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Liu et al. [Liu, Y., D. S. Putler, C. B. Weinberg. 2004. Is having more channels really better? A model of competition among commercial television broadcasters. Marketing Sci. 23(1) 120-133] [...]

Issues are discussed regarding whether the function of issues such as winning, profits and the education or the education of college athletes bears on the perceptions of college sports. Conclusions include that these tend to be competing athletic program priorities. The implications of the findings for theory and practice are considered.

Studies key characteristics influencing microcomputer and software use by farmers and farm businesses. Examines how certain variables, including farm size, product, operator's education and age influence computer use. Large farms and well-educated operators are more likely to use computers. Recommends computer education outreach and crop simulation software development. (TES)

Liu et al. [Liu, Y., D. S. Putler, C. B. Weinberg. 2004. Is having more channels really better? A model of competition among commercial television broadcasters. Marketing Sci. 23(1) 120-133] examine the television broadcast industry using a model in which profit-maximizing broadcasters seek to gain viewers by choosing the type of program to offer and by spending money to set program quality, allowing broadcasters to sell access to those viewers (through inserted advertisements) at a fixed rate per viewer. Wu and Chou [Wu, C., S. Chou. 2006. Commentary on "Is having more channels really better? A model of competition among commercial television broadcasters." Marketing Sci. 25(5) 541-545] argue that the duopoly result for a certain range of the cost parameter in Liu et al. is not a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. They further propose some modifications to the original model to restore Liu et al.'s results. In this reply, we demonstrate how a single strategy, not included in the strategy space of the Liu et al. duopoly model leads to the difference between our analysis and that of Wu and Chou. While we had intended to rule out this strategy, the text was not entirely clear on this issue; Wu and Chou's comment provides an opportunity to clarify the situation. We provide both empirical and theoretical support for excluding this strategy, which allows us to focus on the more plausible competitive situations in television broadcasting. We also reply to Wu and Chou's other comments on several issues, such as the relative importance of program type versus quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competitive behavior in commercial television broadcasting is modeled to examine program choice and the effects of more channels being available on firm strategy. Specifically, broadcasters compete by selecting both the "type" and quality level of a program to offer, but do not compete on price. We obtain five major results. First, a comparison of monopoly and duopoly markets indicates that broadcasters in an industry with a larger number of competitors may provide programs of lower quality compared to broadcasters in an industry with a smaller number. Second, in terms of viewer welfare, having more channels available is not necessarily "better." Third, broadcasters tend to choose an intermediate level of differentiation in terms of the types of programs they provide, resulting in a "counter programming" strategy. In other words, avoidance of price competition is not required for competitors to differentiate themselves from each other. Fourth, if one broadcaster starts the evening with a higher-quality (higher-rated) program than its competitor, its second program should also be of higher quality. Finally, a broadcaster's first program should be of equal or higher quality than its second program. Put another way, it always behooves a broadcaster to "lead with its best." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]