Search

Copyright of Danisname Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences is the property of Global Security & Strategy Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the fourth chapter of Pointers and Remarks (Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt), Avicenna draws conclusions from the univocality of extension within a certain category, positing the existence of an immaterial entity alongside materialistic extensions. Avicenna’s treatment of the relationship between universals and their extensions often resembles the familial bond between fathers and sons (plurality within plurality). However, in the fourth chapter of Pointers and Remarks, he introduces a novel model akin to the relationship between a single father and his sons (unity within plurality). By examining interpretations and comments on Pointers and Remarks, we delve into this conceptual tension. While Avicenna’s argument establishes the existence of universals in the external world, it falls short of proving their immaterial nature. His perspective aligns with realism, yet it also echoes Hamedani Man (al-Rajul al-Hamidānī)’s stance on universals—a viewpoint that necessitates reform and reconstruction. Employing a historical approach, we critically assess these ideas to arrive at a more coherent perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research endeavors to introduce a novel concept in ethics, namely ethics based on the primacy of existence, drawing upon Aṣālat al-wujūd, the theory of the primacy of existence in ontology. Mullā Sadrā's philosophy, which has three basic tenets—the primacy of existence, substantial motion (Ḥarakat-i Juharī), and gradation in existence (Tashkīk-i wujūd)—is the basis for this doctrine. The primacy of existence holds that quiddity is a mental construct and that existence is fundamental. The writers distinguished between two conceptions of ethics in this regard: one based on existence and the other on quiddity. Human quiddity is fixed and does not grade, hence ethics based on quiddity's primacy will always be fixed and the same for every individual. Moral obligations are universal and shared by all individuals. On the other hand, moral obligations for humans might vary depending on their existential status, according to ethics grounded in the primacy of existence. Moral oughts and ought nots are established by human existential grades in this ethics. This ethical model is flexible and dynamic.

This research endeavors to introduce a novel concept in ethics, namely ethics based on the primacy of existence, drawing upon Aṣālat al-wujūd, the theory of the primacy of existence in ontology. Mullā Sadrā's philosophy, which has three basic tenets--the primacy of existence, substantial motion (Ḥarakat-i Juharī), and gradation in existence (Tashkīk-i wujūd)--is the basis for this doctrine. The primacy of existence holds that quiddity is a mental construct and that existence is fundamental. The writers distinguished between two conceptions of ethics in this regard: one based on existence and the other on quiddity. Human quiddity is fixed and does not grade, hence ethics based on quiddity's primacy will always be fixed and the same for every individual. Moral obligations are universal and shared by all individuals. On the other hand, moral obligations for humans might vary depending on their existential status, according to ethics grounded in the primacy of existence. Moral oughts and ought nots are established by human existential grades in this ethics. This ethical model is flexible and dynamic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mulla Sadra has demonstrated "The Principality of Existence" as the basis of the Transcendent Philosophy based on solid arguments and by studying the scholars before him, he considered the peripatetics to believe in The Principality of Existence and the Ishraqi in the principality of Quiddity. Although the question of the principality of Existence or Quiddity has not been raised in this way by early scholars, by examining their works and expressions, one of the parties to the issue in question can be attributed to them. This research seeks to find the opinion of 'Ghias al-din Mansur Dashtaki' on this matter. By examining his texts and expressions in a descriptive-analitical method based on Sadra's philosophy; while providing convincing evidence, the belief in the 'The Principiality of Quiddity' can be deduced from Ghias al-din Mansur. The above evidence will be presented and the claim will be explained in this research. Ghias al-din considers the concept of 'Existence' as one of the validations of the secondary intelligible and redundant on quiddity, denying the realization of any individual and external instances for it.

In ten of his works, Al-Fārābī discusses ousia/substance and its derivatives. Among these works, we frequently encounter quotations from Aristotle and Al-Fārābī's interpretation of them. He accepts the established meaning of ousia as substance and doesn't argue against its translation to maujūd, Eyn, maahiy[y]at and ẕāt. This article tries to show the similarities and differences between Al-Fārābī and Aristotle conceptions of substance and then to bridge between the two innovative theories of Al-Fārābī: one in his division of existence and another regarding his view on reality. In discussing the concept of substance, Farabi seeks to create a unity between Plato and Aristotle's views. In another way, this claim can be expressed that Farabi aims to create a unity between the book of metaphysics and Aristotle's treatise on categories. In this direction, his innovative theory of substance is born. Also, this paper shows some inconsistencies existing in his discussion, which makes his philosophical language even more ambiguous than Aristotle's in Metaphysics and subject to various interpretations. Finally, the relation between the concept of substance and the concepts of shai and tashakhkhos is discussed.

