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The use of the term 'imperial presidency' in South Korea refers to the fact that the country's 1987 constitution grants the state's highest office holder de facto imperial powers with regard to domestic and foreign policy making. This version of the term therefore differs from Arthur M. Schlesinger's usage in the US context, which was critical of the discretionary powers exercised by US presidents in efforts to subvert the checks and balances of the US Constitution. Concentrating political power in the South Korean presidency severely curtails the work of the other political institutions, including its parliament (the National Assembly). Every time the presidency changes hands, the leadership structures of all other public institutions are subjected to major restructuring according to political loyalty, which interrupts their routine functioning. Overall, the presidency in its current form is dysfunctional and works as a barrier against democratic deepening. This article examines why lengthy debate over South Korea's imperial presidency has so far failed to result in comprehensive constitutional reform.

Nearly a year after its formation, the Nation Alliance, consisting of six opposition par­ties ("Table of Six"), finally started to act like a full-fledged electoral alliance against the ruling bloc under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The six opposition leaders have long been criticised for failing to take concrete steps towards embodying a viable po­lit­ical alternative to the People’s Alliance of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) since they publicly signed the joint manifesto for Turkey’s transition into the "Strengthened Parliamentary System" in February 2022. Although the alliance has yet to announce its joint presidential can­didate, it has manifested an unprecedentedly comprehensive joint platform in nine policy areas, including the rule of law, public administration, social policy, economy, and foreign policy. The 200-page joint document provides a comprehensive overview of what changes Turkey can be expected to go through in the short and medium terms should the Nation Alliance manage to defeat President Erdoğan's ruling bloc in the up­coming elections, which will probably take place on 14 May 2023. Even though it would not immediately offer a solution to various issues in Turkey-EU relations, a pos­sible opposition victory could bring bilateral relations back to an institutional frame­work, whereby both parties can cooperate in a productive way to work out their problems and focus on common interests. (Autorenreferat)

Durch ein Verfassungsreferendum im Jahr 2010 wurde die Koalition in Artikel 70(3) als Instrument des kirgisischen Parlamentes (Dschogorku Kenesch) zur Mehrheitsfindung kodifiziert. Bei keiner absoluten Mehrheit für eine Partei bestand seitdem der Zwang zur Koalitionsbildung, was die Fraktionen als zentrale Akteure parlamentarischer Prozesse etablierte. Der Beitrag analysiert für den Zeitraum zwischen 2010 und 2020 interne Strukturen kirgisischer Koalitionen und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Stabilität des jungen Parlamentarismus, dem mit der Machtergreifung Sadyr Dschaparows und der Rückkehr zu einem präsidialen Regierungssystem 2021 ein Ende gesetzt wurde.

In this article we take a longitudinal view on presidential-term-limit reforms in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa since the third wave of democratization. Many countries in the two regions (re-)introduced term limits at this time as a democratic safeguard against personal rule and power abuses. Since then, term limits have been contested by a plethora of reform attempts. Such reforms are commonly seen as a risk to democracy since stable institutions are considered essential for democratic consolidation, while term-limit eliminations are associated with processes of autocratization. From the literature on democratic consolidation, institutionalization and presidential-term-limit reforms we distil theoretical expectations on term-limit-reform paths across time and examine how they relate to the evolution of the political regime. To empirically investigate reform paths across regions we apply the research method of sequence analysis. We find that the stability of term-limit rules is more prevalent than expected, but that this stability sometimes masks institutional ineffectiveness under authoritarian regimes. Rule instability induced by frequent reforms can be part of a piecemeal path towards autocratization, but it can also reflect an open-ended tug of war between authoritarian tendencies and democratic resistance.

