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All parts of Heraclitus’ cosmos are simultaneously living and dying. Its constituent stuffs (“biomasses”) cycle endlessly through physical changes in sweeping patterns (“biorhythms”) that are reflected in the dynamic rhythms of Heraclitus’ own thought and language. These natural processes are best examined at a more-than-human level that exceeds individuation, stable identity, rational comprehension, and linguistic capture. B62 (“mortals immortals”), one of Heraclitus’ most perplexing fragments, models these processes in a spectacular fashion: it describes the imbrication not only of humans and gods but of cosmic masses more generally, and its language mimics the natural relations that it names, or rather intimates through its grammatical and syntactical indeterminacy. The remaining fragments amplify the uncertainties and the exhilarations of Heraclitus’ worldview along the same lines. His approach to nature raises urgent questions about how human beings fit into the cosmos, not least by challenging our intuitive conceptions of life and death, our material makeup, and our entanglements with our natural surroundings. In doing so, he provides vital lessons for contemporary ecological awareness, and proves to be an unexpected ally.

Living in groups offers social animals the significant advantage of accessing collective wisdom and enhanced information processing, enabling more accurate decisions related to foraging, navigation and habitat selection. Preserving group membership is crucial for sustaining access to collective wisdom, incentivizing animals to prioritize group cohesion. However, when individuals encounter divergent information about the quality of various options, this can create a conflict between pursuing immediate rewards and the maintenance of group membership to improve access to future pay-offs. In this study, I show that rational agents who seek to maximize long-term rewards will be more inclined to follow the decisions of their peers than those with short-term horizons. In doing so, they necessarily make less-rewarding decisions in the short-term, which manifests in a lower individual accuracy when choosing the better of two options. Furthermore, I demonstrate that intuitions about collective wisdom can be misleading in groups of agents who prioritize long-term rewards, with disagreement being a better signal for the accuracy of collective choices than consensus. These results demonstrate that observed patterns of sociality should be interpreted in the context of the life history of an individual and its peers, rather than through the lens of an isolated decision. This article is part of the discussion meeting issue 'Understanding age and society using natural populations'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We prove that if V is a unitary simple holomorphic vertex operator algebra of CFT-type, then V is rational, that is, all N -gradable V -modules are direct sums of copies of V. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In supply chains, data is important to improve decision-making. Therefore, data sharing is essential to extract maximum benefits from technologies like Machine Learning and the Internet of Things in an Industry 4.0 context. However, data protectionism often prevails over sharing for organizations in a supply chain. In literature, researchers are looking for ways to turn data protectionism into data sharing. We present a Semi-Systematic Literature Review related to data sharing in an inter-organizational context. Our main goal is to find state-of-the-art literature and, based on this, discover a research gap related to data sharing practices in inter-organizational systems for papers that apply a rational perspective. Game theory provides such a rational perspective. We formulate research questions related to three main concepts: data sharing, inter-organizational systems and game theory. We search for related subtopics that link to the main concepts and give a definition of these. A list of search strings and inclusion criteria results in 149 papers selected for the literature review. We classify the literature with the help of nine categories, which are the basis for our main findings in the Semi-Structured Literature Review. Recent research focuses on data sharing, while older literature focuses more specifically on information and knowledge sharing. In our literature review, we note that trust is an important concept. In literature, researchers try to create trust related to technological issues with the help of blockchain. In contrast, calculus-based trust (a rational perspective) is analyzed with the help of game theory. Solving trust issues and providing incentive mechanisms could solve potential future (data) sharing issues. Based on the literature and main findings, we determine five potential research opportunities for future research to tackle (data) sharing problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My comments focus on the relation between theoretical reason and agency in Gomes’ account. I argue that, while Gomes is right that agency plays a role in relating us to an objective world, accounting for it does not require us to exclude theoretical reason in advance by requiring that the propositions to which we practically assent be theoretically undecidable. There are both theoretical and practical grounds for taking ourselves to have agency in thinking, and we should prefer an account of reason which allows both kinds of grounds to play a role in rationalizing our commitments. Gomes should, therefore, weaken the dualism of theoretical and practical reason which he takes over from Kant. This dualism is in any event hard to sustain outside the context of transcendental idealism; weakening it allows for what I suggest is a better account of the interaction between theoretical and practical reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for a reading of Michel Foucault’s works that draws on an expansive concept of normativity and places Foucault’s project in a broader framework. It is argued that the distinction between the normative and the non-normative fails to grasp what is most significant in Foucault’s work. This distinction should be replaced by a broader understanding of normativity permeating all social practices. However, in order to retain the sound intuition