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The functions of consciousness, viewed from an evolutionary standpoint, can be categorized as being either general or particular. There are two general functions, meaning those that do not depend on the particulars of how consciousness influences behavior or how and why it first evolved: of (1) expanding the behavioral repertoire of the individual through the gradual accumulation of neurocircuitry innovations incorporating consciousness that would not exist without it, and (2) reducing the time scale over which preprogrammed behaviors can be altered, from evolutionary time, across generations, to real-time. But neither answers Velmans' question, of why consciousness is adaptive in a proximate sense, and hence why it would have evolved, which depends on identifying the particular function it first performed. Memory arguably plays a role here, as a strong case can be made that consciousness first evolved to make motivational control more responsive, though memory, to the past life experiences of the individual. A control mechanism of this kind could, for example, have evolved to consciously inhibit appetitive behaviors, whether consciously instigated or not, that would otherwise expose the individual to harm. There is then the question of whether, for amniote vertebrates, a role in memory formation and access would have led directly to a wider role for consciousness in the way the brain operates, or if some other explanation is required. Velmans' question might then have two answers, the second having more to do with the advantages of global oversight for the control of behavior, as in a global workspace, or for conferring meaning on sensory experience in a way that non-conscious neural processes cannot. Meaning in this context refers specifically to the way valence is embodied in the genomic instructions for assembling the neurocircuitry responsible for phenomenal contents, so it constitutes an embodied form of species memory, and a way of thinking about the adaptive utility of consciousness that is less concerned with real-time mechanistic events than with information storage on an evolutionary time scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ultimate goal of the QBIT theory is to provide a scientific solution to the problem of consciousness. The theory assumes that qualia (plural for quale) are real physical entities. Each quale is a physical system consisting of qubits bonded together by quantum entanglement. The qubits of a quale are so intimately bonded together that they collectively form a unified whole that is more than (and different from) the sum of its parts. A quale is a highly organized, coherent system. Organization and coherence are manifestations of information. The more the amount of information in a system, the more organized, integrated, and coherent the system is. That is why the QBIT theory suggests that qualia are maximally entangled, maximally coherent systems containing high amounts of information, and extremely low amounts of entropy or uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dennett’s work has had a profound impact on philosophical and scientific understanding of consciousness. However, interpreting Dennett’s work on consciousness is notoriously challenging. Some have even suggested that his ideas are contradictory. This paper develops and defends an interpretation of Dennett’s views, on which consciousness is a real pattern. I argue that this interpretation can make sense of some initially puzzling features of the view, including: multiple drafts, global workspace theory, qualia eliminativism, consciousness as a user-illusion, and the claim that our reports about consciousness have a special kind of authority. Far from being a tangle of contradictory ideas, this interpretation of Dennett consists of a consistent and robust theory of conscious experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of gender in sociolinguistic variation has long concerned the ways linguistic variables pattern with binary gender identities like male and female, with the implicit assumption that masculine individuals will use variants that index masculinity, and feminine individuals will use variants that index femininity. The emerging field of trans linguistics has built upon insights from queer linguistics and challenged the idea that there must be a one-to-one correspondence between linguistic variants and gender identities. Studies of transgender speakers have illuminated that indexing gender is a process of bricolage , where multiple variables collaborate, and only one needs to index gender in a particular way for the speaker's overall semiotic construction to carry that gendered meaning. Here, I investigate cross-modal bricolage , by exploring how visual gender presentation and three different linguistic variables come together to construct contrasting feminine styles among San Francisco drag queens. Linguistic patterns and aesthetic choices illuminate that bricolage involves a semiotic division of labor , in which only some signs (or modalities) need to index gender to give the overall style that gendered meaning. Concurrently, other signs can contribute qualia to a style's overall qualic cloud , that distinguish the style from others in the semiotic landscape. This exploration illuminates the role of the body in conditioning the indexical potential of linguistic signs, destabilizes monolithic essentializations of trans linguistic practice, and acknowledges the varied ways that gender non-normative identity can manifest across communities. • Visual style patterns with linguistic practice; speakers with contrasting visual styles show contrasting linguistic patterns. • Semiotic division of labor : different signs contribute shades of meaning to a larger style, which contrasts with other styles. • Cross-modal bricolage : linguistic and/or visual signs can carry the semiotic load of contributing gendered meaning to a style. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are various electromagnetic (EM) field theories of consciousness. They postulate an epineural EM field which, due to its binding properties, unifies the different neuronal information differences originating from various sensory and cognitive processes. Only through a real physical integration in space within this field could phenomenal consciousness arise. This would solve the binding problem mentioned in the philosophy of mind. On closer inspection, the electromagnetic interaction not only provides an explanation for the integrative property of the EM field, but also for the necessary differentiating contrasts of information. This article will take a closer look at the physical properties of a postulated EM field. It will also show how the problem of qualia in connection with emergentism could be solved by a new variant of EM field theory. If it can be clearly demonstrated that the postulated epineural EM field plays a decisive role in the origin of consciousness in addition to neuronal "wired" information processing, this also leaves less room for metaphysical assumptions that attempt to solve the binding problem. In experiments to prove the postulated epineural EM field by means of external electromagnetic manipulations, it can never be ruled out that these also have a direct effect on the "wired" neuronal signal processing. Therefore, on the way to proving the EM field theory of consciousness, an experimental method is needed that must ensure that external manipulations only affect the extensions of the EM field without directly influencing the neuronal network. A method will be discussed here that works with the shielding of EM fields instead of external electromagnetic stimuli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Frank Jacksonʼs knowledge argument, Mary, who lives in a black-and-white world, has all the physical knowledge about the world, yet she has new information when she sees a red apple. If we accept this, then physicalism – according to which the description of the world can be realised entirely with the help of physical theories – is false. However, even if Jacksonʼs argument about new information is true, we do not have to discard physicalism. Even exclusively physical computer systems are not capable of predicting their own sensory information if they are built using a specific structure and complexity. It can be shown that a specific type of computational system can lead to the creation of decision-related unpredictability of a specific type of sensory information. This investigation takes a charitable position towards the concept of qualia to provide it with a physicalist and computationalist explanation.

The functions of consciousness, viewed from an evolutionary standpoint, can be categorized as being either general or particular. There are two general functions, meaning those that do not depend on the particulars of how consciousness influences behavior or how and why it first evolved: of (1) expanding the behavioral repertoire of the individual through the gradual accumulation of neurocircuitry innovations incorporating consciousness that would not exist without it, and (2) reducing the time scale over which preprogrammed behaviors can be altered, from evolutionary time, across generations, to real-time. But neither answers Velmans’ question, of why consciousness is adaptive in a proximate sense, and hence why it would have evolved, which depends on identifying the particular function it first performed. Memory arguably plays a role here, as a strong case can be made that consciousness first evolved to make motivational control more responsive, though memory, to the past life experiences of the individual. A control mechanism of this kind could, for example, have evolved to consciously inhibit appetitive behaviors, whether consciously instigated or not, that would otherwise expose the individual to harm. There is then the question of whether, for amniote vertebrates, a role in memory formation and access would have led directly to a wider role for consciousness in the way the brain operates, or if some other explanation is required. Velmans’ question might then have two answers, the second having more to do with the advantages of global oversight for the control of behavior, as in a global workspace, or for conferring meaning on sensory experience in a way that non-conscious neural processes cannot. Meaning in this context refers specifically to the way valence is embodied in the genomic instructions for assembling the neurocircuitry responsible for phenomenal contents, so it constitutes an embodied form of species memory, and a way of thinking about the adaptive utility of consciousness that is less concerned with real-time mechanistic events than with information storage on an evolutionary time scale.