This article attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of the Russian Presidential Administration (‘the Kremlin’). Borrowing from the literature on institutional presidencies and institutional approaches to authoritarianism, I argue that the administration institutionalised over the years of study, 1994–2012. More stable and predictable procedures enhanced administrative presidential powers but personalism and non-compliance with presidential orders remained. Original data on budget, staff, units, organisational structure and presidential assignments demonstrate that presidential power ought to be conceptualised as a polymorphous phenomenon that varies depending on the level of analysis. Researchers should refrain from over-personalising accounts of authoritarian regimes at the expense of more structural, organisational elements such as ‘institutional presidencies’.

The Republic of Türkiye was founded on Ottoman parliamentary tradition introduced in 1878. However, debates on system change have always been on the agenda. The Turkish political elite has occasionally presented proposals on the need to shift from a parliamentary to a presidential system. The times of political crises set a suitable ground for such favourable arguments. This article focuses primarily on the realisation of the system change witnessed under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership. In the first part, it argues that the three-phase strategy of the AK Party has made its political dreams come true. An issue is first popularised, then narrativised, and finally securitised. Consequently, the new presidential government system was adopted with the April 16th, 2017 referendum. The article analyses how the system change has modifi ed the formation of such alliances among the political parties beyond customary ways. It questions to what extent this novel dimension of party politics would be sustainable. The second part thus elaborates on the formation of alliances and the efforts to make them functional on the way to consensual politics. Lijphart’s classification of emocracies as majoritarian governments versus consensus governments has provided a theoretical base for a discussion on the return to a strengthened parliamentary system. The article sheds light on the new dynamics of government/opposition relations and their infl uence on Turkish democracy.

Die Präsidentschaftswahlen vom 10. Januar 2021 und das damit verbundene Ver­fassungsplebiszit sind das Ergebnis einer von Gewalt begleiteten Dynamik, die Kir­gistan seit Oktober 2020 in Atem hält. Mit der Wahl des Populisten Sadyr Japarov zum Präsidenten und der Zustimmung zu der von ihm forcierten Wiedereinführung eines Präsidialsystems wird der Weg bereitet für einen Abbau demokratischer und rechtsstaatlicher Prinzipien, mit dem sich Kirgistan den politischen Verhältnissen in den zentralasiatischen Nachbarstaaten annähert. Eine neue Verfassung ist in Vor­bereitung. Der Entwurf trägt die Handschrift von Akteuren, die eine Pfadumkehr unter neo-traditionalen Vorzeichen anstreben. Er düpiert eine junge Generation politischer Kräfte, die für mehr Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit eintreten, und ist geeignet, das Land anhaltend zu polarisieren. (Autorenreferat)

Kyrgyzstan's presidential election and constitutional referendum on 10 January 2021 represent the provisional endpoint of a series of violent episodes that has gripped the country since October 2020. The victory of the populist Sadyr Japarov and approval for his plan to reintroduce a presidential system of government prepares the ground for a dismantling of democratic principles and rule of law, so that politically Kyrgyz­stan is set to look more like its Central Asian neighbours. A new constitution is in preparation. The draft bears the portents of a neo-traditional roll-back that rebuffs a young generation demanding more democracy and rule of law, and has the potential to deeply polarise the nation. (author's abstract)

Turkey's new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population. Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail. Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system. Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting. The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader - the President. Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair. Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states. (author's abstract)

The recent emergence of two splinter parties from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) points to a deepening crisis within the party and growing discontent toward party leader and president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although the leaders of the two new parties, Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, are both former high-ranking AKP politicians, they differ significantly in their style of politics and ideological leanings. Babacan is trying to position himself at the center of Turkey's ideological spectrum and emphasize issues of good governance and the rule of law. Davutoğlu is aiming for the more conservative voters, focusing on the moral shortcomings of the current regime. Davutoğlu's strategy has better chances in the short term, whereas Babacan is poised for a long game. The importance of both parties relies on their potential to attract votes from the AKP base. In a country that is deeply divided into two almost equal-sized camps that support Erdoğan and oppose him, even a small fraction of votes shifting from the AKP to the opposition can be a game changer. (Autorenreferat)