The article discusses the problem of the existence of the fundamental non-dispositional intrinsic qualities of matter (quiddities) and arguments for two opposite views, quidditism and dispositionalism (causal structuralism). In support of quidditism, arguments by Howard Robinson, John Foster and Philip Goff are deployed. These arguments highlight the incoherence or unintelligibility of the doctrine that the whole reality is just a network of causal relations without any qualitative filler in the nodes of the network. Sydney Shoemaker’s influential argument for dispositionalism, in the article “Causality and Properties”, is analysed and responded. The case is made that Shoemaker’s objections against the existence of fundamental properties whose identity “consists of something logically independent of their causal potentialities” can be neutralised on the assumption that our world is operated by ontologically fundamental laws of nature in virtue of which quiddities have constant causal potentialities. Quidditism with this assumption makes it possible to know all the same properties of matter as dispositionalism, viz., dispositional properties and spatiotemporal relations. So, pace Shoemaker, it has no “disastrous epistemological consequences”. Although such quidditism expands (as compared with dispositionalism) ontology by attributing matter not only with knowable dispositional properties (causal structures) but also with quiddities, which are in a sense unknowable, this ontological exuberance is justified by the need to avoid the vicious regress of powers entailed by dispositionalism.

Philosophers and theologians before Mullā Ṣadrā had diverse views about the ontological status of existence. Paying attention to their opinions is very important to understand Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of ontological priority of existence. On the other hand, philosophers and theologians have dealt with this issue in different positions, and in some cases, there seems to be an apparent inconsistency. In contemporary works, there is no comprehensive examination about these diverse views. This article seeks to shed light on this issue. Peripatetic philosophers considered existence to exist and most likely considered it to be an accident. Suhrawardī and his followers criticized this opinion and considered existence as a secondary intelligible and non-existent. Many later philosophers and theologians also preferred Suhrawardī's viewpoint. While denying that existence is an accident, some theologians considered it to exist outside but to be identical with quiddity. They thought that their view is immune to Suhrawardī's criticisms. According to this opinion, for existence to exist, it does not need to be an accident to quiddity. Another related problem was that philosophers maintained that the universal concept of existence has external instances called particular beings. This is incompatible with existence being a secondary intelligible. ʿAbd-al-Razzāq Lāhījī tried to resolve the inconsistency. According to Lāhījī's solution, existence is external, but does not exist in external reality. This solution can be criticized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following Avicenna, many Muslim philosophers and logicians have identified 'intellectual universal' (kullī ʿaqlī) with the very mental concept dependent on the mind. Apart from the controversies about Platonic Forms, they argue that they cannot be the very universals in logic. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā's commentators have interpreted their view on intellectual universal in the Avicennian framework. In this interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā has embraced Avicenna's explanation about mind-dependent universal concepts; however, he has modified some details of the issue as per his theory of the primacy of existence and Plato's theory of Forms. Having explained Sabzawārī and Ṭabāṭabā'ī's interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā's view in his article, the author goes to propose a different interpretation according to which intellectual universals are identical with Platonic Forms, rather than the mind-dependent universal concepts. This Platonic interpretation is supported by three sets of evidences from Mullā Ṣadrā's own texts. It also shows how Mullā Ṣadrā has answered Avicenna's objection about the use of Platonic universal in logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ten of his works, Al-Fārābī discusses ousia/substance and its derivatives. Among these works, we frequently encounter quotations from Aristotle and Al-Fārābī's interpretation of them. He accepts the established meaning of ousia as substance and doesn't argue against its translation to maujūd, Eyn, maahiy[y]at and ẕāt. This article tries to show the similarities and differences between Al-Fārābī and Aristotle conceptions of substance and then to bridge between the two innovative theories of Al-Fārābī: one in his division of existence and another regarding his view on reality. In discussing the concept of substance, Farabi seeks to create a unity between Plato and Aristotle's views. In another way, this claim can be expressed that Farabi aims to create a unity between the book of metaphysics and Aristotle's treatise on categories. In this direction, his innovative theory of substance is born. Also, this paper shows some inconsistencies existing in his discussion, which makes his philosophical language even more ambiguous than Aristotle's in Metaphysics and subject to various interpretations. Finally, the relation between the concept of substance and the concepts of shai and tashakhkhos is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparing the intuitions and thoughts of Muslim mystics and Suhrawardī regarding the existence of God and the Light of lights and extracting the differences and commonalities of their views provide the ground for promoting their thoughts and also the optimal use of their works. This article, with a descriptive-analytical method, tries to prove the states of inclusive unity (wāḥidiyya) and exclusive unity (aḥadiyya) in the essence of the Light of lights and argue for the ontological primacy of existence in the Illuminationist philosophy of Suhrawardī. Two questions are dealt with in this article. The first is whether, despite his lack of explication, the intuitive divine states of inclusive and exclusive unity of mystics' God can be ascribed to Suhrawardī's Light of lights, too. The second issue is whether according to Suhrawardī's implicit endorsement of the primacy of existence, the existence of Suhrawardī's God is the same as the existence of mystics' God, and according to his endorsement of the primacy of quiddity, they are not the same. The result is that Suhrawardī has implicitly accepts the mystic states of inclusive and exclusive unity of God and renders the existence of God and the Light of lights identical, not their quiddities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For a long time, the question of God's quiddity has been discussed in the words of philosophers and theologians. Most of the theologians have been positive about God's having a quiddity and most of the philosophers have opposed it. Both groups have presented several proofs for their claims, some of which are based on specific foundations. Examining these arguments shows that the interpretation and explanation of the truth of the existence and essence of the Necessary can be so decisive in this debate. Noticing the concomitants of quiddity can also help to reach a conclusion in the discussion. If we consider quiddity to be completely dependent on existence or if we consider the limitation as one of its concomitants, then we must negate quiddity from the Necessary, but if both of these are refuted, then we cannot negate quiddity from Him. In this article, the first claim is proven to be true and the second to be incomplete. The evidence supporting the necessity of quiddity for God is not sufficient, and therefore, because quiddity is essentially dependent on existence and cannot precede existence in any way, quiddity is negated from God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

