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The article seeks to delineate the often misunderstood idea of speculation that has conceptually been converted from an epitome of pure thought into an economic category of profitability and self-interest. But to define speculation already means to pose a problem. In Augustine speculation designates the mutual relationship between reflection and the mirrored appearance of God's gaze. This dictates an unattainable task of catching God's gaze, which is more inward than my innermost self and which models our thoughts accordingly. Such extimate activity as defined by Lacan is the formal condition for the construction of visibility and is inscribed into contemplation. The article postulates that this fundamental discrepancy was also the foundation upon which Hegel carved a positive determination of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Dental caries is the most common chronic childhood disease. The recommended age for the first dental visit (FDV) is 1 year, yet a minority of children visit before the age of 3 years. Aim: The aim of the study was to estimate the patterns of and predictors for dental visits among a sample of children. Design: Parents of children between the ages of 6 months and 18 years, who attended the paediatric dentistry clinics and the well‐baby clinics, were recruited. A validated questionnaire was used to collect data. Logistic regression was utilized to assess the predictors of ever visiting a dentist. Results: The mean age at FDV was 5.8 ± 2.1 years. Parents' belief of not needing to see a dentist was the most common barrier to visiting a dentist (33%). Among the reasons for FDV, caries and pain were the most common (45% and 20%, respectively). Predictors of ever visiting a dentist were children who are not an only child and children of parents who visited a dentist themselves. Conclusion: Children visited the dentist at an age older than that recommended, and the reasons for FDV were mainly caries and its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the so-called golden rule, we ought to treat others as we want to be treated by them. This rule, in one form or another, is part of every major religion, and it has been accepted by many philosophers with various ethical views. However, if the literal golden rule is interpreted as an absolute rule, it is problematic. In this paper, I introduce a new version of this famous principle that is similar to various classical definitions. According to this variant, the rule can be formulated in the following way: If you want it to be the case that if $x$ x were in your situation and you were in $x$ x 's situation then $x$ x would do $H$ H to you, and you have a good will, then you ought to do $H$ H to x. I show how this version can be derived from a small set of highly plausible premises, and I defend it against some of the most interesting and/or common objections against the golden rule in the literature. I conclude that we have good reason to believe in this rendition of the principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article challenges a reductive analysis of social practices by distinguishing five kinds of reason for following the rules of conventional practices. Depending on one's preferred intellectual tradition, conventional practices enable coordination, facilitate cooperation, constitute activities, fulfil reciprocity, or specify abstract rights. Instead of being rival theories of social practices, these different models complement one another in a normative analysis of social practices. By distinguishing five kinds of reasons to follow conventional rules, this paper supports a more dynamic conventionalist analysis of subjects like property, the law, professional obligation, civic responsibility, and culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumers who desire to be ‘rational’ tend to rely on reason and resist affective influences and thus choose objective options that are superior on quantifiable and measurable attributes but inferior on subjective and malleable attributes. Existing research reveals that consumers experience intrapersonal benefits from choosing objective options. Beyond these benefits, this study reveals the novel and interpersonal curse of choosing objective options that hinders consumers from receiving help. Six studies found that, compared to subjective‐option choosers, objective‐option choosers were considered less warm and received less help. Moreover, this social curse was attenuated when consumers’ choices did not reflect their own preferences. The current research contributes to the literature on objectivity–subjectivity trade‐offs by extending it from the intrapersonal to the interpersonal perspective, and to the literature on helping by revealing how consumption reduces future help received in irrelevant contexts beyond current consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I aim to clarify the role of 'wonder' in education. Most of us who work in education want to provide valuable experiences for our students, and we want them to be driven by intrinsic values such as truth and recognition of the dignity of human existence. However, whilst I echo many of the sentiments espoused by advocates of the utility and ethical significance of wonder, I contend that some recent developments—and in particular, Schinkel's argument that 'deep' ('contemplative' or 'cosmic') wonder has a 'fundamental' role in education—are misconceived. This is, I argue, because any concept deployable within educational spaces (whether formal or informal) must pay due regard to the conceptual constraints of the concept of 'education'; that is, attention must be paid to the role of 'learning'. Schinkel's proposals are, I suggest, vulnerable to a critique of sentimentalism and excessive romanticism. As such, they offer little in terms of practical import for educators. As I will propose, if we are to take 'wonder' seriously in educational contexts, we must pay attention to the purpose of wonder as an epistemic emotion; namely, aiming for knowledge and understanding, and getting there requires sensitivity to practical know-how and conceptual competence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The film Life of Pi narrates a fable about the relationship between an individual and the mindbody realm, based on the transformative journey of an Indian boy, Piscine Patel, who found himself in a tumultuous battle between hope and despair, faith and reason, as he navigated the vast, unforgiving expanse of the open sea after a harrowing shipwreck. Once deeply rooted in