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1 Background 1.1 Impact Benefit Agreements and Confidentiality Clauses 1.2 The Rationale for Confidentiality among First Nations 1.3 The Emergence of Transparency in Nunavut 2 Discussion 2.1 The Public Law [...], Les ententes sur les répercussions et avantages (ERA) font généralement l'objet de clauses de confidentialité. Au Nunavut, la tendance récen te à les rendre publiques favorise un certain con trôle en la matière. À la lumière de cette divulgation, le présent article analyse le contenu des ERA du Nunavut et les conséquences à court terme de leur divulgation pour aboutir à trois conclusions: (1) cle par leur portée, le contenu des ERA du Nunavut est quasi législatif et s'assimile davantage au droit public qu 'au droit privé--une caractérisation qui favorise la transparence; (2) le rôle croissant des ERA par rapport à l'obligation de consulter peut également justifier une transparence accrue, et (3) la transparence des ERA au Nunavut a contribué à la circulation des idées parmi les communautés, ce qui a entraîné un examen critique constructif de la part du public et des universitaires. En tirant ces conclusions, le présent article ne suggère pas que toutes les ERA devraient être publiques. Il existe diverses raisons pour lesquelles les parties optent pour la confidentialité. Néanmoins, la tendance à l'abandon de la confidentialité au Nunavut invite à une réflexion plus large sur les avantages de la transparence des ERA. Impact Benefit Agreements are typically hidden from public view by confidentiality clauses. However, a recent trend towards public disclosure of IBAs in Nunavut has made scrutiny possible. In light of this unique disclosure, this paper analyses the contents of Nunavut 's IBAs and the short-term consequences of their transparency, reaching three conclusions: (1) the con ten ts of Nunavut 's IBAs are quasi-legislative, resembling public law more than private law in scope and scale--a characterization which warrants transparency; (2) IBAs' increasing role in the Duty to Consult may further warrant transparency, and (3) IB A transparency in Nunavut has allowed ideas to spread among Nunavut's communities and has invited constructive public and academic scrutiny. In reaching these conclusions, this paper does not suggest that all IBAs ought to be publicized. There are a variety of reasons why both Indigenous communities and extractive proponents opt for IBA confidentiality. Nonetheless, the trend away from confidentiality in Nunavut invites a broader discussion about the merits of IBA transparency. En los acuerdos de impacto y beneficios (AIB) se suscriben cláusulas de confidencialidad. En Nunavut, la reciente tendencia de publicarlas ha fomentado un cierto control sobre la materia. A la luz de esta divulgación, este artículo analiza el contenido de los AIB de Nunavut y las consecuencias de su divulgación a corto plazo, para llegar a tres conclusiones: (1) Por su alcance, el contenido de los AIB de Nunavut es cuasi legislativo, y se asimila más al derecho público que al derecho privado, lo cual es una caracterización que favorece la transparencia. (2) El creciente rol de los AIB en relación con la obligación de consulta puede igualmente justificar una mayor transparencia. (3) La transparencia de los AIB en Nunavut ha contribuido al intercambio de ideas entre las comunidades, lo que ha conllevado a un examen crítico y constructivo por parte del público y de los universitarios. Llegando a estas conclusiones, este artículo no propone que todos los AIB deberían ser públicos. Existen diversas razones por las cuales las partes pueden optar por la confidencialidad. Sin embargo, la tendencia existente para desistir de la confidencialidad en Nunavut invita a realizar una reflexión más amplia sobre las ventajas de la transparencia de los AIB.

