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By definition, individuals with absolute pitch (AP) can categorize an isolated musical note with near perfect accuracy without a reference pitch. This definition implies a uniformity of performance across people; however, in reality AP is a complex, multidimensional ability, shaped by both early and recent auditory experiences. In the present study we assess how individual differences in working memory, musical expertise, and language background relate to the accuracy with which an AP possessor can identify an isolated musical note. In a standard test of AP ability, all AP participants performed virtually perfectly. When tested on more challenging notes, drawn from less frequently experienced timbres and octave ranges, we found that working memory positively related to note categorization performance, though only among individuals who reported a tonal language background. This interaction between tonal language and working memory, however, may have been partly grounded by differences in musical expertise reported between tonal and non-tonal language. Supporting this possibility, in a follow-up analysis we observed a general interaction between working memory performance and musical expertise across all participants. Taken together, these results highlight the complexity of AP categorization when considered as an auditory skill rather than a native talent. The observation that working memory may be an important component of auditory processing in AP when the to-be-judged sounds are less easily categorized is consistent with recent theoretical accounts of how working memory and expertise relate to auditory recognition more broadly.

Our aim was to determine if deficits in intentional forgetting that are associated with depression and dysphoria (subclinical depression) could be explained, at least in part, by variations in working memory function. Sixty dysphoric and 61 non-dysphoric participants completed a modified version of the think/no-think (TNT) task and a measure of complex working memory (the operation span task). The TNT task involved participants learning a series of emotional cue–target word pairs, before being presented with a subset of the cues and asked to either recall the associated target (think) or to prevent it from coming to mind (no think) by thinking about a substitute target word. Participants were subsequently asked to recall the targets to all cues (regardless of previous recall instructions). As expected, after controlling for anxiety, we found that dysphoric individuals exhibited impaired forgetting relative to the non-dysphoric participants. Also as expected, we found that superior working memory function was associated with more successful forgetting. Critically, in the dysphoric group, we found that working memory mediated the effect of depression on intentional forgetting. That is, depression influenced forgetting indirectly via its effect on working memory. However, under conditions of repeated suppression, there was also a direct effect of depression on forgetting. These findings represent an important development in the understanding of impaired forgetting in depression and also suggest that working memory training might be a viable intervention for improving the ability of depressed individuals to prevent unwanted memories from coming to mind.

We discuss two relatively understudied yet important phenomena relevant to the ecologically crucial task of gathering reliable information from human faces. First, facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) predicts aggressiveness judgments and is associated with aggression-related behavior and life history outcomes. A significant body of research indicates fWHR is an honest evolutionary signal of propensity to aggression yet little is known about how or if this signal is preserved in judgments across race boundaries. Evidence for a universal relationship between increased fWHR and enhanced aggression perception has been found using Asian and white face stimuli, but race moderated the relationship between high fWHR and ratings in a pain ascription task using black and white faces. Second, we examine research on olfactory cues to face perception and focus particular attention on the possibility that face judgments may be influenced by putrescine, an organic compound found recently to heighten threat and escape-related cognitions in a single subliminal odor presentation study. Here we probe how fWHR and face race interact in aggression judgments during subliminal exposure to putrescine and a control condition. We present a standardized method of subliminal putrescine delivery and find null effects of putrescine on face judgments. Overall, our primarily white participants show a reduced difference in aggressiveness ratings to black faces from low to high levels of fWHR compared to the same contrast in white face stimuli, consistent with an account in which black faces are not perceived with the same configural precision as white faces.

The present study examined the effect of stimulus valence on two levels of selection in the cognitive system, selection of a task-set and selection of a response. In the first experiment, participants performed a spatial compatibility task (pressing left and right key according to the locations of stimuli) in which stimulus-response mappings were determined by stimulus valence. There was a standard spatial stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect for positive stimuli (flowers) and a reversed SRC effect for negative stimuli (spiders), but the same data could be interpreted as showing faster responses when positive and negative stimuli were assigned to compatible and incompatible mappings, respectively, than when the assignment was opposite. Experiment 2 disentangled these interpretations, showing that valence did not influence a spatial SRC effect (Simon effect) when task-set retrieval was unnecessary. Experiments 3 and 4 replaced keypress responses with joystick deflections that afforded approach/avoidance action coding. Stimulus valence modulated the Simon effect (but did not reverse it) when the valence was task-relevant (Experiment 3) as well as when it was task-irrelevant (Experiment 4). Therefore, stimulus valence influences task-set selection and response selection, but the influence on the latter is limited to conditions where responses afford approach/avoidance action coding.

An emerging area of research in cognitive science is the utilization of networks to model the structure and processes of the mental lexicon in healthy and clinical populations, like aphasia. Previous research has focused on only one type of word similarity at a time (e.g., semantic relationships), even though words are multi-faceted. Here, we investigate lexical retrieval in a picture naming task from people with Broca’s and Wernicke’s aphasia and healthy controls by utilizing a multiplex network structure that accounts for the interplay between multiple semantic and phonological relationships among words in the mental lexicon. Extending upon previous work, we focused on the global network measure of closeness centrality which is known to capture spreading activation, an important process supporting lexical retrieval. We conducted a series of logistic regression models predicting the probability of correct picture naming. We tested whether multiplex closeness centrality was a better predictor of picture naming performance than single-layer closeness centralities, other network measures assessing local and meso-scale structure, psycholinguistic variables and group differences. We also examined production gaps, or the difference between the likelihood of producing a word with the lowest and highest closeness centralities. Our results indicated that multiplex closeness centrality was a significant predictor of picture naming performance, where words with high closeness centrality were more likely to be produced than words with low closeness centrality. Additionally, multiplex closeness centrality outperformed single-layer closeness centralities and other multiplex network measures, and remained a significant predictor after controlling for psycholinguistic variables and group differences. Furthermore, we found that the facilitative effect of closeness centrality was similar for both types of aphasia. Our results underline the importance of integrating multiple measures of word similarities in cognitive language networks for better understanding lexical retrieval in aphasia, with an eye towards future clinical applications.

The complexity of the visual world requires that we constrain visual attention and prioritize some regions of the scene for attention over others. The current study investigated whether verbal encoding processes influence how attention is allocated in scenes. Specifically, we asked whether the advantage of scene meaning over image salience in attentional guidance is modulated by verbal encoding, given that we often use language to process information. In two experiments, 60 subjects studied scenes (N(1) = 30, N(2) = 60) for 12 seconds each in preparation for a scene recognition task. Half of the time, subjects engaged in a secondary articulatory suppression task concurrent with scene viewing. Meaning and saliency maps were quantified for each of the experimental scenes. In both experiments, we found that meaning explained more of the variance in visual attention than image salience did, particularly when we controlled for the overlap between meaning and salience, with and without the suppression task. Based on these results, verbal encoding processes do not appear to modulate the relationship between scene meaning and visual attention. Our findings suggest that semantic information in the scene steers the attentional ship, consistent with cognitive guidance theory.

