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We explain the individual-level extremity of members of Congress, and hence polarization, using a model that relies on district ideology, member sorting, and institutional changes in Congress. Of the three mass-elite linkage models we consider, proximity, directional, and mixed, only the directional model is consistent with all three explanations. Because the directional model implies, contrary to the existing literature that centrist representatives will not be advantaged when they seek reelection, we reconsider that literature. Based on an entirely theoretical argument we suggest that the discipline's current understanding fails on two fronts: first, it does not adequately distinguish between sympathetic and antagonistic districts; and second, it incorrectly assumes that winning or losing elections responds to the same set of factors as margin of victory. We test these claims and find them supported. Our work suggests that polarization is a natural rather than an aberrant condition in two-party democracies with centrist electorates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the effect of national economic changes on party swings in state legislative seats and party changes in governorships in a historical context. The period in question covers an era when the economy was largely unregulated by the national government, and the onus fell to state governments to handle the problems related to fluctuating interest rates, inflation and deflation, and bank panics. We posit, then, that the electoral prospects of parties in state government should be affected by changes in the national economic situation to a greater extent than observed in modern studies. We expect to find that voters punished majority parties at the state level when the economy took a downturn, especially during bank panics and periods of deflation, as these governments were the principal actors in economic regulation. This will add to the existing literature on economics and state politics by expanding the scope of study to a period when economic changes were more pronounced and state governments played a larger role in the banking and financial sectors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proximity theory-based voting models find that the ideal location for an incumbent is nearest to the median voter, while directional voting models find that the key is to be orientated in the same ideological direction as the median voter. In this paper, I use directional logic to investigate the effect of incumbent ideological extremity on candidate entry in Senate elections. Looking at elections from 1952 to 2006, I find that when incumbents are oriented in the same ideological direction as the median voter, extremity plays a positive role in discouraging quality challengers from entering the race. Conversely, when a Senator is orientated counter to the median voter in the state, then ideological extremity will play a negative role by encouraging potential quality challengers. I examine quality challengers both in a binary way, whether they held previous office or not, and in an ordinal way, expanding the quality measures from Lublin(1994). Under both conceptualizations, I find a conditional effect for ideology based on the general orientation of the state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the factors that predict primary challenges to congressional incumbents and then analyzes the newspaper coverage of those races as an illustration of strategies used by congressional challengers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely accepted that the quality of challengers plays a major role in the success of incumbents seeking reelection. Since quality challengers are such a critical factor in election outcomes, this paper examines the relationship between incumbent ideology and the emergence of quality challengers. In House races where the incumbent seeks reelection, I find a relationship between candidate entry and ideology conditioned by district type. Greater ideological extremity increases the likelihood of facing a quality challenger in districts where the median voter is oriented counter to the incumbent. This relationship reverses in districts sympathetic to the ideological direction of the incumbent. In those districts, extremity benefits the incumbent as they are less likely to face a quality challenger. The conditional relationship of ideological extremity and challenger entry suggests that incumbents face different ideological motivations depending on the orientation of their district. Provided that an incumbent is in sync with their district, extremity can be beneficial in terms of avoiding challengers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an examination into the district factors and representative characteristics that lead to challenges of incumbent House members in party primaries. Given the extreme difficulty in defeating incumbent House members, it is expected that rational political actors will gauge the political climate carefully. Partisan dominated districts will be more likely to be the site of inter-party battles as the seats will be of greater value to potential challengers. Members that moderate their views will be more likely to be challenged due to the relative ideological extremity of the respective partisan base. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is no abstract for this paper ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]