Besides the introduction of multi-party elections, the sub-Saharan wave of democratic reforms of the 1990s encompassed the introduction of limits to the number of terms that a chief executive can serve. Executive term limits (ETLs) are key for democracy to advance in a continent with a legacy of personal rule. However, the manipulation of ETLs has become a recurring mode of autocratisation, through which African aspiring over-stayers weaken executive constraints, taint political competition, and limit citizens’ possibility to choose who governs. This article presents a three-phase model of autocratisation by ETL manipulation and, using new data, offers one of the first regional comparative studies of ETL manipulation in sub-Saharan Africa that rests on econometric modelling. The analysis leads to revisiting some previous findings on the drivers of ETL manipulation and highlights the relevance of other previously underestimated factors that may either discourage a leader from challenging ETLs or prevent their successful manipulation. In Subsahara-Afrika wurden im Zuge demokratischer Reformen in den 1990er-Jahren nicht nur Mehrparteienwahlen eingeführt, sondern auch Beschränkungen der Anzahl der Amtszeiten des Staatsoberhauptes. Amtszeitbeschränkungen auf einem Kontinent mit dem Erbe personalistischer Herrschaft sind ein Schlüssel für mehr Demokratie. Die Manipulation von Amtszeitbeschränkungen jedoch ist eine wiederkehrende Form der Autokratisierung geworden. Dadurch schwächen die Herrschenden Beschränkungen der Exekutive, sowie den politischen Wettbewerb und begrenzen die Möglichkeit der Bürger zu wählen, wer regiert. Dieser Artikel stellt ein Drei-Phasen-Modell der Autokratisierung durch die Manipulation von Amtszeitbeschränkungen vor und führt unter Verwendung neuer Daten eine der ersten regional vergleichenden statistischen Analysen durch. Die Ergebnisse revidieren einige frühere Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich der Ursachen der Manipulation von Amtszeitbeschränkungen und unterstreichen die Relevanz anderer zuvor unterschätzter Faktoren, die den Versuch und die erfolgreiche Umsetzung einer Manipulation von Amtszeitbeschränkungen erklären.

This study makes the following contributions to the study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America: Conceptually it adopts Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova's (2008) distinction between clientelistic and nonclientelistic types of patronage politics and widens these authors classification of patrons' motivations for making appointments, specifically as a lens for the study of patronage practices within Latin America’s presidentialist regimes. Analytically, it sets up a new taxonomy of patronage appointments based on the roles that appointees' play vis-à-vis the executive, the ruling party, and the public administration - one that can be used for the comparative study of the politics of patronage. Empirically, it applies this taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of patronage in Argentina and Uruguay under two left-of-center administrations. Theoretically, it contributes to theory-building by relating the findings of our research to the differences in party systems and presidential powers within the two countries under study, and to agency factors associated with the respective governments' own political projects. The article concludes that differences in patronage practices are a manifestation of two variant forms of exercising governmental power: a hyper-presidentialist, populist one in Argentina and a party-centered, social-democratic one in Uruguay., Este articulo hace las siguientes contribuciones al estudio de la política de los nombramientos de patronazgo en América Latina: En lo conceptual adopta la distinción empleada por Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova’s (2008) entre formas clientelares y no clientelares de políticas de patronazgo, como un lente para el estudio específico de prácticas de patronazgo en regímenes presidencialistas en América Latina. En lo analítico, construye una nueva taxonomía de nombramientos de patronazgo basada en los roles que los nombrados cumplen en relación al executivo, el partido gobernante y la administración pública, la cual puede ser usada para el estudio comparado de la política del patronazgo. En lo empírico, aplica la taxonomía a un estudio piloto de la política del patronazgo en Argentina y Uruguay bajo dos administraciones de centro-izquierda. En lo teórico, contribuye a la elaboración de teoría al relacionar los hallazgos de investigación a diferencias en los sistemas de partidos y en los poderes presidenciales en los dos países objeto de estudio, así como factores de agencia asociados a los proyectos políticos de los respectivos gobiernos. El articulo concluye que diferencias en las prácticas de patronazgo son una manifestación de dos formas diferentes de ejercicio del poder gubernamental: una de tipo híper-presidencialista, populista, en Argentina y otra de tipo partido-céntrica, social democrática, en Uruguay.