his religious beliefs, Piscine began to lose faith in his objects of devotion. In his despair, he heeded his father's teachings, ingrained deep within his heart, and began to struggle for survival at sea using reason. When the external environment dampened Piscine's will to survive, the illusions of faith provided him with spiritual support, allowing him to rekindle his rational thinking and confront the challenges ahead. Throughout his arduous drift at sea, Piscine was accompanied by a fierce tiger, symbolizing the raw power of rationality, and a delicate lotus, embodying the essence of pure faith. Together, these symbolic representations serve as a poignant metaphor for integrating faith and reason in a state of perpetual flux, highlighting the intricate dynamics between faith and reason in the face of uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If akrasia is acting against reason, then we might say that we are now in an akratic situation with regard to climate change. Indeed, we recognize its existence and give great credit to the sciences concerned, and climate skeptics are few. But our actions waver between non-existence and inadequacy. Why? In fact, trust in science is undermined by a discrediting of reason. « Technique » is overvalued for better or for worse, and the ethics of its choices forgotten. The recourse to politics obscures the decisive importance of society, as this crisis affects everyone's private behavior. Finally, fear and mistrust prevent us from calmly accepting the uncertainty inherent in knowledge and life. How might we correct this akrasia? By returning to a fallibilist, realistic epistemology, based on truth, on the objectivity of facts, and supported by an exercise of intellectual virtues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several theorists maintain that a consideration is a reason to ϕ (where ϕ-ing is an act-type) if and only if that consideration is a reason to intend to ϕ, and some hold as well that a consideration is a reason not to ϕ if and only if that consideration is a reason to intend not to ϕ. The claims often stem from views about what it is to be a practical reason. Here it is argued that both equivalence claims are false. Although no view of practical reasons is advanced, views that imply either equivalence claim are shown to be mistaken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are justified belief and rational belief related? Some philosophers think that justified belief and rational belief come to the same thing. Others take it that justification is a matter of how well a particular belief is supported by the evidence, while rational belief is a matter of how well a belief coheres with a person's other beliefs. In this paper, I defend the view that justification is a dimension of rationality, a view that can make sense of both of these conflicting accounts. When it modifies belief, 'rational' is a multidimensional adjective, as there are multiple dimensions along which a belief can be rational. I will argue that one of these dimensions is justification, an account that can not only explain why philosophers give diverging theories of the relationship between justified belief and rational belief, but can also reveal why rational belief and justified belief are closely related despite being distinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the twelfth century, certain thinkers in the north of Europe were exalting human reason in a manner that had not been seen since the time of the ancient philosophers. Adelard of Bath, William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres and Peter Abelard all championed ratio in a way that seemed to challenge the hegemony of learning that rested securely with the authority of scripture, the testament of the Fathers and the canons of the established councils. In so doing, it represented a significantly different approach from the firmly established 'authors' (auctores) as certain scholars pursued their learning, and indeed even divine ascent, via other avenues. Even the visionary Hildegard von Bingen set enormous stock in rationality. This paper will discuss the use of reason for the anagogic ascent to the divine in order to trace its roots to a Platonic understanding of the universe in tandem with a highly positive anthropology that allowed for a bold reassessment of human capabilities, as well as a new appreciation of nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of historical arguments in legal reasoning today is relatively rare and often superficial. The aim of the paper is to clarify whether the situation can be changed and whether this would be useful for the interpretation of codified private law. In the author’s view, a change in this direction will be possible and justified when historical arguments are made available in a way that is clearly linked to issues of contemporary practice and is addressed to lawyers who believe in the existence of objective premises of rationality in law and are open to including historical arguments into topical reasoning in order to support a solution that he or she considers legitimate. The author believes that the best way for making historical arguments available for such a purpose is a historical commentary on the Civil Code. The article presents a conception for such a commentary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contends that technical progress, from automation in industry to artificial intelligence, might involve the risk of a humanly impoverished society. Instrumental values could overcome final values and determine the end of meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last centuries of the Middle Ages, reason and the faculty of judgement were at the heart of the construction of a model of masculinity promoted by clerics for the laity. While the pastoral literature and sermons produced by the mendicant friars made it imperative for men to be able to love their wives in a measured way, passionate love was as much condemned by these clerical texts as it was by the medical treatises and chapters devoted to medicine in the encyclopaedias of the thirteenth century. According to their authors, excessive love leads to madness and folly and runs counter to the model of perfection embodied by masculinity. Yet madness in love and lovesickness, as mental pathologies, are specifically assimilated to the very essence of masculinity in its physiological dispositions, and are attributed to men following the commentary of Girardus Bituricensis. This article explores this ambivalence in a dialogue between medical discourse and clerical sources.