Impressions of competence from faces predict important real-world outcomes, including electoral success and chief executive officer selection. Presumed competence is associated with social status. Here we show that subtle economic status cues in clothes affect perceived competence from faces. In nine studies, people rated the competence of faces presented in frontal headshots. Faces were shown with different upper-body clothing rated by independent judges as looking ‘richer’ or ‘poorer’, although not notably perceived as such when explicitly described. The same face when seen with ‘richer’ clothes was judged significantly more competent than with ‘poorer’ clothes. The effect persisted even when perceivers were exposed to the stimuli briefly (129 ms), warned that clothing cues are non-informative and instructed to ignore the clothes (in one study, with considerable incentives). These findings demonstrate the uncontrollable effect of economic status cues on person perception. They add yet another hurdle to the challenges faced by low-status individuals. Subtle economic status cues from clothes affect perceived competence from faces even when perceivers are warned that such cues are non-informative or are instructed and incentivized to ignore them. This bias puts low-income individuals at a disadvantage.

Humans interpret others’ behaviour as intentional and goal-directed, expecting others to take the most energy-efficient path to achieve their goals. Recent studies have shown that these expectations of efficient action provide a perceptual prediction of an ideal efficient trajectory, against which the observed action is evaluated, resulting in a distorted perceptual representation of unexpected inefficient actions. Here we show that these predictions rely on the inferred intentionality of the stimulus. Participants observed an actor reach for an object with a straight or arched trajectory. The actions were made efficient or inefficient by adding or removing an obstructing object. The action disappeared mid-trajectory and participants reported the last seen position of the hand on a touch screen. Replicating previous research, judgments of inefficient actions were biased toward the efficient prediction (straight trajectories upward to avoid the obstruction, arched trajectories downward towards the target) In two further experiments, we removed intentional cues by replacing the hand with a non-agentive ball (Exp 2), and by removing the biological profile of the motion by depicting it move at a constant speed (Exp 3). Perceptual biases were substantially reduced when intentional cues were removed. Predictions of efficient action are at least partially perceptually represented and influence perceptual judgments of others actions, biasing them towards these expectations. These predictions emerge from attributions of intentionality to the observed actor, triggered by the perception of agency and kinematics that follow biological motion profiles.

The human voice is a highly flexible instrument for self-expression, yet voice identity perception is largely studied using controlled speech recordings. Using two voice-sorting tasks with naturally varying stimuli, we compared the performance of listeners who were familiar and unfamiliar with the TV show Breaking Bad. Listeners organised audio clips of speech with (1) low-expressiveness and (2) high-expressiveness into perceived identities. We predicted that increased expressiveness (e.g., shouting, strained voice) would significantly impair performance. Overall, while unfamiliar listeners were less able to generalise identity across exemplars, the two groups performed equivalently well when telling voices apart when dealing with low-expressiveness stimuli. However, high vocal expressiveness significantly impaired telling apart in both the groups: this led to increased misidentifications, where sounds from one character were assigned to the other. These misidentifications were highly consistent for familiar listeners but less consistent for unfamiliar listeners. Our data suggest that vocal flexibility has powerful effects on identity perception, where changes in the acoustic properties of vocal signals introduced by expressiveness lead to effects apparent in familiar and unfamiliar listeners alike. At the same time, expressiveness appears to have affected other aspects of voice identity processing selectively in one listener group but not the other, thus revealing complex interactions of stimulus properties and listener characteristics (i.e., familiarity) in identity processing.

Crossmodal correspondence is of scientific and commercial interest in regard to the packaging of food and beverages. Research has shown that colors and shapes can be associated with certain aromas, but these interactions have been less extensively studied with authentic visual stimuli (i.e., packaging), nor with complex odors in a food matrix. This study sought to investigate odor-color-shape crossmodal interactions with complex odor stimuli (wine odors) and wine labels. The present research uses projective mapping with 3D shapes and colors, along with a wine label matching study, to test whether chardonnay odors of different character (buttery, citrus, floral, smoky, and vegetable) are associated with certain colors and shapes. In the projective mapping experiment, most chardonnay odors were grouped similarly, however, the vegetable-forward wine was more associated with sharper shapes than rounded ones. In the wine label experiment, the yellow labels tended to be better matched with all odors, except the vegetable-forward wine, which was matched equally to all colors. These findings indicate that regardless of chardonnay odor character, it is mostly associated with a yellow colored label. Interestingly, results also indicated that not all correspondences aligned with the most common color association of an odor character (i.e., vegetative was not strictly associated with green, smoky was not associated with brown, etc.). Significant correlations between stimuli liking and matching scores indicate much of the correspondences are explained by hedonics. Overall, the present research demonstrates evidence for odor-color-shape correspondences in complex odors and realistic visual stimuli, however not as strongly as in controlled environments and simplistic stimuli.

We encounter multisensory environmental oscillations that span a wide range of temporal frequencies. In both audition and touch, sensory cues comprising repeating events are perceived either as a continuous signal or as a stream of temporally discrete events (flutter), depending on the events’ repetition rate. At high repetition rates (>100Hz), auditory and tactile cues interact reciprocally in pitch processing: The frequency of a cue experienced in one modality systematically biases the perceived frequency of a cue experienced in the other modality. Here, we tested whether audition and touch also interact in the processing of low-frequency stimulation. Because some neural populations have been shown to represent both auditory and tactile flutter, we predicted reciprocal multisensory interactions in flutter perception. We also tested whether multisensory interactions occurred if the stimulation in one modality comprised click trains and the stimulation in the other modality comprised amplitude-modulated signals, given that these stimulus types may be supported by distinct neural representations. In a series of human psychophysical experiments, we found that auditory cues bias touch and tactile cues bias audition on a flutter discrimination task. Moreover, we observed similar interaction patterns regardless of stimulus type and whether the same stimulus types were experienced in the two modalities. Combined with earlier studies, our results suggest that the nervous system extracts and combines temporal rate information from multisensory environmental signals, regardless of stimulus type, in both the low- and high temporal frequency domains. This function likely reflects the importance of temporal frequency as a fundamental feature of our multisensory experience.

Cognitive control is applied in situations that require overriding a habitual and automatic response. The conflict monitoring hypothesis and the Expected Value of Control (EVC) theory as its extension posit a control system responsible for detecting conflicting occasions and adapting to them dynamically within a task. Here we evaluate this prediction in two versions of one of the most popular tasks in cognitive control, namely the Stroop task. We hypothesized that nearby-items interference combines with task interference in the multi-item version effectively turning it into a multi-task that may challenge cognitive control. Adopting an alternative methodology tracking within-task performance, we compared the classical multi-item version of the Stroop task and its single-item counterpart in adults and children. The results revealed a within-task performance decline only in the multi-item version of the task, in both incongruent and neutral conditions, modulated by the presumed maturity of the control system. These findings suggest capacity constraints in control implementation and allocation under conditions requiring parallel execution of multiple cognitive tasks. Task complexity and demands seem to modulate effects on performance. We discuss implications for cognitive control as well as substantial concerns regarding the calculation and use of indices of interference based on the commonly used multi-item version of the Stroop task.