sometimes, imagination of philosophy issue is more important and more difficult than its judgment, and principality of existence issue is from these issues. in this article, we have surveyed to some of imagination meanings of this issue.also we have surveyed to two explanation of disputable point; and we have surveyed with reasons of principality of existence to some of imagination meanings. explanation of disputable point, which is an important issue in this field, is not mentioned in Mullah Sadra's books. But people like Sabzevari, Tabatabai and others have paid it. In the meantime, modares Zunuzi has written a comprehensive and precise explanation of disputable point on the issue. Some have criticized this and we have responded to them. In this article, the meanings of the quiddity, existence, imagination meanings, and limitation of the dispute are discussed. It addresses issues such as whether there are personal or some kind of phenomena in this issue.

What is it that determines the identity of an entity? Processualism is a theoretical perspective that offers a startling answer to this question. The identity of an entity—whether human or nonhuman, animate or inanimate—depends on the set of relations in which this entity is located. And as the sets of relations are several, so are the identities that an entity can take. This article discusses this conclusion by integrating processual accounts from different fields of inquiry, such as relativistic physics and actor-network theory. According to a processual interpretation of relativistic physics, speaking of states of things is but an abstraction. For states come from the introduction of arbitrary (physically meaningless) breakups of the spacetime continuum. Therefore, processes precede states, a process being a set of relations that confers identity on a physical state. According to a processual interpretation of actor-network theory, the same holds true for actors. Again, speaking of states of actors is but an abstraction. For what really acts is heterogeneous networks. When one describes actors in isolation, one is neglecting a whole array of relations with other actors whereby that actor can act or is made to act in such and such a way. These strands of processualism come to the same conclusion as to the identity of entities. These are not characterized by individuality but by individua(bi)lity: they can be differently individuated according to the set of relations one is able to take into account. The main methodological consequence is that, if one intends to describe what an entity is, knowledge of this entity—whether human or nonhuman, animate or inanimate—should be based on progressively less narrow localizations and mappings of the relations it has to other entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presentation of an appropriate criterion for understanding the nature of contract will result in useful application of this credit-based instrument in administration of the legal relations in a society. This is because lack of an appropriate criterion will cause discord and disagreement on determining articles of the contract and will eventually result in increasing cost of administering social relations, lack of certainty and lack of predictability. On this basis, the principal question of this research paper is about the nature of contract. To find an appropriate answer to the principal question of “What is the nature of a contract?” we have applied a descriptive-analytical methodology to find a criterion for understanding the nature of natural creatures per se in understanding the nature of contract as a clear example of a credit-based and hypothetical thing. Findings of this paper indicate that the nature of contract is synonymous with its quiddity and this quiddity is itself synonymous with the need for the existence of ultimate nature for a contract, i.e. the same goal for realization of which in social relations the contract has been created. Without such a goal, the existence of contract will be all in vain. Among experts at law, Dr. Mohammad Jafar Langroudi and among jurists, Imam Khomeini must be considered as outstanding theoreticians in the field who have both argued the need for ultimate essence of a contract as its nature. This theory stands counter to the theory of direct effects and is considered as a prerequisite for its nature as argued in Imamiya jurisprudence, whilst it has been accepted in Iran’s law in Clause 1 of Article 233 of Civil Code.