In this article, I argue for a culturally specific and historically informed understanding of Black voice and musical identity through an examination of the musical practices of vocalist Alberta Hunter (1895–1984), whose long career can be broken into two distinct periods: first from the middle of the 1910s to 1956, and a second between 1977 and her death in 1984. Within, I reframe musical practices emergent from and developed within Black American communities as musical "qualia"—socio-culturally informed and chronotopically situated embodiments of something's properties—of Blackness, to enable a more direct investigation of how and why certain sounds signal or index Blackness to both listeners and performers. To demonstrate the musico-semiotic function of Black vocality and musical performance, I employ a synthetic methodology combining theorizations of qualia from the field of linguistic anthropology with detailed transcription and analysis of four recordings of "Downhearted Blues," a piece she co-composed with pianist Cora "Lovie" Austin and recorded several times throughout her long career. Close examination of three recordings made by Hunter (1922, 1939, and 1977) and one made by vocalist Bessie Smith (1923) allows for a more granular understanding of how Hunter's musical practice transformed over time in dialogue with broader genealogies of Black musical history. I focus particularly on Hunter's relationships with other Black women in the performance of this tune, arguing that "Downhearted Blues" ultimately becomes a site for the development of a Black feminist epistemology exemplary of what musicologist Tammy Kernodle has identified as "Black Women Working Together" (2014). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are various electromagnetic (EM) field theories of consciousness. They postulate an epineural EM field which, due to its binding properties, unifies the different neuronal information differences originating from various sensory and cognitive processes. Only through a real physical integration in space within this field could phenomenal consciousness arise. This would solve the binding problem mentioned in the philosophy of mind. On closer inspection, the electromagnetic interaction not only provides an explanation for the integrative property of the EM field, but also for the necessary differentiating contrasts of information. This article will take a closer look at the physical properties of a postulated EM field. It will also show how the problem of qualia in connection with emergentism could be solved by a new variant of EM field theory. If it can be clearly demonstrated that the postulated epineural EM field plays a decisive role in the origin of consciousness in addition to neuronal “wired” information processing, this also leaves less room for metaphysical assumptions that attempt to solve the binding problem. In experiments to prove the postulated epineural EM field by means of external electromagnetic manipulations, it can never be ruled out that these also have a direct effect on the “wired” neuronal signal processing. Therefore, on the way to proving the EM field theory of consciousness, an experimental method is needed that must ensure that external manipulations only affect the extensions of the EM field without directly influencing the neuronal network. A method will be discussed here that works with the shielding of EM fields instead of external electromagnetic stimuli.

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can result only from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behaviour but its stable fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers' fading qualia argument falls into it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Frank Jacksonʼs knowledge argument, Mary, who lives in a black-and-white world, has all the physical knowledge about the world, yet she has new information when she sees a red apple. If we accept this, then physicalism – according to which the description of the world can be realised entirely with the help of physical theories – is false. However, even if Jacksonʼs argument about new information is true, we do not have to discard physicalism. Even exclusively physical computer systems are not capable of predicting their own sensory information if they are built using a specific structure and complexity. It can be shown that a specific type of computational system can lead to the creation of decision-related unpredictability of a specific type of sensory information. This investigation takes a charitable position towards the concept of qualia to provide it with a physicalist and computationalist explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Archaeologies is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or "distant" to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision--such as those related to being an object, background or detail--constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Work in philosophy of mind often engages in descriptive phenomenology, i.e., in attempts to characterize the phenomenal character of our experience. Nagel’s famous discussion of what it’s like to be a bat demonstrates the difficulty of this enterprise (1974). But while Nagel located the difficulty in our absence of an objective vocabulary for describing experience, I argue that the problem runs deeper than that: we also lack an adequate subjective vocabulary for describing phenomenology. We struggle to describe