Practical reason is the use of reason to decide how to act and perform in a social reality. When someone deliberates about what to do, one puts all the reasons for the action, and then all the reasons against the action will determine the outcome of the action. In that situation, we can describe that practical action with reason because we will determine reason with the weight of different reasons not on the weighing reasons. In this paper, we analyze that reasons have weight against the theory that weights of reasons have no role in a theory of reasoning, and defend that reasons have weight with the evidence of practical reasons. The aim of this paper is to argue that weight of reasons has a role in the process of reasoning. In every situation of life, we can use have reason and weight of reason according to the practical situation of life.

This paper contends that technical progress, from automation in industry to artificial intelligence, might involve the risk of a humanly impoverished society. Instrumental values could overcome final values and determine the end of meaning.

We document a strong positive initial market reaction to merger announcements from bidders with either large earnings growth or significant earnings decline, relative to those with neutral earnings change, reflecting a U-shaped pattern between bidders' earnings growth and announcement returns. However, the higher initial returns for bidders with earnings decline subsequently reverse, whereas the higher returns for bidders with high growth do not. We further show that the return patterns are driven by a tendency for retail investors to gamble that merger and acquisition deals initiated by poorly performing bidders will generate high synergies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant’s philosophy directly addresses theological issues, one of which is the question of love for one’s neighbour. Its philosophical interpretation makes it possible not only to soften the rigorism of Kantian ethics, but also to resolve some of its characteristic paradoxes and to clarify the question of the concrete application of the categorical imperative. The article considers, in particular, the “paradox of method” used by Kant to define good and evil: evil is defined as reason’s abuse of its own freedom. It is precisely because of this understanding of evil that confidence in the moral quality of one’s own judgment becomes impossible. Kant even strengthens this point by introducing the notion of conscience as a self-judging reason, the latter being the strictest judge, whose verdict will always be accusatory. In order to avoid such undesirable conclusions, which leave no hope of justification in the face of the moral law, Kant introduces the concept of love for one’s neighbour as “a necessary addition to the imperfection of human nature”. True, such love, according to Kant, is impossible in respect to all people. But it is its presence in relation to some that allows us to overcome our own imperfection. Love for one’s neighbor precisely means voluntary recognition of the objective imperfection of one’s own subjective judgment about the morality and reasonableness of other people. And this recognition itself allows a person to rise to a moral height that would otherwise be inaccessible. In interpreting Kant’s ethics and, in particular, his concepts of reason and judgment, the author of the article relies on the concept of Joseph Simon, one of the leading modern German scholars of Kant studies in recent decades.

Abstract Medicine is faced with a number of intractable modern challenges that can be understood in terms of hyper-intellectualization; a compassion crisis, burnout, dehumanization, and lost meaning. These challenges have roots in medical philosophy and indeed general Western philosophy by way of the historic exclusion of human emotion from human reason. The resolution of these medical challenges first requires a novel philosophic schema of human knowledge and reason that incorporates the balanced interaction of human intellect and human emotion. This schema of necessity requires a novel extension of dual-process theory into epistemology in terms of both intellect and emotion each generating a distinct natural kind of knowledge independent of the other as well as how these two forms of mental process together construct human reason. Such a novel philosophic schema is here proposed. This scheme is then applied to the practice of medicine with examples of practical applications with the goal of reformulating medical practice in a more knowledgable, balanced, and healthy way. This schema’s expanded epistemology becomes the philosophic foundation for more fully incorporating the humanities in medicine.