Der Aufstieg Anton Wainos zum Leiter der Präsidialverwaltung (PV) steht stellvertretend für einen graduellen Generationswandel in Spitzenämtern der Staatsverwaltung. In den 2000er Jahren wurde durch die Präsidialverwaltung eine Art "Nomenklatura lite" aufgebaut, durch die Nachwuchs gesichtet und gefördert wird. Neben meritokratischen Elementen sind vor allem persönliche Verbindungen und Patronagebeziehungen entscheidend für Zugang zur Kaderreserve und Beförderung. Mit der graduellen Verjüngung durch Kaderwechsel reproduziert sich die derzeitige Ordnung der Macht, die techno-bürokratische und klepto-neopatrimoniale Elemente verbindet.

Turkey's presidential and general elections, held on 24 June 2018, marked a significant turn in Turkish politics. The controversial referendum of 2017 narrowly approved constitutional amendments that replaced the parliamentary system with an executive presidential one. With the 2018 presidential vote those amendments took effect, sealing Turkey's transition into a presidential system. Strategically, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan relied on contained uncertainty, which generated hope among the opposition, gave legitimacy to the elections, and simultaneously perpetuated a sense of despair through the common belief that he would win by any means necessary. The elections, held under a state of emergency, were among the most unjust in Turkey's recent history. Despite the extremely unfavourable conditions, and the sobering cynicism after election night, the opposition has revived its can-do spirit that had been lost after the 2013 Gezi protests. The presidential system granted Erdoğan the opportunity to legalise and institutionalise his existing one-man rule. Since his inauguration on 9 July 2018 as the first executive president, Erdoğan has embarked upon a complete overhaul of the state apparatus, with a hands-on micromanagement style. The elections hardly brought stability to the country. The looming economic crisis, social polarisation, the Kurdish conflict, the war in Syria, and troubled foreign relations will likely determine the course of future events. The elections of 24 June 2018 did not deliver Turkey's long-awaited normalisation, but paved the way for the institutionalisation of granting emergency powers to the executive. Turkish civil society will be completely smothered if left to the country's inner dynamics. The European Union can do more than expressing its "deep concerns" about Turkey's de-democratisation and act in line with its criticism in the latest progress report.

Indonesia presents an extremely rare quasi-experimental research case: the constitutional reforms and the transition to full presidentialism have effected a presidentialization of political parties that is largely in line with the changes predicted by the model of Samuels and Shugart [2010. Presidents, parties and prime ministers: How separation of powers affects party organization and behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press]. Especially the rise of the new president and his difficult relationship with his own party are testimony to this. But a closer look reveals that the model has to be adapted to Indonesian politics. Presidents have tools to forge grand coalitions and to overcome the dualism to an extent. The size and history of political parties as well as wider socio-economic changes, that is an increasing oligarchization of party organization, have to be considered. Moreover, highly personalized vehicle parties serving the interests of a presidential candidate have emerged. It follows that institutional and structural incentives combined have produced a party system consisting of different party types.