of two distinct moments within critical thought, this broader understanding must be complemented with a view of the entwined perspectives of participant and observer, both thoroughly permeated by normativity. However, there is a tension between these perspectives which both Foucault and critics such as Jürgen Habermas recognise as intensified in modernity. This intensification is manifest as instability, an ever-present possibility of shifting between perspectives that seems to demand resolution. Taking the fundamental norm motivating Foucault’s work as “the undefined work of freedom” the paper considers how this norm guides Foucault’s work by affirming this play of perspectives or “revolving door of rationality” in a way that marks a fundamental difference from his critics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I investigate whether there are any cases in which it is rational for a person to hold inconsistent beliefs and, if there are, just what implications this might have for the theory of epistemic justification. A number of issues will crop up along the way – including the relation between justification and rationality, the nature of defeat, the possibility of epistemic dilemmas, the importance of positive epistemic duties, and the distinction between transitional and terminal attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary debate on Kant's practical philosophy has focused on racial claims appearing primarily in transcripts of students' notes taken during his lectures. But was Kant – the champion of world citizenship – really a racist? It is certainly hard to defend him from the charge of racial prejudices. However, a universally exclusivist standard of rationality such as the one he promoted leads at worst to cultural imperialism. It is more doubtful whether this amounted also to a full racist theory, as this would have implied seeing some races as inherently incapable of full rationality. Kant's biological theory of races – the investigation of race being a theoretical rather than practical task – did not serve such a racist purpose. This article argues that Kant was ultimately interested in scientific distinctions, assuming the point of view of a naturalist researcher (Naturforscher). Accordingly, he cannot be said to be a biological racist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Weak judgmentalism of emotions posits that emotions necessarily involve judgments. However, a standard critique of weak judgmentalism is that it cannot adequately account for the rationality of recalcitrant emotions, which persist despite the agent holding beliefs that conflict with them. This leads to the seemingly counter-intuitive conclusion that recalcitrant emotions are as irrational as logical mistakes. In response to this critique, I make two arguments. First, I distinguish between low-level and high-level beliefs, and argue that having two beliefs with contrary contents at different levels can be rational to some extent. Therefore, weak judgmentalism can explain why recalcitrant emotions are not as irrational as logical mistakes. Second, I argue that recalcitrant emotions involve mental conflicts, while normal emotions do not. By framing the issue in this way, weak judgmentalism can also explain why recalcitrant emotions are not as rational as normal emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several philosophers have proposed Knowledge-Based Decision Theories (KDTs)—theories that require agents to maximize expected utility as yielded by utility and probability functions that depend on the agent's knowledge. Proponents of KDTs argue that such theories are motivated by Knowledge-Reasons norms that require agents to act only on reasons that they know. However, no formal derivation of KDTs from Knowledge-Reasons norms has been suggested, and it is not clear how such norms justify the particular ways in which KDTs relate knowledge and rational action. In this paper, I suggest a new axiomatic method for justifying KDTs and providing them with stronger normative foundations. I argue that such theories may be derived from constraints on the relation between knowledge and preference, and that these constraints may be evaluated relative to intuitions regarding practical reasoning. To demonstrate this, I offer a representation theorem for a KDT proposed by Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) and briefly evaluate it through its underlying axioms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is growing evidence of the connection between variations in kinship intensity and cross-cultural differences in psychological traits. Contributing to this literature on kinship intensity, we put forward a mental model to explain the enduring connection between ancestral niche and psychological traits. Our model posits that two primary orientations or dispositions—strong-ties and weak-ties rationalities—have co-evolved with our ancestral niches to perpetuate—by internalizing and reproducing—the social structure (such as preferences for certain attitudes, values, and beliefs) of the ancestral niche. The findings from 1,291 participants across four societies—China, India, Taiwan, and the United States—support our hypothesis that strong-ties (weak-ties) rationalities, when activated, will endorse strong-tie (weak-ties) values and beliefs. This proposed model contributes to the toolbox of cultural and cross-cultural psychology in a twofold sense: First, in addition to the index of kinship intensity, it offers a measure of kin-based rationality as another predictor of psychological traits; second, it renders intelligible the niche and rationality disconnect prevalent in the globalizing era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can AI systems such as ChatGPT think? We present an argument from rationality for the negative answer to this question. The argument is founded on two central ideas. The first is that if ChatGPT thinks, it is not rational, in the sense that it does not respond correctly to its evidence. The second idea, which appears in several different forms in philosophical literature, is that thinkers are by their nature rational. Putting the two ideas together yields the result that ChatGPT is not a thinker. The paper sets out the argument in detail and shows how it can withstand numerous objections. We end the paper by contrasting the argument from rationality with a more well-known argument often taken to show that ChatGPT doesn’t think, due to Bender and Koller. