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Though research has shown that candidates and the media can influence the importance voters ascribe to political issues, little work has sought to test the interactive agenda-setting effects of each--in particular, to determine whether the ability of candidates to set the public's agenda depends on the media's willingness to reflect their issue emphases. Using an experiment conducted during the early stages of the 2006 Texas gubernatorial election, the author shows that candidate attempts to influence voter issue salience are most effective when the media focus on the same topics. The findings suggest the value for candidates of enlisting the news media in helping to pass their messages along and serve as a point of departure for more work on the influence of candidate-media agenda convergence. Keywords: campaigns; elections; agenda setting; news media; issue salience

In a collection of essays, Great Contemporaries, Winston Churchill described Joseph Chamberlain as 'incomparably the most live, sparkling, insurgent, compulsive figure in British affairs' at the beginning of the twentieth […]

The political aspects of economic redistribution are discussed.

The authors of this paper are four practitioners each of whom has many years of experience working in the Federal government and also has pursued doctoral studies in public or business administration. Three ideas developed in this paper are that: (1) the Federal civil service has been changed from being a model workplace to a much less desirable one; (2) although downsizing has been touted as an efficiency and economy measure, lower level employees experienced the most cuts and (3) the current practice of replacing Federal employees with private corporations costs much more. Over the past two decades private sector workplaces in the United States, and now the Federal government workplace, have experienced so much change that previous theories, concepts, models, and expectations no longer hold. Just as private industry workplaces have been changed by downsizing, reorganizations, mergers, elimination of middle management, and outsourcing, so, too, has the Federal government workplace been fundamentally altered. Reducing the number of government workers, replacing Federal employees with private finns, increasing the number of officials with political agendas, and using harsh personnel management practices have transfigured the Federal workplace. Examples of factors that have contributed to a changed workplace include: the Civil Service Reform Act which replaced the Civil Service Commission with the Office of Personnel Management; importing private sector approaches into the government, e.g., the Grace Commission; replacing the Civil Service Retirement System with the Federal Employees Retirement System; pressure to downsize and privatize; and many elements of the National Performance Review and Government Performance and Results Act. Now that the metamorphosis away from the traditional Civil Service borne of the Pendleton Act is nearly complete (although the new paradigm is not entirely clear), questions about the effects of a changed government workplace are being raised. Some people believe the metamorphosis is from a caterpillar to a butterfly, while others think the opposite. Whether the changed Federal government is a thing of beauty or a distasteful organism will be determined over time by observations and assessments of the effects of the change. These effects will be both internal to the government workplace, itself, and external to it, involving the products, services, outputs, and outcomes it produces. This paper begins by describing some of the politically mandated changes that have altered the very foundation of the Federal government workplace over the past 20 years and made it a much less desirable place to work. Next, some of the effects of two politically mandated changes are examined: (1) downsizing or reducing the number of Americans who can work for their government and (2) contracting out or replacing government workers with private corporations. Political officials have told the media and the American public that these changes were needed to improve the government's efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. It has been suggested that these initiatives will reduce costs. However, an examination of downsizing and contracting out shows the opposite effect. While overall the Federal government has fewer employees now than in 1961, the statistics indicate that lower level employees have been cut the most: * The number of secretaries decreased by 39% between 1992 and 1998. * The blue collar workforce is down 40% since 1982, e.g., Supply Clerical and Technician (-35%), Accounting Technician (-24%), and Electronics Mechanic (-41%). * Between 1993 and 1998 the number of GS-1 to GS-10 employees fell from 767,000 to 594,000. * In 1983 the number of GS-1 to GS-10 workers exceeded GS-11 to GS-15 by nearly 300,000, while in 1997 GS-11 to GS-15 outnumbered the lower level workers by 44,000. Although authoritative cost comparison studies are difficult to conduct because top officials have made little provision to collect information on the cost of contracting with private firms or the number of contract employees, available information indicates that it is much more expensive than using government employees. The contracting out we are talking about is not the usual kind--building ships or planes, or acquiring computer systems or special expertise not available in the government. Rather, it is contracting with private firms to do jobs that are currently being performed by Federal employees. Not satisfied with the level at which firms are being substituted for Federal employees, actions by political officials have created an environment which now favors private corporations and where they can be given work at top management's discretion, often regardless of cost. In fact, today most contracting out is done without the use of Circular A-76 Cost Comparison Studies. There is empirical and logical evidence that shows that replacing government employees with private corporations is more expensive. For example, a study by the Department of the Army documents what people close to contracting have always known--that it is far more expensive to contract with a private firm for work than to have Federal employees do it. Logically, the government incurs additional items of cost when replacing Federal employees with private corporations. First, there is the profit that goes to the firm. Second, there is the firm's overhead which pays for corporate offices, staffs, and CEOs. Third, there are the costs of the contracting and award process and of contract administration and management. Although the worker on a government contract may be paid a little less than a government worker, the cost of the worker is only a third to a half of what the government pays the firm. Thus, replacing government workers with private firms usually costs far more and it is not unusual for it to cost two to three times as much. This paper partly is based on the authors' long experience in the Federal government. It is not based on the organizations in which they are currently employed. Key Words: Government employees; Political officials; Political appointees; Federal government; Efficiency; Effectiveness; Cost-effectiveness; Downsize; Layoff; Contract-out; Privatize; Civil Service; Reform; Practitioners; Workplace; Government workplace; American workplace; Cost comparison; Cost analysis; A-76 studies; Management; American workers; Change; Replace workers; Corporations; Government contracts with corporations; Recommendations for reform; Weakened government; Outsourcing; Attack on government; Dismantling government; Retrenchment; Personnel management practices.