Copyright of Journal of Islamic Research / İslâmi Araştırmalar Dergisi is the property of Turkey Economical & Cultural Solidarity (TEK-DAV) Foundation and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Mulla Sadra’s work, we encounter two different meanings of the terms substance and accident. One is the well-known meaning according to which contingent beings divide into substances and accidents: like first philosophers Mulla Sadra defines substance as a being not in the subject, and accident as a being in the subject. More precisely, substance is a quiddity which is not in the subject, not a property of something else, and accident is a quiddity in the subject, not needed by the subject, a property of something else. Thus, from this point of view both substance and accident are quiddities. God falls into neither of the two above defined categories, because in the division it is the quiddity which is divided; hence Mulla Sadra considers “non-substance” as a negative divine attribute, providing some arguments for his claim. He proposes another meaning for the duality of substance and accident founded upon components of his own philosophy such as the primacy of existence (asālat al-wūjūd), hypostatic unity of being (waḥdat shakhsī wūjūd), and ontological indigence (faqr wūjūdi). Based on the primacy of existence, he redefines quiddity as a shade (ẓīl) of existence. Therefore, quiddity is not divided into substance and accident, but the latter two are both existential. Next, invoking the principle of hypostatic unity of being, he states that it is only the true unified Being who deserves the title substance, describing as accidents other beings which are his manifestations. Through explaining ontological indigence he also proves that the realization of indigent existence depends on rich existence and compared to him everything in the universe is pure dependence (rabṭ) and mere indigence, and considered a mode and manifestation of him. The substance is he who is independent and essentially rich, and the rest which are the manifestation of dependence count as accidents. Mulla Sadra matches the two meanings together. Everything in the universe is a manifestation of a particular name of God. Thus, just as parts of the universe are divided into genus, species, individuals, and substances, so the division is found in the names of God; and just as the truth of substances is veiled by accidents, so the divine essence is veiled by its names and attributes; and just as attributes such as species - some of which are more general and some more particular as with close and distant species and their correlatives – together with which the substance is a particular genus or type, so some of divine attributes are more general and more permeating and some more particular and less permeating. Each of the innumerable beings in the universe which are its parts is a manifestation of a particular name among divine names; and just as parts of the universe divide into genus, species, individuals, substances, and accidents (including quantity, quality, relation, habitus, time, location, situation (or position), action, and passion ("being acted on)), so the names of God divide into genus, species, substantial, accidental, etc. names. Everything in the visible universe is a shade testifying to what is in the invisible the world of names, as the manifestation of the substantiality of the Creator, called Allah by Mulla Sadra, is “the perfect man” In the light of foundations specific to his philosophy, Mulla Sadra’s novel explanation demonstrates that the duality of substance and accident both make sense and have examples in the external world (although in his wisdom in accordance with the well-known meaning of the terms an immediate cognition of substance is not possible, and it is only accidents which are knowable). But also his analysis paves the way for the demonstration of dependent existence (i.e. the existence of beings which are not God). If considered in comparison to the Necessary, everything is dependent, or, accidental, as Mulla Sadra calls it. The impact of the concept of dependence (or accidentality) upon philosophical discussions is that it dispenses with the need for quiddities and linking quiddity-bound concepts to the concepts not bound by quiddity. Thanks to the analysis, the fact of God being together with names and attributes (called accidents by Mulla Sadra) takes on a novel interpretation: it is not like the coincidence of the accidental and essential; nor like the coincidence of substance and accident in the well-known sense of the terms; nor like the coincidence of quiddity and existence, because God is not a general quiddity at all. Instead, his truth is a pure, simple, sacred Being that has no names, shapes or limits, and for which no proof is invoked. Rather, he is the proof for everything, a witness to every manifestation. The main concern of this article is to compare, examine and match the two views, since despite the fact that there are numerous books and articles addressing the issue of substance and accident, there is not a discrete study of the two perspectives; hence the necessity of explaining Mulla Sadra’s view. Because this aim is fulfilled through studying and researching into his books, the present article’s research method is conceptual analysis written in an analytic-descriptive form.

