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That Putin's regime has been able to put the memory of the Great Patriotic War (GPW) to political use is hardly news to any observer of Russia. What is often overlooked, however, is that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has contributed to the instrumentalization of this memory by the Kremlin. In this article, I aim to bridge this gap. Drawing on an analysis of the ROC's commemorative activities, I reconstruct the specific, martyrological, interpretation of the GPW that it is forging. With sin, atonement, and glory as its central concepts, this interpretation invests the suffering and losses of the GPW with patriotic sense. Thus, it turns the politically problematic traumatic memory of the GPW into a politically useful one. Simultaneously, it is consistent with the triumphant cult of the GPW advanced by the Kremlin. It also perfectly suits the statist historical narrative focused on the continuity of Russia's past, which is crucial for the ideology of Putin's regime. Furthermore, this interpretation does not contradict the Soviet memory of the GPW that the regime relies on. Finally, in combining Orthodox Christianity with militarism, the martyrological interpretation of the GPW is highly suitable for the regime's political business of the day, which is waging its war against Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coined by Rousseau, the term civil religion describes the form of bond that integrates the individual into the whole and gives meaning to their existence (1893). Civil religion has become critical for the Russian state to legitimize the Ukrainian invasion as necessary for the common good. As president of Russia who holds the authoritative power, Vladimir Putin mostly communicates his political message through public addresses. Analyzing the 21 transcripts of speeches by Putin after the Ukrainian invasion, this study asked: How does Putin’s regime frame the post-Soviet Russian civil religion in addresses after the Ukrainian invasion? Through discourse analysis, this study found the three most common themes, patriotism and honor in sacrifice, anti-Western senti- ment, and democratic values. Examined using the rhetorical triad of nationalism by Levinger and Lytle (2003), the study results reveal that the deliberate choice of themes justifies war as necessary through glorification of patriotism, villainization of the enemy, and moral justification of violence. In effect, the findings reveal how Putin’s regime strategically positions the Russian people and the state in the post-Soviet world to defend the act of interstate invasion.

The article highlights the chronology of the use and dynamics of changes in the meaning of the narrative „neo-Nazism” in the rhetoric, speeches and articles of V. Putin from the time he assumed the position of President of the Russian Federation until the beginning of Russia's Total War against Ukraine (the so-called Special Military Operation). The combination of the definitions „Nazism” and „neo-Nazism” in the artificially created pseudo-historical and pseudo-political ideologeme of the revival of neo-Nazism in Ukraine as a legacy of Nazi collaborators during the Second World War in the modern Ukrainian socio-political environment and state authorities is singled out. Changes in the dynamics of V. Putin's use of the „neo-Nazism” narrative in relation to events in Ukraine were traced and analyzed, depending on the schedule of internal political levers in Kyiv (in particular, the influence of pro-Russian forces on state policy) or in accordance with the geopolitical tactics of the Russian Federation in implementing its strategy of mastering Ukraine and expansion on international arena. The transformation of the negative direction of the narrative „neo-Nazism” in V. Putin's personal rhetoric from accusations of the so-called nazification of certain segments of Ukrainian society to the state authorities of Ukraine has been revealed. It has been singled out that V. Putin purposefully tries to give the narrative of „neo-Nazism” a wider global political scope, redirecting it into discrediting and accusing not only Ukraine or the Baltic countries (in the context of the reproduction of the neo-empire of the USSR in the post-Soviet space), but also the countries of the West (members of the EU and NATO), which allegedly encourage the revival of Nazism and contribute to the strengthening of neo-Nazism in Ukraine at the state level. It is summarized that the propaganda ideology and narrative of „neo-Nazism” started by V. Putin in order to divert attention from the basic neo-fascist principles of his own dictatorial system in Russia, gradually became the core of his concept of a distorted image not only of Ukraine, but also of Western democracies in a visionary strategy of changing the levers of geopolitical influence on the Eurasian space and the destruction of the established world security system.