Practical reason is the use of reason to decide how to act and perform in a social reality. When someone deliberates about what to do, one puts all the reasons for the action, and then all the reasons against the action will determine the outcome of the action. In that situation, we can describe that practical action with reason because we will determine reason with the weight of different reasons not on the weighing reasons. In this paper, we analyze that reasons have weight against the theory that weights of reasons have no role in a theory of reasoning, and defend that reasons have weight with the evidence of practical reasons. The aim of this paper is to argue that weight of reasons has a role in the process of reasoning. In every situation of life, we can use have reason and weight of reason according to the practical situation of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to examine the public benefits and interests in determining the causes of the provisions while revealing the things that are in favor or against the person in terms of his deeds/actions by Islamic jurists from detailed/partial evidence in the context of Islamic law. While making the compotent Muslim responsible for the command, the wise Shari' Almighty has primarily taken having the faculty of reason as the basis. In this context, Muslims have also developed some sciences in order to ground religious provisions on a rational basis. The science of hadith methodology was developed for the correct transmission of the textual narrations, and the science of methodology of Islamic jurisprudence was developed for the correct understanding of such narrations. They also determined the sources/origins and evidences of the sciences called fiqh and usul al-fiqh, and the ways and rules of accessing these sciences within the framework of above-mentioned sciences. While in regards to the rulings and their causes, the objectives of Shari’a (maqaṣid) is taken into consideration in terms of Divine Lawmaker, the public interest (maslaha) is taken into consideration in terms of the compotent believers. In this context, although it is essential to worship/serve the Shari'a in prayer, the satisfaction and peace of the soul and heart, the discipline of time and the interests of accountability are taken into consideration for the competent believer. Fasting is obligatory for those who are healthy, zakat is obligatory for those who have the minimum required amount of wealth, and pilgrimage is obligatory upon those who are rich and healthy. As can be seen in these examples, objectives of Shari’a and interests of the public have been considered together. The reason also plays an active role in determining these issues, addressing them, thinking about and understanding them. As a matter of fact, although the determination of causes was not based solely on the perspective of wisdom by the jurists, a rational basis was still sought in every religious ruling. Literally, juristic cause (‘illah) literally means a situation that causes a change in its location. In the conceptual framework, it means the situation that makes it appropriate to impose the provision, the intended result, benefit, clear or stable characteristic of the provision. A person traveling during Ramadan is given the permission not to fast. The interest considered here is to relieve the burden and trouble of the traveler. Being on a journey is taken as the cause of the ruling. The conditions required for the legal cause are that it should be clear, stable, appropriate, and that it should not be specific for a certain situation. In this context, intoxication is the legal cause for the prohibition of wine while being on a journey is the legal cause for shortening of ritual prayers. In addition, when determining the legal cause, the Holy Book and the sunnah of the Prophet are the first sources to look. In the second degree, if there is a consensus among mujtahids in an age regarding that a certain quality was the cause of a religious ruling, this quality was accepted as the cause of that ruling by consensus. In this respect, reason is important in understanding religious provisions. Because when the compotent believer understands the cause existing behind a ruling, he may be more willing to do what is ordered to him by the Shari' Almighty. In this article, we have shown the role of reason and the objectives of Shari’a and the public interest, on which Islamic jurists base their views while deducing the religious provisions of the compotent believers’ actions from the detailed evidences in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah by using the method of textual analysis and the qualitative method within the framework of classical and modern scientific sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the science of kalām, which played an important role in the construction of the Islamic belief system in the historical process, and the denialist movements that oppose these belief systems differ from each other in terms of foundations and goals, they sometimes showed similarities in terms of procedure, method and discourse. This situation gave the impression that there is a harmony and parallelism between thought structures that differ from each other in many points, as in the case of Muʿtazila and deism. These structures, which constitute two opposing movements of thought regarding the possibility and necessity of prohethoot and revelation, have reached different results by using the same procedure and method to prove their own theses. This study aims to question the reality of the similarity in method between Muʿtazila and deism, which at first glance seems to support such an impression, in terms of the source of morality. Deism accepts the existence and unity of God, as in the classical period, but argues that prophethood and revelation are impossible and unnecessary by putting forward rational justifications. There are three basic arguments put forward by deism in terms of the source of morality. The first of these is that moral values are inherent in the essence of things and actions, secondly, these inherent features of things and acts bring about a deterministic necessity because they are the determining reasons that necessitate the value of the act, the last one is that moral values can be known by reason alone, without divine help. On the other hand, the Muʿtazila school of theology defends the possibility and necessity of prophethood and revelation on rational grounds and accepts it as a divine obligation. The conclusion reached by Muʿtazila, who tries to reveal the source of morality with a similar discourse and method, is different from deism. Although there are different views against these three basic