Who gets what in portfolio allocation, and how does it matter to coalition partners’ legislative support in presidential systems? I propose that portfolios are not all alike, and that their allocation as well as the support for the president's agenda depends on the particular distribution of assets within the executive. The portfolio share allocated to coalition parties is weighted by a measure of importance based on the assets controlled by the ministry in question, such as policies, offices, and budgets. Once the weighted allocation of ministries has been identified, the results show that: 1) the president concentrates the most important ministries in their own party, mainly considering the policy dimension; 2) the positive relationship between portfolio allocation and legislative support remains, with the importance of specific dimensions being considered; and, 3) coalition partners do not respond differently in terms of legislative support in light of the different assets’ distribution within the portfolio allocation., Quem ganha o quê na alocação de ministérios e como isso importa para o apoio legislativo dos parceiros da coalizão em sistemas presidencialistas? Proponho que os ministérios não são todos iguais e que sua alocação, bem como o apoio à agenda do presidente, depende da distribuição específica de ativos dentro do executivo. A proporção de ministérios alocada aos partidos da coalizão é ponderada por uma medida de importância baseada nos ativos controlados pelo ministério em questão, tais como políticas, cargos e orçamento. Uma vez que a alocação ponderada dos ministérios foi identificada, os resultados mostram que: 1) o presidente concentra os ministérios mais importantes em seu próprio partido, principalmente considerando a dimensão de políticas; 2) mantémse a relação positiva entre alocação de ministérios e apoio legislativo, mesmo considerando a importância de dimensões específicas; e 3) os parceiros de coalizão não respondem de maneira diferente em termos de apoio legislativo, tendo em vista a distribuição dos diferentes ativos na alocação de ministérios.

Die Indische Union stellt die Europäische Union sowohl im Hinblick auf ihre Größe, aber auch in Bezug auf ihren Integrationsgrad in den Schatten. Doch während der europäische Föderalismus sich von unten nach oben entwickelt, ist der indische Föderalismus ein „Föderalismus von oben“. Das hat sich aus seiner kolonialen Herkunft ergeben. Die von Britisch Indien übernommene Verfassungsstruktur war nur deshalb föderalistisch, weil die Briten das Dilemma bewältigen mussten, eine graduelle Übertragung von Selbstverwaltungsrechten an gewählte indische Gremien mit einer Stützung der unabsetzbaren zentralen Exekutive zu verbinden. Die neue föderale Verfassung von 1935 enthielt neben der Bundesverfassung eine Einheitsverfassung für alle Provinzen Britisch Indiens. „Provincial autonomy“ – wie diese Konstruktion beschönigend genannt wurde – war die Schaffung einer politischen Arena für die indischen Politiker, die ihre Kräfte binden und vom Widerstand gegen die Zentralgewalt ablenken sollte., Indien - Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, 2001: Indien - Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft

This work examines whether the size, as well as the composition, of legislative coalitions is an additional factor that affects the incidence of protests against national governments in Latin America. Based on aggregate data for 18 democracies from 1980 to 2014, the analysis reveals that the relationship between the size of legislative coalitions in the lower house of national assemblies and the odds of antigovernment protests is U-shaped. Specifically, the odds of antigovernment protests occurring decrease until the president has a coalition comprising 50–55 percent of the national assembly; once this threshold is passed, the odds of protests taking place increase as the coalition grows. This result holds after controlling for the party composition of the governing coalition and other factors previously linked to the occurrence of antigovernment protests. The evidence thus indicates that both minority and supermajority scenarios can be socially destabilizing for Latin American democracies., Este trabajo analiza si el tamaño y la composición de las coaliciones legislativas son factores adicionales en la incidencia de protestas en contra de los gobiernos nacionales de América Latina. Con base en datos agregados de 18 democracias de la región para el período 1980-2014, este estudio demuestra que la relación entre el tamaño de la coalición gubernamental en (la cámara baja de) la legislatura nacional y la probabilidad de protestas antigubernamentales tiene una forma de U. Específicamente, la probabilidad de protestas antigubernamentales disminuye hasta que el presidente cuenta con una coalición del tamaño de 50-55 por ciento de la asamblea nacional; después de este punto, la probabilidad de protestas aumenta a medida que crece el tamaño de la coalición. Este resultado es válido aún después de controlar por la composición partidista de la coalición, así como otros factores que estudios anteriores han vinculado con la incidencia de protestas antigubernamentales. La evidencia indica que tanto las minorías como las supermajorías legislativas pueden ser socialmente desestabilizadoras para las democracias latinoamericanas.