Reseña de: Bosch, A. (2023). El año que llegó Putin. La Rusia que acogió y catapultó a un desconocido. Catarata, 171 pp.

The article explores how the ideology of Putin’s regime is configured depending on the purposes for which it is used. It examines how the Kremlin’s attempt to mobilize the nation through ideology after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine aligns with its broader strategies of utilizing ideology. To understand variations in the Kremlin’s discourse, the study contrasts two conceptual configurations: patriotic statism (state as the ultimate value, requiring citizens to make sacrifices) and welfare statism (state as a means to provide people’s well-being). This framework enables us to analyze how different configurations of Putin’s ideology are employed in various political genres. The analysis reveals that while the genres of ideological proclamation, ideological indoctrination, and declarative justification are dominated by patriotic statism, welfare statism proves essential for the genre of mobilizing invocation. When Putin aims to mobilize the nation, the promises of welfare appear more reliable than mere rhetoric of patriotic self-sacrifice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on transcripts from the television network Channel One, a popular news source in Russia, this article addresses the question: “How was Vladimir Putin covered by state-controlled media while the regime became increasingly centralized?” The literature on the subject is scarce and inconclusive. Dictators create different images of themselves, and the portrayals of present-day spin dictators — those who primarily rely on the power of propaganda to persuade rather than dominate — are understudied. While some analysts point to Putin’s omnipresence in mass media, others uncover the lack of media personalization and relatively neutral coverage. Using 385,981 news transcripts from 2000–2022 and relying on techniques from natural language processing, I examine how a present-day autocrat attempts to optimize the intensity of state-controlled propaganda. I uncover three main tendencies. First, during all the years in power, the ruler has been more frequently referred to through positive stories. Second, there is only partial evidence that the relative references to Putin on Channel One have significantly increased over time. Third, during all his years in power, Putin has been more frequently mentioned in domestic news rather than in stories about foreign affairs. However, I also demonstrate that the share of news about foreign affairs and events abroad that mentions the ruler has been increasing every year since 2013. By focusing on the supply side of propaganda, this article contributes to the literature on autocratic resilience and spin dictators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the ambivalent stance of Latin American governments towards Russia's actions in Ukraine. Using Proyecto Élites Parlamentarias de la Universidad de Salamanca (PELA‐USAL) data, it explores ideological self‐placement, Putin's approval and alliance preferences among Latin American Members of Parliament, highlighting the influence of anti‐imperialism and multilateralism on their international alignments and support for Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Clinton administration’s drive to enact reform in Ukraine during the 1990s was viewed at the time as being necessary for the nation’s revitalization and re-integration into Western Europe. Decades later, these policies have been critiqued for antagonizing the Kremlin, causing it to seek political control over its former satellite. This paper addresses the viability of the Clinton administration’s efforts and the reasons for their ultimate failure. It finds that despite its best intentions, the administration’s economic strategy faced unanticipated resistance from the Kremlin, as long-standing ties with Kiev undermined US-led efforts for economic and political reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 2000, before Vladimir Putin became known on the world stage--even before he had been elected president of Russia--he gave an interview to three Russian journalists who asked him the types of questions that constitute an Adlerian lifestyle personality questionnaire: that is, to describe himself and his family while growing up, and to relate early memories or recollections. Interpreting his responses shows that Putin, who grew up an only child, mythologized the perceived heroic role that his soldier-father had played in World War II in defense of the Soviet empire and had also set a goal for himself to be a leader of "hooligans" (his word) when he was younger and then of a more accepting conservative Russian or Soviet society. With regard to Putin's current behavior, in which he likely sees himself as a kind of czar invading Ukraine, and given that the interview was conducted over 20 years ago, the purpose of this article is to show the longitudinal value of using Adlerian interpretive methods to assess personality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sources of identity for the state are subjected to a constant process of change dependent upon, but not reduced to the aspect of who is creating the collective consciousness of the state's self-awareness at the specific point in time. This paper traces and analyses the legal and political changes made in Russia's legislature and governance model