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We propose a model of strategic renegotiation in which businesses are sequentially interconnected through their liabilities. This financing structure, which we refer to as a credit chain, gives rise to externalities, as each lender's willingness to provide concessions to its borrower depends on how this lender's own liabilities are expected to be renegotiated. We highlight how government interventions aimed at preventing default waves should account for private renegotiation incentives and interlinkages. In particular, we contrast the consequences of targeted subsidy and debt reduction programs following economic shocks, such as pandemics and financial crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractWarners backstage musicals of 1933 appear regularly in accounts of “pre-Code Hollywood” that highlight their apparent violations of the Production Code. Those films are often contrasted with the RKO Fred Astaire-Ginger Rogers romantic dance musicals, largely produced after the Code's supposed “enforcement” from 1934. This article argues, however, that the apparently dramatic contrast between the decade's two major cycles and their relationship to the Code is better understood as a process that Richard Maltby argues was characteristic of early 1930s Hollywood: “the more gradual, more complex and less melodramatic evolution of systems of convention in representation.” Placing the aesthetics of Warners musicals in dialogue with Production Code files and internal studio documents, this article contends that the musical's shift towards a romantic model was a pragmatic response to the Code, one that was already in progress before July 1934. Genre—if understood as an historical process rather than one essential definition or a set of monolithic subgenres—can make such aesthetic shifts and institutional renegotiations visible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is the second instalment in the series. The preceding article detailed the background, methodology and methods, while the current article delves into the study's findings and alignment with the broader literature. The study aimed to explore the research question: 'how do men perceive their engagement in the self-management of non-cancer-related lymphoedema?' Upon completing an online survey based on the validated lymphoedema quality of life tool (LYMQoL), the gathered data underwent narrative thematic analysis. Three themes emerged: Theme 1 explored the strategies men use to address the psychological impact of self-care, including physical concealment. Theme 2 focused on the use of physical control as a method for managing perceived vulnerability. Theme 3 centred on relationships within self-care. The findings shed light on the intricate nature of self-care in the context of lymphoedema and its impact on masculinity. These insights resonate with existing literature, emphasising the use of available resources driven by the perceived vulnerability men experience in their lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Simple contest schemes, which tend to use extreme contemporaneous peer benchmarking, are generally thought to be less efficient at motivating productive and cooperative effort than explicit bonus contracts that optimally weight observed own and peer outputs. We show, however, that contest schemes can outperform explicit bonus contracts in a two-period dynamic setting if periodic output is correlated over time, and contract terms can be renegotiated. In our model, all parties update their beliefs about ex ante unknown time-invariant noise upon observing first-period outputs, and second-period wage offers are updated accordingly. This creates first-period shirking incentives for the agents. We show that relative to bonus contracts, the extreme contemporaneous peer benchmarking in contest schemes can weaken or even eliminate the adverse incentives created by prior-period benchmarking, even though the available information and the learning process are the same under both schemes. This dynamic advantage allows contest schemes to outperform repeated bonus contracts for a wide range of parameter values, despite imposing higher static efficiency losses in each period. If competing agents are assigned to sufficiently similar tasks, a contest scheme's ability to sever the statistical link between periods can yield not only higher early productive effort compared with bonus contracts, but also less uncooperative behavior, despite putting the agents in a more contest-like situation. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00035. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a debt-run model to study the effects of liquidity injections on debt markets in the presence of a renegotiation option. In the model, creditors decide when to withdraw their funding and equityholders can renegotiate the contract terms of debt. We show that when equityholders have a large bargaining power, liquidity injections into distressed firms can rather cause more aggressive runs from their creditors, hurting the debt value. This outcome occurs because equityholders can strategically utilize the renegotiation option as a bankruptcy threat, pushing down the debt value below the potential liquidation value of the firm. In such a scenario, a deterred default resulting from emergency capital injections could be detrimental to creditors.

We study firms' decisions to withhold loan covenant details by focusing on a unique disclosure-related cost. Prior research documents the prevalence of tight initial covenants that are selectively relaxed in future renegotiations. This uncertainty in renegotiation outcomes can generate a disclosure-related cost because disclosing a snapshot of initial covenants with a high likelihood of violation could lead to harmful outsider reactions (e.g., trade credit cuts) to violations that may be eventually cured. We hypothesize and find that, when firms are likely to face tighter initial covenants and more renegotiations, they are more likely to withhold covenant details, particularly when under pressure from trade creditors. Our inference is robust to controlling for firms' obligation to disclose (i.e., contract materiality) and future performance. Prior research has found that the precise covenant details of many loans are not publicly available. We are the first to offer a systematic explanation related to disclosure costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2015, Greece witnessed a political earthquake with the election of the populist anti-austerity/EU bailout coalition of the left-wing party SYRIZA and the far-right party ANEL. It is argued that during January--July 2015, the SYRIZA--ANEL coalition engaged in a protracted process of renegotiation of Greece's bailout terms that were agreed between previous Greek governments and the so-called Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) adopting a behaviour ruled by "unpolitics." First, the SYRIZA--ANEL government immediately rejected formal and informal rules of EU decision-making. Second, the SYRIZA--ANEL government rejected traditional means of compromise, such as package deals and side payments. Third, when Greece's creditors presented their last-minute bailout offer in June 2015 to avoid Greece leaving the eurozone (Grexit), the SYRIZA--ANEL government rejected the suggested solution and tried to exploit the ensuing deadlock by calling a rashly organised referendum asking Greeks to vote against the suggested deal. This period of "unpolitics" ended almost immediately after the referendum when, in a sudden and unexpected volte-face, Tsipras interpreted the referendum result as a call for compromise with the Troika and accepted the previously intolerable bailout deal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the problem of voluntary participation in negotiations regarding the provision of public goods. In contrast to earlier studies, in our model, a negotiation is followed by renegotiations. First, players decide whether to participate in a negotiation, and the participants produce a public good. The participants then renegotiate the level of the public good with nonparticipants in the preceding negotiations. We show that with these renegotiation opportunities, many players may participate in providing the public good in the preceding negotiation. In some cases, all players participate in the preceding negotiation and the public good is produced efficiently. Our findings indicate that more players participate in the provision of public goods if they have strong bargaining power in the renegotiations. Hence, this problem may not be as severe as reported by previous studies. Our results may be consistent with the recent developments in voluntary projects for international river management. • We present a simple model of voluntary negotiation on providing public goods. • Players can choose whether to join a negotiation providing public goods. • There are opportunities to renegotiate the agreement of the initial negotiation. • The opportunities may induce many players to join the public good provision. • The public goods may be supplied efficiently by the participation of all players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we address the remunicipalization question from a novel perspective: by looking at "who is at the helm". Using a comprehensive panel dataset covering the complete universe of French drinking water services from 2009 to 2021, we show that the type of local governments in charge of supervising water services (inter-municipal cooperation or not) influences the decision to remunicipalize. We argue that this is because the costs of negotiating the remunicipalization of water services as well as the level of involvement in the investment and supervision of water services vary according to the type of local government. We conclude by discussing the lessons to be learned from our study concerning the future of remunicipalizations in France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal framework on amendments to Public-Private Partnership Contracts as provided by the Public-Private Partnership Law No. 18,786. To this end, within the scope of unilateral amendments, the consequences of imposing such amendments in an illegitimate manner and the possibility of unilaterally imposing a limitation of the contract's subject matter are examined. Additionally, aspects regarding bilateral amendments to Public-Private Participation Contracts and possible limitations applicable to the subject matter on which they may be based, are addressed. This paper also studies the possible consequences that non-compliance with the formal requirements established in the applicable law may have on the validity of the amendment in question. Finally, the grounds for renegotiation and, especially, the case of illegitimate unilateral amendments as an additional ground not expressly provided for in the applicable law, are analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A notary is a public official who is given the mandate to make authentic deeds, one of which is through business contracts. In practice, business contracts often experience various updates for one reason or another. As part of a notary's duties to make business contract deeds, the notary also has the responsibility to ensure that all procedures and contract clauses do not conflict with the law. This research will discuss considerations about the role of notaries in preparing business contract documents, potential sources of disputes related to the implementation of business contracts and provisions for resolving disputes related to business contract deeds. To discuss this problem, an empirical juridical approach will be used through analytical descriptive research. The research concludes that the presence of a notary takes into account the interests of the parties when drafting business contract deeds so that they can anticipate possible conflicts that may arise. The authenticity of a notarial deed becomes absolute with the commitment of the parties concerned to continue to rely on consultation and agreement in resolving disputes that may arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Children of God (now The Family International [TFI]) emerged in the countercultural moment of the 1960s on the radical fringe of the Jesus People movement and evolved into a controversial new religious movement that has generated significant scholarly research over the past 5 decades. This article will review the history of TFI, with particular focus on its latest shift to online religion, and reflect on the research published throughout its history and how this has engaged with the cycles of organizational change that have characterized the movement. The history of TFI highlights the dynamic nature of new religions, and their potential to strategically adapt and revise beliefs