In uncertain environments we must balance our need to gather information with our desire to reap rewards by exploiting current knowledge. Achieving this balance is further complicated in reactive environments where actions produce long-lasting change to the system. In four experiments, we investigate how people learn to make effective decisions from experience in a dynamic multiarmed bandit task. In contrast to the typical exploitation-dependent diminishing rewards found in previous studies, options were framed as skills that developed greater rewards the more they were chosen. In Experiment 1, we provide a proof of concept, and in Experiments 2-4 we explore the boundaries of participants' sensitivity to reactive dynamics. Our results suggest that most individuals can learn effective strategies for coping with these reactive environments. A two-part comparison of several competing psychological models supports several conclusions: (a) a sizable minority of individuals learned that their environment was reactive, (b) evidence suggests several distinct groups of individuals employed unique decision strategies, and (c) testing models with the simulation method reveals qualitative misfits that motivate future theory development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Supplemental Digital Content is Available in the Text. We present a fully characterized face stimulus database focusing on expressions of pain, surpassing previous sets in terms of size, quality, diversity, and characterization., Introduction: Facial expressions of pain serve an essential social function by communicating suffering and soliciting aid. Accurate visual perception of painful expressions is critical because the misperception of pain signals can have serious clinical and social consequences. Therefore, it is essential that researchers have access to high-quality, diverse databases of painful expressions to better understand accuracy and bias in pain perception. Objectives: This article describes the development of a large-scale face stimulus database focusing on expressions of pain. Methods: We collected and normed a database of images of models posing painful facial expressions. We also characterized these stimuli in terms of the presence of a series of pain-relevant facial action units. In addition to our primary database of posed expressions, we provide a separate database of computer-rendered expressions of pain that may be applied to any neutral face photograph. Results: The resulting database comprises 229 unique (and now publicly available) painful expressions. To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing databases of this size, quality, or diversity in terms of race, gender, and expression intensity. We provide evidence for the reliability of expressions and evaluations of pain within these stimuli, as well as a full characterization of this set along dimensions relevant to pain such as perceived status, strength, and dominance. Moreover, our second database complements the primary set in terms of experimental control and precision. Conclusion: These stimuli will facilitate reproducible research in both experimental and clinical domains into the mechanisms supporting accuracy and bias in pain perception and care.

Hierarchical structure and compositionality imbue human language with unparalleled expressive power and set it apart from other perception–action systems. However, neither formal nor neurobiological models account for how these defining computational properties might arise in a physiological system. I attempt to reconcile hierarchy and compositionality with principles from cell assembly computation in neuroscience; the result is an emerging theory of how the brain could convert distributed perceptual representations into hierarchical structures across multiple timescales while representing interpretable incremental stages of (de)compositional meaning. The model's architecture—a multidimensional coordinate system based on neurophysiological models of sensory processing—proposes that a manifold of neural trajectories encodes sensory, motor, and abstract linguistic states. Gain modulation, including inhibition, tunes the path in the manifold in accordance with behavior and is how latent structure is inferred. As a consequence, predictive information about upcoming sensory input during production and comprehension is available without a separate operation. The proposed processing mechanism is synthesized from current models of neural entrainment to speech, concepts from systems neuroscience and category theory, and a symbolic-connectionist computational model that uses time and rhythm to structure information. I build on evidence from cognitive neuroscience and computational modeling that suggests a formal and mechanistic alignment between structure building and neural oscillations, and moves toward unifying basic insights from linguistics and psycholinguistics with the currency of neural computation.

A fundamental component of interacting with our environment is the gathering and interpretation of sensory information. When investigating how perceptual information shapes the mechanisms of decision-making, most researchers have relied on the use of manipulated or unnatural information as perceptual input, resulting in findings that may not generalize to real-world scenes. Unlike simplified, artificial stimuli, real-world scenes contain low-level regularities (natural scene statistics) that are informative about the structural complexity of a scene, which the brain could exploit forde perceptual decision-making. In this study, participants performed an animal detection task on low, medium or high complexity scenes as determined by two biologically plausible natural scene statistics, contrast energy (CE) or spatial coherence (SC). In Experiment 1, stimuli were sampled such that CE and SC both influenced scene complexity. Diffusion modeling showed that both the speed of information processing and the required evidence are affected by the low-level scene complexity. Experiment 2a/b refined these observations by showing how the isolated manipulation of SC alone results in weaker but comparable effects on decision-making, whereas the manipulation of only CE has no effect. Overall, performance was best for scenes with intermediate complexity. Our systematic definition of natural scene statistics specifies how the complexity of natural scenes interacts with decision-making, and increases our understanding of how humans process information in real-world environments. We speculate that the computation of CE and SC could serve as an indication to adjust perceptual decision-making based on the complexity of the input.

Visual working memory is a capacity-limited cognitive system used to actively store and manipulate visual information. Visual working memory capacity is not fixed, but varies by stimulus type: Stimuli that are more meaningful are better remembered. In the current work, we investigate what conditions lead to the strongest benefits for meaningful stimuli. We propose that in some situations participants may try to encode the entire display holistically (i.e., in a quick "snapshot"). This may lead them to treat objects as simply meaningless, colored "blobs", rather than individually and in a high-level way, which could reduce benefits of meaningful stimuli. In a series of experiments, we directly test whether real-world objects, colors, perceptually matched less-meaningful objects, and fully scrambled objects benefit from deeper processing. We systematically vary the presentation format of stimuli at encoding to be either simultaneous-encouraging a parallel, "take-a-quick-snapshot" strategy-or present the stimuli sequentially, promoting a serial, each-item-at-once strategy. We find large advantages for meaningful objects in all conditions, but find that real-world objects-and to a lesser degree lightly scrambled, still meaningful versions of the objects-benefit from the sequential encoding and thus deeper, focused-on-individual-items processing, while colors do not. Our results suggest single-feature objects may be an outlier in their affordance of parallel, quick processing, and that in more realistic memory situations, visual working memory likely relies upon representations resulting from in-depth processing of objects (e.g., in higher-level visual areas) rather than solely being represented in terms of their low-level features. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The world contains not only objects and features, but also relations between them. When a piece of fruit is in a bowl, and the bowl is on a table, we appreciate not only the individual objects and their features, but also the relations containment and support, which abstract away from the particular objects involved. How does the mind represent relations themselves, separately from the objects participating in them? Though abstraction of this sort is frequently studied within the domains of language and higher-level reasoning, here we show that abstract relations may also arise in automatic visual processing, by exploring a surprising perceptual “error” that such relations can produce. In four experiments, participants saw a stream of images containing different objects arranged in force- dynamic relations — e.g., a phone contained inside a basket, a marker resting on a garbage can, or a knife sitting inside a cup. Participants’ task was to respond to a single target image (e.g., phone-in- basket) within the stream of distractors. Surprisingly, even though participants completed this task quickly and accurately, they false-alarmed more often to images that matched the target’s relational category than to those that did not — even when such images involved completely different objects. In other words, when participants were searching for a phone in a basket, they were more likely to mistakenly respond to a knife in a cup than to a marker on a garbage can. Follow-up experiments using this “image confusion” paradigm ruled out strategic responding, and also controlled for various image features that may have been confounded with these relations. We suggest that relational properties are automatically extracted by the mind, and in ways that are abstract: We see relations themselves, beyond the identities of the objects participating in them.

Line drawings have been useful stimuli for visual perception, cognition, and related fields, because edges play an important role in the visual system. Although there are many datasets of line drawing stimuli available for research, we often need a new set of stimuli for specific research purposes. Here I provide an R implementation of image processing effects where a photo is converted to a line drawing image. Drawing style, such as lineweight, texture smoothness, and the inclusion of shading can be controlled by adjusting the parameters of this algorithm. With this tool, line drawing stimuli can easily be created with just a few lines of script, and will be useful for various research applications.