over the course of the past 20 years. This article argues that constitutional and legal changes have promoted and identify the president of Russia as a 'curator' of foreign policy—controlling the decisions made and the state identity that supplements them or enables them. As a result, it can be argued that although in the Russian political elite, several key agents can be identified as the ones shaping and influencing Russia's foreign policy and constructing its identity, President Vladimir Putin, from a legal and political perspective has the most legal power and authority and thus can be considered the main agent of Russia's identity construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fukuyama predicts that despite Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, initially upending the trend toward liberal democracy, he will see more reverses. Cold War, Putin, Ukraine, Russia, liberalism, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, neo-conservativism Keywords: Francis Fukuyama; The End of History; Cold War; Putin; Ukraine; Russia; neo-conservativism; liberalism EN Francis Fukuyama The End of History Cold War Putin Ukraine Russia neo-conservativism liberalism 318 323 6 11/11/22 20221101 NES 221101 I There's a lot of authoritarian governments on the move, and they're consolidating power. So far, Putin has seen none of his fondest dreams - Ukraine being overwhelmed by Russia, neutral countries distancing themselves from NATO, Eastern Europe becoming less democratic - come to fruition. [Extracted from the article]

Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent threats to use nuclear weapons are grounded in a psychology that is paranoid and also millennialist – that is, focused on an imagined future that will come only after the "good" have vanquished the evil "others." This is a fundamentalist mindset that is not restricted to religious attitudes and is exemplified by past leaders such as Adolf Hitler and Osama bin Laden. In Putin's worldview, the profound humiliation that he believes the West has inflicted on his sense of self, both as an individual and as a member of the Russian people, is an intolerable injury that must be avenged. In this mindset, violence is a moral imperative. The fundamentalist mindset makes it difficult for a leader like Putin to retreat from a field of battle that has assumed apocalyptic meaning. And because Putin possesses nuclear weapons and has signaled that he might use them if cornered, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which he would agree to a conventional surrender or compromise. Russia must feel it has preserved a respected role in any final settlement, including the shared need to preserve human civilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By calling for Putin's removal from power, Western officials and scholars magnify Russian historic fears of a state collapse. Worse, they magnify them by fueling the Kremlin propaganda machine and reinforcing Russians' reluctance to turn against their regime. Still, Putin will inevitably have to go someday. When that day arrives, however, it is all but clear what the future for Russia will be. Will Russia after Putin necessarily collapse? Or will Putin's successor turn to the West with a plea for peace and engage the country in reforms and modernization? History can still go either way. But by creating a huge police force to repel popular discontent, accumulating vast financial reserves to escape sanctions, and modifying the Russian constitution so the ruler can indefinitely remain in power, Putin has already laid the groundwork for whoever happens to be his successor to persevere in the current course of aggression – a course where the aggressor possesses the world's largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of SIRIUS - Zeitschrift fur Strategische Analysen is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article highlights the chronology of the use and dynamics of changes in the meaning of the narrative «neo-Nazism» in V. Putin’s rhetoric, speeches and articles over a two-year period from the beginning of the total period of the Russian-Ukrainian war, i.e. from February 2022 to February 2024. The combination of the definitions «Nazism» and «neo-Nazism» in the artificially created pseudohistorical and pseudo-political ideology of the revival of neo-Nazism in Ukraine as a legacy of Nazi collaborators during the Second World War in the modern Ukrainian socio-political environment and state authorities is singled out. Changes in the dynamics of V. Putin’s use of the «neo-Nazism» narrative in relation to Ukraine and Western countries and in accordance with the geopolitical tactics of the Russian Federation regarding the implementation of its strategy of mastering Ukraine and expansion on the international arena were traced and analyzed. It is summarized that the propaganda ideology and narrative of «neo-Nazism», used by V. Putin in order to divert attention from the basic neo-fascist principles of his own dictatorial system in Russia, became the core of his concept of a distorted image not only of Ukraine, but also of Western democracies in a visionary strategy of changing the levers of geopolitical influence on the Eurasian space and the destruction of the established world security system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Analyzing and interpreting a narrative can provide insight into the occurrence of an event, its