and practices to accommodate changing cultural contexts. Research of TFI's journey from radical communalism to virtual community offers insights into novel ways in which new religions may be disrupted and socially reconstructed in the digital information age, and the renegotiations of belief, worldview and identity this may entail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public-private partnership (PPP) renegotiations and their outcomes have been studied extensively in Latin America and Europe but not in the United States. Therefore, this study evaluates factors triggering U.S. PPP renegotiations by examining six highway PPPs located in California (2), Indiana (1), and Virginia (3). The findings suggest exogenous macroeconomic shocks, project and political complexity, and institutional inexperience are the most compelling triggers behind U.S. PPP renegotiations. These findings also highlight America's distinct political and institutional environment – i.e. favourable to buy-outs as well as debt restructuring via bankruptcy – as a possible explanation for the absence of opportunism among U.S. PPP renegotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common for suppliers to underestimate costs in procurement auctions, thereby decreasing the bid price and profit on completion of the supply, and potentially resulting in supply disruptions. We study the bidding decisions of suppliers that underestimate costs when the buyer uses first‐price or second‐price sealed‐bid procurement auctions. We study the effects of underestimating costs on the bid prices and performance decisions under different auction modes and propose renegotiations after procurement auctions to cope with supply disruptions. The results show that: (1) using first‐price or second‐price auctions, underestimating costs does not guarantee a positive profit on completion of the supply. When the winning supplier's degree of underestimation is high enough, underestimating costs may cause supply disruptions. (2) When the buyer faces supply disruptions, if the expected payment for re‐selecting another supplier is not less than a certain threshold value, the buyer can prevent supply disruptions through renegotiations after procurement auctions. (3) Compared to the situation where all suppliers' budgeted costs are accurate, underestimating costs always decreases the supplier's profit. For the buyer, when the supplier completes the supply under the original or renegotiated contract, underestimating costs can decrease the procurement costs. Finally, we show the main conclusions with numerical examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents initial findings from an interdisciplinary study on the significance of food origin for contemporary Italian consumers. Despite the prolonged crisis and over 9 million people experiencing food hardships in 2022, the labeling of food origin remains a paramount concern for Italian consumers, significantly influencing their purchasing decisions. In this era of uncertainty, the food origin label has evolved into a symbolic construct, exacerbating omnivore dilemmas within an increasingly unreliable global landscape and contributing to a renegotiation of trust in expert knowledge, eroded by the prolonged crisis. By examining the cultural narratives underlying geographical indications of food products, their impact on consumer values and meanings, and their integration into daily communication and consumption practices, this study provides insights into the emerging contradictory axiology and social dynamics guiding food-related practices during times of crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a unifying framework generalizing established theories we characterize under which conditions Joint Ownership of assets creates the best cooperation incentives in a partnership. We endogenise renegotiation costs and assume that they weakly increase with additional assets. A salient sufficient condition for optimal cooperation incentives among patient partners is if Joint Ownership is a Strict Coasian Institution for which transaction costs impede an efficient asset reallocation after a breakdown. In contrast to Halonen (2002) the logic behind our results is that Joint Ownership maximizes the value of the relationship and the costs of renegotiating ownership after a broken relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores an understudied aspect of women's transnational labour migration, namely how left-behind men negotiate the changes in their status in the domestic and public spheres when their daughters or wives migrate for work and become primary earners in the family. A case study of Syrian Christians in a village in Central Kerala with a long history of women's transnational labour migration demonstrates how left-behind men refashion their masculine identities by reasserting their role as family protectors when they lose their traditional role as family providers. The article illustrates how left-behind men employ diverse social and discursive practices in domestic and community spheres to reconstruct their gendered sense of self and resist the social stigma of failed masculinity. It also demonstrates how the Church, which continues to be a dominant institution influencing the personal and political lives of Syrian Christians, has become an arena for left-behind men to reassert their patriarchal status at home and in the community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: In the transition to college, students with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) often face difficulties. Parental support may aid in the successful adjustment to college, and a strong parent-child relationship (PCR) may optimize the balance between autonomy and support necessary during this transition. Method: Few studies have examined this; therefore, a qualitative study using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was conducted. First- and second-year college students with ADHD participated in open-ended, one-on-one interviews (N = 11; 64% women, 91% White). Results: The two broad categories of findings included Parental Support and the Renegotiation of the Parent-Child Relationship. Participants described feeling supported by their parents in the progress toward their short- and long-term goals. Students described this support as helpful when they managed or initiated the contact, but as unhelpful when the parent was perceived as over involved. They