (EU) tax laws concerning taxation of art objects acquired through intra-community transactions by a taxable reseller. Topics discussed include applicability of value-added tax (VAT) on the acquisition of art objects; determination of the tax base for transactions; and implications of EU tax directives. It mentions European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that VAT paid by a taxable reseller on intra-community acquisition of an art object.

Nowadays, many countries and governments implement the cap-and-trade regulation to curb carbon emissions. This study aims to explore how the regulation affects an e-tailer's choice of retailing formats between marketplace and reseller as well as its partner's response by considering a supply chain composed of an e-tailer and a manufacturer. We also take the manufacturer's investment strategy into account and then develop four models to examine the two members' preferences for retailing formats. First, our results demonstrate that if a product's emissions in the retail process are medium (low) or the platform fee rate is relatively low (high), the e-tailer and the manufacturer both prefer marketplace (reseller) mode. Second, the e-tailer prefers to offer reseller mode for one manufacturer with a strong ability of emission reduction and offer marketplace mode otherwise; but the manufacturer's preference is opposed to the e-tailer's. Third, the manufacturer always benefits from her investment, regardless of in marketplace or reseller modes; the e-tailer's attitude towards the manufacturer's investment varies with retailing formats. Specifically, the e-tailer under reseller mode always prefers the manufacturer to invest; but under marketplace mode, he prefers the manufacturer to invest only when the latter's ability of emission reduction is weak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumers can buy concert tickets from primary platforms (e.g., Ticketmaster) or from consumer-to-consumer resale platforms (e.g., StubHub). Recently, Ticketmaster has entered and been trying to control the resale market by prohibiting consumers from reselling on competing resale platforms. Several states in the United States have passed or are discussing laws requiring tickets to be transferrable on any resale sites, worrying that platform integration—Ticketmaster controlling both the primary and the resale platforms—will increase ticket service fees and harm musicians and consumers. This article establishes a game-theoretic framework and shows that the opposite can happen: platform integration can lower the service fees in both markets, alleviating double marginalization in the primary market and benefiting the musician and consumers. Moreover, with platform integration, the presence of a small number of scalpers can counterintuitively reduce the ticket price and benefit the musicians and consumers. In addition, platform competition in the resale market may harm consumers. This article further shows that these insights apply in other markets (e.g. used goods, peer-to-peer product-sharing markets) and provides suggestive empirical support for the theoretical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The paper aims to clarify the effects of brand differentiation on the platform's formulation of channel strategy and help the online platform formulate the optimal channel strategy, which involves selecting a proper selling mode for each brand. Design/methodology/approach: The paper develops a multistage game model consisting of one online platform and two competing manufacturers with differentiated brands and examines the effects of brand differentiation on these three channel members' profits under each candidate channel strategy. Findings: The results show that the platform prefers to offer the reselling mode for both brands when the brand differentiation is low, and this preference will be enhanced by the decrease in order fulfilment cost. By contrast, when the brand differentiation is high, it will offer the reselling mode for the premium brand but the marketplace service for the economy brand if the order fulfilment cost is not high; or the marketplace mode will be offered to both brands if this cost is high. Research limitations/implications: This study assumes that the order fulfilment costs of platform and manufacturer are fixed and symmetric. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to consider asymmetric costs of order fulfilment. Practical implications: The paper guides the online platform to formulate the optimal channel strategy for differentiated brands and provides managerial insights for differentiated brands entering online markets. Originality/value: This paper explores platforms' optimal channel strategy by jointly considering the effects of brand differentiation and investigates the impacts of brand differentiation on the optimal decision making under four candidate options. Moreover, this paper has been extended to examine the case when the manufacturers' production costs cannot be neglected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Data trading is important for optimizing the allocation of data elements. However, data can be easily copied, disseminated, or resold, leading to disorderly development in the data trading market, and raising the issue of data governance. Data trading involves various participants, while existing research lacks an understanding of participant interactions and strategy adoption, as well as determination of optimal strategies for the participants. To address these gaps and provide insights for the governance of data trading platforms, this paper proposes an evolutionary game model for the governance of data trading involving three parties: data suppliers, demanders, and trading platforms. Our findings reveal that data trading platforms choosing to govern, data suppliers choosing to innovate positively, and data demanders choosing not to resell can be achieved under certain conditions. We also find that an increase in the price of data trading or the number of transactions can weaken the effectiveness of platform governance and make data trading more difficult to govern. Additionally, the incentives for data innovation provided by the trading platform