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Cash usage at the point-of-sale decreased perceptibly in the past years. This is mainly due to the ongoing trend towards digitalization, but there are also indications that consumers were somewhat pushed into cashless payments by government regulations and supply-side restrictions by commercial banks. Nonetheless, overall demand for euro cash remained strong and even increased relative to GDP since the financial crisis in 2008. In this process, however, we observe a supply-driven shift towards lower banknote denominations. Central banks all over the world are intensively thinking about the potential issue of a Central Bank Digital Currency as a substitute or complement to cash. Although the characteristics of a possible digital euro have become more perceptible, its fundamental design properties remain unknown. We propose a double pre-paid scheme combining central elements of TARGET Instant Payment Settlement and electronic money features enabling offline and online instant payments. The issuance of a digital euro would be neutral to total money supply as banks act only as intermediaries. Since anonymity is categorically discarded by the ECB and as cash has some special advantages from a consumer perspective, the digital euro will rather co-circulate with cash than replace it in transactions.

To broaden the operational scope of monetary policy, several authors suggest cash abolishment as an appropriate means of breaking through the zero lower bound. The key question in this respect is: What are the costs of such a proposal? We argue that the welfare costs of bypassing the zero lower bound can be dealt with analytically and empirically by assuming negative interest rates on cash holdings. Adopting a money-in-the-utility-function (MIU) model, we measure the welfare loss in terms of theamount needed to compensate consumers (compensated variation), and as excess burden (deadweight loss) imposed on the economy. Firstly, we gauge the welfare effects of abolishing cash, both, for the Euro area and for Germany, and we perform several robustness checks. Secondly, we broaden the analysis by taking into account the liquidity services of assets included in the monetary aggregates M1 and M3, and we contrast the results for the year 2015 with those for the pre-crisis period 2005. Our findings suggest that the welfare losses of negative interest rates incurred by consumers and society are large, notably if implemented in a low interest rate environment. Imposing a negative interest rate of 3 percent on cash holdings and reducing the interest on all assets included in M3 creates a deadweight loss of € 62bn for euro area and of €18bn for Germany. The annual compensation required by consumers in the euro area as well as in Germany is equivalent to 2.2 percent of GDP or about €700 per capita. Thus, stepping into deep negative interest rates turns out to be a very costly economic experiment, leaving aside the potential risks and negative side effects of protracted and intensified unconventional monetary policy., REGENSBURG PAPERS IN MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS; 1

Despite the increasing use of cashless payment instruments, the notion that cash loses importance over time can be unambiguously refuted. In contrast, the authors show that cash demand increased steeply over the past 30 years. This is not only true on a global scale, but also for the most important currencies in advanced countries (USD, EUR, CHF, GBP and JPY). In this paper, they focus especially on the role of different crises (technological crises, financial market crises, natural disasters) and analyse the demand for small and large banknote denominations since the 1990s in an international perspective. It is evident that cash demand always increases in times of crises, independent of the nature of the crisis itself. However, largely unaffected from crises we observe a trend increase in global cash aligned with a shift from transaction balances towards more hoarding, especially in the form of large denomination banknotes.

In this paper, we focus on the role of different types of crises (technological crises, financial market crises, natural disasters) and their effects on the demand for cash in an international context. It becomes evident that over the past 30 years cash demand always increased in times of crises, independent of the nature of the crisis itself.However, the type of crises determines whether small or large banknote denominations are affected more. In case of payment uncertainties, we find a crisis-related increased demand for small denominations, probably reflecting an increased demand for transaction balances. In times of uncertainties regarding the financial and/or general economic development (also possibly driven by natural disasters), large banknote denominations were comparatively more in demand indicating that the crises-related need for non-transaction balances was the dominant driver.

Wir zeigen, dass die gängige These, Bargeld würde wegen des zunehmenden Einsatzes elektronischer Zahlungsmittel generell immer stärker an Bedeutung verlieren, sowohl im weltweiten Maßstab als auch in den Emissionsländern der international nachfragten Sorten(USD, EUR,CHF, GBPund JPY) als klar widerlegt angesehen werden kann.Besonderes Augenmerk legen wir dabeiauf die Entwicklung der Bargeldnachfrage in Krisenphasen. Hierunterscheiden wir zwischen drei verschiedenen Typen von Krisen (technologische Krisen, Finanzmarktkrisen, Naturkatastrophen) und untersuchen jeweils die krisenbedingte Nachfrage nach großen und kleinen Denominationen von Banknotenseit 1990. Dabei zeigt sich als generelles Krisen-Charakteristikum, dassin derartigenunsicheren Zeiten die Bargeldnachfrage unabhängig von der speziellen Art der Krise immer ansteigt. Dahinterstehen sowohl Transaktions - als auch Hortungsmotive. Die völlig elastische Befriedigung dieser Nachfrage durch die Zentralbanken hilft die jeweilige Situation zu beruhigen und die Unsicherheit zu reduzieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind Forderungen nach der Abschaffung von Bargeld äußerst kritisch zu sehen., REGENSBURG PAPERS IN MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS; 5