described a strong PCR in this transition as helpful to their adjustment and enjoyed the renegotiation of the PCR in terms of their own increased autonomy and responsibility. Many additional themes and sub-themes are described herein. Conclusion: Optimal levels of involvement and support from parents in the context of a strong PCR is beneficial for adjustment to college for those with ADHD. We discuss the clinical implications of our findings, such as therapists helping families transition to college, and working with college students with ADHD on an adaptive renegotiation of the PCR in their transition to adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the coordinated outcomes. The set of communication-proof equilibria is a small and relatively homogeneous subset of the set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players' beliefs and interim Pareto efficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on what might be tentatively called the "monstrous ontoepistemology of memory" in Tadeusz Kantor's Wielopole, Wielopole in reference to more general principles of the theatre of death (even though monstrosity is a problematic quality in this particular context). Through its contribution to the semiosis of life and death, Kantor's project is used as a way of thinking of memory as an undead space disconnected from any particular recollection. Instead, for Kantor, theatre explores a more ontological figure of memory, which constitutes a nonhuman/inhuman fabric of being. Inspired by Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, investigations into the monstrous and the undead make it possible to explore the renegotiations of life and death as they weaken the anthropocentric view of memory. As liminal terms, they also help this text envision the aforementioned fabric as the monstrous other to memory. The reading is supported with a posthumanist/deconstructivist framework informed by Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Jacques Derrida, and Timothy Morton. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave the principal unaware of relevant options. By doing so, the agent increases the principal's cost of distorting the agent's choices and increases the principal's willingness to grant him higher information rents. We further show that the principal may use the option of renegotiation as a tool to implement actions that are not describable to her at the contracting stage. If the agent renegotiates, his proposal signals information about the payoff state. Due to her limited awareness, the principal makes a coarse inference from the agent's recommendations and, as a result, accepts a large number of the agent's proposals, which ultimately benefits both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses three features that characterise the authoritarian restoration following what is known as the Arab springs of 2011: a) the recourse to technocratic governments, b) the proliferation of discourses on the depoliticisation of governance and c) the postponement of the renegotiation of the old social contracts. Added to this is the importance of the international nexus, given that strategic allied states at a global level and international financial institutions embrace a formula that ensures stability and facilitates the implementation of neoliberal reforms. However, this authoritarian technopopulism fails to address the economic demands of the population, nor does it provide avenues of political inclusion or a framework for drawing up a new social contract; at best, it serves momentarily as a structure to contain the protests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines some thoughts on relational contracts. Such a contract can involve an implicit agreement to behave in certain ways, that includes the use of explicit, legally enforceable contracts, which may be rewritten as play proceeds. The use of implicit contracts involves a series of challenges not encountered with a legal contract that irrevocably specifies all contingent behavior. What agreements are credible? What threatened punishments will withstand efforts to renegotiate? To what extent can a long-run player establish a reputation for a particular kind of behavior? Can information design and Bayesian persuasion usefully be viewed through this lens? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a sample of 1525 withdrawn deals from 1981 to 2015 in the United States, we find that target firms close to their 52‐week high prices after merger announcements have lower withdrawal probabilities. The effect is different across merger waves. The out‐wave deals are sensitive to the target reference prices while in‐wave deals are not. Moreover, targets with post‐announcement prices close to 52‐week high tend to have higher withdrawn returns and receive higher adjustments of offering prices in renegotiation. Overall, our results suggest that target post‐announcement stock prices significantly affect deal outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides novel evidence that corporate political influence operates through renegotiations of existing government contracts. Using detailed data on contractual terms and renegotiations around sudden deaths and resignations of local politicians, the estimates show that politically connected firms initially bid low and successfully renegotiate contract amounts, deadlines, and incentives. The effects hold across different industries and contract types, enhance firm value, and persist around the exogenous increase in contract supply due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Overall, this paper establishes an unexplored link between political influence, ex post renegotiations, and ex ante bidding of government contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Within a formal model of international agreements in the shadow of renegotiations and domestic competition, we highlight three important ways elections shape international agreements. Elections determine who will be in control of policy in the future, which affects how leaders bargain today. Elections also determine the deals policymakers will agree to. Finally, proposers have the opportunity to shape the contours of domestic political competition with what is offered in pre-electoral bargaining. We identify that several canonical results in the literature – like the Schelling conjecture or the idea that hawkish leaders have an innate bargaining advantage over