Interest in iconicity (the resemblance-based mapping between aspects of form and meaning) is in the midst of a resurgence, and a prominent focus in the field has been the possible role of iconicity in language learning. Here we critically review theory and empirical findings in this domain. We distinguish local learning enhancement (where the iconicity of certain lexical items influences the learning of those items) and general learning enhancement (where the iconicity of certain lexical items influences the later learning of non-iconic items or systems). We find that evidence for local learning enhancement is quite strong, though not as clear cut as it is often described and based on a limited sample of languages. Despite common claims about broader facilitatory effects of iconicity on learning, we find that current evidence for general learning enhancement is lacking. We suggest a number of productive avenues for future research and specify what types of evidence would be required to show a role for iconicity in general learning enhancement. We also review evidence for functions of iconicity beyond word learning: iconicity enhances comprehension by providing complementary representations, supports communication about sensory imagery, and expresses affective meanings. Even if learning benefits may be modest or cross-linguistically varied, on balance, iconicity emerges as a vital aspect of language. Published as:Nielsen, Alan K. S. & Dingemanse, Mark. 2021. Iconicity in Word Learning and Beyond: A Critical Review. Language and Speech. 64(1). 52–72. (doi:10.1177/0023830920914339)

Recent studies have shown that mind-wandering (MW) is associated with changes in eye movement parameters, but have not explored how MW affects the sequential pattern of eye movements involved in making sense of complex visual information. Eye movements naturally unfold over time and this process may reveal novel information about cognitive processing during MW. The current study used Recurrence Quantification Analysis (Anderson, Bischof, Laidlaw, Risko, & Kingstone, 2013) to describe the pattern of re-fixations (fixations directed to previously-inspected regions) during MW. Participants completed a real-world scene encoding task and responded to thought probes assessing intentional and unintentional MW. Both types of MW were associated with worse memory of the scenes. Importantly, RQA showed that scanpaths during unintentional MW were more repetitive than during on-task episodes, as indicated by a higher re-fixation rate and more stereotypical fixation sequences. This increased repetitiveness suggests that the viewer had to refresh previous locations more frequently in order to remember the information. Moreover, this increased repetitiveness contributed to fixations focusing on a smaller spatial scale of the stimuli. Finally, we were also able to validate several traditional measures: both intentional and unintentional MW were associated with fewer and longer fixations; Eye-blinking increased numerically during both types of MW but the difference was only significant for unintentional MW. Overall, the results advanced our understanding of how visual processing is affected during MW by highlighting the sequential aspect of eye movements.

Generalization of fear is considered an important mechanism contributing to the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders. Although previous studies have identified the importance of stimulus discrimination for fear generalization, it is still unclear to what degree overt attention to relevant stimulus features might mediate its magnitude. To test the prediction that visual preferences for distinguishing stimulus aspects are associated with reduced fear generalization, we developed a set of facial stimuli that was meticulously manipulated such that pairs of faces could either be distinguished by looking into the eyes or into the region around mouth and nose, respectively. These pairs were then employed as CS+ and CS− in a differential fear conditioning paradigm followed by a generalization test with morphs in steps of 20%. Shock expectancy ratings indicated a moderately curved fear generalization gradient that is typical for healthy samples but its shape was altered depending on individual attentional deployment: Subjects who dwelled on the distinguishing facial features faster and for longer periods of time exhibited less fear generalization. Although both, pupil and heart rate responses also showed a generalization gradient, with pupil diameter and heart rate deceleration increasing as a function of threat, these responses were not significantly related to visual exploration. In total, the current results indicate that the extent of explicit fear generalization depends on individual patterns of attentional deployment. Future studies evaluating the efficacy of perceptual trainings that aim to augment stimulus discriminability in order to reduce (over )generalization seem desirable. Data, materials, experimental & analysis scripts can be accessed via https://osf.io/4gz7f/.

The ability to automatically assess emotional responses via contact-free video recording taps into a rapidly growing market aimed at predicting consumer choices. If consumer attention and engagement are measurable in a reliable and accessible manner, relevant marketing decisions could be informed by objective data. Although significant advances have been made in automatic affect recognition, several practical and theoretical issues remain largely unresolved. These concern the lack of cross-system validation, a historical emphasis of posed over spontaneous expressions, as well as more fundamental issues regarding the weak association between subjective experience and facial expressions. To address these limitations, the present paper argues that extant commercial and free facial expression classifiers should be rigorously validated in cross-system research. Furthermore, academics and practitioners must better leverage fine-grained emotional response dynamics, with stronger emphasis on understanding naturally occurring spontaneous expressions. We posit that applied consumer research might be better situated to examine facial behavior in socio-emotional contexts rather than decontextualized, laboratory studies, and highlight how AHAA can be successfully employed in this context. Also, facial activity should be considered less as a single outcome variable, and more as promising input for two-step machine learning in combination with other (multimodal) features. We illustrate this point in a case study using facial activity as input features to predict crying behavior in response to sad movies. Implications of this approach and potential obstacles that need to be overcome are discussed within the context of consumer research.

The Dutch painter Piet Mondrian (1872-1944) is the archetypal modernist, with the paintings of his uncompromisingly austere mature period, comprised of a white background, black vertical and horizontal lines and occasional, areas of red, yellow or blue, being icons of modern design. His paintings also represent a rare opportunity to experiment on aesthetic composition, the paintings being simulated relatively easily on a computer screen, with participants manipulating them interactively.The founding father of experimental aesthetics, Gustav Theodor Fechner, described three research methods in his Vorschule der Aesthetik of 1876, the Method of Choice, the Method of Production and the Method of Use. Most empirical work has used the Method of Choice, whereby participants are shown two or more similar images and choose between them. Our first studies of Mondrian used the Method of Choice. A set of 25 original (‘O’) Mondrian paintings were synthesised on a screen, as also were two pseudo-Mondrians, (P1 and P2). The pseudo-Mondrians were created by randomly moving all of the horizontal and vertical lines in the painting by a small amount (for P1) or by a slightly larger amount (for P2). P1 and P2 therefore had the same broad structure as O, containing the same ‘words’ (components), using the same ‘deep structure’ or ‘syntax’, but with the composition varied only by altering the relative positioning of the lines (equivalent in linguistic terms to a different pattern of stress or emphasis – prosodics). For each of the 25 paintings we created O, P1 and P2, and participants compared O with P1, O with P2, and P1 with P2, making 75 paired comparison judgements overall.In five separate studies, totalling 277 participants, it was clear that original Mondrians could reliably be distinguished from pseudo-Mondrians, with some participants being more sensitive than others. Fechner’s Method of Production allows participants to manipulate the content of an aesthetic object, altering it until they feel that it is most satisfactory. We adapted this method so that participants were presented with a single Mondrian painting on a computer screen. By moving the computer mouse a vertical, a horizontal or both a vertical and a horizontal line in the Mondrian were moved up and down or sideways. The images were constrained so that the moving lines were yoked to other lines of the same directionality, so that several moved at the same time, and lines could never cross over each other (i.e. the syntax remained fixed, with only proportional arrangements being altered). The original Mondrian was always a possible outcome of moving the cursor.The Production studies manipulated 39 original Mondrian paintings, none of which were included in the set of 25 used in the Choice experiments. All of the 84 participants could therefore carry out both the Method of Choice and the Method of Production, the order of the two Methods being chosen at Random (and order having no effect upon the results).The most striking result was that although the 84 participants, as expected, had clear preferences in the Method of Choice for Mondrians over pseudo-Mondrians, using the Method of Production there was no evidence that participants produced images which showed any overall similarity to the original Mondrians.A detailed study of what participants were doing when they were using the Method of Production suggested that the complexity of the task, despite its relative simplicity, was too great for them. Despite only manipulating in a two-dimensional space (or sometimes a one-dimensional space), participants seemed to find the task difficult. The program always started with the cursor at one of the four corners indicating the maximum dynamic range of the cursor, and in many cases participants ended up either on one of the edges of the space or even in a corner. In most cases only a small proportion of the possible design space was sampled before a decision was made.Our paper will consider how people can and cannot make complex aesthetic choices across a range of possible stimuli. In particular we will suggest that much of the problem with the Method of Production is a problem of visual working memory, participants not being able to hold in their heads a range of previous images to compare with the current one which is shown on screen. The Method of Choice, in contrast, makes no demands at all upon visual working memory. Although computer design in principle allows an almost infinite space of possibilities to be explored, in practice the ability to do so usefully seems to be heavily constrained by the cognitive limits of human processing, meaning that design systems need careful ergonomic organisation to prevent such problems.