In 1874, the original 275-officer contingent of North-West Mounted Police left Manitoba for what is now Alberta, to bring law and order to a frontier suffering the depredations of American whiskey traders preying on Aboriginal people. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, now 28,000 strong, has since become world renowned. It deals with organized crime, terrorism, illicit drugs, economic crimes and offences threatening the integrity of Canada's national borders. It also protects VIPs, supports other Canadian law enforcement agencies through its National Police Services, and carries out provincial and municipal policing under contract in eight provinces and three territories. This article reviews the history, outlines the benefits, and examines some of the implications of these policing contracts, using the 2012 Alberta agreement as the template. En 1874, le premier contingent de 275 agents du corps de la police montee du Nord-Ouest quittait le Manitoba pour se rendre la ou se trouve aujourd'hui l'Alberta afin d'instaurer l'ordre public a une frontiere ou les negociants en whisky faisaient des ravages en s'attaquant aux Autochtones. La Gendarmerie royale du Canada, qui compte actuellement plus de 28 000 personnes, a acquis depuis lors une renommee internationale. Elle lutte contre le crime organise, le terrorisme, les drogues illicites, les infractions et crimes economiques qui menacent l'integrite des frontieres nationales du Canada. Elle protege egalement les dignitaires, soutient d'autres organismes canadiens d'application de la loi par le biais de ses Services nationaux de police, et accomplit sous contrat le travail de police provincial et municipal dans huit provinces et trois territoires. Cet article passe en revue l'historique, souligne les avantages et examine certaines des implications de ces contrats de police, en se servant de l'entente 2012 avec l'Alberta comme modele., In July 1874, two hundred and seventy-five mounted police officers comprising the original contingent of the North-West Mounted Police left Fort Dufferin in Manitoba bound for the territory that is [...]

The contracts for naval warships placed in private shipyards in the nineteenth century provide an early example of state procurement policy. It has been widely argued that these contracts allowed the firms concerned to earn unusually high profits, although the evidence provided has been very limited. This article analyses the effects of naval warship contracts on the profitability of the dominant suppliers during the naval arms race of 1889-1914 in order to provide new and more systematic evidence on the workings of an early form of regulation and on a tangible aspect of the relationship between firms and the British government.

Incentive/disincentive (I/D) contracting has developed from basic cost- and profit-sharing arrangements between an owner and a contractor. To motivate the contractor to put in an extra effort to realize one or more project objectives of an accelerated, costly, and complex undertaking, the owner may offer an award to the contractor. The owner may also threaten the contractor with a penalty if the objectives are not met. This paper reviews the fundamental incentive/disincentive arrangements in contracting literature. Then, results are reported of a survey conducted on a sample of Illinois DOT highway contracts that included I/D provisions. The survey investigates whether there exists an agreement or disagreement between IDOT's and the contractors' perceptions of I/D contract provisions. The findings reveal how I/D contract milestones are established, how they are executed, what kind of work practices the contractor uses to fulfill I/D targets, and how the contracting parties perceive I/D contracts' effectiveness as opposed to non-I/D contracts. Certain issues pointed out by the respondents as problematic and in need of further refinement in I/D applications are also highlighted.

Bunching takes place in equilibrium if certain boundary conditions related to adverse selection are considered. For unilateral intervention, bunching takes place on a subset of types. It also takes place during bilateral intervention but assumes a different form. Asymmetric equilibria exists if the government provides either a comprehensive pooling contract or a fully separating contract.

Statistics on 4,412 minority business enterprises (MBEs) that provided goods and services to the government in 1987 were examined to determine the effectiveness of preferential procurement programs in helping MBEs. The variables selected include the owner's level of education and management experience, marital experience and the quality and quantity of human capital. Results show that MBEs who relied heavily on government contracts were more likely to close down earlier than other firms.

The contract is the main mechanism for governing transactions within public sector 'quasi markets'. This article explores the nature of the contracting process in the light of new empirical data from a qualitative study of the development of contracting for HIV/AIDS services within the National Health Service. These data are compared with four possible models of the contracting process emerging from the academic literature, classical, relational, regulated and pseudo contracting. The White Paper on the NHS reforms uses a classical concept of contracting, in which purchasers are represented as making well informed and unrestricted choices between competing options. This bore little relation to the process observed within the four purchasing organizations studied. Instead, elements of all the models were observed, with the dominance of any one model varying with different situations, times and localities. Competition was only patchily evident, with purchasers more commonly encouraging co-operative relationships between providers to preserve stability. Attempts to utilize the contract process to mould and reconfigure services were often hampered by restrictions imposed by regulations and slow implementation of new mechanisms. Contracting was also adversely affected by rapid organizational change and lack of adequate information. It is concluded that contracting in the NHS is an evolving process and has yet to achieve its full potential as a management mechanism.

Contracts have been a key element in the recent reform of British public services. Their introduction has formed part of a broader process of change in which the market structures and values have featured prominently. In practice, contracts have both brought benefits and presented problems. More particularly, greater organizational formality has raised some important issues - the role of trust and the form and practice of accountability prominent among them. Evidence from a recent ESRC-supported study shows that some services (the simpler ones) have generally gained from the reforms; but the evidence for more complex ones is equivocal at best.