causes, and its nature. Therefore, it can be said that narratives are a way to understand events. Narratives can be based on fact or fiction, but they help people make sense of the world through stories about themselves and others. This highlights the importance of narratives in shaping actions in the world. From this point of view, the current crisis in Ukraine can be seen as a story in which both Russia and Ukraine are trying to present their narratives of the history, causes, and methods of their conflict. The purpose of this research is to examine the narrative dimensions of this crisis from the point of the view of Putin and Zelensky, who are its main narrators. To achieve this, data will be collected and then analyzed from the statements of the leaders of Russia and Ukraine. Research question: The question of the article based on the relationship between the narrative and the dynamics of contradiction is: what factor has made the crisis in Ukraine prolonged and inevitable? Research hypothesis: hypothesis is that conflicting narratives as incompatible ideological and identity beliefs by the leaders of Russia and Ukraine is the inevitable ground of the conflict and has become one of the long-term crises. Methodology and theoretical framework: The theoretical approach of the article is narrative analysis. The reason for choosing this theory is that narratives shape our understanding of ourselves and even create the physical world. The research method for this article is qualitative content analysis. In this method, the main concepts of the subject are extracted based on the selected theoretical approach. In the next step, these concepts are interpreted as research data by referring to the words and opinions of Putin and Zelensky as the ruling elite. This method is a good way to achieve the research goal because it seeks to understand the opinion and infer the specific characteristics of a crisis. Results and Discussion: Certainly, the history of the Ukraine crisis dates back to the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. But the turning point and the beginning of the conflict of this crisis was in early 2014, after the annexation of Crimea to Russia. Although this annexation was the beginning of a military conflict, on the political side, the first friction was caused by Viktor Yanukovych decision against Ukraine's agreement with the European Union in 2013. Since then, political movements in favor of a nationalist approach to opposing Russian influence led to a period of protests against Yanukovych government and ultimately to his ouster from power in 2014. After this period, Ukraine's tendency towards the West increased the tension between this country and Russia. Therefore, in the post-Soviet period, while Ukraine was following policies to consolidate its independence, the Russian Federation sought to control Soviet geography, which was defined as the foreign country close to the Russian Federation. These foreign policy goals, carried out by the two countries, have caused security duality against each other and the emergence of some crises. In defining this security dilemma, the narrative of the elites of these two countries has always played a fundamental role. Narratives are often used by the ruling elite to incite society and resort to war and violence against others. In addition to the reconstructing the identities that make conflict possible, another key condition in the escalation of conflict, is the role of elites who mobilize identities and narratives for war. According to this role of leaders, Putin's narrative of preventive war, removal of threats and nationalism, delegitimization, negativity and victimization have formed the three elements of his narrative to legitimize and justify the attack on Ukraine, while Zelensky, on the other hand, in response to Putin's narrative, has presented an opposite narrative of inversion, marginalization, and contradiction and has declared his narrative fictional. Conclusion: The narratives of Russia and Ukraine have been formed in such a way that these narratives do not allow for mutual understanding or a short-term solution to the crisis, and that only a tragedy or miracle can end the war. Consequently, as long as the conflicting narratives remain unchanged and less conflicting narratives replace them, even if the current crisis temporarily subsides, it is still waiting to happen again. The structure of both sides' narratives shows that Putin's story is based on both material elements and normative-identity, but the dominant and provocative narrative is based on material and geopolitical elements. On the other hand, Ukrainian narratives have a normative and identity nature due to their connection with Western narratives and formation against Russian narratives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Parties act as political institutions that connect government and society. They also play a vital role in the political endurance of nations. The Russian Federation is one the countries that has an active multi-party system. The formation of parties in Russia started later than in Western Europe. The first political parties were formed under Tsar Nicholas II in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, until 1905, the establishment of political associations in Russia was strongly opposed until the declaration of October17, 1905. With the October Revolution of 1917, a one-party system was gradually formed