To broaden the operational scope of monetary policy, several authors suggest cash abolishment as an appropriate means of breaking through the zero lower bound. The key question in this respect is: What are the costs of such a proposal? We argue that the welfare costs of bypassing the zero lower bound can be dealt with analytically and empirically by assuming negative interest rates on cash holdings. Adopting a money-in-the-utility-function (MIU) model, we measure the welfare loss in terms of the amount needed to compensate consumers (compensated variation), and as excess burden (deadweight loss) imposed on the economy. Firstly, we gauge the welfare effects of abolishing cash, both, for the Euro area and for Germany, and we perform several robustness checks. Secondly, we broaden the analysis by taking into account the liquidity services of assets included in the monetary aggregates M1 and M3, and we contrast the results for the year 2015 with those for the pre-crisis period 2005. Our findings suggest that the welfare losses of negative interest rates incurred by consumers and society are large, notably if implemented in a low interest rate environment. Imposing a negative interest rate of 3 percent on cash holdings and reducing the interest on all assets included in M3 creates a deadweight loss of € 62bn for euro area and of €18bn for Germany. The annual compensation required by consumers in the euro area as well as in Germany is equivalent to 2.2 percent of GDP or about €700 per capita. Thus, stepping into deep negative interest rates turns out to be a very costly economic experiment, leaving aside the potential risks and negative side effects of protracted and intensified unconventional monetary policy.

To broaden the scope of monetary policy, cash abolishment is often suggested as a means of breaking through the zero lower bound. However, practically nothing is said about the welfare costs of such a proposal. Rösl, Seitz and Tödter argue that the welfare costs of bypassing the zero lower bound can be analyzed analytically and empirically by assuming negative interest rates on cash holdings. They gauge the welfare effects of abolishing cash, both, for the euro area and for Germany. Their findings suggest that the welfare losses of negative interest rates incurred by money holders are large, notably if implemented in the current low interest rate environment. Imposing a negative interest rate of 3 percentage points on cash holdings and reducing the interest on all assets included in M3 creates a deadweight loss of € 62bn for the euro area and of €18bn for Germany. Therefore, the authors argue that cash abolishment or negative interest rates on cash to break through the zero lower bound at any price can hardly be a meaningful policy goal.

Die repressive Niedrigzinspolitik der EZB führt nach unseren Berechnungen zu geschätzten Zinsverlusten für die deutschen Sparer in einer Größenordnung von 70 Mrd. € pro Jahr. Die Zinsverluste sind höher als die finanziellen Belastungen durch Kapitalertragsteuer und Güterpreisinflation. Dieser Rechnung stehen jedoch die Entlastungen gegenüber, die auf Seiten der (insbesondere öffentlichen) Schuldner zu buchen sind. Wir kalkulieren die gesamten Netto-Wohlfahrtseffekte mehrstufig im Rahmen eines Modells überlappender Generationen. Danach führt die Kapitalertragsteuer zu einer wohlfahrtsmindernden Zusatzlast (deadweight loss) im Gegenwert von 10 Mrd. €, während die Zusatzlast einer permanenten Inflationsrate von 1,5% p.a. bei 33 Mrd. € liegt. Die seit 2010 von der EZB verfolgte krisenbedingte Niedrigzinspolitik ist für Deutschland mit einer Zusatzlast von 39 Mrd. € pro Jahr (1,4% des BIP) verbunden. Damit überschreiten bereits jetzt die kumulierten Wohlfahrtseinbußen in Deutschland die Primäreffekte der Krise, deren Folgen die EZB mit der extremen Niedrigzinspolitik zu bekämpfen versucht. According to our calculations the interest income losses for German savers as a result of ECB's monetary policy of extreme low interest rates amount to €70 billion per year. These losses exceed the financial costs of capital yields taxes and the inflation of goods prices. However, this calculation does not take into account that (notably public) debtors benefit from the policy of low interest rates. We use an overlapping generations (OLG) model in order to calculate stepwise the net welfare costs. Capital yields taxes impose an excess burden (deadweight loss) of €10 billion per year and the deadweight loss resulting from a permanent inflation rate of 1.5% p.a. totals to €33 billion per year. In comparison, the monetary policy of low interest rates that is conducted by the ECB since 2010 corresponds to a deadweight loss in welfare of €39 billion or 1.4% of GDP per year. Hence, the cumulated net welfare losses resulting from the subsequent ECB policy of easy money already exceeds the primary effects of the financial crisis by now.

