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Summary: Despite (or because of) this liberalization demanded by banks and multinational firms, the economic and financial crises have continued to take different forms since 1991: the financial bubble, the balance of payments crisis, the financial panic, bankruptcy or moral hazard. Risk taking and speculation tend to become the main activities of banks in the financial sector. After a strong call in 2008 for a reform of the financial system, particularly with the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) or the European Union (MSU, Single Supervisory Mechanism, and MRU, Single Resolution Mechanism), the risks of a crisis are always high. Under the pressure of the banking system, the separation between commercial banks and investment banks is not always effective. Secondly, international financing rules are not always respected, and several banks have been accused of fraudulent transactions, particularly in the United States. Finally, financial innovation becomes an effective means of speculation. It facilitated tax evasion and encouraged governments to reduce taxes and public investment. The question arises whether banks still finance the economy, while still benefiting from the support of central banks. New systems come competition in the financial field, including crypto-currencies (bitcoin), pension funds and Islamic banks., Document de travail sur Conflits et guerre économique » Pré-publication Grenoble 2019 Résumé : Malgré (ou à cause) de cette libéralisation réclamée par les banques et les firmes multinationales, les crises économiques et financières ont continué à se succéder sous des formes différentes depuis 1991 : la bulle financière, la crise de la balance des paiements, la panique financière, la banqueroute ou l'aléa moral. Les prises de risque et la spéculation tendent à devenir les activités principales des banques dans le secteur proprement financier. Après un appel fort en 2008 en faveur d'une réforme du système financier, notamment auprès de la BRI (Banque des Règlements Internationaux) ou de l'Union européenne (MSU, Mécanisme de surveillance unique, et MRU, Mécanisme de résolution unique). Cependant, La séparation entre les banques commerciales et les banques d'investissement n'est pas toujours effective, sous la pression du monde bancaire, dont plusieurs membres ont été accusées d'opérations frauduleuses, notamment aux Etats-Unis. L'innovation financière devient un moyen efficace de spéculation. Elle a facilité l'évasion fiscale et incité les gouvernants à réduire les impôts et les investissements publics. La question se pose de savoir si les banques financent encore l'économie, tout en bénéficiant toujours du soutien des banques centrales. Des systèmes nouveaux viennent la concurrence dans le domaine financier, notamment les crypto-monnaies (bitcoin), les fonds de pension et les banques islamiques.

RESUMENAnte la disolución de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS), la desaparición del Consejo de Ayuda Mutua Económica (came), y el florecimiento del neoliberalismo en un mundo globalizado y desregulado económica y financieramente, Cuba país dirigido económicamente por el Estado ha realizado una serie de reformas para concertar su tránsito lento y complicado hacia un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo capitalista que le permita sortear sus problemas internos y la crisis mundial. Estas transformaciones han acelerado su ritmo con la llegada al poder de Raúl Castro y el restablecimiento de relaciones político-diplomáticas con los Estados Unidos de América. A fin de demostrar esta situación, presentamos aspectos generales de Cuba, y analizamos los alcances a corto, mediano y largo plazo de las reformas económicas.AbstractIn the wake of the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the disappearance of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (comecon), and the flourishing of neoliberalism in a globalized and economically and financially deregulated world, Cuba, with a State-directed economy, has undertaken a series of reforms to begin its slow and complicated transition toward a new paradigm of capitalist development, which will permit it to sort out its domestic problems and deal with the global crisis. These transformations took off with the arrival of Raúl Castro to power and the reopening of political and diplomatic relations with the United States of America. To depict the current scenario, this paper introduces some general aspects of Cuba and analyzes them in the short-, medium-, and long-term scope of the economic reforms.

The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2008. Policymakers in the EU and the US set ambitious reform efforts in motion to better protect consumers of financial services. Decisions to reform credit regulations marked the end of highly politicized reform debates in the US Congress as well as in the European Parliament, involving lobbying from business associations and civil society groups, in which proponents of reforms would normally have been considered to be much weaker than their opponents. Paradoxically, a poorly-resourced civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent regulatory change. What, then, explains that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? Le but de l’étude est de mettre en question la capture de régulation par les intérêts concentrés de la finance dans les débats sur les mesures à prendre après la crise du crédit partie des États-Unis en 2008. Les décideurs publics de ce pays et de l’Union européenne ont entrepris des efforts de réforme ambitieux pour mieux protéger les consommateurs de services financiers. Les débats au Congrès des États-Unis et au Parlement européen se sont achevés sur des décisions importantes concernant la réglementation du crédit. Fortement politisés, ils avaient suscité un lobbying intense des groupes d’intérêt de la finance et de la société civile, où normalement ces derniers auraient été tenus pour beaucoup plus faibles que leurs adversaires. Paradoxalement, une coalition de la société civile aux moyens modestes a réussi à convaincre les décideurs de la nécessité du changement et à contrecarrer les efforts du lobby financier pour l’empêcher. Qu’est-ce qui explique que des acteurs faibles et périphériques l’ont emporté sur des acteurs riches et puissants ? Programme doctoral en Science Politique, mention Sociologie politique comparée The Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo) et le Centre d'études européennes (CEE)

The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2008. Policymakers in the EU and the US set ambitious reform efforts in motion to better protect consumers of financial services. Decisions to reform credit regulations marked the end of highly politicized reform debates in the US Congress as well as in the European Parliament, involving lobbying from business associations and civil society groups, in which proponents of reforms would normally have been considered to be much weaker than their opponents. Paradoxically, a poorly-resourced civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent regulatory change. What, then, explains that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors?; Le but de l’étude est de mettre en question la capture de régulation par les intérêts concentrés de la finance dans les débats sur les mesures à prendre après la crise du crédit partie des États-Unis en 2008. Les décideurs publics de ce pays et de l’Union européenne ont entrepris des efforts de réforme ambitieux pour mieux protéger les consommateurs de services financiers. Les débats au Congrès des États-Unis et au Parlement européen se sont achevés sur des décisions importantes concernant la réglementation du crédit. Fortement politisés, ils avaient suscité un lobbying intense des groupes d’intérêt de la finance et de la société civile, où normalement ces derniers auraient été tenus pour beaucoup plus faibles que leurs adversaires. Paradoxalement, une coalition de la société civile aux moyens modestes a réussi à convaincre les décideurs de la nécessité du changement et à contrecarrer les efforts du lobby financier pour l’empêcher. Qu’est-ce qui explique que des acteurs faibles et périphériques l’ont emporté sur des acteurs riches et puissants ?