arguments of deism, some Muʿtazila theologians argue that moral values are inherent in the essence of things and actions, while others take into account the states and conditions related to moral values. One of the most important reasons behind Mu'tazila's different views on this issue is their natural philosophy. Contrary to deism's thesis that moral values can only be known through reason, although Muʿtazila grants the mind a wide range of competence both a priori and theoretically, this is not a mind independent of divine declarations. In this context, the fact that revelation and reason are both created by God brings about harmony and coordination rather than contradiction and disharmony between the two. In contrast to deism's understanding of a deterministic necessity regarding moral values depending on the ontological structure of things and actions, Muʿtazila argued that values of things and actions were essentially created by God and that this situation did not cause a necessity independent of His power and will. By making a comparison between deism and Muʿtazila regarding the source of morality, the study aims to reveal the differences in the context of the foundations and goals between these two movements of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to examine the problem of the possibility of value and the source of attributing value to actions in the context of the thought of the Ottoman scholar Shams al-DīnAhmad b. Mūsā al-Hayālī. The question of what is the approach to the issue of value in the Hanafi-Maturidi tradition vis-à-vis the Mu'tazila and Ash'arites is discussed with reference to al-Hayālī's views. al-Hayālī expressed his own thoughts in the commentary he wrote on his teacher Hızır Bey's ode called al-Qasīda al-Nūniyya. He especially examined the issue of husn and qubh in the interpretation of the lines of this ode: "Goodness and evil are religious, but / we say that they can be known by reason". In analyzing and interpreting his thoughts, Muhammad 'Umar b. al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Jalīl b. al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Jamīl al-Baghdādī al-Hanafī’s work titled alHawāshī al-Futūhiyya li-Sharh al-Nūniyya and Mehmet Emin Uskudārī's work titled Hāshiya 'alā Sharh al-Hayālī 'alā alQasīda al-Nūniyya are used. Ash'arites claimed that knowledge of value is not possible for humans and accepted that the source of our knowledge about good and evil is religion. Mu‘tazilite thinkers, on the other hand, associated good and evil with the essence of actions or with the attributes found in the essence of actions. Some Mu‘tazilite thinkers, such as the al-Jubbā’ī stated that the context and conditions in which actions are performed are also important in attributing value. Regarding value, Hanafī scholars from Bukhara stayed close to the Ash'arite understanding of value, while Māturīdīs stayed close to Mu‘tazilite ideas. Although Māturīdīs accepted that religion gives information about good and evil, they claimed that the value of some things could be known through reason. In our study, it has been shown that al-Hayālī’s basic approach is in favor of al-Māturīdī’s understanding of values. Attention has been drawn to the similarities between the Mu‘tazilite and Māturīdī scholars regarding the meanings of good and bad attributed to actions. It has been explained that good and evil have three meanings. First, goodness means that a person's deeds are praised in this world and rewarded in the afterlife. Evil means being blamed in this world and punished in the afterlife. Secondly, good is what is fit for purpose, and bad is what is not fit for purpose. This also means that good is what is beneficial and bad is what is harmful. Thirdly, good is an attribute of perfection and evil is an attribute of deficiency. For example, knowledge is good because it makes people more perfect. Ignorance is bad because it leaves man in a deficient and low state. According to Mu'tazila, the goodness and evil of everything can be known through reason, while according to al-Māturīdī the goodness and evil of some things can be perceived through reason. In this context, Mu'tazilite and Māturīdī thinkers criticized the arguments of the Ash'arites, who accepted that religion is the source of value knowledge that necessitates responsibility. The article also discusses the relationship between the source of value and the liar paradox which arises from the combination of truth and falsehood in a single sentence. Believing that there is a solution to the liar paradox, al-Hayālī stated that al-Māturīdī’s understanding of value can be justified through this solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminology and Criminal Justice are bifurcated on multiple dimensions: education, publication patterns, and epistemological orientation. These asynchronous efforts might plausibly be remedied through a three-pronged pursuit of improved science, adherence to trial and error in justice practice, and evidence-based practice. Unfortunately, these potential solutions face a triple threat of criminal justice being built on a monopolistic (single producer) and monopsonistic (single purchaser) foundation, limits on rationality (including biases in theory and practice), and fundamental limitations of tacit knowledge. Although these are likely to always be present, one option may be the development of an area with new possibilities for criminological research and criminal justice practices. In revisiting a scholarly exchange over agency, we consider how moving toward cognitive criminology could foster a more enriched understanding of human action. This may offer opportunities for both fields, including unifying the basic science of Criminology with the application of Criminal Justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is there such a pervasive mistrust of science and expertise in the United States these days? This essay argues that, alongside the contribution made by the internet in facilitating the spread of misinformation, information silos, validation of kooky views, and so forth, the most significant factor derives from our failure to inculcate in our citizenry the basics of critical scientific thought and of its myriad extraordinary accomplishments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Holy Qur’an constitutes the broadest field from which scholars draw their topics. Because of its miraculous importance that no other text has, the linguist, jurist, fundamentalist, and rhetorician dealt with it to understand its meanings and discover the secrets of its miraculousness. The goal of the research was to find out some of the semantic relationships for the interpretation of (Marage AlTafakir