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how three types of experience—personal, related others, and unrelated others—influence decision-making. We present the complexities and nuances in using these experiential sources to suggest that personal experience is preferred to the other two sources. We discuss the implications of this preference for decision-making processes, especially in contexts involving transformative outcomes. To conclude, we discuss how people rely on other experiential sources when their preferred source is limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves this tension, presenting a model that aligns the roles of mind‐wandering in planning with empirical evidence and the sustained stability of intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This homage to Danny Kahneman and Amos Tversky describes how each of them thought about psychology. It outlines the principal results of their collaborative research, which was their most original and most influential. Why? In search of an explanation it examines their joint thinking during their collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supported. Contrary to what's often assumed, these phenomena need not indicate motivated irrationality, even though they are instances of belief-consistent information processing. Second, I engage with arguments purporting to show that belief-consistent information processing does not indicate motivated irrationality because of its mere differential treatment of confirming and non-confirming evidence, but rather because it reveals the undermining presence of an irrelevant influence, such as a desire or partisan identity-driven cognition. While linking belief-consistent reasoning to a deeper source of directional motivation to make good on the claim that it indicates motivated irrationality is indeed what's needed, two prominent such arguments fail. The non-normativity of many reasoning processes often taken to indicate motivated irrationality is not in fact well established. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset not only emphasized the importance of the Greek tradition as it applies to modern philosophy; he also insisted on demonstrating how it inspired his own philosophical project. He believed the pre-Socratic philosophers, Parmenides and Heraclitus, were the first to develop a rational basis for the thinking process and attempted to show a dynamic continuum of this tradition up to the present. His concern was to protect this heritage from the challenges of scientific positivism and postmodernism. This article will examine five key works by Ortega that deal with the Spanish philosopher's early concept of la razón vital (vital reason), the development of la razón histórica (historical reason), historical methodology, dialectical thinking, and his understanding of the emergence of philosophy in ancient Greece. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the seventies, the definition of scientific knowledge has undergone major shifts. However, game researchers do not sufficiently reflect upon those epistemological changes. This paper suggests that to make game studies more inclusive—for women especially and diverse voices in general—game researchers need to shift from traditional, objective epistemologies toward pragmatist ones instead. To support such an argument, this paper first focuses on the central concepts of pragmatist feminist epistemology: experience, rationality, situation and fallibilism. Those concepts are then used for a rereading of game studies epistemological stances. I argue that game studies initially adhered to traditional epistemologies, which formed hostile attitudes toward women and minorities in the field. On the contrary, several authors now develop their scholarship congruently with a feminist pragmatist epistemology. Their works are analyzed to observe how pragmatist feminist concepts concretely manifest in research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the relationship between humor, creativity, rationality, intuitiveness, and decision-making quality, all of which are vital in organizational management and success. Despite the importance attached to decision-making, prior research has not fully addressed how humor and creativity interact with rationality. Drawing from psychology, cognitive science, and management studies, we investigate how humor and creativity jointly influence cognitive reflection and decision quality. Using a sample of 998 participants and employing a mediating-moderation PROCESS model, our findings indicate that rational individuals tend to make higher-quality decisions, with affiliative humor mediating this relationship. Furthermore, we observed that employees' creativity levels moderated this relationship, especially among rational employees with high creativity, who made higher-quality decisions. These findings highlight the interconnectedness of humor, creativity, and rationality in decision-making processes, offering practical implications for organizational behavior and management practices. Understanding this interplay can provide a nuanced approach to enhancing decision-making processes in management, emphasizing the value of humor in organizational contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that level‐incoherence is epistemically valuable in a specific set of epistemic environments: those in which it is easy to acquire justified false beliefs about normative requirements of epistemic rationality. I argue that in these environments level‐incoherence is the rationally dominant strategy. Nevertheless, level‐incoherent combinations exhibit a distinctive tension, and this tension has been thought by many to indicate that level‐incoherence is always irrational. Although this idea has proved resilient, I argue that it is incorrect. I evaluate three candidate explanations for the distinctive tension exhibited by level‐incoherent combinations, only one of which is the traditional view (which I call the 'Prohibition View') that epistemic level‐incoherence is prohibited by epistemic rationality. I argue instead for the 'Inquiry View', according to which level‐incoherence is not rationally criticisable but is a reason to undertake further inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent psycholinguistic findings raise fundamental questions about comprehenders' ability to rationally adapt their predictions during sentence processing. Two mouse cursor tracking experiments (each N = 85) assessed this adaptivity by manipulating the reliability of verb-based semantic cues. In Experiment 1, predictive mouse cursor movements to targets (e.g., bike) versus distractors (e.g., kite) were measured while participants heard equal proportions of nonpredictive (e.g., "spot ... the bike"), predictive (e.g., "ride ... the bike"), and antipredictive (e.g., "fly ... the bike") sentences. In Experiment 2, participants heard equal proportions of nonpredictive and antipredictive sentences. Participants were observed to flexibly adapt their predictions, such that they disengaged prediction in Experiment 1 when verb-based cues were unreliable and as likely to be disconfirmed as confirmed, while they generated adapted predictions in Experiment 2 when verb-based cues were reliably disconfirmed. However, links to individual differences in cognitive control were not observed. These results are interpreted as supporting rational theoretical approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Book 3 of Porphyry's De abstinentia contains an overlooked argument in favor of vegetarianism for the sake of nonhuman animals themselves. The argument runs as follows: Animals are essentially sentient creatures. Sentience (αἴσθησις) allows them to discern what is good for their survival and what is destructive to them, so that they can pursue the former and avoid the latter. As a result, animals (human and nonhuman) have preferences, desires, and hopes. Having purposeful strivings that can be promoted or frustrated makes them recipients of justice and injustice. This means, for Porphyry, that animals, unlike plants, can be wronged since they are creatures that discern, and purposefully pursue, what is good or bad for them. This reading stands against interpretations that argue that Porphyry advocates vegetarianism only for our benefit, and not for the animals' own sake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The emergency department is a place where patients require immediate treatment and care. It is the specialty that cares for patients at risk. Doctors face challenges in rationalizing, choosing, and initiating appropriate drug therapy for patients admitted to emergency medicine. They also encounter problems with medication errors and adverse drug events. Hence, a prescription-based survey is one of the most effective methods for analyzing the prescribing patterns of drugs and the prescribing behavior of physicians. The core drug use indicators developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) are more informative and feasible. These include prescribing, patient care, and health facility indicators. Aims and Objectives: (i) The aim of this study was to study, assess, and evaluate the rationality of prescription pattern in emergency department in a particular region and (ii) to understand whether prescription pattern is in accordance with the WHO core prescribing indicators or not? Materials and Methods: Details regarding the age and gender of the patient, the reason for admission, diagnosis made, treatment given, the number of drugs per prescription, drugs prescribed by generic name, drugs prescribed from the essential drug list, dosage, refills, and dosage forms were collected. The rationality of the prescriptions was assessed and evaluated using these indicators. Results: In the present study, the average number of drugs per prescription was 4.6, injections were prescribed in 84.8%, antibiotics in 43.2%, and the generic name was mentioned in 50.8%. In addition, 72.8% of the drugs were prescribed from the essential drug list. Descriptive and inferential statistical analyses were used. The Student's t-test was employed to compare inter-group variation for continuous variables. The Chi-square test was used to compare categorical variables. Conclusion: Among the study population, approximately three-fourths belonged to the age group of 20-60 years, and two-thirds were males. The majority of patients came due to injuries, including road traffic accidents, followed by respiratory illnesses (26.4%) and gastrointestinal ailments (15.6%). Among the prescriptions studied, all had the drug name legibly written, 93.3% had the dose mentioned, and 86.5% had the frequency mentioned. The most common route of administration was parenteral (76.6%), followed by oral (19.3%). In the present study, the average number of drugs per prescription was 4.6, injections were prescribed in 84.8%, antibiotics in 43.2%, and the generic name was mentioned in 50.8%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classical economic analysis is based on the hypothesis of perfect rationality attributed to economic agents. Their behavior is considered, according to this analysis, in a narrow sense represented by Homo-oeconomicus. The latter is a calculating agent in the true meaning of the term, who calculates to optimize his choice and maximize a utility function. However, in a decision-making process, the economic agent finds himself interacting with a complex and uncertain environment. To decide, he adapts his choice behavior to an end, considering the constraints of this environment. He does not always seek the optimal solution, but he can be satisfied with the solution that he considers satisfactory. This solution highlights the role of deliberation, which considers the norms and customs of society, as well as environmental constraints. This work revisits rationality by examining the assumptions underlying decision-making behaviors. This analysis considers the real motivations of the decision-maker and their implications in his decision-making process, both in the individual context and in that of the organization. It studies the sources of the limitation of rationality and seeks to know why the decision-maker abandons optimization and is interested in satisfactory solutions in his choice. The results of this analysis recommend that bounded rational behavior can still be considered when motivations are considered. They advocate that their understanding is fundamental to refound the economic behavior of choice on hypotheses, which correspond well to the social and economic context of the decision.