Ende letzten Jahres hat die Europäische Zentralbank einen Beschluß mit weitreichenden Veränderungen über die Verteilung der monetären Einkünfte der nationalen Zentralbanken der Euroländer gefaßt. Welche Veränderungen kommen auf die einzelnen Nationalbanken zu? Wer gehört zu den Verlierern, wer zu den Gewinnern?

In dem vorliegenden Papier versuchen wir den Bestand der Euro-Banknoten zu ermitteln, der sich von der deutschen Banknotenemission im Ausland befindet. Dabei unterscheiden wir nach Beständen, die außerhalb des Euro-Währungsraumes gehalten werden, und solchen, die in anderen Ländern der EWU zirkulieren. Die Analyse basiert auf Ansätzen, die den Auslandsumlauf auf indirektem Wege abschätzen. Der Untersuchungszeitraum reicht von 2002 bis 2009. Wir finden heraus, dass Ende 2009 insgesamt rund zwei Drittel der deutschen kumulierten Nettoemissionen im Ausland umliefen. Der größte Teil, etwa 160 Mrd. €, befand sich außerhalb des Euro-Raums, der Rest - 80 Mrd. € - lief in anderen EWU-Ländern um. Somit entsprach der Inlandsumlauf deutscher Euro-Banknoten nur rund einem Drittel aller von der Bundesbank in Höhe von 350 Mrd. € in Umlauf gegebenen Banknoten. Damit werden die Ergebnisse direkter Ansätze bestätigt. In this paper, we endeavour to determine the volume of euro banknotes issued by Germany that is in circulation outside Germany. In so doing, we draw a distinction between banknotes outstanding in non-euro-area countries and those that are in circulation in other euro-area countries. The analysis is based on approaches that estimate the volume of banknotes in circulation outside Germany indirectly. The observation period runs from 2002 to 2009. We discover that, at the end of 2009, a total of roughly two-thirds of Germany's cumulated net issuance of euro banknotes was in circulation outside Germany. The lion's share of roughly €160 billion was in non-euro-area countries, with the remaining €80 billion in other euro-area countries. Thus, the volume of German euro banknotes in circulation in Germany accounted for only roughly one-third of all banknotes issued by the Deutsche Bundesbank (€350 billion). This confirms the results of direct approaches.

In dem vorliegenden Papier versuchen wir, den Bestand der Euro-Banknoten zu ermitteln, der sich von der deutschen Banknotenemission im Ausland befindet. Dabei unterscheiden wir nach Beständen, die außerhalb des Euro-Währungsraums umlaufen, und solchen, die in anderen Ländern der EWU zirkulieren. Die Auswertung basiert auf verschiedenen verfügbaren Statistiken und Befragungen, die hilfsweise verwendet werden (direkte Ansätze). Der Untersuchungszeitraum geht von 2002 bis 2009. Wir finden heraus, dass insgesamt ca. 220 Mrd. € an deutschen Euro-Banknoten im Ausland umlaufen. Der größte Teil, etwa 160 Mrd. €, befindet sich außerhalb des Euro-Raums, der Rest - 60 Mrd. € - läuft in anderen EWU-Ländern um. Damit entspricht der Inlandsumlauf von Euro-Banknoten in Deutschland Ende 2009 (rd. 130 Mrd. €) nur rund einem Drittel aller von der Deutschen Bundesbank in Umlauf gegebenen Banknoten (350 Mrd. €).

In this paper, we endeavour to determine the volume of euro banknotes issued by Germany that is in circulation outside Germany. In so doing, we draw a distinction between banknotes outstanding in non-euro-area countries and those that are in circulation in other euro-area countries. The analysis is based on approaches that estimate the volume of banknotes in circulation outside Germany indirectly. The observation period runs from 2002 to 2009. We discover that, at the end of 2009, a total of roughly two-thirds of Germany's cumulated net issuance of euro banknotes was in circulation outside Germany. The lion's share of roughly €160 billion was in non-euro-area countries, with the remaining €80 billion in other euro-area countries. Thus, the volume of German euro banknotes in circulation in Germany accounted for only roughly one-third of all banknotes issued by the Deutsche Bundesbank (€350 billion). This confirms the results of direct approaches. In dem vorliegenden Papier versuchen wir den Bestand der Euro-Banknoten zu ermitteln, der sich von der deutschen Banknotenemission im Ausland befindet. Dabei unterscheiden wir nach Beständen, die außerhalb des Euro-Währungsraumes gehalten werden, und solchen, die in anderen Ländern der EWU zirkulieren. Die Analyse basiert auf Ansätzen, die den Auslandsumlauf auf indirektem Wege abschätzen. Der Untersuchungszeitraum reicht von 2002 bis 2009. Wir finden heraus, dass Ende 2009 insgesamt rund zwei Drittel der deutschen kumulierten Nettoemissionen im Ausland umliefen. Der größte Teil, etwa 160 Mrd. €, befand sich außerhalb des Euro-Raums, der Rest - 80 Mrd. € - lief in anderen EWU-Ländern um. Somit entsprach der Inlandsumlauf deutscher Euro-Banknoten nur rund einem Drittel aller von der Bundesbank in Höhe von 350 Mrd. € in Umlauf gegebenen Banknoten. Damit werden die Ergebnisse direkter Ansätze bestätigt.

