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Energy regulators have a unique role to play in the field of cybersecurity. While the implementation of cybersecurity measures is typically the responsibility of power system operators, regulators have an obligation to ensure that investments made in the name of cybersecurity are reasonable, prudent, and effective. These guidelines are intended to assist regulators in defining tariffs by establishing a regulatory approach to enhance the cybersecurity stance of their power systems, and are based on literature and current practices. They attempt to answer the following questions: oWhich regulatory frameworks are best suited to evaluate the prudency of cybersecurity expenditures? oHow can regulators identify and benchmark cybersecurity costs? oHow can regulators identify good countermeasures for cybersecurity? oHow can regulators assess the reasonableness of the costs associated with these countermeasures? oIs it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity investments? oWho should identify, benchmark, measure and evaluate the countermeasures in different regulatory frameworks? As power systems modernize, digitize, and integrate, they are increasingly exposed to additional vulnerabilities that can be exploited by cyberattacks. Attacks on the power grid can have devastating effects on a nation's security, economy, and public welfare, and are a potent threat to all nations worldwide. These guidelines are a first-of-their-kind resource to empower energy regulators to support and encourage grid resilience by ensuring prudent and effective investments in cybersecurity by their regulated entities. The guidelines, melting competencies and wisdom from different disciplines, strive to provide space for concepts, processes and methods rather than prescriptive lists or ready-to-use formulas. These guidelines were developed by CNR-Ircres for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) with funding support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of the Europe and Eurasia Cybersecurity Partnership. USAID and NARUC launched their work on cybersecurity in December 2016 in an effort to equip energy regulators from Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine with the tools and technical capacity to work with utilities in preventing and mitigating cyberattacks and to improve and safeguard overall energy security in the region. While these guidelines were developed for the Europe and Eurasia region, much of their content can be applied universally.

The Collaborative Research Project DRUST brings together eminent European research groups that cover the full breadth of Cognitive Science (including cognitive anthropology, cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychiatry, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology) in an interdisciplinary examination of how different types of common ground support interpersonal and intercultural understanding. Communication plays a key role for such an understanding but only to the extent that dialog partners have sufficient common ground. Misunderstandings occur because most dimensions on which common ground can exist are not universally shared and not a priori present. New research in the Humanities and the Cognitive Sciences has shown that partners in dialogue and partners in action often differ in their perception of the situation, prior background, inference capacity, and linguistic conventions. Although common ground is available when individuals interact with members of their own culture in well-defined contexts, considerable gaps in common ground occur in today's multicultural societies where individuals with different cultural backgrounds interact in heterogenous contexts. Profound misunderstandings easily go unnoticed. A better comprehension of the neural, psychological, and cultural processes that establish common ground is thus crucial for identifying the roots of interpersonal understanding and intercultural understanding and can help to reduce misunderstandings and the serious consequences such misunderstandings can cause.

The experience of the ICRAF-Agroforestry project is drawn in this paper to identify adapted agroforestry trees for Zimbabwe conditions. From the experience with trees at Domboshawa and Makoholi, certain tree species have performed well in target technologies. A wide range of Leucaena species and provenances show potential for fodder bank technologies. These can now be considered as alternative species to the psyllid-prone L. leucocephala. Other non-Leucaena species include Acacia angustissima and Calliandra calothyrsus. Emphasis is placed on targeting these agroforestry tree species for specific functions and services. Transactions of the Zimbabwe Scientific Association Volume 72 (Supplement) 1998, pp. 2-9