fe Dacakc Al Tadaber of Contemplation and the Minutes of Contemplation), by Sheikh Abd alRahman al-Maidani (d. 1425 AH), who It falls within the standard of textual plotting in textual linguistics, as it relied on many semantic relationships in interpreting and clarifying the Book of God Almighty. The research plan required that it be divided into an introduction and three sections, which dealt with the introduction, the definition of semantic relationships, the life of the interpreter and its scientific effects, and the definition of interpretation. The first section dealt with the relationship of gradualism, while the second section dealt with the relationship of causality. The third section dealt with the relationship of generality and detail, in accordance with what the Qur’anic discourse requires, highlighting the most important results reached by the researcher, and presenting a list of the sources and references on which he relied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primary/shariah evidence accepted by the majority of Islamic legal doctrines and used in deducing judgments are; book, sunnah, ijma and qiyas. However, apart from these primary evidences, it is known that many additional/methodical evidences are also used in the production of religious/legal judgments. Procedural evidences frequently used in Hanafi doctrine are; istihsan, custom, maslahat-i mursal, and the words of the companions. Other methodological evidence used in Islamic law by almost all legal doctrines, including Hanafis, with different intensity and with some additional conditions are; şer'u men kablena, istishâb, istislâh, deeds of the people of Medina, seddi zerâi' etc. can be listed as follows. However, when secondary issues are examined with the inductive method, it is observed that different evidence and methods, apart from the primary and secondary evidence mentioned above, are also used as legal instruments in deriving the verdict. In this context, the present study deals with the issue of "rational inference", which is used in determining the criminal sanction of the crime in the context of Hanafi criminal law, "in the context of the crime of cutting off hands". In the research, it has been determined that in Hanafi criminal law, in addition to the above-mentioned evidence, rational inference was also used as a basis for the decision. Considering the volume of the article, types of inference, evidentiary value and conceptualization process were excluded from the scope of the study. The subject is limited to the rational inferences that are effective in determining the criminal sanction of amputation of hands among effective acts; the crimes of hadd, retaliation for killing and ta'zir are excluded from the scope. In addition, examples of rational reasoning carried out on the issues of hudud and retaliation for killing are pointed out in the footnotes. In Islamic law, the punishment for the crime of cutting off a hand in accordance with retaliation is to cut off the hand of the perpetrator of the crime if he meets the necessary conditions. The focus of this study is on the rational inferences that are effective in determining a different penal sanction instead of the retaliation provision in some special cases for the perpetrator or victim(s). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this work by David B. Burrell, the concept of the importance given to language in the field of philosophy of religion, which is one of the sub-disciplines of philosophy, is discussed under different headings. In this study, the philosophical benefits that contribute to religious understanding are analyzed on the axis of medieval Jewish, Christian and Islamic studies. Under the heading of the importance of language, Thomas Aquinas is concerned with how we behave in linguistic expressions about God, and Bernard Lobergan, on the need for certainty, sees Thomas Aquinas as the founder of the paradigm, but presents Descartes as a definitive example in this regard. Under the heading of the evaluation of truth, the role of reason in the problem of truth is emphasized, followed by a discussion of how the existence of God is expressed through Aquinas' Summa Theologiae. In the section titled The Language of Imperfect Signification, it is pointed out that philosophers of religion differ in similar discourses when it comes to divinity. Although language is limited in relation to the concept of God, this problem is compensated for by the author by saying that the questioners are special creatures. As a result, this study has clarified the concept of preambula fidei (the highest divine knowledge) and clarified previously misunderstood studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge theory is a discipline that interacts between different disciplines and examines issues such as the source, nature, transfer and use of knowledge. Discussions about the nature and source of knowledge have increased the importance of knowledge theory along with technological developments and changes in the field of communication. This offers many interesting areas for future research. There are various views on the definition and approaches of knowledge. One of the scholars who put forward important opinions on this subject is Abū ‘Alī al-Yūsī (d. 1102/1691). Yūsī, who had important views on the definition and value of knowledge, lived in the 17th century and was a prominent Mālikī scholar of Morocca, well-versed in rational and natural sciences, and distinguished in theology, philosophy, logic, and methodology. Yūsī’stheory creates a comprehensive framework that transcends the boundaries of disciplines. This interdisciplinary approach promotes a holistic understanding of knowledge and encourages scientists from different fields to collaborate and contribute to the advancement of knowledge theory. According to him, the capacity to access and understand knowledge varies between man and other beings. The idea that man has limited knowledge and God has absolute knowledge is an important point in understanding the sources and the nature of knowledge. At the heart of Yūsī’s theory is the recognition of the multidimensionality of knowledge. It goes beyond a simplistic view that equates knowledge with mere awareness or understanding. Instead, he argues that knowledge encompasses cognitive processes, epistemological considerations, and broader metaphysical dimensions. According to Yūsī, knowledge comes from three sources: reason, revelation, and senses. According to him, reason alone is not sufficient to understand the complexity of existence. Therefore, it emphasizes the importance of revelation, which represents divine guidance and transcendent wisdom. Revelation expands the scope of human