in Russia, thus ending the first period of party formation. At the end of the Soviet era in the late 1980s and after the implementation of "Perestroika" and "Glasnost" by Mikhail Gorbachev, important changes took place in the Russian political system. This especially led to the re-emergence of parties. In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of political parties was very rapid and numerous. Subsequently, during the following years, the party structure of the Russian Federation experienced significant numerical and substantive changes, a subject which this article tries to investigate. Research question: What is the role of political parties in the political life of Russia? Do all Russian political parties have equal influence and rights since Vladimir Putin assumed power? Research hypothesis: The hypothesis of this atricle is that the party system in Putin's Russia is effectively a "dominant party" system; in which parties affiliated with Putin's United Russia Party primarily dominate and control the legislative process. The authors of this article also argue that the amendment of the Russian constitution in 2020 did not change the role and position of Russian parties in practice. Methodology: In order to conduct this research and answer the key questions, a descriptive-analytical approach has been chosen. In addition, the authors have explained the problem and investigated the issue by collecting and analyzing the required data through desk research and descriptive analysis of available sources (articles, books and reliable internet sources). Results and discussion: The approval of the law on political parties in 2001 and the imposition of party electoral thresholds (minimum share of primary votes: 5-7 percent) drastically reduced the number of parties. But in October 2011, the government passed a bill to simplify party registration. After the approval of this law, the number of parties increased. From the 4th Duma (2003) to the 8th Duma (2021), the "United Russia" as Putin's "Party of Power" has always won an absolute majority of votes. This party has the largest number of representatives in the State Duma and in the regional parliaments. Since power in Russia is ultimately concentrated in the hands of the president, it is in the interests of political parties and party elites to get close to him in order to reduce any tensions and disagreements. Indeed, due to the dominance of the "Party of Power", the Russian political party system is virtually non-competitive. This is the main problem of party development in today's Russia. Therefore parliamentary parties have many resources, while non-parliamentary opposition parties have neither resources nor political stability. Considering the contemporary dominance of certain political parties in the Russian parliament and their failure to replace with newer parties, it has definitely reduced the interest and willingness of Russian citizens to vote. In this regard, in 2016, the lowest participation rate in the history of parliamentary elections of the Russian Federation was recorded with only 47.88 percent. This low turnout was in contrast to the previous four elections, in which 60 percent of all eligible voters participated and two elections, in which 55 percent participated. Several amended articles of the Russian constitution actually strengthen the role and position of the president. For example, according to clause 2 of Article 95 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the number of representatives of the President in the Federation Council increases from 17 to a maximum of 30. Likewise, Articles 129 and 107 increase the interference of the President in the judiciary and thus limit the independence of the country's judiciary. On January 15, 2020, Vladimir Putin once again inexplicably reiterated the need for a strong presidential system and sufficient powers for the president in Russia. Conclusion: Although according to the constitution of the Russian Federation (2020), the country has a multi-party system, but in practice, the Power Party (United Russia) plays the main role compared to other parties in Russia. The party system in Russia has become the dominant party system. Russian political parties are not an effective bridge between the people and the government due to the weakness of civil society in Russia. Therefore, until a strong civil society is formed in Russia, the country's political parties will not play a central role as a link between civil society and the government. The "United Russia" party as the dominant political party in power, has practically become Putin's tool to hold the majority of seats in the parliament. As a result, when Putin wants to become the president of Russia, through this party and in the name of "the will of the Russian people" he can influence the establishment of laws in Parliament without opposition and in line with his political interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's invasion of Ukraine shattered peace in Europe, and highlighted the fundamental disagreements between Russia and NATO over the status of Ukraine and other former Soviet territories. Russia raised the stakes of this disagreement by attempting to conquer Ukraine, and threatening to use nuclear weapons if NATO intervened. NATO and the European Union must negotiate an end to the fighting and deny Russian victory over Ukraine. Once peace is achieved, European security architecture must