Studies related to Islamic psychology have been expanding in recent decades in Iran, and various studies have been carried out under this title. Despite the importance of the nature of Islamic psychology, unfortunately, studies have not systematically addressed the nature of Islamic psychology, and the lack of discussion about this issue is clear evident. In the present article, the researcher has attempted to explain various views on the nature of Islamic psychology by examining studies related to Islamic psychology. The method of this research is descriptive-analytical and the method of data collection is library and interview with experts in this field. In this paper, the researcher has attempted to examine the views of these two areas by examining the nature of Islamic psychology by distinguishing between the Islamic and the scientific aspects of studies related to Islamic psychology. The findings of this study, evaluating the views of Islamic psychology scholars on the nature of Islamic psychology, are divided into two parts, which is an essential step in the path of theoretical and practical research in Islamic psychology.

Paradoxes of nested modality, like Chisholm's paradox, rely on S4 or something stronger as the propositional logic of metaphysical modality. Sarah-Jane Leslie's objection to the resolution of Chisholm's paradox by means of rejection of S4 modal logic is investigated. A modal notion of essence congenial to Leslie's objection is clarified. An argument is presented in support of Leslie's crucial but unsupported assertion that, on pain of inconsistency, an object's essence is the same in every possible world (in which that object exists). A fallacy in the argument is exposed. Alternative interpretations of Leslie's objection are provided and are found to involve equivocation between different notions of "essence." A material artifact's modal essence, as distinct from its quiddity essence, could have been different than it is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of Islamic thought includes various breaks in terms of the dynamics of the development process. These breaks may be related to the conceptual and methodological principles or basic propositions of a certain sect or discipline, or they may occur around the interpretation of the views of a prominent scholar in the tradition of thought. One of the examples of this, which we will examine in this study, is the view attributed to al-Ash'arī that existence and quiddity are the same things. According to this view, existence is a concept that expresses the truths/substances of things that exist concretely/singularly; it is not a general and common-sense universal concept that encompasses all beings. In the theological texts written in the Post-Classical period, it is reported that al-Ash'arī generally supported this view. However, there is no specific expression regarding this problem in al-Ash'arī's works or in the works compiled his views. Our aim in this study is to examine the background of the relation of this view to al-Ash'arī and to try to determine what he means by saying existence and essence are the same things. In the study, in determining al-Ash'arī's views, his own works and Ibn Fūrak's Mujarrad, which compiles his views, were consulted directly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of philosophical secondary intelligibles is an essential prelude to a rediscovery of Qâḍî Sa'îd Qumî's philosophical system, particularly his rejection of the primacy of existence (iṣâlat al-wujûd). With a careful study of those of his work which are attributed to him beyond any doubts and drawing on the descriptive-analytic method, we seek to analyze Qâḍî's views of philosophical secondary intelligibles and their laws. It turns out that he never uses the term "secondary intelligibles," instead referring to them as "general things," in which he includes concepts such as existence, object, possibility, and necessity. He describes these as general, self-evidence concepts, and "infinitive" notions occurring to, and predicated of, all things, taking them to be the weakest things in terms of existence with a trace of existence in the fact itself (nafs al-amr). Some of his statements refer to a kind of metaphysical occurrence of philosophical concepts. In his discussion of generation (ja'l), however, he takes the "quiddity" to be essentially created and other accidents and implications of a thing as accidentally created. His emphasis on simple generation sheds light on certain confusions. From Qâḍî's words two distinct levels of externality of philosophical concepts can be derived: first, these concepts have a faint trace of realization and objectivity; and second, they have no realization and objectivity over and above the essence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary literature on Mullasadra there is a controversy on his view on the reality of quiddity; on whether, according to his texts, quiddity is in-the-World or just in-the-Mind. This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. Among Mullasadra’s expressions about quiddity, these are mostly supposed to be against quiddity’s being in-the-World: first that quiddity is abstract; second that quiddity, in itself, is non-existent; and third that quiddity is a predicate of existence. In order to show that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, quiddity is in-the-World, I will argue, based on textual evidences, first that if the context is considered, those texts that normally are supposed to be counter-evidence for quiddity’s being in-the-World from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, are just apparently so; and second that if all relevant texts are examined, there is just one possible reading of Mullasadra’s view about the reality of quiddity: he constantly takes quiddity in-the-World.