The recently established presidents in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are seeking to implement governmental agendas that represent a policy shift with respect to previous administrations. However, in doing so, they face political and social constraints. Executive politics - that is, the presidential approach to the design of the highest executive agencies and appointment strategies - stands out as a tool to improve presidential leeway and coordination capacity. Since late 2015 the Latin American left has faced setbacks due to the election of President Mauricio Macri of Argentina and President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of Peru, as well as former vice president Michel Temer's assumption of power in Brazil after the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. In Argentina and Peru these power shifts in the presidency were accompanied by minority support in Congress. In Brazil, in contrast, Temer built a large co­alition in Congress, albeit within a highly polarised political and social context that threatens its cohesiveness and survival. To face congressional oppositions, attentive publics, and organised social sectors that seek to hinder their policy goals, Latin American presidents need to use their important constitutional policymaking powers - as well as their prerogatives to appoint officials and to design the executive's upper-level structure - wisely and strategically. The three presidents have established smaller institutional presidencies than their predecessors - that is, they have reduced their core structure of close aids and supports. At the same time, they have given more power to the cabinet ministers, as well as to the cabinet coordination units, with the goal of aligning the executive with the president's policy preferences. The constitutional powers that presidents have to conduct the policymaking process, particularly in Congress, are important governing tools, but executive politics represents an equally crucial strategy. Presidents use changes to the executive's design and political appointments to influence the creation of policies and achieve their policy goals. These are important (although often neglected) presidential tools, particularly when presidents are dealing with reform ­agendas within constraining political environments.

Die Türkei steht vor einem Wendepunkt. Der Ausgang des Referendums am 16. April 2017 über die Einführung eines Präsidialsystems in der Türkei entscheidet über nichts weniger als die Abschaffung der Demokratie und die Etablierung einer Autokratie. Im türkischen Präsidialsystem ist weder eine Gewaltenteilung noch ein System konkurrierender Machtblöcke und Institutionen vorgesehen, das eine Alleinherrschaft verhindern kann. Die Umfragen zum Referendum in der Türkei sagen ein Kopf-an-Kopf-Rennen voraus, bei dem beide Lager um jede Stimme kämpfen müssen. Insofern könnten die Stimmen der türkischen Wahlberechtigten in Deutschland das Zünglein an der Waage sein. Darauf setzt die türkische Regierungspartei AKP: Sie hofft, dass die knapp 60 Prozent der DeutschtürkInnen, die in Deutschland zu ihren AnhängerInnen gehören, der Einführung des Präsidialsystems zustimmen werden.

Nachdem das türkische Parlament im Januar 2017 dem AKP-Entwurf zur Verfassungsänderung zustimmte, schreitet die politische Umgestaltung der Türkei zum autokratischen Präsidialsystem weiter voran. Der Reformvorschlag sieht eine drastische Verschiebung der Machtverhältnisse und exekutiven Befugnisse zugunsten des Staatspräsidenten vor. Selbst ohne die notwendige Zustimmung im Referendum am 16. April würde die Einführung des Präsidialsystems Recep Tayyip Erdoğans oberste Priorität bleiben. Die damit verbundene weitere Entfernung der Türkei von europäischen Werten und Normen würde die bereits stark belasteten Beziehungen zur EU noch stärker strapazieren. Trotz ihrer beschränkten Einflussmöglichkeiten kann die EU zumindest Anreize schaffen, um das Ausmaß der autokratischen Ausprägung des türkischen Regierungssystems etwas einzudämmen: Die Union bleibt der wichtigste Handelspartner der Türkei; an die Modernisierung der Zollunion ließen sich klare politische Konditionen knüpfen. Zudem könnte eine mögliche Lösung des Zypernkonflikts neue Kanäle zwischen der EU und Türkei öffnen.