Our interactions with the visual world are guided by attention and visual working memory. Things that we look for and those we ignore are stored as templates that reflect our goals and the tasks at hand. The nature of such templates has been widely debated. A recent proposal is that these templates can be thought of as probabilistic representations of task-relevant features. Crucially, such probabilistic templates should accurately reflect feature probabilities in the environment. Here we ask whether observers can quickly form a correct internal model of a complex (bimodal) distribution of distractor features. We assessed observers’ representations by measuring the slowing of visual search when target features unexpectedly match a distractor template. Distractor stimuli were heterogeneous, randomly drawn on each trial from a bimodal probability distribution. Using two targets on each trial, we tested whether observers encode the full distribution, only one peak of it, or the average of the two peaks. Search was slower when the two targets corresponded to the two modes of a previous distractor distribution than when one target was at one of the modes and another between them or outside the distribution range. Furthermore, targets on the modes were reported later than targets between the modes that, in turn, were reported later than targets outside this range. This shows that observers use a correct internal model, representing both distribution modes using templates based on the full probability distribution rather than just one peak or simple summary statistics. The findings further confirm that performance in odd-one out search with repeated distractors cannot be described by a simple decision rule. Our findings indicate that probabilistic visual working memory templates guiding attention, dynamically adapt to task requirements, accurately reflecting the probabilistic nature of the input.

Over the past 15 years, there has been an explosion of new research on the role of the hippocampus in representation of information about time in memory. Much of this work was inspired by the ideas and research of Howard Eichenbaum, who made major contributions to our understanding of the neurobiology of episodic memory and the neural representation of time. In this paper, I will review evidence regarding the role of time in understanding hippocampal function. This review will cover a broad range of evidence from studies of humans and nonhuman animals with a narrative arc that follows Howard’s major discoveries. These studies demonstrate that the hippocampus encodes information in relation to an episodic context, and that time, as well as space, serves to define these contexts. Moreover, the research has shown that the hippocampus can encode temporal, spatial, and situational information in parallel. Building on this work, I present a new framework for understanding temporal structure in human episodic memory. I conclude by outlining current controversies and new questions that must be addressed by the field in the years to come.

The olfactory sense is a particularly challenging domain for cognitive science investigations of perception, memory, and language. Although many studies show that odors often are difficult to describe verbally, little is known about the associations between olfactory percepts and the words that describe them. Quantitative models of how odor experiences are described in natural language are therefore needed to understand how odors are perceived and communicated. In this study, we develop a computational method to characterize the olfaction-related semantic content of words in a large text corpus of internet sites in English. We introduce two new metrics: olfactory association index (OAI, how strongly a word is associated with olfaction) and olfactory specificity index (OSI, how specific a word is in its description of odors). We validate the OAI and OSI metrics using psychophysical datasets by showing that terms with high OAI have high ratings of perceived olfactory association and are used to describe highly familiar odors. In contrast, terms with high OSI have high inter-individual consistency in how they are applied to odors. Finally, we analyze Dravnieks’s (1985) dataset of odor ratings in terms of OAI and OSI. This analysis reveals that terms that are used broadly (applied often but with moderate ratings) tend to be olfaction-unrelated and abstract (e.g., “heavy” or “light”; low OAI and low OSI) while descriptors that are used selectively (applied seldom but with high ratings) tend to be olfaction-related (e.g., “vanilla” or “licorice”; high OAI). Thus, OAI and OSI provide behaviorally meaningful information about olfactory language. These statistical tools are useful for future studies of olfactory perception and cognition, and might help integrate research on odor perception, neuroimaging, and corpus-based linguistic models of semantic organization.

Many recent studies in numerical cognition have moved beyond the use of purely chronometric techniques in favor of methods which track the continuous dynamics of numerical processing. Two examples of such techniques include eye tracking and hand tracking (or computer mouse tracking). To reflect this increased concentration on continuous methods, we have collected a group of 5 articles that utilize these techniques to answer some contemporary questions in numerical cognition. In this editorial, we discuss the two paradigms and provide a brief review of some of the work in numerical cognition that has profited from the use of these techniques. For both methods, we discuss the past research through the frameworks of single digit number processing, multidigit number processing, and mental arithmetic processing. We conclude with a discussion of the papers that have been contributed to this special section and point to some possible future directions for researchers interested in tracking the continuous dynamics of numerical processing.

Little is understood about the attentional mechanisms that lead to perceptions of collective efficacy. This paper presents two studies that address this lack of understanding. Study 1 examined participants (N = 59) attentional processes relating to positive, neutral or negative emotional facial photographs, when instructed to select their ‘most confident’ or ‘least confident’ team. Eye gaze metrics of first fixation duration (FFD), fixation duration (FD) and fixation count (FC) were measured alongside individual perceptions of collective efficacy and emotional valence of the teams selected. Participants had shorter FFD, longer FD, and more FC on positive faces when instructed to select their most confident team (p < .05). Collective efficacy and emotional valence were significantly greater when participants selected their most confident team (p < .05). Study 2 explored the influence of video content familiarity of team-based observation interventions on attentional processes and collective efficacy in interdependent team-sport athletes (N = 34). When participants were exposed to familiar (own team/sport) and unfamiliar (unknown team/sport) team-based performance video, eye tracking data revealed similar gaze behaviours for the two conditions in terms of areas of interest. However, collective efficacy increased most for the familiar condition. Study 1 results indicate that the emotional expressions of team members influence both where and for how long we look at potential team members, and that conspecifics’ emotional expression impacts on our perceptions of collective efficacy. For Study 2, given the apparent greater increase in collective efficacy for the familiar condition, the similar attentional processes evident for familiar and unfamiliar team footage suggests that differences in meaning of the observed content dictates collective efficacy perceptions. Across both studies, the findings indicate the importance of positive emotional vicarious experiences when using team-based observation interventions to improve collective efficacy in teams.