can significantly promote data suppliers to innovate data positively. However, when these incentives are too high, the platform may weaken its level of governance or even move towards non-governance. Increasing penalties for data resale weakens data demanders' motivation to resell data, and a higher probability of data resale being reported lowers their motivation to do so. By examining the role of different participants in data trading, the model proposes ways to improve the efficiency and robustness of the data market while better protecting the interests of data traders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prosperity of e-commerce has made more and more businesses willing to enter the e-commerce market, which has also brought a series of strategic collaboration between firms. This study considers game models with and without collaboration between the platform and the retailer. An e-commerce platform has relative logistics service sharing advantages while the retailer has relative procurement advantages. We formulated a multichannel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers to explore the feasibility of the above strategic collaboration model. We utilized the Stackelberg game and Nash game approaches to obtain equilibrium solutions under both cooperative and noncooperative scenarios. Through a further analysis, we determined the impacts of the logistics sensitivity, the cost of the unit logistics service effort, the price of shared logistics service per unit, and the price competition intensity on optimal prices, the logistics service efforts, and the profits. Moreover, the collaborative exchange of advantages between the platform and the retailer needs to consider the interests of participating manufacturers in the game. Our extension suggests all three firms should actively promote deeper collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study an online platform's demand information sharing strategy in a distribution channel where a manufacturer distributes products through both platform and seller channels. Information sharing becomes increasingly important in recent years as online platforms gather massive consumer information that is typically invisible by upstream manufacturers and competing sellers/retailers. We study an online platform's demand information sharing strategy in a distribution channel where a manufacturer distributes products through both platform and seller channels. We consider two different selling structures: the conventional reselling model (in which the platform acts as a reseller) and the agency/marketplace model (in which the platform acts as an agency). We find that for both selling formats, the platform always has incentives to share information with at least one party (either manufacturer or seller or both). The marketplace selling format gives the platform stronger incentives to share information with the seller. With low competition in the reselling model, the platform may not share information with the manufacturer, whereas it always does in the marketplace model. Interestingly, the forecasting accuracy does not structurally change optimal information sharing in the reselling model but induces the platform to share information with both the manufacturer and the retailer when it is high or low in the marketplace model. Our findings provide useful guidelines for an online platform on when and whom to share demand information with. History: Yuxin Chen served as the senior editor and Zsolt Katona served as associate editor for this article. Funding: This research was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 71971205, 72188101, 71671173, 72091210/72091215, and 71731010]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2022.1397. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing attention to non-fungible tokens (NFTs) since 2021, and many reports of remarkable returns by traders of NFTs raise the question of the actual returns in the whole NFT market. We examine the returns of NFT resales using data of 2.12 million secondary market NFT trades on Ethereum's five largest marketplaces starting in June 2017 until December 2021 at the individual transaction level and trader level and control for transaction costs by implementing a linear regression model and nonparametric tests. We find that the majority of resales are in profit and a high concentration of profits at the trader level, with the top 10% of traders accounting for the majority of profits, and we identify differences in profits for the analyzed NFT categories. Our results show that experienced investors systematically outperform inexperienced investors, indicating information inefficiency in the NFT market, while we do not find clear evidence for the underperformance of more expensive NFTs compared to less expensive ones. Additionally, we find indications of the importance of pump-and-dump schemes on the level of returns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the problem of a principal (she) designing a contract for an agent (he) to form a short-lived partnership to exploit an asset before reselling, as in asset flipping. The agent possesses higher expertise than the principal in the sense that he can form a more-accurate assessment of the resale value of the asset before negotiating the dissolution of the partnership. By dissolving the partnership through a Texas shootout with the agent as proposer, the principal can "neutralize" her partner's informational advantage and have him disclose the resale value for free. Thus, in the optimal contract, the agent's superior expertise does not distort the structure of the partnership (i.e., the allocation of shares). The partners attain a higher aggregate surplus ex-ante if the principal commits to giving the asset away to the agent upon dissolving the partnership: She earns a lower revenue but lets all types of the agent enjoy a higher surplus. Thus, at the ex-ante stage, the agent could "bribe" the principal to implement this alternative. However, the additional surplus for lower types is insufficient to compensate the principal, so this higher ex-ante aggregate surplus is unattainable at the interim stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]