This article presents an annotated translation of The Equivalence between Giving and Receiving (al-Taswiya bayna al-ifāda wa-l-qabūl), a short Arabic treatise on essence (dhāt) and existence (wujūd) composed by the South Asian philosopher-Sufi Shaykh Muḥibb Allāh Ilāhābādī (996–1058/1587–1648). Although modern scholarship has habitually referred to Muḥibb Allāh as an ardent defender of the doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd ("unity of existence") associated with the figure of Ibn al-ʿArabī, such generalized formulations fail to do justice to the uniqueness of Muḥibb Allāh's intellectual contributions. Most authors who had set out to provide a philosophical defense of Ibn al-ʿArabī's teachings – including the well-known likes of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, ʿAfīf al-Dīn al-Tilimsānī, ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, Dāwud al-Qayṣarī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and so on – had tended to prioritize a philosophically utilizable formulation of wujūd or "existence." Muḥibb Allāh, in notable contrast, favors a presentation of the divine Reality in terms of "pure essence/quiddity" (dhāt/māhiyya maḥḍa), at times going to considerable lengths to uphold his alternative formulation. Such a strategy of argumentation is uncommon amongst philosophical defenders of Ibn al-ʿArabī, the distinctiveness of which is further enhanced by Muḥibb Allāh's peculiar mode of disputation, which straddles the line between metaphysics and natural philosophy/physics. The Taswiya occasioned at least sixteen commentaries and refutations; this translation benefits from consulting the earliest of these, composed by Mullā Maḥmūd al-Jawnpūrī (d. 1062/1652) and Khwāja Khwurd (d. 1073/1663), as well as three later commentaries by Ḥabīb Allāh Paṭnaʾī (d. 1140/1728). Most significantly, this translation makes extensive use of Muḥibb Allāh's own Persian auto-commentary, the Sharḥ-i taswiya , which is a critical aid for deciphering the author's at times opaque manner of expression and argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, Suhrawardi’s evidences to prove the idea of essence nobility in his Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq was examined by taking into account the interpretations of Qutb al-Din al-Shīrāzī and Shams al-Din Shahrazūrī and Sadra’s criticisms on the book was presented. Avicenna developed the Aristotelian distinction of being and quiddity to its final limits and included this distinction among the main topics of Islamic philosophy. Suhrawardi, with his objections to Avicenna, took the issue into the category of primary controversial issues, on the other hand Mullā Ṣadrā responded to some criticisms of Suhrawardī in his talikāt that had an effect in turning the discussion in favor of Avicenna. Especially the problem of whether being or quiddity has the primacy was clearly put forward by Mīr Dāmād and his student Mullā Ṣadrā, and the discussion continued in this line. Suhrawardī and his commentators have criticized the Peripatetic (Mashshāʼī) philosophy in many ways, while forming the Ishrāqī system. It is obvious that these criticisms made a very important contribution to the development of Islamic philosophy. In addition, although Suhrawardī claimed to have established a new system, it is clear that the Ishrāqī community used the Peripatetic foundations. For example, the debate on being and quiddity in the Peripatetic philosophy has turned into the doctrine of the vertical and horizontal lights in Ishrāqī philosophy. Suhrawardī replaced the concept of being with the concept of light with accepting that the distinction between being and quiddity is only a mental distinction and claimed that the primacy in the external world belongs to the quiddity. Accordingly, the concept of being is one of the mental universal concepts that have no external reality. Furthermore, this concept is too far from having an external reality to reveal metaphysical truths, since it is widely used by the Peripatetic philosophers to include bodies. Because, metaphysical beings such as God, light and angel cannot be grouped under the same denominator with dark entities like bodies. Suhrawardī and his commentators argued that if the primacy of being is accepted, it would render the distinction between necessary being and contingent being meaningless while talking about the existence of contingent beings would actually mean an infinite regress of contingent beings. Mullā Ṣadrā's criticisms of Suhrawardī had significant contribution to Islamic philosophy. According to him, the claim of that “being is a mental concept that has no external reality” originates from the inability to grasp the truth of being. Because he confused it with other universal concepts that have no external reality, the reason is that he did not pay attention to the special position of the concept of being, that caused him not to see that the same assessment can be made for the concept of light. However, the being that creates the external world should not have any special quiddity in terms of its truth so that it can give reality to all other creatures. Mullā Ṣadrā claimed that the idea of distinction between necessary being and contingent being will disappear with the acceptance of being nobility that derived from the inability to understand the modulated structure of the being. In other words, according to him, existence of being as the ultimate reality does not prevent its appearance and emanation at different levels. So, the contingent beings express the level of existence in a hierarchy. If existence of a being has strength, intensity, wealth and perfection, its contingency decreases as much. According to Ṣadrā, quiddities cannot be characterized by existence and non-existence in terms of their identicalness. In terms of their appearance in the external world, the quiddities can only emerge depending on being. In this sense, the quiddities do not have an ontological status of their own. This acceptance would invalidate the claims regard to an infinite regress of regeneration of the contingent beings. According to Ṣadrā, the claim that "in case of accepting the aṣālat of being, being would require another being and it will require another one" originates from not understanding that the being itself self-exists and not in need of anything else to exist. In order to the infinite regress of being in the mind, it is sufficient to end the mental reputation at any point. In sum, according to Ṣadrā, there is only one being who’s its existence is in itself and necessary. The contingents are nothing but dependent states and results of the emanation from the Necessary Being. In this case, being is the primary, and the quiddities are states dependent on the being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes different ontological categories and how they relate to the conservation of contemporary art. Faced with the necessity of apprehending the work of art from an ontological point of view, a theoretical approach is made on the concepts that most affect the conservation of contemporary art: quiddity, truth-authenticity, identity, quality, consistency, and interpretation. These are analyzed from an empirical perspective, based on the experience of conservation and restoration. Since conserving and restoring require making decisions that will affect the material and conceptual plane of the works, several possible paradigms that must be introduced into the deontological code of the profession are analyzed. In addition, the study of a new paradigm is provided, that of the death of the work of art. This paradigm can serve as a frame of reference, given the impossibility of bringing the 'Truth' of the artwork into the world of the sensitive. This may occur due to different conditioning factors and limitations of a material, technical, or intentional type, which affect issues that were once established as essential to the entity. On the other hand, different types of time that are related to the conservation of contemporary art are studied: biological time, the eternal present of the work, time as a constructor agent, and destructive time as a facilitator of the appearance of ruin or ruin-relic in the work of art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distinction between the existence and the quiddity is the one of the fundamental ontological issues of the philosophy. In this way, the subject goes back to Aristotle. As a matter of fact, the issue about the distinction has continued in general terms in the Islamic philosophy along the lines of Aristoleles. However, the issue then evolved into a discussion of the ontological priority. In this article, but we will focus directly on the mentally posited of the quiddity, unlike ontological priority. As a matter of fact, quiddity, which is the answer to the question "what is it" is accepted as an i'tibari quality without any ontological reality. Especially Ibn Sina divided the quiddity into three parts considering it being i'tibari of quiddity as nonconditioned, negatively-conditioned-conditioned-by-something. One of these three parts, non-conditioned quiddity, is also a natural condition, has also been named as universal. The issue of whether the natural universal has ontological reality or not in the outside world is one of the outstanding debates of the philosophy. Some philosophers asserted that the natural universals don't have an ontological reality in the external world, and that this is a purely mental evaluation, while some philosophers asserted that the natural universal has an external reality in the context of the predicate of particular beings in the external world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions concerning quiddity (namely, quiddity’s being an abstract entity and its being true of existence) when attached to his theses about abstraction and truth, entails that quiddity is in-the-World; though it exists just secondarily. If these arguments turn out to be sound, a question arises: what is the difference between existence’s being primarily existent and quiddity’s being secondarily so? In order to answer this question, I will propose that one can understand and explain primary and secondary existence and being in-the-World by means of effectiveness and mind-independence. I will give some textual evidence which show that this proposal is not far from Mullasadra’s own viewpoint.