[In press, Art & Perception] Some neuroaestheticians have adopted a strongly reductionistic view of the arts and sought to supplant scholarship about the arts with an understanding of their evolutionary and neuropsy- chological underpinnings. I use the work of several neuroaestheticians to provide examples of four problematic tendencies that beset this approach: (1) assume that a domain-general system encodes the affective value of works of art; (2) oversimplify or disregard art history and scholarship about the arts; (3) apply laboratory findings to explain unique works of art, and (4) use widespread preferences to account for works of art. I then diagnose the ailment underlying these tendencies: the denial of autonomous standing to the production and inter- pretation of the arts, and suggest remedies. I end with an example of research that shows how neuroscientific research can successfully addresses an important and long-standing aesthetic question.

Bishop Berkeley suggested that the distance of an object can be estimated if the object&rsquo, s size is familiar to the observer. It has been suggested that humans can perceive the distance of the object by using such &ldquo, familiarity&rdquo, information, but most or many of the prior experiments that found an effect of familiarity were not designed to minimize or eliminate potential influences of: higher cognitive factors on the observers&rsquo, responses, or the influences of low-level image features in the visual stimuli used. We looked for the familiarity effect in two experiments conducted both in Russia and Japan. The visual stimuli used were images of three coins used in Russia and Japan. The participants&rsquo, depth perception was measured with a multiple-choice task testing the perceived depth-order of the coins. Our expectation was that any effect of &ldquo, on depth perception would only be observed with the coins of the participant&rsquo, s country. We expected a substantial familiarity effect based on our meta-analysis of the &ldquo, effects observed in prior experiments. But, our results in both experiments showed that the familiarity effect was virtually zero. These findings suggest that the importance of a familiarity effect in depth perception should be reconsidered.

Recent research highlights the influence of (e.g., task) context on conceptual retrieval. In order to assess whether conceptual representations are context-dependent rather than static, we investigated the influence of spatial narrative context on accessibility for lexical-semantic information by exploring competition effects. In two visual world experiments, participants listened to narratives describing semantically related (piano-trumpet; Experiment 1) or visually similar (bat-cigarette; Experiment 2) objects in the same or separate narrative locations while viewing arrays displaying these (“target” and “competitor”) objects and other distractors. Upon re-mention of the target, we analysed eye movements to the competitor. In Experiment 1, we observed semantic competition only when targets and competitors were described in the same location; in Experiment 2, we observed visual competition regardless of context. We interpret these results as consistent with context-dependent approaches, such that spatial narrative context dampens accessibility for semantic but not visual information in the visual world.

The grouping of options into arbitrary categories influences adults’ decisions about allocating choices or resources among those options; this is called “partition dependence.” Partition dependence has been demonstrated in a wide range of contexts in adults and is often presented as a technique for designing choice architectures that nudge people towards better decisions. Whether children also make partition dependent decisions is unknown, as are potential patterns of developmental change. In this experiment ( N = 159), we examined whether children exhibit partition dependence using a novel resource allocation task. This novel task, distributing food tokens to zoo animals, did elicit partition dependence in our developmental sample. Both older children (ages 7-10 years) and younger children (ages 3-6 years) made partition dependent allocations, and younger children exhibited a larger partition dependence effect than did older children. This work provides the first evidence that children’s decisions, like adults’, are influenced by the arbitrary grouping of the options, and suggests that younger children may be more susceptible to this influence, at least in the context explored here.

While theories of consciousness differ substantially, the ‘conscious access hypothesis’, which aligns consciousness with the global accessibility of information across cortical regions, is present in many of the prevailing frameworks. This account holds that consciousness is necessary to integrate information arising from independent functions such as the specialist processing required by different senses. We directly tested this account by evaluating the potential for associative learning between novel pairs of subliminal stimuli presented in different sensory modalities. First, pairs of subliminal stimuli were presented and then their association assessed by examining the ability of the first stimulus to prime classification of the second. In Experiments 1–4 the stimuli were word-pairs consisting of a male name preceding either a creative or uncreative profession. Participants were subliminally exposed to two name-profession pairs where one name was paired with a creative profession and the other an uncreative profession. A supraliminal task followed requiring the timed classification of one of those two professions. The target profession was preceded by either the name with which it had been subliminally paired (concordant) or the alternate name (discordant). Experiment 1 presented stimuli auditorily, Experiment 2 visually, and Experiment 3 presented names auditorily and professions visually. All three experiments revealed the same inverse priming effect with concordant test pairs associated with significantly slower classification judgements. Experiment 4 sought to establish if learning would be more efficient with supraliminal stimuli and found evidence that a different strategy is adopted when stimuli are consciously perceived. Finally, Experiment 5 replicated the unconscious cross-modal association achieved in Experiment 3 utilising non-linguistic stimuli. The results demonstrate the acquisition of novel cross-modal associations between stimuli which are not consciously perceived and thus challenge the global access hypothesis and those theories embracing it.

The Cognitive Reflection Test, measuring intuition inhibition and cognitive reflection, has become extremely popular because it reliably predicts reasoning performance, decision-making, and beliefs. Across studies, the response format of CRT items sometimes differs, based on the assumed construct equivalence of tests with open-ended versus multiple-choice items (the equivalence hypothesis). Evidence and theoretical reasons, however, suggest that the cognitive processes measured by these response formats and their associated performances might differ (the nonequivalence hypothesis). We tested the two hypotheses experimentally by assessing the performance in tests with different response formats and by comparing their predictive and construct validity. In a between-subjects experiment (n = 452), participants answered stem-equivalent CRT items in an open-ended, a two-option, or a four-option response format and then completed tasks on belief bias, denominator neglect, and paranormal beliefs (benchmark indicators of predictive validity), as well as on actively open-minded thinking and numeracy (benchmark indicators of construct validity). We found no significant differences between the three response formats in the numbers of correct responses, the numbers of intuitive responses (with the exception of the two-option version, which had a higher number than the other tests), and the correlational patterns of the indicators of predictive and construct validity. All three test versions were similarly reliable, but the multiple-choice formats were completed more quickly. We speculate that the specific nature of the CRT items helps build construct equivalence among the different response formats. We recommend using the validated multiple-choice version of the CRT presented here, particularly the four-option CRT, for practical and methodological reasons. Supplementary materials and data are available at https://osf.io/mzhyc/ .

Trust serves as the foundation for social harmony and prosperity, but it is not always easy to build. When people see other groups as different, e.g., members of a different race or ethnicity, the perceived boundary often obstructs people from extending trust. This may result in interracial conflicts. The current research argues that individual differences in the lay theory of race can systematically influence the degree to which people extend trust to a racial outgroup in conflict situations. The lay theory of race refers to the extent to which people believe race is a malleable social construct that can change over time (i.e., social constructionist beliefs) versus a fixed essence that differentiates people into meaningful social categories (i.e., essentialist beliefs). In our three studies, we found evidence that social constructionist (vs. essentialist) beliefs promoted interracial trust in intergroup contexts, and that this effect held regardless of whether the lay theory of race was measured (Studies 1 and 3) or manipulated (Study 2), and whether the conflict was presented in a team conflict scenario (Study 1), social dilemma (Study 2), or a face-to-face dyadic negotiation (Study 3). In addition, results revealed that the lay theory's effect on interracial trust could have critical downstream consequences in conflict, namely cooperation and mutually beneficial negotiation outcomes. The findings together reveal that the lay theory of race can reliably influence interracial trust and presents a promising direction for understanding interracial relations and improving intergroup harmony in society.