dovish leaders – only hold under certain restrictions on how voters evaluate their leaders. In contrast, we show paradoxically that when voters are prospective, electoral incentives shade the ability for domestic leaders to negotiate better deals for their publics. Counterintuitively, this leads to hawks agreeing to more conciliatory agreements than doves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to generate some recommendations for the future improvement of the content of the Association Agreement (AA) between the European Union (EU) and Central America (CA). Although the political conditions for renegotiation are currently complex, it is possible to present some reflections on the provisions of the Agreement and its eventual modification, especially to strengthen synergies with the environmental and climate change commitments, such as the commitment to effectively implement the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement of the countries of the region. The article presents recommendations for potential renegotiation on key components of the Agreement, including the preamble; objectives; exceptions; sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS); technical barriers to trade; investment provisions; intellectual property rights; trade and sustainable development; dispute resolution; and cooperation and political dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-sectoral strategic negotiation is a key challenge in PPPs. Based on framing and game theory, we investigate the effect of sectoral agency, affect, and bargaining domain on sectoral agents' bargaining behaviour in a PPP renegotiation scenario. Results confirm that public agents are more likely to bargain for satisfactory, 'good enough' contracts than private agents, who maximize their utility. This difference is stronger in the loss vis-a-vis the gain domain. These experimental findings advance our understanding of psychological mechanisms underlying cross-sectoral negotiations, suggesting that public managers and policy-makers account for partners' dissimilar bargaining logics to prevent asymmetric loss socialization in PPPs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I demonstrate that transacting parties may expend resources on ex ante contracting, which may not be legally enforceable, to help build and maintain their long-term relationships. I first introduce three legal concepts, namely scaffolding, managerial provisions, and formal relational contracts, which highlight the recent trend towards more detailed contracts. These concepts indicate that the role of detailed contracts is not to improve judicial contract enforcement, but to enhance clarity and alignment of interests and to reduce renegotiation costs, which ultimately support the parties' relationships. I then proceed to present and analyze a simple reduced-form model, which demonstrates that the parties' efforts for ex ante contracting are not necessarily monotonic with the level of alignment of their interests. Furthermore, I discuss recent contracting practices in Japan and attempt to provide an explanation for the lack of change observed in these practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the occurrence of renegotiation costs in dynamic, binary agency models with a risk‐averse agent. I investigate technological interdependence arising from complementary tasks or substitutable tasks across periods. In addition, I analyze stochastic interdependence between periods. The analysis leads to two results. First, the timeliness of performance measures leads to zero costs from renegotiation. Surprisingly, timeliness may arise even in the case of stochastic interdependence. Second, neither technological nor stochastic interdependence is sufficient for renegotiation losses. The former finding is in line with results obtained in the LEN model, but the latter contrasts. In the binary agency model, renegotiation does not harm efficiency as long as raising incentives in the second period is ineffective for inducing higher effort in the first period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Scholars have long observed that states play off overlapping international institutions against one another in an effort to advance their policy objectives. This article identifies a strategy utilized by the EU in response to regime complexity that I term "backdoor bargaining." Unlike forum-shopping, regime-shifting, and competitive-regime creation strategies, which states use to move multilateral negotiations to an institution that they expect will produce a more favorable outcome, backdoor bargaining involves a state using negotiations within one institution to gain an advantage in negotiations taking place at another distinct institution in a regime complex. I demonstrate the plausibility of backdoor bargaining by showing that the EU used the renegotiation of the Food Aid Convention as a strategy to gain bargaining leverage in the agriculture negotiations at the World Trade Organization. The article also offers insights into the potential consequences of international regime complexity for the EU as a global actor and the coherence of its foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In many Petroleum contracts, the parties put renegotiation clause in order to keep longtime balance, so that if the balance disrupted, the parties should be obliged to renegotiate in order to rehabilitate the contract balance. So if renegotiation process didn’t reach result, what will happen to the contract? Also in which circumstances the parties have right to recourse arbitration? Do arbitrators have the right to adjust the contract? In one side, keeping the balance was the first base of the agreement, and by disrupting the balance the continuation of contract would become unfair and in contrast with common intention, and on the other side, termination of the contract without party consent is impossible. In the absent of arbitration clause, one parties can recourse to the arbitration tribunal, so that the tribunal can arbitrate the case if it is deduced from implicit agreement or enforceable law that it has jurisdiction. In case of putting adjustment right for arbitrator, he can adjust it. otherwise, it can be understood from the first intention of the parties, economical logic, principles of international trade law and the principle of similarity of arbitrator and judge authorities that the arbitrator has right to use adjustment.