knowledge by providing insights and truths beyond our limited reasoning abilities. Sensory experiences such as perception and observation also contribute to our understanding of the world. By interacting with the senses, we gain empirical knowledge and discover physical manifestations of reality. Yûsî’s theory underscores the need to integrate these different sources of knowledge. According to him, knowledge can be valuable in itself or serve another purpose. Yūsī’s theory underscores the need to integrate these different sources of knowledge. According to him, knowledge can be valuable in itself or serve another purpose. The division of knowledge into two categories: sciences for its own sake and sciences that serve another purpose, reveals the value and use of knowledge. In this perspective, it can be said that Yūsī’s theory of knowledge has a deep and versatile understanding within the tradition of Islamic thought. The six basic sciences and eight auxiliary sciences that stand out among Islamic sciences are a reflection of this understanding. Likewise, his theory of knowledge encourages in-depth studies in the relevant field by providing interaction between different disciplines and emphasizes the value of knowledge, showing that it plays an important role in human life. The study aims to provide a basis for studies on Yūsī’s other theological views, especially his theory of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Muslim thought, the relationship between aqliyyat (reason) and sam'iyyat (Things that can only be known through the Quran and the Hadith) is an important issue that is axiomatically continuous. One of the scholars who interpreted the relationship between two concepts in the most accurate and original way in the literature is Al-Qadi Abd al-Jabbar. In Ahl al-Sunnah, the reason is regarded as an important blessing for human beings in religious understanding due to its wisdom and functionality, and it is accepted as one of the basic sources of knowledge such as news and senses. In Islam, the relationship between reason and revelation has been dealt primarily within the context of the value of reason itself in terms of maslahat (public interest), and then in terms of the correct understanding of revelation. In the thought of kalam, the question of faith has been tried to be grounded on a rational basis through the principle of the compatibility of knowledge with its object, that is, the inference obtained by making an observation on existence Al-Qadi Abd al-Jabbar took this content to a higher level with his original method. According to Qadi, the intellect is the most important element in comprehending and implementing the proposals of prophethood and Shariah and in attaining perfection. This study is an overview of Kādī's solution to the problem of the reason's competence in the relationship between reason and revelation in the method of kalam, which constitutes an original method by taking into account the accumulative tradition that preceded him on the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy evaluation is a well‐established management practice in many countries worldwide. Evaluation as we know it dates back to the 1970s. Throughout its rich history, evaluation has fulfilled a growing number of purposes with a focus on rationality and accountability. This article describes the major challenges facing evaluators and public administration researchers interested in the practice. We then formulate a research agenda, based on interdisciplinary research, to inform future work and guide the future of evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Islamic thought, the evaluation of the subject of proposal by different sects on the axis of revelation and reason is an activity aimed at finding solutions to the problems related to the source of the divine responsibility of independent human existence. Does human being, due to his creation, have the opportunity and power to know, comprehend and fulfill this responsibility on his own, without divine help and guidance? Or does human responsibility turn into obligation through divine notifications, and is the human being held accountable after this stage? The concept of taklîf was shaped within the framework of the value theories of the theological schools. In this context, there has been a simultaneous discussion of the ontological status of value in ethics and the sources of human knowledge of this value, and these two themes have rarely been clearly distinguished. Three different attitudes have developed in relation to these two issues. According to the first, values have an objective existence and can be known by independent human reason or revelation, or both. According to the latter, values are essentially shaped by God's commands and are ultimately known only by revelation, and reason has a secondary position to revelation. According to the third, values are objective and can be fully known by the independent intellect of those who have knowledge. In contrast to the Mu'tazilites, who stand out with their rationalist attitude towards the knowledge of good and evil in things and actions, Ash'arites are positioned with an attitude that prioritises revelation. According to the Hanafî-Mâturîdî school of theology, which endeavours to reconcile revelation and reason in the middle of these two, reason can act on its own up to a certain point without divine help. In the Hanafî-Maturîdî school of theology, the theology of value constitutes a common area where reason and revelation act together. While reason knows the good and evil in things and actions in general terms, revelation reinforces and elaborates it. On the other hand, reason serves as a ground and foundation for the knowledge and understanding of the values revealed by revelation. As a result, although good and evil are known through revelation or reason, all these processes take place on the ground and basis of reason. Although there is a similarity between the Hanafî-Maturîdî school of theology and the Muctazilites with regard to the knowledge of good and evil by the intellect, the two sects differ from each other at the point of imposing a responsibility on human beings based on this knowledge. For, although the intellect knows the good and evil inherent in things and actions, it does not have the authority to make judgements in line with this knowledge. In addition, the presence of certain obstacles in the mind at the point of thinking in a healthy way and finding the truth negatively affects its ability to make the right decision alone and unaided. Another effective factor in this is that the intellect has a limited power of knowing and perceiving in terms of creation. Since the intellect is essentially