Decision theory requires agents to assign probabilities to states of the world and utilities to the possible outcomes of different actions. When agents commit to having the probabilities and/or utilities in a decision problem defined by objective features of the world, they may find themselves unable to decide which actions maximize expected utility. Decision theory has long recognized that work-around strategies are available in special cases; this is where dominance reasoning, minimax, and maximin play a role. Here we describe a different work around, wherein a rational decision about one decision problem can be reached by “interpolating” information from another problem that the agent believes has already been rationally solved.

Contemporary Islamophobia, while pervasive in the West, has now escalated in societies as distinct as China, India, Myanmar, and Israel in the post-9/11 era. Yet, Islamophobia is not something new, with roots from the centuries after Islam's founding. This study argues that a global-historical framework is necessary to fully understand Islamophobia's origins and impact. It extends previous global critical race and racism frameworks and their focus on whiteness to include an emphasis on the epistemological and structural foundations of global Islamophobia. Within these foundations, two key elements are forwarded as the basis for a guiding ontology of whiteness: (1) the Enlightenment-era epistemological transition from religious ways of knowing to knowledge based on controlled and controlling rationality; and (2) the institutions built by European conquest. Using this conceptual framework, the study traces a genealogy of Islamophobia to identify five key moments in its development and resurgence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. The article presents the axiological aspect of will as a phenomenon of a person's regulation of his behavior and scientific activity, in particular. The study of the mechanisms of volitional decisions in scientific knowledge is necessary, first of all, because the will is responsible for the formation of goals and the implementation of eff orts to realize them. The purpose of philosophical research is to identify the ontological sources of the phenomenon of will and their axiological analysis in scientific activity leading to creative judgments. Theoretical analysis. The axiological approach allows us to explore the possibilities of the mind, as opposed to impulsive desires, in conditions of making volitional decisions both in science and other forms of knowledge. The ontological basis of will is the presence of an obstacle, overcoming which becomes the fulfillment of a goal. In scientific activity, the will prevents the manifestation of emotional excitement, acting as a determinant of scientific research activity. An axiological analysis of will as a value and a source of positive emotions demonstrates the achievement of a goal by satisfying the need to overcome an obstacle that has a correlation with the category of singularity. Conclusion. A value analysis of the phenomenon of will shows the possibilities of human thinking for the most productive scientific activity, expressed in a combination of the optimal level of emotional stress and strong will.

Background. Individual techniques, or decision-making styles, are included in the regulation of hierarchies of processes that mediate a person’s exit from situations of uncertainty. Diagnostics of these styles helps both to solve practical problems and to clarify theoretical issues — in particular, the issue of the generalization of styles and their connections with the intellectual and personal spheres. Objective. The aim is to test and adjust the General Decision-Making Style Inventory questionnaire to a Russian sample. Study Participants. 456 people aged 18 to 50 years (M = 24.80; SD = 7.61); of these, 74 were men (M = 22.96; SD = 4.88) and 358 were women (M = 25.25; SD = 8.08), 24 subjects did not indicate gender. 80% were university students, 20% were working employees. Methods. The study included 3 stages: translation, assessment of structural validity and reliability on a Russian sample, assessment of convergent validity. 4 questionnaires were used: the General Decision-Making Style, Rational-Experiential Inventory, Personal Factors of Decision Making (PFDM), Impulsivity-7. Results. A structural model of connections between the scales (factors) of the General Decision-Making Style Questionnaire has been constructed. The model demonstrated good fit to the data and Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients were acceptable (0.75 to 0.85). The convergent validity of the questionnaire scales was confirmed. Analysis of differences by gender revealed significantly higher scores for Intuitive and Dependent styles in women. Conclusions. The General Decision-Making Styles Questionnaire has a 5-factor structure and acceptable psychometric properties. Convergent validity has been demonstrated primarily for the Rational and Intuitive styles when identifying their connections with other similar constructs. Both styles are not related to each other, but are related in the opposite way to the Spontaneous (Impulsive) style.