One of the most important philosophical problems, at least in tradition of analytical philosophy, is the problem of proper names’ references. This paper intends to represent a new interpretation of the reference of proper names based on the theory of Principality of Existence developed by Mulla Sadra. He has mentioned the differences between nominal existence and infinitive existence. The latter is an abstract concept of being while nominal existence is the principal reality or the fact of things that has a real and a mental appearance. In Islamic Philosophy context we can consider the real appearance as essence (dhat) which is indeed special limitation of nominal existence and makes the entity of an existent like X. On the other hand mental appearance could be considered as quiddity (mahiyyah) which has an epistemic aspect re-presenter of essence. On this basis this paper argues that the proposition “X exists” could be turn to “nominal existence is X” and the nominal existence, as the unchangeable fact, would be the best alternative of a proper name’s reference. Also, changes on properties of an entity are caused by changes on limitations of existence without any on the reference of proper names.

The general purpose of this article is threefold. Firstly, it is to further the notion of coaching as orchestration through developing insight into precisely how and what coaches orchestrate. Secondly, it is to firmly position coaching as a relational practice, whilst thirdly it is to better define coaching’s complex nature and how it can be somewhat ordered. Following an introduction where the purpose and value of the article are outlined, we present the reflective method of critical companionship through which we explored and addressed the aforementioned purposes. The case for the quiddity, or the ‘just whatness’ (i.e. the inherent nature or essence) of coaching as involving complex, relational acts which can be somewhat explained through recourse to the developing theory of orchestration is subsequently made. In doing so, two precise examples of how we as coaches orchestrate sporting practice are presented. The article concludes with both a summary of the principal argument(s) made, and some reflective considerations for future directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sohrawardi has a significant contribution in the theory of reality, as some of the basic principles of this theory have been droved from his viewpoint or have been the reflection of his thoughts. Different contrasting interpretations of Sohrawardi’s reality and reliability and not paying attention to his explicate have aroused extensive debates such as ,if Sohravardi cognizes existence as something credential and reliable , how would he consider human sensuality and its transcendent possessing a simple and nonidentity existence so that Mulla Sadra inevitably had to interprets his expressions to refute the contradictions. The main purpose of this paper is to review and analyze Mulla Sadra’s attributed contradictions to Sohrawardi in the matter of reliability of existence. This article is going to show: 1-The key to solve some of the ambiguities regarding the antecedents’ words is related to the terminology of expressions. 2-The authenticity and reliability matters are the progression of the matter of abundance of existence over substantiality. 3-Due to Sohrawardi`s explicit words, there is no contradiction in his speech, so it needs no interpretation.

The Transcendent Philosophy of Mulla Sadra was a complete philosophical system that sought to harmonize various intellectual trends that existed in the Islamic world prior to its genesis. It not only brought new philosophical discussions to the forefront but it also helped solve many of the philosophical problems that had until then not been properly resolved. One of the topics that this school of thought discussed in detail was the subject of creation. This discussion revolves around the question as to what is it that a cause essentially brings into reality? What does a cause do? In this regards there are three views. The first is the view that a cause essentially brings quiddity into reality. The next is that a cause gives existence to quiddity. Mulla Sadra was of the opinion that a cause essentially creates existence and through it, it brings quiddity into reality. In order to substantiate this idea, Mulla Sadra tried to refute the other two possible alternative options. This article seeks to analyze the proofs that he put forward to affirm the principality of the creation of existence. The majority of the proofs have been taken from Mulla Sadra's independent work on this subject, Regarding the Principality of the Creation of Existence. Many of these proofs are problematic and are not compatible with other philosophical principles. Others are sound and can be relied on to substantiate this claim. All in all, it can be said that the principality of the creation of existence is one of the necessary corollaries of the principality of existence itself.

Zorunlu varlığın mahiyeti meselesi İbn Sina Felsefesinin onemli meselelerinden biridir. İbn Sina’ya gore zorunlu varlık, varlığı dısında mahiyet sahip değildir. Onun bu ifadesi farklı sekillerde yorumlanmıstır. Bazı yorumlara gore İbn Sina zorunlu var- lığın basitliği korunsun diye o varlıktan her turlu mahiyeti olumsuzlamısdır. Diğer yo- rumlara gore ise o, gercekte zorunlu varlığın mahiyeti var ve o mahiyet kendi zatıdır, demek istiyor. Bize gore zorunlu varlığa yuklediğimiz mahiyet zihinsel alıskanlıktan kaynaklanır. Biz, her zaman mumkun varlıklarda bir mahiyet goruyoruz bu nedenle aynı mahiyeti zorunlu varlığa da atfediyoruz. Halbuki zorunlu varlık mumkun varlık- ların butun sıfatlarını dıslar. Dolayısıyla mumkun varlıklarda mahiyet olarak kabul olunan zorunlu varlığın zatıdır

The root and source of the unity of existence is mysticism, and it has been entered into philosophy from this realm. Perhaps the first philosophical explanation of the mystics’ unity of existence doctrine has been done by Dawwani. But this philosophical explanation has some unjustified and irrational consequences and accessories. Sadra, also, makes his best efforts to give a philosophical explanation of mystics’ unity of existence of doctrine. He did that through abandoning the theory of analogical unity of existence and suggesting a new philosophical system, whose pieces have been mentioned in Asfar (Volume II) and other places of the book and also in the book of Igaz an-naimin (Awakening the sleepers). By this way, he not only has not ended philosophy, but has brought it into a new realm of philosophical thoughts. So, we must design this new philosophical system to understand this important stage of his philosophy, especially to understand his philosophical explanation of personal unity and its valuable accessories. In this paper we describe briefly the philosophical system and the ontology of Dawwani’s approach, and attempt, as much as possible, express his philosophical explanation of unity of existence through an optimistic outlook. Then we will show that even though there are some the similarities between this explanation and Sadra's philosophical explanation, Dawwani’s approach is self-inconsistent and that is why we will criticize it ultimately. Afterwards, we continue to express the Sadra's philosophical explanation of mystical unity of existence. So the object of this paper is to compare these two philosophical explanation, reveal their strengths and weaknesses, also the relationship between these two explanations. It will be clear that Sadra's philosophical explanation is worthy and reasonably defensible through a new philosophical system which has been followed by Sadra and he has referred to it in his books, not in the analogical unity of existence