The detection of conflict between incompatible impulses, thoughts, and actions is a ubiquitous source of motivation across theories of goal-directed action. In this overview, we explore the hypothesis that conflict is emotive, integrating perspectives from affective science and cognitive neuroscience. Initially, we review evidence suggesting that the mental and biological processes that monitor for information processing conflict—particularly those generated by the anterior midcingulate cortex—track the affective significance of conflict and use this signal to motivate increased control. In this sense, variation in control resembles a form of affect regulation in which control implementation counteracts the aversive experience of conflict. We also highlight emerging evidence proposing that states and dispositions associated with acceptance facilitate control by tuning individuals to the emotive nature of conflict, before proposing avenues for future research, including investigating the role of affect in reinforcement learning and decision making.

Traditionally, recognizing the objects within a scene has been treated as a prerequisite to recognizing the scene itself. However, research now suggests that the ability to rapidly recognize visual scenes could be supported by global properties of the scene itself rather than the objects within the scene. Here, we argue for a particular instantiation of this view: That scenes are recognized by treating them as a global texture and processing the pattern of orientations and spatial frequencies across different areas of the scene without recognizing any objects. To test this model, we asked whether there is a link between how proficient individuals are at rapid scene perception and how proficiently they represent simple spatial patterns of orientation information (global ensemble texture). We find a significant and selective correlation between these tasks, suggesting a link between scene perception and spatial ensemble tasks but not nonspatial summary statistics In a second and third experiment, we additionally show that global ensemble texture information is not only associated with scene recognition, but that preserving only global ensemble texture information from scenes is sufficient to support rapid scene perception; however, preserving the same information is not sufficient for object recognition. Thus, global ensemble texture alone is sufficient to allow activation of scene representations but not object representations. Together, these results provide evidence for a view of scene recognition based on global ensemble texture rather than a view based purely on objects or on nonspatially localized global properties. (PsycINFO Database Record

Accepted for publication in Cognitive Science; this is currently the pre-peer reviewed manuscript.Novelty is a pivotal player in cognition, and its contribution to superior memory performance is a widely accepted convention. On the other hand, mnemonic advantages for familiar information are also well documented. Here we examine the role of experimental distinctiveness as a potential explanation for these apparently conflicting findings. Across two experiments we demonstrate that conceptual novelty, an unfamiliar combination of familiar constituents, is sensitive to its experimental proportions: improved memory for novelty was observed when novel stimuli were relatively rare. Notably, no mnemonic advantage for conceptual novelty over familiarity was observed even when novel stimuli were extremely rare. Finally, memory levels for familiar items were similar across all experimental proportions, suggesting that encoding of familiar items is insensitive to distinctiveness manipulations. Together, these results imply that novelty does not always result in a mnemonic advantage. Instead, the effects of different aspects of novelty and familiarity should be explored orthogonally.

Current theories argue that hyper-sensitisation of social threat perception is central to paranoia. Affected people often also report misperceptions of group cohesion (conspiracy) but little is known about how paranoid ideation affects conspiracy thinking in live interactions. In a pre-registered experimental study, we used a large-scale game theory approach (n=1,165) to test whether the social cohesion of an opposing group affects paranoid attributions in a mixed online and lab-based sample. Participants spanning the full population distribution of paranoia played as proposers in a modified Trust Game against a lab-based panel. Participants were allocated a bonus and chose how much money to send to a pair of responders which was quadrupled before reaching the responders. Responders decided how much to return to the proposers through the same process. Participants played in one of two conditions: against a cohesive group who communicated and arrived at a joint decision, or a non-cohesive group who made independent decisions. After the exchange, proposers rated the extent to which the responders’ decisions were driven by (i) self-interest and (ii) intent to harm. Although the true motives are ambiguous, cohesive responders were reliably rated by participants as being more strongly motivated by intent to harm, indicating that group cohesion affects social threat perception. Highly paranoid participants attributed harmful intent more strongly overall but were equally reactive to social cohesion as other participants, suggesting paranoia involves a generally lowered threshold for social threat detection but an intact sensitivity for cohesion-related group characteristics.

Trustworthiness and dominance impressions summarize trait judgments from faces. Judgments on these key traits are negatively correlated to each other in impressions of female faces, implying less differentiated impressions of female faces. Here we test whether this is true across many trait judgments and whether less differentiated impressions of female faces originate in different facial information used for male and female impressions or different evaluation of the same information. Using multidimensional rating datasets and data-driven modeling, we show that (a) impressions of women are less differentiated and more valence-laden than impressions of men and find that (b) these impressions are based on similar visual information across face genders. Female face impressions were more highly intercorrelated and were better explained by valence (Study 1). These intercorrelations were higher when raters more strongly endorsed gender stereotypes. Despite the gender difference, male and female impression models-derived from separate trustworthiness and dominance ratings of male and female faces-were similar to each other (Study 2). Further, both male and female models could manipulate impressions of faces of both genders (Study 3). The results highlight the high-level, evaluative effect of face gender in impression formation-women are judged negatively to the extent their looks do not conform to expectations, not because people use different facial information across genders but because people evaluate the information differently across genders. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

To create neural representations of external stimuli, the brain performs a number of processing steps that transform its inputs. For fundamental attributes, such as stimulus contrast, this involves one or more nonlinearities that are believed to optimise the neural code to represent features of the natural environment. Here we ask if the same is also true of more complex stimulus dimensions, such as emotional facial expression. We report the results of three experiments combining morphed facial stimuli with electrophysiological and psychophysical methods to measure the function mapping emotional expression intensity to internal response. The results converge on a nonlinearity that accelerates over weak expressions, and then becomes compressive for stronger expressions, similar to the situation for lower level stimulus properties. We further demonstrate that the nonlinearity is not attributable to the morphing procedure used in stimulus generation.

One popular and classic theory of how the mind encodes knowledge is an associative semantic network, where concepts and associations between concepts correspond to nodes and edges, respectively. A major issue in semantic network research is that there is no consensus among researchers as to the best method for estimating the network of an individual or group. We propose a novel method (U-INVITE) for estimating semantic networks from semantic fluency data (listing items from a category) based on a censored random walk model of memory retrieval. We compare this method to several other methods in the literature for estimating networks from semantic fluency data. In simulations, we find that U-INVITE can recover semantic networks with low error rates given only a moderate amount of data. U-INVITE is the only known method derived from a psychologically plausible process model of memory retrieval and one of two known methods that we found to be consistent estimators of this process: if semantic memory retrieval is consistent with this process, the procedure will eventually estimate the true network (given enough data). We conduct the first exploration of different methods for estimating psychologically valid semantic networks by comparing people’s similarity judgments of edges estimated by each network estimation method. To encourage best practices, we discuss the merits of each network estimation technique, provide a flow chart that assists with choosing an appropriate method, and supply code for others to employ these techniques on their own data.