our own phenomenal states in terms we ourselves find adequately expressive. This paper aims to flesh out why our phenomenological vocabulary is so impoverished – what I call the impoverishment problem. As I suggest, this problem has both practical and philosophical import. After fleshing out the problem in more detail, I draw some suggestive morals from the discussion in an effort to point the way forward towards a solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human mind can be thought of as a black box, where the external inputs are elaborated in an unknown way and lead to external outputs. D'Ariano and Faggin schematized thinking and consciousness through quantum state dynamics. The complexity of mental states can be formalized through the entanglement of the so-called qualia states. Thus, the interaction between the mind and the external world can be formalized as an interplay between classical and quantum-state dynamics. Since quantum computing is more and more often being applied to robots, and robots constitute a benchmark to test schematic models of behavior, we propose a case study with a robotic dance, where the thinking and moving mechanisms are modeled according to quantum–classic decision making. In our research, to model the elaboration of multi-sensory stimuli and the following decision making in terms of movement response, we adopt the D'Ariano–Faggin formalism and propose a case study with improvised dance based on a collection of poses, whose combination is presented in response to external and periodic multi-sensory stimuli. We model the dancer's inner state and reaction to classic stimuli through a quantum circuit. We present our preliminary results, discussing further lines of development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper tries to understand the generative lexicon on Gaddi language through studying and explaining the relevant literature available in the domain. Considering the interdependency of the approach, the paper has taken a specific domain of linguistics and has tried to understand the relevance of the approach, specifically the theory in generative lexicon. I have followed the model "qualia structure" of generative lexicon to understand how the four levels of the structure contribute in the meaning formation. This paper presents some examples from Gaddi language, which facilitate our understanding of the theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The overall contention of this paper, conducted through an examination of the idea of a 'critical direct realism' as this was developed across the twentieth century first in the thought of Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) and then in a different form by his son Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989), is that such a view, in both its conceptual and sensory representational dimensions, is plausible as a form of direct realism. However, to the extent that the mediating sensory or qualitative dimension was itself conceived by both thinkers in what I characterize as strongly 'phenomenal realist' terms, the resulting philosophical commitments were of a kind that most current direct realists would generally not accept, even in cases where they themselves are phenomenal realists (perhaps naïve realists). The various perceiver-dependent forms of that additional, perhaps detachable commitment of most critical realists is likely responsible for the assessment of William Pepperell Montague (1873–1953) and other 'neo-realists' that 'critical realism' is not really, as advertised by Roy Wood Sellars, a version of direct realism, but ultimately a retreat to indirect realism. However, I argue that in both of its primary conceptual and sensory representational commitments, 'critical direct realism' remains a plausible competitor to direct acquaintance versions of direct realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We know little about how skin colour is used to discriminate and dehumanise Dalits in everyday language. Thus, the construction of fairness and darkness of skin colour in savarna perception and the qualities attributed need to be under-stood through the lens of caste identities. Drawing on an ethnographic study in Nallapadu Palle Scheduled Caste Colony in Andhra Pradesh, this article aims to understand how various qualities are attributed to the skin and colour of Dalits and savarnas using Qualia, linguistic registers and indexicalities. The Telugu linguistic forms “Nalupu” (Dark) and “Telupu” (Fair), when used in registers, are analysed to understand the qualities indexed with these forms. It is essential to examine the process of caste manifestation in language through colour, which indexes several qualities through a specific linguistic form, varying its social meaning when attributed to a savarna and a Dalit. The study found that the social meanings of Nalupu and Telupu used in everyday conversations differed for savarnas and Dalits. When spoken in the context of Dalits in Palle, it indexed qualities to discriminate and re-establish caste. It is argued that these attributes lead to the creation of caste hierarchies. The article calls for examining the connection between colourism and caste discrimination further.

Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or “distant” to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision—such as those related to being an object, background or detail—constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans.