Politische Entwicklungen in Lateinamerika (LA) haben die wissenschaftliche Debatte zur Demokratieentwicklung maßgeblich beeinflusst. Die derzeitigen schweren politischen Krisen in Brasilien und Venezuela veranschaulichen sowohl die strukturellen Defizite des in LA vorherrschenden Systemtypus der Präsidialdemokratie als auch die institutionellen Mechanismen, die das Überleben der lateinamerikanischen Spielarten des Präsidentialismus bislang ermöglicht haben, wenn auch unter großen Herausforderungen. In Lateinamerika entwickelten sich unterschiedliche Modelle präsidentieller Demokratie. Dazu gehören sowohl verschiedene Spielarten eines Mehrheitspräsidentialismus und präsidentieller Dominanz als auch der "Koalitionspräsidentialismus" und andere ad-hoc-Lösungen im Fall von Minderheitsregierungen. Der Koalitionspräsidentialismus, wie er in Brasilien praktiziert wird, war eine innovative lateinamerikanische Lösung, um politische Blockaden zu überwinden. Dies bedeutet aber im Umkehrschluss, dass ein Präsident ohne unterstützende Koalition möglicherweise politisch nicht überlebt. Während in Brasilien der Kongress versucht, Präsidentin Rousseff mittels eines Amtsenthebungsverfahrens abzusetzen, inszeniert der venezolanische Präsident Maduro einen konstitutionellen Staatsstreich, um den Kongress zu entmachten. In beiden Fällen steht dem Präsidenten eine feindliche Mehrheit im Kongress gegenüber, aber die Lösung der daraus resultierenden Blockade fällt jeweils unterschiedlich aus. Bei einem politischen Patt können Präsidenten versuchen, den Kongress zu umgehen und zu entmachten. Minderheitspräsidenten sehen sich aber auch zum Rücktritt gezwungen oder werden durch ein Amtsenthebungsverfahren bzw. institutionelle Äquivalente zu einem "Misstrauensvotum" abgesetzt.

Political developments in Latin America (LA) have repeatedly fuelled a rich, ongoing, and contentious academic debate about democracy and its deficits. LA is a region characterised by presidential democracies, a political system with arguably serious structural shortcomings. Brazil and Venezuela, both of which are currently undergoing severe political crises, are illustrative of both the perils of presidentialism and the institutional mechanisms that have enabled LA presidential democracies to survive, albeit with deficits. Latin America is home to various political models of presidential democracy, including several variants of majoritarian presidentialism and presidential dominance as well as coalition presidentialism and other ad hoc solutions for minority governments. Inter-institutional deadlocks due to presidents’ lack of adequate support in the respective Congress are perceived as a major shortcoming and a risk for presidential democracies. "Coalition presidentialism," as practiced in Brazil, has been an innovative LA solution for overcoming political deadlocks. However, the converse argument implies that without a coalition there might be no surviving president. While the Brazilian Congress is trying to remove President Rousseff by means of impeachment, Venezuelan president Maduro is orchestrating a constitutional coup to disempower Congress. In both cases the presidents face an adverse majority in Congress, but the solution to the deadlock situation is different for each case. Political stalemates between a congress and a president can be resolved by different means. On the one hand, presidents can try to sidestep and disempower the congress. On the other, minority presidents have sometimes been forced to resign, or removed by impeachment and other institutional equivalents to a "vote of non-confidence." Policy Implications If presidents are unable to control their parties or coalitions, their removal may become a real possibility, despite fixed presidential terms. Some scholars call for constitutional reforms to allow for earlier elections. We argue that impeachment should be replaced by a vote of non-confidence (by a two-thirds majority). Then the political debate would be framed less in normative terms (questioning the moral integrity of the incumbent president) and more in political-programmatic and partisan-related terms.