be rebuilt. This requires improving political relations between Russia and an expanded NATO, establishing stable military-to-military relations at reduced force levels, and reliably reducing the threat of nuclear war. NATO should indicate that it is willing to remove US nuclear weapons from Europe in exchange for similar Russian reductions – and the rearward movement of Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces. Near-term agreement on such steps can reduce the short-term threat of nuclear war, while also setting the stage for negotiations on replacing the INF treaty with a new agreement banning intermediate and short-range offensive missiles in Europe. Both sides need to re-assert that nuclear arms are weapons of last resort and pledge never to employ them first in a conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Rustamova has written for numerous non-government media outlets in Russia for a Russian audience, such as Meduza and TV Rain, on Russian politics and society. Keywords: Putin; dissent; Russia; Ukraine war; authoritarianism; sanctions; Cold War EN Putin dissent Russia Ukraine war authoritarianism sanctions Cold War 315 317 3 11/11/22 20221101 NES 221101 In the last issue of the I Bulletin i 's bi-monthly magazine, the executive editor, Dan Drollette Jr., interviewed Russian independent journalist Farida Rustamova about what it is like to try to do honest, accurate, uncensored journalism from modern-day, Putin's Russia - for primarily a Russian audience. Putin, dissent, Russia, Ukraine war, authoritarianism, sanctions, Cold War. [Extracted from the article]

This article covers the period of November 2023-May 2024 of the internal developments in Armenia, the foreign dynamics shaping the international relations of Armenia, the ongoing process of signing the Peace Agreement with Azebaijan and the bilateral relations of Turkiye and Armenia in the light of the process of normalisation of their relations. The period under review has been a time frame where acts have been put into motion that can be qualified as a breaking or turning point both internally and externally. The Nikol Pashinyan administration has undertaken some courageous and risky steps, breaking with established taboos. With a view to overcoming past bigoted concepts, the initiatives encouraged or condoned by the Pashinyan administration to make changes or amends in the Constitution, national hymn and symbols, school curriculum, and genocide narrative, which help cement the past and cause rupture with the present, has led to reactions. Internal reactions have come from partisans of the former government, extreme nationalists and most importantly the Church, while external reactions have come from the militant organizations of the Diaspora who perceive their survival and livelihood in provoking radical and militant nationalism, and third party states wishing to use this as a vehicle to put political pressure on Türkiye. On the other hand, Christian fundamentalism that appeared in the West has endeavored to project Armenians as a symbol of Christian solidarity, thus to base assistance to Armenia on ideological grounds. Some states, allowing the tail to wag the dog, have seen political advantages in fulfilling these initiatives and demands. Following the termination of the occupation of Karabakh, the major obstacle to achieving a lasting peace with Azerbaijan has been removed, limiting the issues for negotiations to border demarcation and transport connections and facilities. Distancing itself from Russia to align with the West as Russia was not in a position to open a second front as the war with Ukraine was going on, Armenia has come to realize the necessity to normalize its relations with Türkiye, the neighbor to provide its connections with the West. Türkiye had been sincerely supporting the process of normalization of relations from early on. However, Türkiye has considered this in a regional perspective, to coincide with the normalization of Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan, within the regional stability with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Leviathan: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article highlights the military-political situation of Ukraine on the eve of the full-scale incursion of Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine and the beginning of the total war of the Russian Federation against the state of Ukraine in February 2022. The political actions and measures of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky against the background of the concentration of enemy troops around the borders of Ukraine on the eve (2019–2022) of the beginning of the full-scale period of the Russian- Ukrainian war and the diplomatic efforts of the leaders of the West (NATO) to warn the state and political leadership of Ukraine about the imminent full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. It points to the obvious signs and accomplished facts of preparations by V. Putin and the military-political leadership of Russia for a comprehensive attack on the enemy in several directions at the same time (including directly on Kyiv) and the efforts of Western democracies, diplomacy and intelligence to prevent and prepare the Armed Forces of Ukraine and her political escort to repel the attack of the Moscow invaders. The unpreparedness of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi for the appropriate perception of