The main goal of this dissertation is to highlight the beneficial effects of financial development resulting from financial reforms on performance of infrastructure industries, hence on economic growth, in emerging and developing countries through a set of empirical analyses on the power sector. The first chapter seeks to demonstrate that financial reforms implemented by a host of countries over the past decades have effectively improved financial systems’ development using a dataset on 54 emerging and developing countries incorporating newly available dimensions of reforms that have been applied in these countries’ financial sector during the mid-1970s through mid-2000s time period. We find a gradual, possibly two-year lagged, but positive and significant global effect of the reforms on the overall level of development of the financial sector. More importantly, when the impacts of the banking and securities markets reforms on the respective sub-sectors are separately examined, we find that the reforms effectively spur the depth of the banking sector and stock markets’ size and liquidity as early as the year of their implementation. Interestingly enough, and consistent with the literature, our findings provide strong evidence that economic development, country risk, and the quality of institutions are key determinants of the financial sector level of development suggesting that these factors do affect the effectiveness of the reforms. In particular, higher economic, financial, and political risk, poorer quality and effectiveness of the legal system, and a more corrupt economic and political system have significant adverse effects on financial development. Regression results also highlight that low fiscal deficit and trade liberalization are beneficial to the financial sector’s deepening.In the second chapter, we assess the extent to which the level of development of a country’s financial sector is a factor that draws private participation in infrastructure projects financing. We investigate this issue for the case of the energy sector in a 1990-2007 dataset on 56 developing and emerging countries and find that, unambiguously, a financial sector that offers proper financing solutions and risk-mitigating tools indeed contributes to improving private participation in energy projects. As expected, both economic development and macroeconomic stability are found to be significant determinants of a country’s appeal to private investors. While greater energy needs, as reflected in important network losses, are found to attract private participation, political, economic, and financial risks dampen private investors will to participate in energy projects. A couple of interesting results that come out of the analysis, which contradict some existing empirical studies, is that higher interest rates and exchange rate risk do not divert away private investors from energy projects. These results can be interpreted as evidence of the positive role played by agreements schemes with governments in building investors’ confidence in the developing countries’ economic climate.Putting together results from the two previous chapters, we make the hypothesis of the existence of a significant empirical link between infrastructure and financial sectors reforms the effects of which are reflected in infrastructure sectors growth and performance. In the third chapter, we seek to demonstrate this hypothesis which empirical validity would imply that infrastructure sectors can be expected to benefit from financial reforms in terms of growth and performance. We investigate the impact of four important components of the power sector reforms in developing countries on some of this sector’s performance outcomes and assess the contribution of the domestic financial systems. The power sector reform policies examined are the unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution, the introduction of competition typically coupled with the implementation of privatization programs in the generation and distribution segments, and the creation of an independent energy regulatory authority. In a dataset on 42 developing countries covering the 1990-2005 period, we find that private participation in generation and distribution has significantly improved power supply and operational efficiency as reflected in higher electricity generation per capita, greater labor productivity, lower distribution losses, and better coverage. The creation of a separate regulatory agency is also found to have enhanced the sector’s performance in terms of actual output, labor productivity, and coverage.Interestingly, we find that the effects of the unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution segments, and the creation and experience of an autonomous regulator have been exacerbated by the modernization of the financial systems. In particular, deeper and more liquid financial markets have eased access to long-term financing for operators allowing them to upgrade their networks and hence to increase output, decrease power losses in distribution, and increase labor productivity and access. Therefore, these empirical results suggest that countries that have implemented reforms that deepen most their domestic financial systems have been able to tap on more benefits from their infrastructure sectors’ reforms., L’objectif de cette étude est de mettre en lumière les effets bénéfiques du développement des systèmes financiers sur la performance des industries d’infrastructure, donc sur la croissance économique, dans les pays en voie de développement à travers une série d’analyses empiriques sur le secteur de l’énergie. Les résultats du premier chapitre mettent en évidence un effet positif et significatif, bien que graduel, des réformes financières sur le niveau de développement du secteur financier.Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous confirmons que le niveau de développement du secteur financier d’un pays le rend plus attractif du point de vue des investisseurs privés pour le financement des projets d’énergie. Les résultats montrent également que ces investisseurs prennent en compte le niveau de développement économique, la stabilité macroéconomique, les risques pays et la qualité des institutions dans leur décision de participer à ces projets.Étant donné ces conclusions, nous testons dans le troisième chapitre l’hypothèse de l’existence d’une relation significative entre les réformes des secteurs de l’électricité et financier dont les effets se reflètent dans la performance du secteur électrique. Nos résultats montrent que l’implication du secteur privé et la création d’une autorité de régulation améliorent l’offre d’électricité et la fiabilité du réseau. De plus, les impacts positifs du dégroupage des segments du secteur et de la régulation sont exacerbés par la modernisation des systèmes financiers. Ces résultats suggèrent donc qu’en facilitant l’accès au financement, un secteur financier plus développé permet aux opérateurs de moderniser et améliorer la performance de leurs réseaux.