In past research on imitation, some findings suggest that imitation is goal based, whereas other findings suggest that imitation can also be based on a direct mapping of a model's movements without necessarily adopting the model's goal. We argue that the 2 forms of imitation are flexibly deployed in accordance with the psychological distance from the model. We specifically hypothesize that individuals are relatively more likely to imitate the model's goals when s/he is distant but relatively more likely to imitate the model's specific movements when s/he is proximal. This hypothesis was tested in 4 experiments using different imitation paradigms and different distance manipulations. Experiment 1 served as a pilot study and demonstrated that temporal distance (vs. proximity) increased imitation of a goal relative to the imitation of a movement. Experiments 2 and 3 measured goal-based and movement-based imitation independently of each other and found that spatial distance (vs. proximity) decreased the rate of goal errors (indicating more goal imitation) compared with movement errors. Experiment 4 demonstrated that psychological distance operates most likely at the input-that is, perceptual-level. The findings are discussed in relation to construal level theory and extant theories of imitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Humans display a very good understanding of the content in briefly presented photographs. To achieve this understanding, humans rely on information from both high-acuity central vision and peripheral vision. Previous studies have investigated the relative contribution of central/peripheral vision. However, the role of attention in this task remains unclear. In this study, we presented composite images with a scene in the center and another scene in the periphery. The two channels conveyed different information, and the participants were asked to focus on one channel while ignoring the other. In two experiments, we showed that (1) people are better at recognizing the central part, (2) the conflicting signal in the ignored part hinders performance, and (3) this effect is true for both parts (focusing on the central or peripheral part). We conclude that scene recognition is based on both central and peripheral information, even when participants are instructed to focus only on one part of the image and ignore the other. In contrast to the zoom-out hypothesis, we propose that the gist recognition process should be interpreted in terms of the evidence accumulation model in which information from the to-be-ignored parts is also included.

Considerable effort and funding have been spent on developing Attention Bias Modification (ABM) as a treatment for anxiety disorders, theorized to exert therapeutic effects through reduction of a tendency to orient attention toward threat. However, meta-analytical evidence that clinical anxiety is characterized by threat-related attention bias is thin. The largest meta-analysis to date included dot-probe data for n = 337 clinically anxious individuals. Baseline measures of biased attention obtained in ABM RCTs form an additional body of data that has not previously been meta-analyzed. This article presents a meta-analysis of threat-related dot-probe bias measured at baseline for 1,005 clinically anxious individuals enrolled in 13 ABM RCTs. Random-effects meta-analysis indicated no evidence that the mean bias index (BI) differed from zero (k = 13, n = 1005, mean BI = 1.8 ms, SE = 1.26 ms, p = .144, 95% confidence interval [-0.6, 4.3]. Additional Bayes factor analyses also supported the point-zero hypothesis (BF10 = .23), whereas interval-based analysis indicated that mean bias in clinical anxiety is unlikely to extend beyond the 0 to 5 ms interval. Findings are discussed with respect to strengths (relatively large samples, possible bypassing of publication bias), limitations (lack of control comparison, repurposing data, specificity to dot-probe data), and theoretical and practical context. We suggest that it should no longer be assumed that clinically anxious individuals are characterized by selective attention toward threat. Clinically anxious individuals enrolled in RCTs for Attention Bias Modification are not characterized by threat-related attention bias at baseline. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Humans regularly pursue activities characterized by dramatic success or failure outcomes where, critically, the chances of success depend on the time invested working towards it. How should peo- ple allocate time between such make-or-break challenges and safe alternatives, where rewards are more predictable (e.g., linear) functions of performance? We present a formal framework for studying time allocation between these two types of activities, and explore optimal behavior in both one-shot and dynamic versions of the problem. In the one-shot version, we illustrate striking discontinuities in the optimal time allocation policy as we gradually change the parameters of the decision-making problem. In the dynamic version, we formulate the optimal strategy—defined by a giving-up threshold—which adaptively dictates when people should stop pursuing the make-or-break goal. We then show that this strategy is computationally inaccessible for humans, and explore boundedly rational alternatives. We compare the performance of the optimal model against i) a myopic giving-up threshold that is easier to compute, and even simpler heuristic strategies that either ii) only decide whether or not to start pursuing the goal and never give up or iii) consider giving up at a fixed number of control points. Comparing strategies across environments we investigate the cost and behavioral implications of sidestepping the computational burden of full rationality.

Can what we know change what we see? A line of research stretching back nearly a century suggests that knowing an object’s canonical color can alter its visual appearance, such that objectively gray bananas appear to be tinged with yellow, and objectively orange hearts appear redder than they really are. Such “memory color” effects have constituted the strongest and most complete evidence that basic sensory processing can be penetrated by higher-level knowledge, and have contributed to theories of object perception in psychology, neuroscience, and even philosophy. Are such phenomena truly perceptual? Or could they instead reflect shifts in judgments and responses without altering online color perception? Here, we take a novel approach to this question by exploiting a “logic” that is inherent in visual processing but that higher-level cognition often cannot follow. In four experiments spanning both classical and contemporary work, we exhaust the predictions of memory color theories by exploring scenarios where memory color accounts make tortuous hypotheses that would be difficult for subjects to grasp, but that should be easily accommodated by visual processing. We show that such conditions eliminate or even reverse memory color effects in ways unaccounted-for by their underlying theories — especially in a novel “odd one out” paradigm that may help distinguish visual appearance from higher-level judgment in a powerful and general way. We suggest that prior knowledge can influence color judgments in real and robust ways, but that such influences may not truly reflect changes in visual appearance per se. We further discuss the general utility of this approach for isolating perception from judgment, both for memory color effects and beyond.

With the development of increasingly automated vehicles (AVs) comes the increasingly difficult challenge of comprehensively validating these for acceptable, and ideally beneficial, impacts on the transport system. There is a growing consensus that virtual testing, where simulated AVs are deployed in simulated traffic, will be key for cost-effective testing and optimization. The least mature model components in such simulations are those generating the behavior of human agents in or around the AVs. In this paper, human models and virtual testing applications are presented for two example scenarios: (i) a human pedestrian deciding whether to cross a street in front of an approaching automated vehicle, with or without external human–machine interface elements, and (ii) an AV handing over control to a human driver in a critical rear-end situation. These scenarios have received much recent research attention, yet simulation-ready human behavior models are lacking. They are discussed here in the context of existing models of perceptual decision-making, situational awareness, and traffic interactions. It is argued that the human behavior in question might be usefully conceptualized as a number of interrelated decision processes, not all of which are necessarily directly associated with externally observable behavior. The results show that models based on this type of framework can reproduce qualitative patterns of behavior reported in the literature for the two addressed scenarios, and it is demonstrated how computer simulations based on the models, once these have been properly validated, could allow prediction and optimization of AV impacts on traffic flow and traffic safety.

Many studies of multisensory spatial localization have shown that observers’ responses are well-characterized by Bayesian inference, as localization judgments are influenced not only by the reliability of sensory encoding, but expectations about where things occur in space. Here, we investigate the frame of reference for the prior expectation of objects in space. Using an audiovisual localization task, we systematically manipulate fixation position and evaluate whether this prior is encoded in an eye-centered, head-centered, or hybrid frame of reference. Results show that in a majority of participants, this prior is encoded in an eye-centered frame of reference.