The dualism of properties and qualia have been inherited problems of the Cartesian theory. Old problems with new vestments that have been overlapped in the speech of cognitive sciences, in special in the one of the philosophy of mind. For some contemporary thinkers the above mentioned 'problems' are within the frameworks of the Metaphysical questions. This article presents advances concerning an analytical research that tries to reveal the genesis of the problem caused by the inadequate use of language, in order to show that such questions in the long run are only pseudoproblems. Problems of linguistic and logical order disguised with metaphysical apparel. In the first part of the writing the speech that gives origin to the problem will be analyzed, later the Cartesian speech will be checked - being this the official doctrine that inherits the problem to the philosophy of the mind-they will present the reasons for which it affirms that these problems are not more than errors inherited by the use of language. Finally, they will present in a brief way how the eliminative and emergent positions of Dennett and Searle there are no really overcoming of the dualism as they sustain it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the article is to highlight the main substantive elements of the value coordinate approach, which, in turn, can be regarded as a unifying philosophical and natural science principle of seeing the essence of consciousness in connection with the recognition of the need to expand the boundaries of its study and also unambiguously reveals the value character and dialectic of interaction of its structural vectors (coordinates) as a way of forming inner experience or a hard problem of consciousness, as formulated by David Chalmers. The research methodology is, in addition to the universal general philosophical method of dialectics, cultural, axiological, historical and comparative approaches, the coordinate approach itself, which is stated in the title, the essence and directions of application of which are revealed in the sources cited in the bibliography sources and in the text of the article. The scientific novelty lies in the definition, substantiation, and presentation of the main provisions of the value coordinate approach, which reveals the dialectic of interaction of its structural vectors (coordinates) as a way of forming inner experience that can be used as a theoretical basis for the formation of an alternative model of consciousness. Conclusions. The article substantiates the understanding of supervenience as a certain correspondence between processes in the brain with an extremely broad understanding of the phenomenon of consciousness itself, which is nevertheless opaque. This opacity is the result of the absolutisation of the cognitive axis of value coordinates. At the same time, taking into account the historical epistemological dynamics, the modern field of consciousness in its integrity, in addition to the epistemological dimension dominant in the human being, should include moral and aesthetic coordinates. This is the essence of the coordinate approach. That is, in order to understand consciousness in general, which is what a human being is trying to achieve, its supervenience on the brain must take into account its specificity in the human form. The adoption of this approach is based on an understanding of the distribution of energy in the picture of human perception in the form of value, mental, cultural and physical energy. Moreover, the closer a modern person is on the coordinate axis to describing the image of reality in the mind in terms of value energy, the more abstract, that is saturated with the energy of speculative meanings, the picture of reality itself becomes, but this is precisely the condition for the free interaction of these meanings in the human mind. Based on the idea of the coordinate approach, the action of value energy on the stage of the individual's consciousness in each individual case is a recognition of the unique dynamic unity of the field of inner experience the hard problem of consciousness and the coincidence with it in the focus of the person's self-consciousness on the verge of their external perception. On this single boundary, first, the formation of a picture of the world of each individual occurs. Second, there is an attempt to interfere with the method of human cognition purely from the standpoint of the epistemological coordinate in the formation of a transparent model of seeing consciousness as such - that is, an unconscious attempt to distort the picture of consciousness in the epistemological paradigm. Finally, the transformation of the real flow of value energy in two directions - internal and external. As a result of the intersection of external and internal energy flows, the desired picture of inner experience is either enriched and expanded, namely the scene of consciousness, or, if it is an outpouring of transformed value energy to the outside, there is a meeting with the active factors of the scene of consciousness - the outside world, where the energy flow itself appears in the form of phenomena of the physical world. In this form, consciousness is studied (and each time it is more and more deeply detailed) by traditional science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In current histories, C.I. Lewis is credited for bringing the strict concept of qualia – concerned solely with sensory states – into contemporary philosophy. It is this strict notion which is then credited with bringing in worries about inverted spectra, philosophical zombies, and the idea that we can individuate the senses introspectively. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistaken reading of Lewis and the history of qualia. I argue that the strict notion of qualia stems from the work of Johannes Müller in the mid-nineteenth century and his work on individuating the senses. The structuralist psychologists who followed in his wake, in turn, developed an account where the qualitative character of experience played no causal role. I also show that Lewis adamantly rejects this strict concept of qualia. He instead endorses a pragmatic conception of qualia derived from William James in which evaluative states – such as the painfulness of pain – play an essential, causal role in the life of the organism. The upshot is that Lewis positions himself against the strict conception of qualia, arguing it is phenomenologically false and philosophically wrong-headed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Verba: Anuario Galego de Filoloxia is the property of Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Servicio de Publicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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In his well-known Knowledge Argument (KA) Frank Jackson attempted to show that physicalism is false by offering a case that allegedly showed that a complete physicalist description of the world leaves something crucial out, namely the phenomenal qualities of experience. Eventually Jackson himself retracted and claimed that the interesting task is to explain where and why intuition-pumping arguments against physicalism such as the KA go wrong. This is exactly the task that occupies this paper: to discuss and criticize three of the most important diagnoses of the KA’s weak points and to offer my own view about the latter. Along the way, several important but often neglected features of the KA are expounded and clarified.

In China's vigorous development and inheritance of intangible cultural heritage, the sustainability and acceptability of intangible cultural heritage products have become a controversial subject. This study aims to explore the relationship between batik product qualia factors and the purchase intention for batik products and exammine the mediating role of consumer attitude in the relationship. We adopted quantitative research methods and used SPSS 26 and Process 2.15 software to test our hypotheses. We conducted extensive surveys of consumers of different ages, genders, income levels, and educational backgrounds, and finally, a total of 381 valid questionnaires were collected. The results showed that batik products' creativity, delicacy, beauty, and eco-friendliness were significantly and positively related to consumers' attitudes. In addition, creativity, beauty, and eco-friendliness, but not delicacy, were significantly and positively associated with consumers' purchase intention. Consumer attitude plays an intermediary role between qualia factors and purchase intention. This study analyzes Gejia batik from the perspective of qualia factors, breaking through the limitations of previous studies on the aspects of heritage protection and environmental protection. The study's results can inspire batik manufacturers or designers to enhance the competitiveness of batik design products in the tourism market.

In this paper, I present a two-pronged argument devoted to defending the type-identity theory of mind against the argument presented by Kripke in Naming and Necessity. In the first part, the interpersonal case, I show that since it is not possible to establish the metaphysical conditions for phenomenal identity, it is not possible to argue that there can be physical differences between two subjects despite their phenomenal identity. In the second part, the intrapersonal case, I consider the possibility of imagining one and the same individual having the same phenomenal state while counterfactually being in very different physical states. I argue that this case should respect Kripke's implicit theory of personal identity—but this proves to be a very difficult task to accomplish, thus preventing the argument from getting off the ground. Therefore, I maintain, that the type-identity theory is still the better option to solve the mind–body problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The QBIT theory is a recently introduced multi-disciplinary approach to the problem of consciousness. One of the main axioms of the theory is that when information-theoretic certainty of an observer about a stimulus goes beyond a certain threshold, the observer becomes conscious of that stimulus. This axiom could provide an explanation for how the brain generates consciousness. In short, the QBIT theory suggests that the brain generates consciousness by reducing the entropy of its internal representations below a critical threshold. This paper explains how the brain gradually minimizes the entropy of its internal representations and consequently generate minimum-entropy representations (also known as conscious representations or qualia). The paper also explores the consequences of this entropy-minimization process in the context of quantum information theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Linguistic Landscape: An International Journal (LL) is the property of John Benjamins Publishing Co. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper presents the location-sharing argument, which concludes that qualia must share the locations of their physical correlates. The first premise is a consequence of relativity: If something shares a time with a physical event in all reference frames, it shares that physical event’s location. The second premise is that qualia share times with their correlates in all reference frames. Both physicalism and dualism benefit from having qualia share locations with their correlates, as this makes relations between qualia and physical things easier to explain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many musical instruments produce a myriad of sound colors resulting from diverse playing techniques, both traditional and extended. Such techniques include parameters that are often regularly manipulated in music, such as pitch, intensity (dynamics), articulation style, and duration. Despite the likely contribution of such timbral variations to musical experience, within-instrument timbral flexibility and its semantic consequences have not been addressed empirically. Participants rated sounds produced by the oboe and the French horn on 12 combinations of register and dynamics using the 20-dimensional timbre qualia model from Reymore and Huron (2020). Data are modeled with Exploratory Factor Analysis, partial proportional odds regressions, and random forest classifiers. Although trends between ratings and register/dynamics emerged, the results illustrate the complexity of within-instrument timbral variability. Some trends were approximately linear, others demonstrated non-linear patterns, and some timbre qualia dimensions displayed interactions between register and dynamics. While certain trends were shared between the oboe and French horn, such as an increase in sparkling/brilliant ratings with register, others seem to be unique to each instrument, such as the relationship of ratings of woody to register for the oboe or of ratings of muted/veiled to dynamics for the horn. Results demonstrate that within-instrument timbral variability based on dynamic and register is apparent to listeners and that semantic interactions among parameters can be present. The methodology established in this paper can be extended to address within-instrument timbral flexibility with respect to articulation, duration, and other sources of variation for any instrument or group of instruments.

Traditional approaches in timbre research have often equalized sounds according to pitch, loudness, duration in order to study timbral differences across instruments. In a compact case study of the semantic qualities of the oboe and French horn, Reymore (2021) takes a different approach and considers timbral differences within musical instruments, which arise due to the covariation of timbre with the musical parameters of fundamental frequency (pitch) and playing effort (dynamic level). The study constitutes a timely contribution to a growing body of work on the covariation between timbre, pitch, and loudness. After providing a background and summary of important aspects of the target article, I elaborate on results from a recent complementary study that analyzed acoustical signal properties regarding that matter. Finally, I address three important issues in this context that appear to be worthy of future research.

The nature of personal identity is ultimately theological in nature. Through a survey of some of the recent philosophical evidence for the soul (in the analytic philosophical tradition), the following lays out reasons for why personal identity is accounted for by a soul because of the nature of phenomenal consciousness as essentially descriptive of persons. Yet, this conclusion is buttressed by theological reflection on personal origins and the end of life. Through a guided reflection on the origins of persons and the end of life (through the lens of dementia case studies), further suggested information about the person as a substance of consciousness reveals more than what is uncovered through philosophical or scientific analysis alone. In this way, and building on Priest’s recents work, the following is a sketch of personal identity as ensouled identity that moves beyond what Priest calls the ‘conditioned’ mode to the ‘unconditioned’ mode of theology.

The latest progress in empirical studies of consciousness and spectacular advances in AI technologies kick philosophy out of the familiar comfort of uncontrolled proliferation of concepts and scholastic disputes. In the overview of the current state of empirical theories of consciousness, author reveals that those theories still find themselves in the pre-paradigmatic stage, therefore not yet posing an immediate existential threat to the philosophy of consciousness, though making it watch out. Author attempts to deal with the certain ambiguity of the term ‘consciousness’, stripping its meaning from parts already susceptible to science and technology and from parts still highly unlikely to be explained away. Besides, the relationship between philosophy and science is specified in general by analyzing them to their inner dynamics of theories and ontologies, showing that for science, the distinction between the two is substantially more important than for philosophy. From this perspective, philosophical schemas of consciousness claiming to be ‘experiential’ must have met recently formulated criteria for empirical theories of consciousness, otherwise failing to explain anything in the domain. Finally, author adds his pragmatic criterion that addresses the technological perspectives a theory provides. In the end, a winning competitive theory will have to let us produce and control artificial conscious devices.