In this paper, we analyze the volume of euro banknotes issued by Germany within the euro area with several seasonal methods. We draw a distinction between movements within Germany, circulation outside Germany but within the euro area and demand from non-euroarea countries. Our approach suggests that only about 20% of euro notes issued by Germany are used for transactions in Germany. The rest is hoarded (10%), circulates in other euro area countries (25%) or is held outside the euro area (45%). In dem vorliegenden Papier analysieren wir die Emissionen von Euro-Banknoten durch die Deutsche Bundesbank anhand verschiedener saisonaler Ansätze. Wir unterscheiden zwischen der Nachfrage aus Deutschland, der Haltung in anderen Euro-Ländern und Umlauf außerhalb des Euro-Währungsgebiets. Es stellt sich heraus, dass nur ca. 20 % der emittierten Banknoten für Transaktionszwecke in Deutschland gebraucht werden. Der Rest wird aus unterschiedlichen Gründen gehortet (10 %), läuft in anderen EWU-Ländern um (25 %) oder wird außerhalb des Euro-Raums gehalten.

In this paper, we endeavour to determine the volume of euro banknotes issued by Germany that is in circulation outside Germany. In so doing, we draw a distinction between banknotes outstanding in non-euro-area countries and those that are in circulation in other euro-area countries. The analysis is based on various available statistics and, as an additional aid, on surveys (direct approaches). The observation period runs from 2002 to 2009. We discover that German euro banknotes to a total amount of approximately €220 billion are in circulation outside Germany. The lion's share of roughly €160 billion is in non-euro-area countries, with the remaining €60 billion in other euro-area countries. Thus, the volume of outstanding euro banknotes in Germany at the end of 2009 (around €130 billion) accounts for only roughly one-third of all banknotes issued by the Deutsche Bundesbank (€350 billion). In dem vorliegenden Papier versuchen wir, den Bestand der Euro-Banknoten zu ermitteln, der sich von der deutschen Banknotenemission im Ausland befindet. Dabei unterscheiden wir nach Beständen, die außerhalb des Euro-Währungsraums umlaufen, und solchen, die in anderen Ländern der EWU zirkulieren. Die Auswertung basiert auf verschiedenen verfügbaren Statistiken und Befragungen, die hilfsweise verwendet werden (direkte Ansätze). Der Untersuchungszeitraum geht von 2002 bis 2009. Wir finden heraus, dass insgesamt ca. 220 Mrd. € an deutschen Euro-Banknoten im Ausland umlaufen. Der größte Teil, etwa 160 Mrd. €, befindet sich außerhalb des Euro-Raums, der Rest - 60 Mrd. € - läuft in anderen EWU-Ländern um. Damit entspricht der Inlandsumlauf von Euro-Banknoten in Deutschland Ende 2009 (rd. 130 Mrd. €) nur rund einem Drittel aller von der Deutschen Bundesbank in Umlauf gegebenen Banknoten (350 Mrd. €).

In a surprisingly growing number of regions in Germany private "regional currencies" are issued as a cash substitute for the euro. Currently, these regional currencies are conceived almost exclusively as Schwundgeld (depreciative currency), which loses value on a predetermined timescale. This loss of value is intended to encourage the money owners to spend their money quickly in order to boost local demand. The paper shows that the issuance of unofficial parallel currencies is not a fundamentally new phenomenon neither in Germany nor in other European countries. The theoretical assumptions of the Schwundgeld concept (Silvio Gesell (1862 – 1930)) are highly flawed and suboptimal from a welfare-theoretical perspective. However, the current economic welfare losses resulting from the issuance of Schwundgeld are negligibly small.

Die Satzung des Europäischen Systems der Zentralbanken sieht eine Umverteilung von Geldschöpfungsgewinnen (Seigniorage) zwischen den Notenbanken des Eurosystems vor. Die Diskussion um die «Gewinner» und «Verlierer» aus dieser Regelung wird sehr kontrovers geführt. Die Arbeit versucht, diese Umverteilungsproblematik systematisch zu analysieren. Insbesondere die theoretischen Grundlagen des Seigniorage, die mannigfaltigen Tätigkeiten der EWU-Zentralbanken und deren Auswirkungen auf die Entstehung der Notenbankgewinne sowie die Verwendung der Geldschöpfungsgewinne werden detailliert untersucht.