The present study aims on the one hand to analyze North American curriculum reforms with a focus on the twentieth century, and on the other hand it aims to demonstrate the implications of Weberian rationality theory for century-specific curriculum theory and practice. At the theoretical level the study shows the implications of Weberian rationality in the work of Dewet, Weber and Tyler. At the practical level, the main findings of the study show that the progressive period was influenced by practical rationality or more specifically instrumental rationality through the social efficiency orientation promoted by Bobbitt and Tyler. Also, the need for post-Sputnik reform of the North American curriculum led to a hyper-rationalization of education towards the imposition of external standards on schools, this trend culminating in the report "A Nation at Risk" (1983) which led to an economic approach to education. The North American curriculum reforms that followed did not abandon this trend of hyper-rationalization and standardization of education.

In this article, we provide a detailed discussion of Hasok Chang's analysis of the Chemical Revolution. Our focus lies on his use of the framework of systems of practice and his claim that the abandonment of the phlogiston theory was irrational. We argue that his framework runs into problems when applied to the chemical revolution because of its static view on the aims of the historical actors and we suggest using Nicholas Jardine's concept of the reality of questions instead as a more flexible historiographical tool. We show how Chang's claim regarding the irrational aspects of the chemical revolution follows from his strictly individualistic epistemology, leading him to see institutional and social aspects that impact the determination of aims as external to scientific rationality. We argue that a viable pragmatist and pluralist philosophy of science needs to embrace 'academic politics' as an explicit part of its view of rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for negatively valenced events to be located in the past rather than the future, and positively valenced ones to be located in the future rather than the past. Strong risk aversion is the preference to pay some cost to mitigate the badness of the worst outcome. People who are both strongly risk averse and future-biased can face a series of choices that will guarantee them more pain, for no compensating benefit: they will be pain pumped. Thus, combining these preferences is rationally impermissible. Dougherty (2011) argues that this gives us reason to think that future-bias is rationally impermissible. This argument, and a similar one presented by Greene and Sullivan (2015) , relies on the idea that if several preferences are not rationally combinable, then in the absence of some explanation of why they are not combinable, we should conclude that (at least) one of them is rationally impermissible. We take up this question by, inter alia, reflecting on the empirical results of a study we ran that probes people's risk averse and future-biased preferences. We argue that the data, in conjunction with other considerations, suggests that we should not infer from the irrationality of the combination of these preferences to the irrationality of one of the preferences singly. We also argue that given the descriptive data about these preferences, there is no reason to think that, if one of them is rationally impermissible, then it is future-bias. Finally, we reflect on the general issue of whether individual preferences are rationally evaluable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As society's reliance on software systems escalates over time, so too does the cost of failure of these systems. Meanwhile, the complexity of software systems, as well as of their designs, is also ever‐increasing, influenced by the proliferation of new tools and technologies to address intended societal needs. The traditional response to this complexity in software engineering and software architecture has been to apply rationalistic approaches to software design through methods and tools for capturing design rationale and evaluating various design options against a set of criteria. However, research from other fields demonstrates that intuition may also hold benefits for making complex design decisions. All humans, including software designers, use intuition and rationality in varying combinations. The aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive overview of what is known and unknown from existing research regarding the use and performance consequences of using intuition and rationality in software design decision‐making. To this end, a systematic literature review has been conducted, with an initial sample of 3909 unique publications and a final sample of 26 primary studies. We present an overview of existing research, based on the literature concerning intuition and rationality use in software design decision‐making and propose a research agenda with 14 questions that should encourage researchers to fill identified research gaps. This research agenda emphasizes what should be investigated to be able to develop support for the application of the two cognitive processes in software design decision‐making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the critical perspectives of scholars during the Han Dynasty on customs and beliefs related to ghosts and deities. Focusing on Wang Chong as an example, it explores the naturalistic explanations of life and death, the concept of ghosts and deities, and the associated customs of funerals, sacrifices, and taboos. Wang Chong's criticisms focused on the core ideologies that underpinned funeral practices, sacrifices, and taboos and attempted to undermine the essence of these traditional customs. By reinterpreting funeral practices, sacrifices, and taboos from a ritualistic perspective that emphasized the social function rather than their supernatural implications, Wang Chong aimed to reconcile