The nature of personal identity is ultimately theological in nature. Through a survey of some of the recent philosophical evidence for the soul (in the analytic philosophical tradition), the following lays out reasons for why personal identity is accounted for by a soul because of the nature of phenomenal consciousness as essentially descriptive of persons. Yet, this conclusion is buttressed by theological reflection on personal origins and the end of life. Through a guided reflection on the origins of persons and the end of life (through the lens of dementia case studies), further suggested information about the person as a substance of consciousness reveals more than what is uncovered through philosophical or scientific analysis alone. In this way, and building on Priest's recents work, the following is a sketch of personal identity as ensouled identity that moves beyond what Priest calls the 'conditioned' mode to the 'unconditioned' mode of theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do brains create all our different colors, pains, and other conscious qualities? These various qualia are the most essential aspects of consciousness. Yet standard neuroscience (primarily based on synaptic information processing) has not found the synaptic-firing codes, sometimes described as the “spike code,” to account for how these qualia arise and how they unite to form complex perceptions, emotions, et cetera. Nor is it clear how to get from these abstract codes to the qualia we experience. But electromagnetic field (versus synaptic) approaches to how qualia arise have been offered in recent years by Pockett, McFadden, Jones, Bond, Ward and Guevera, Keppler and Shani, Hunt and Schooler, et cetera. These EM-field approaches show promise in offering more viable accounts of qualia. Yet, until now, they have not been evaluated together. We review various EM field theories of qualia, highlight their strengths and weaknesses, and contrast these theories with standard neuroscience approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout this essay the author analyzes the concept of transcendence in Jung's theoretical corpus with a focus on its philosophical parameters and therapeutic efficacy in promoting a category of value. Although Jung did not precisely define the terms transcendence, transcendent, and transcendental, it is necessary to tease out these features in order to illuminate the varieties of transcendence in Jung's thought. Distinctions are made between the ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological dimensions of transcendence, including the structure, method, form, and process of mediating, transitioning, and transforming inner experience. Jung's notion of the dialectic operative within the transcendent function is specifically critiqued. Here the author explores the possibility of a synthesis of internal opposition that leads to a greater principle of unity through the sublation of psyche. He further examines the transcendent function in the process of active imagination by drawing on patient material derived through associations in the analysis of the transference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The perception of color by humans and other primates is a complex task which is addressed not only by neurophysiology, but also by other related sciences such as psychophysiology, psycholinguistics, and even philosophy. This review takes the neurophysiology of vision as a starting point to examine the contributions of all related disciplines to understanding how color perception is encoded in primates. The currently known neurophysiological mechanisms of color perception in primates are considered and a hypothetical scheme for processing color stimuli in the primate cortex is proposed in which color coding is carried out by conceptual neurons at the highest stage of stimulus processing, these cells being responsible only for reflecting the color parameter of the visual stimulus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The human mind can be thought of as a black box, where the external inputs are elaborated in an unknown way and lead to external outputs. D’Ariano and Faggin schematized thinking and consciousness through quantum state dynamics. The complexity of mental states can be formalized through the entanglement of the so-called qualia states. Thus, the interaction between the mind and the external world can be formalized as an interplay between classical and quantum-state dynamics. Since quantum computing is more and more often being applied to robots, and robots constitute a benchmark to test schematic models of behavior, we propose a case study with a robotic dance, where the thinking and moving mechanisms are modeled according to quantum–classic decision making. In our research, to model the elaboration of multi-sensory stimuli and the following decision making in terms of movement response, we adopt the D’Ariano–Faggin formalism and propose a case study with improvised dance based on a collection of poses, whose combination is presented in response to external and periodic multi-sensory stimuli. We model the dancer’s inner state and reaction to classic stimuli through a quantum circuit. We present our preliminary results, discussing further lines of development.