the contemporary reality, caused by the «Russian syndrome» of his worldview, state-security myopia and unpreparedness for a strategic vision of military-political threats and political naivety, etc., was noted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to analyse the parameters of the security discourse in the context of the war in Ukraine. In this sense, we aim to reflect the functional line, associations and synergy between concepts such as: strategic communication, security discourse and international public relations. We will analyse the strategic narratives in the context of the geopolitical confrontations. As a case study, the following three security speeches were selected: that of Biden, that of Putin and that of Zelensky; their impact and international resonance was also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The awareness of representing an ancient culture, as well as a tradition of resistance to the various powers that have invaded that space from time to time, probably constitute the main resource of the Armenian community today. An element of identity that means for the country the awareness of continuously risking for its survival in a context such as that of the Caucasus exposed to tensions that have repercussions on a very large scale. In these circumstances, Armenian territory appears as a "buffer" between great powers, former superpowers in phases of decline, and new regional powers on the rise, which often use geopolitical expedients - including the so-called "corridor approach" - to reaffirm some power positions. A situation in which the millenary survival of the country, and its extraordinary culture, appear something heroic: a fact which deserves the attention of all humanity. An even more important fact considering that the country manages to maintain a democratic system, albeit amidst various contradictions, and a policy of international integration and collaboration on wide range. The latest evolutions, with the "invasion" by the side of Azerbaijan of the Nagorno Karabakh, with the consequent exodus of the local Armenian population, however, bring back to actual reality the memory of a past of nightmares, that seemed to be overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay reviews new books on the fraught relationships between Ukraine, Russia and North Atlatic Treaty Organization countries since 1990, and on comparative studies of quasi-colonial subjugation, the development of anti-imperial nationalism and conflict, and protracted and violent transitions to full national independence in Ireland and Ukraine. There are comparisons of the ways in which four centuries of recurrent tension, conflict and divergence between Ukraine and Russia either resembled or differed from the five centuries of fraught relationships between Ireland and Britain. Ireland's Great Famine (1846–1849) is compared with Ukraine's Holodomor (1932–1933). The essay also assesses conflicting attributions of responsibility for 'squandering' the opportunity to enhance European security and global peace during the 1990s, and for bringing about dramatic escalations of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 – initiating a 'Second Cold War' from 2014 onward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In February 2022, many observers initially evaluated the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a failure of Western deterrence. That assessment was and is flawed inasmuch as the West never articulated a clear strategy to deter such an invasion. Engaging with relevant conceptual debates about how deterrence works and relating this information to what the West did and did not do in the run-up to the invasion, this article shows that deterrence efforts were based on problematic assumptions about the Kremlin's motivations. The study concludes with lessons for Western military and policy practitioners with the intention to enable better future thinking about how to deter Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to explore potential avenues for the forthcoming "fourth wave" of memory studies, building upon existing theories of temporality in the field. By focusing on relative duration, particularly short-term versus long-term perspectives, it argues for the differentiation between objects of remembering, such as events and conditions, and modes of remembering, such as commemoration, legacy, and heritage. The article argues that our present moment is characterized by the proliferation of temporalities of various scales and the complex interplay between forms of memory and the scales against which it is constructed. This argument is illustrated by the different forms of the Chernobyl disaster remembering in Russia as well as Putin's strategic use of historical analogies from the distant past. Finally, the article proposes an agenda for the politics of time, expanding the scope of the "politics of memory" to encompass the social construction of past, present, and future on different scales and their use by existing systems of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Postscript is a summative reply to the many rich and engaging contributions which support, complement, strengthen, advance, further develop and refine, but also critique and question, and at rare times misread, simplify and distort, central tenets of my lead article in this special issue. To best address the most important themes, I briefly rehearse the aim and