Mulla Sadrā's view about the ideality of quiddity is interpreted in various, even contradicting, forms. Allamah Tabatabaii’s and Ayatollah Fayazi's views on explaining the ideality of quiddity are among the most important interpretations of Mulla Sadra’s theory. Allamah Tabatabaii has rejected any external existence of quiddity and has considered it as a mental mirage of reality; whereas Ayatollah Fayazi believes that the ideal quiddity exists externally as well. Ayatollah fayazi holds the belief that attribution of existence to the existing quiddity is an “actual attribution“. However, it seems to me that none of the above-mentioned interpretations have explained Mulla Sadrā's theory correctly. What can be inferred from Mulla Sadra’s works is that quiddity is not externally non-existent and possesses a kind of existence. It is, however, different from the existence of quiddity. For specific reasons, he argues that the term “existent” cannot be used for the existence of quiddity, and has considered this kind of existence as affirmation of thingness. In this paper, Allamah Tabatabaii and Ayatollah Fayazi's interpretations of Mulla Sadra’s view as well as mine are discussed at first, and then some of the consequences of such a debate for Mulla Sadra’s philosophy are presented.

The accidentality of existence in Avicenna (Ebn Sinā, d. 1037) is related to his distinction between "existence (vojud)" and "quiddity (māhiyya)." Both these theories have been greatly criticized by Averroes (Ebn Roshd, d. 1198). The latter's misunderstanding of Avicenna has been the cause of confusion for the comprehension of Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) in Western Christian scholasticism. This misunderstanding has also extended to Western contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. This paper will try to clarify how this phenomenon perpetuated a global confusion and misunderstanding between the East and the West and also created a disastrous situation for the comprehension of the Peripatetic School. This state of affairs has continued up to the present day among both medievalists and scholars of Aristotelian philosophy. However, it is not my intention in this paper to give a complete review of Western and Eastern scholarship on this subject. Rather, I shall limit myself (with some exceptions) to the works of Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 205) and other Greek commentators, Avicenna, and Averroes, which together constitute the primary sources for the ongoing discussion around the nature of "essence" and "existence" in Avicenna's works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important philosophical problems, at least in tradition of analytical philosophy, is the problem of proper names' references. This paper intends to represent a new interpretation of the reference of proper names based on the theory of Principality of Existence developed by Mulla Sadra. He has mentioned the differences between nominal existence and infinitive existence. The latter is an abstract concept of being while nominal existence is the principal reality or the fact of things that has a real and a mental appearance. In Islamic Philosophy context we can consider the real appearance as essence (dhat) which is indeed special limitation of nominal existence and makes the entity of an existent like X. On the other hand mental appearance could be considered as quiddity (mahiyyah) which has an epistemic aspect re-presenter of essence. On this basis this paper argues that the proposition “X exists” could be turn to “nominal existence is X” and the nominal existence, as the unchangeable fact, would be the best alternative of a proper name's reference. Also, changes on properties of an entity are caused by changes on limitations of existence without any on the reference of proper names. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Dil Araştırmaları is the property of Journal of Dil Arastirmalari and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Unlike the Christian philosophy, in the Islamic philosophy, the question of individuality was emerged and grew gradually in a philosophical ground. The naïve form of the problem can be found in the Farabi and Ibn Sina's works, and its perfect form can be seen in Bahmanyar’s writings. Then, Suhrawardi considered the problem at a totally different view and separated from Peripatetics basically. After Suhrawardi, Nasir al-Din Tūsi and Mulla Sadra, were dealt with the problem, while the differences between the two philosophers’ approaches were more than their agreements. The issues related to the ‘individuality’ can be divided into four distinct debates: The conceptual bases of individuality; the affirmative principles of individuality; the Criterion of Individuality, and its justification. In the affirmative principles of individuality they are almost consentaneous, but in the other debates we can see some serious disagreements. The quiddity’s ability to justify “individuality” is the most important controversy between them. Nasir al-Din Tūsi considers quiddityas Criterion of Individuality, but Mulla Sadra belives that it is just ‘existence’ which can be the Criterion of Individuality.

The problem of gradation in being is one of the fundamental debates in philosophy. Some Muslim philosophers have accepted the gradation and some have denied it. By comparing the ideas of Muslim thinkers, the present article tries to examine Mirfendereski’s peculiar idea on this issue and by presenting valid arguments, it proves that, in spite of common opinions about him, he believed in gradation in being.

The problem of gradation in being is one of the fundamental debates in philosophy. Some Muslim philosophers have accepted the gradation and some have denied it. By comparing the ideas of Muslim thinkers, the present article tries to examine Mirfendereskiâs peculiar idea on this issue and by presenting valid arguments, it proves that, in spite of common opinions about him, he believed in gradation in being.