local tradition with rationality and promote a more profound understanding of the world. His approach, though complex and at times seemingly contradictory, holds an important position among the intellectual critiques of customs and beliefs during the Han Dynasty, and it sheds light on the challenges faced by ancient Chinese scholars in navigating the intersections between rationality, morality, and religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many authors assume that we are rationally required to be somewhat moved by any recognized reason. This assumption turns out to be unjustified if not false, both in general and under any non-trivial restriction. Even its most plausible forms are contradicted by the possibility of exclusionary reasons. Some have doubted the latter's possibility. But these doubts are also shown to be unfounded, and exclusionary reasons' pervasive role in normative theorizing is defended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

De Cruz and Levy, in their commentaries on Religion as make‐believe, present distinct questions that can be addressed by clarifying one core idea. De Cruz asks whether one can rationally assess the mental state of religious credence that I theorize. Levy asks why we should not explain the data on religious "belief" merely by positing factual beliefs with religious contents, which happen to be rationally acquired through testimony. To both, I say that having religious credences is p‐irrational: a purposeful departure from rational thought and behavior, where the purpose in question is maintaining a group identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his book Prejudice, Endre Begby argues that people who hold paradigmatically prejudiced beliefs – for example, the belief that women are less adept at math than men – might be fully rational in holding those beliefs. In this article, I argue that Begby fails to provide compelling examples of beliefs that are both rational and prejudiced. On Begby's account, whether a belief is prejudiced is determined by its content: it follows that any two token beliefs with the same content will either both be prejudiced, or both unprejudiced, regardless of how they differ in other respects. I sketch an alternative account, on which whether a person's belief counts as prejudiced might be sensitive to a greater range of factors. I then turn to Bebgy's discussion of 'evidential preemption,' a phenomenon by which certain speech acts seem to inoculate themselves from having their contents disconfirmed or falsified by later counterevidence. I argue for skepticism about evidential preemption. To the extent that there is a genuine normative phenomenon in the neighborhood, it is the familiar one of testimonial defeat, in which testimony from one source is neutralized by conflicting testimony from another source that one has reason to think is more reliable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pessimists about moral deference argue that there is something special about moral beliefs which make it impermissible for agents to defer on moral matters. In this paper, I argue that, even if pessimists are right that there is something special about moral beliefs, that is not enough to render moral deference impermissible. A stronger requirement—the rationality requirement—makes deferring to experts not only permissible but also rationally required. When one does not defer to one's perceived moral expert, one either violates Belief Consistency or violates Belief Closure. The moral considerations, such as moral understanding or virtue, for not deferring to experts either fail to show that not deferring is a better option than deferring or fail to show that those moral considerations outweigh rationality requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the rationality of Weil sums of binomials of the form W u K , s = ∑ x ∈ K ψ (x s − u x) , where K is a finite field whose canonical additive character is ψ , and where u is an element of K × and s is a positive integer relatively prime to | K × | , so that x ↦ x s is a permutation of K. The Weil spectrum for K and s , which is the family of values W u K , s as u runs through K × , is of interest in arithmetic geometry and in several information-theoretic applications. The Weil spectrum always contains at least three distinct values if s is nondegenerate (i.e., if s is not a power of p modulo | K × | , where p is the characteristic of K). It is already known that if the Weil spectrum contains precisely three distinct values, then they must all be rational integers. We show that if the Weil spectrum contains precisely four distinct values, then they must all be rational integers, with the sole exception of the case where | K | = 5 and s ≡ 3 (mod 4). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to understand the distinctively human behavior from Aristotelian ethics and evolutionary science to offer a perspective of what it means to act rationally. We argue that this way of acting is characterized by a decision informed by the analysis of whether or not it is worth pursuing an end, and by certain means, which takes place through a weighting of consequences from the body of knowledge that the person has so far We also argue that such a process can occur quickly (and requiring a less cognitive effort) or slowly (and demanding more cognitive effort), depending on whether or not the person has previous experiences of choices that have generated good consequences in the type of context presented; What does it mean for a person to have or not rational heuristics established in their minds, which are those that are connected to the most current network of "whys" and that has been consolidated precisely because they have proven effective in pointing out what is best to do in that kind of context. Finally, we apply the perspective we are offering to evidence three imprecise notions about "acting rationally". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theta Functions are not an easy subject of mathematics because new researches about this wide topic are still being published regularly. The findings about Theta Functions lead directly to many applications in different fields of applied mathematics and help also to develop old interesting mathematical topics such as Poisson summation and Riemann Zeta Function. This work proves by using a theorem of Dirichlet and a previously demonstrated useful approximation that the rational inputs of Theta-3 Functions give only irrationals as outputs of these functions. This paper applies only simple notions of sequences and represents an opportunity for the students of mathematics to easily understand the steps of the demonstrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today's society is a knowledge society, where innovation and discoveries are absolutely necessary. Knowledge serves as the driving factor of society, especially since today knowledge is no longer only a human mental process, but also one that animals, and artificial intelligence, and intelligent robots, and the Internet have. The purpose of this study is to highlight the fact that the modern notion of "educated and well-informed man" presupposes not only a permanent and healthy informational competition with other members of society, but also with oneself. This implies the fact that human freedom and happiness can be acquired not only unconsciously, but also consciously, through learning, through cultivation, by becoming more elevated tomorrow than today, because the knowledgeable, well-documented human is not only stronger, but also capable to face current challenges. That is why the constant search and the presence of doubt in what he thinks, the joy of a conscious interpretation of reality will allow him to exploit his potential to the maximum, and this can ensure his true happiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that there are no irrational visual experiences, if we mean just the experiences that one is having now, but there are irrational visual experiences, if we mean also the experiences that one has had in the past. In other words, I will be arguing that perceptual irrationality is a retrospective phenomenon. So as to further support the first conjunct of my thesis, and to contextualize it among contemporary discussions, I also critique Susanna Siegel's proposal that one could be having an irrational experience, in the sense of a hijacked experience that has inherited a sub-threshold epistemic charge from a corrupt outlook. The present discussion is conducted from a Husserlian point of view, according to which perception is rational, rather than arational. I am, however, in this paper, not undertaking to defend the Husserlian view or the rationality of perception, or even to argue that the view I refer to as Husserlian is, in all aspects, the view that Edmund Husserl actually held. I aim merely to provide certain clarifications concerning the more specific topic of irrational visual experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to find strategies and ways to improve the effectiveness of principal supervision by examining other variables that have a positive and dominant influence on the effectiveness of principal supervision. From the qualitative research that has been carried out, different variables are Servant leadership and organizational culture as exogenous variables and organizational climate and personality as entering variables. The strategies and methods found were recommended to related parties, namely teachers, school principals, school supervisors, education offices, and the Ministry of Education and Culture. This study uses a combination of Correlation Research and SITOREM Analysis. This joint research methodology uses a correlation research flow, which is analyzed using SITOREM analysis. The residents in the study are all supervisors and principals of vocational schools in Bogor Regency. The sampling technique in this study uses a proportional random sampling technique, which collects data by taking a proportional population to be used as a sample. The formula used to determine the sample uses the Slovin formula with a margin of error of 5%. The study's conclusion showed a positive and significant influence of serving leadership, personality, and organizational climate on the effectiveness of principal supervision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractOne of the most debated topics among those who study heuristics is the question of their rationality. The present paper proposes an answer to this question based on the ideas of instrumental rationality and the probabilistic nature of heuristic judgments and decisions. Accordingly, it is argued that the rationality of heuristics is determined by their effectiveness, i.e., their ability to achieve a desired result. At the same time, heuristics do not always produce such a result, but only in a certain number of cases. Therefore, their effectiveness should not be evaluated by the binary logic criterion (effective/ineffective) but by the probabilistic criterion, i.e., by how often they lead to the desired result. Each heuristic has a certain objective probability of achieving such a result, which determines its rationality. However, this probability is mostly unknown to us, so when relying on heuristics, we are likely guided by a subjective perception of it, which serves as a metacognitive cue about the probability of the conclusion obtained with the help of this heuristic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behavioural economics has not only posed serious challenges for the empirical adequacy of rational choice, but also for its normative status. Since the 1990s, a large body of work has proposed various normative approaches that account for inconsistent choices. Focusing on the relevant approaches, history, methods, and limits, this article offers a literature review of the relationship between normative and behavioural economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]