relevance of the moral argument, show how it normatively guides political support for Ukraine and address the relation between morality and law. I will then turn to the two normative visions at stake in this war, to assess the analysis and status of Dugin's Eurasian ideology, to finally take up the claim for principle-based negotiations to achieve a state of ceasefire and, eventually, lasting peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russo-Ukrainian War marks a significant moment in the post-1945 history of Europe when a new European war has begun that will shape relations with Russia for a long time to come. This war is not a regional war but is a product of the divergent and seemingly irreconcilable paths of the Russian Federation and Ukraine that go back to the collapse of the USSR while the critical juncture was the Iraq war, which set the terms for the current collapse in normative internationalism. The question of military support – its extent and duration – for Ukraine has major implications for the future of Europe. The moral and political challenges for Europe should not be confused with the interests of US foreign policy, which is using Ukraine for purposes that have little to do with what Europe should be concerned with, namely justice and peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay provides supplementary evidence for Kögler's thesis. It argues that Putin will have 'won' if he succeeds in reducing Ukrainian society to a chaotic, fragmented, violent, long-term social condition that can be characterised as a 'new war'. The essay describes the combination of the 'political marketplace' and exclusivist identity politics typical of new wars and how they apply to Putin's Russia. It concludes with a proposal for negotiations based on principles, especially justice, instead of or as well as borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Secondly, I turn to the role of religion in Putin's domestic and foreign policy which is important if we are to understand Dugin and modern-day Russia. Putin's Russia: A commentary on Professor Kögler's perspective The political framing of I Eurasianism i allows Dugin to employ a notion that has been popular among the Russian public and thus to associate a Russophile and radical conservative doctrine with Russia's political and cultural past and its future ([8]). Keywords: Demographic crisis; Dugin; Katechon; orthodoxy; Putin; symphonia EN Demographic crisis Dugin Katechon orthodoxy Putin symphonia 548 551 4 11/02/23 20231101 NES 231101 Hans-Herbert Kögler raises important questions about the morality of war ([7]). [Extracted from the article]

Keywords: Kögler; Putin; Russia; Ukraine; war EN Kögler Putin Russia Ukraine war 552 555 4 11/02/23 20231101 NES 231101 Kögler has written a scathing critique of the attempt by the Russian ultra-nationalist philosopher Aleksandr Dugin to legitimize the Russian attack on Ukraine (Kögler, 2023). Kögler, Putin, Russia, Ukraine, war But since wars have their own dynamics of development, Putin now owns this war and his political motive has shifted to avoiding any signs of weakness perceptible to his domestic audience. The moral call to defend Ukraine by Hans-Herbert Kögler. [Extracted from the article]

This essay is a reflection on the Ukraine war grounded in moral motives to empathetically support an attacked victim (whether at the individual or national level). It entails a critique of the moral abstraction of the geopolitical perspective and an analysis of Putin's imperial Eurasian ideology, including Dugin's cultural essentialism and the biopolitical strategies of its implementation. Current calls for peace, ceasefire or diplomacy appear problematic in this light. The need to articulate normative principles orienting negotiations with morally acceptable results becomes apparent, as they both justify the use of effective military means of empathetic solidarity and limit the dangers of an unchecked militarization and bellicose attitudes in this conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Putin executed his invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it has generated various responses in the real world and on social media. Among the most active users worldwide, Indonesian netizens contribute significantly to social media debates. It is intriguing since the past pattern indicates that Indonesian social media seldom generate a massive response to international affairs issues, especially those unrelated to Indonesia. However, in the case of Putin's Invasion, the Indonesian netizens behaved out of pattern by reproducing extensive narratives to support Russia's invasion by glorifying Putin's masculine side. In this paper, we trace how the narrative glorifying Putin's masculinities is constructed within Indonesian netizens' responses by interpreting Twitter data right after the first Russian attack from February 2022 to March 2022. Further, we also explain under what conditions the narratives emerge. We found that the narrative created two different patterns: the first pattern radiated romanticizing Putin's machoism aspect and, at the same time, feminizing the Indonesian government. We then argue that the supporting narratives are linked with how Indonesian gender relations are imbued with hegemonic masculinity products of the past Indonesian colonialism that shaped the praise for the hegemonic masculinity point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]