a tool and a means of grasping good and evil, the function of the intellect varies according to the state of value that objects and actions have or acquire. In this context, objects and actions are divided into two parts in terms of goodness and evil. The first are those who are ontologically good and bad, and the second are those who are good and bad for reasons other than their essence. Since goodness and evil originate from its own essence, reason commands truthfulness and justice, which it sees as innately good, and forbids lies and cruelty, which it sees as bad. The divine command and the reward in return can only be realised on the basis of this rational necessity. From another point of view, judgements are divided into three as wajib (necessity), impermissible and possible. In this study, which deals with the ideas of the kalam sects in general and the Hanafi-Maturidi school in particular, regarding the proposal, the subject will be examined in the context of the disciplines of kalam and fiqh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vittorio Hösle's 2018 book, Kritik der Verstehenden Vernunft: Eine Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften ("A Critique of Understanding Reason: The Grounding of the Humanities") provides an ambitious and systematic treatment of human understanding that is important for legal scholars and others. In it, he addresses questions like the nature of mental acts, how they are expressed and grasped, the complex relationship between authorial intention and understanding, what conditions are necessary for understanding to succeed, and more. His account also touches directly on legal interpretation and speaks to a number of contemporary jurisprudential puzzles. Part I of this essay provides a grand tour of Hösle's theory of understanding, as well as his specific treatment of law. Understanding, as he defines it, is focused on the attempt to indirectly recreate a past mental act though the medium of author's physical manifestations of meaning (often language). Yet, given his intentionalism, Hösle's treatment of legal interpretation lands in a surprising place. Though he continues to insist on the importance of the lawmaker's original mental acts and the difference between questions of meaning and truth, he also recognizes several reasons why it could be undesirable for legal decisions to be strictly bound by the lawmaker. Part II of this essay turns to how Hösle's theory might inform current debates about legal interpretation by applying it to three recurring puzzles for intentionalist theories: (1) the problem of the inartful author; (2) whether there is anything interpretation (or understanding) "just is"; and (3) the nature of group intentions. As to the first puzzle, Hösle connects "meaning" with the author's original mental act(s) even if the attempt to communicate this meaning on a specific occasion misfires. Yet Hösle also grants that, from the reader's or hearer's perspective, understanding necessarily relies on currently available evidence. Concerning the second puzzle, Hösle suggests the phenomenon of indirectly attempting to recreate the mental acts of another (i.e. "understanding") just is something that occurs in the process of legal adjudication, whatever you call it. But it does not follow that adjudication should (or can) always be bound by this understanding. For the third puzzle, the manner in which Hösle conceptualizes group intention and "works" suggests that only openly shared aspects of the lawmaking body's plan count as part of the group's intention. For this reason, especially in the context of works accomplished by a group, his intentionalism shares at least initial similarities with public meaning originalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dominant paradigm in Indian legal review is doctrinal and empirical. However, judgements of the Supreme Court of India are often couched in rhetoric and literary sources. In this regard, the law and literature paradigm has created different interpretive tools, including law as literature and literature in law. These are the tools that I utilise to explore how sex work is understood and how the ideal sex worker is conceptualised by the judges of India. Judgements on sex work are particularly conducive to a law and literature analysis as in these cases, the courts are called upon to justify legal rationality, forcing them to draw upon popular morality, best reflected in persuasive literature. Judicial dicta in four cases that have come before the Supreme Court over the span of half a century (1964–2012) are analysed to provide a cultural critique of the post-colonial and neoliberal sensibilities that underlie judicial discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Many contemporary thinkers of the Anthropocene, who attempt to articulate a non-modern and relational ontology, all too readily dismiss critical theory inherited from the Frankfurt School for being anthropocentric, failing to acknowledge certain basic similarities. Instead, this article argues that the scaffolding of Anthropocene thinking—the recognition of the origins of the contemporary condition of 'loss of world' and the hope of 'living on in the ruins'—share much with earlier critical theorists' recognition that the Holocaust necessitated a fundamental break with the past. In reading these two sets of literatures together, we suggest we can get a better grasp of the stakes involved in the contemporary crisis of critique, and in the speculative framings enabling alternative futures to come into being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Manuel Piñon restores the Thomistic understanding of the concept of freedom, which was blurred by the interpretations of some of the Angelic Doctor's commentators--injecting into it ideas such as 'intrinsic active indifference' and 'capability for self-determination-by putting stress on the reflexive quality of the faculty of the will over its acts. Such is progressively developed in this article in three sections. In the first section, the clarification of the nature of the will as taught by Thomas Aquinas, which, according to the analysis of Piñon, acts self-reflexively, is discussed. In the second, the reasons offered by Piñon for expostulating that the will is a self-reflexive faculty, just like the intellect, are systematically presented. In the third, it is demonstrated how the self-reflexive modality of the volitive faculty over its specific acts. Finally, it is concluded with some personal observations and comments on the relevance of Piñon's elaboration on the Thomistic teaching of freedom to the practice of freedom by many today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]