This article argues that political ambitions combined with the resources offered by professional legislatures can enhance the prospects for representation of citizen interests because ambitious legislators have strong incentives to closely monitor constituent opinions while they wait for a strategic opportunity to run for higher office. The effect of ambition for higher office should be especially pronounced in professional legislatures that provide members with high salaries, staff, and office budgets to aid their efforts. The relationship between ambition, legislative professionalism, and behavior are tested using data drawn from a survey of upper and lower chamber members in eight state legislatures. The results show that legislators who are progressively ambitious spend more time monitoring public opinion than legislators who are non-ambitious or statically ambitious and that legislative resources augment this effect.

Descriptive representation occurs when elected politicians are typical of the larger class of persons that they represent, such that blacks represent blacks, disabled people represent disabled people and so on. Research undertaken in the context of the UK government's devolution programme helps us to judge the strength of the demand for descripted representation amongst political activists and elites. In the case of women, one grouping where proportional descriptive representation has (almost) been achieved, substantial benefits are perceived, for example in relation to improvements in the deliverative function of democracy. In the case of other 'minority' groupings the absence of descriptive representation is thought to have entailed significant costs. This failure has necessitated the development of complex bureaucratic structures that are seen as a poor substitute for descriptive representation. In this and other respects the innovations in governance introduced with devolution have helped to stimulate demand for descriptive representation. This demand exceeds the supply of representation on offer and descriptive representation will be the focus of an increasing amount of debate and controversy in future.

Drawing on the Kuhnian model of scientific paradigms, this article suggests consensus politics should be conceptualised not as an agreement or a settlement but as a political framework that derives from an ideationally informed policy paradigm. Such a consensus constrains the autonomy of governing elites, encouraging them to conform to an established policy agenda that defines the 'mainstream' wherein 'the possible is the art of politics'. In Britain, as demonstrated by the replacement of a post-war social democratic paradigm by a contemporary neo-liberal successor, periods of policy continuity and incremental reform have been matched by occasions of dramatic political change. Any appreciation of consensus politics has therefore to explain change as well as account for stability, something considerably under emphasised in the existing literature. Consensus politics are therefore best defined as a constrained space within which politics is conducted and political actors differ, a paradigmatic framework form which political outcomes emerge, and never as an agreement freely entered into. Looking at consensus politics beyond the much commented upon post-war example, this article used British politics since 1945 as an exemplar of consensus politics and an illustration of how a consensus can be forged, how it can endure and how it may change.

This article discusses the electoral process and the role of American mayors as a comparison to the newly formed mayoralty of the Greater London Authority. American mayors play little to no role in national politics and few advance to state-wide office; however, the authors believe that London mayors may play a significantly larger role in national politics, given the city's disproportionate role in British social and economic life.

Politicians have significant influence over technological programs such as space satellite programs and this can enhance or retard the development of space programs. The scientists involved in space programs form coalitions with the politicians to develop programs of their interests. Some of the space programs of the US, such as the launching of meteorological satellites, Earth Observation system and land satellites, were successful because of the coalition strategy between scientists and politicians.

Leon Trotsky was a revolutionary leader, army commander, politician and intellectual. He had a major impact on the early history of the USSR. However, his role is often overshadowed by [...]

The use of the 1861 report by John Milton Earle, a Worcester politician and newspaper publisher, by the United States as basis for recognizing aboriginal people such as the Massachusetts Nipmucs is examined. In 2004, the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs through its Office of Federal Acknowledgment had denied petitions by two groups claiming Nipmuc Indian ancestry using the said report.

Former House Majority Leader, Tom DeLay has resigned, but the question remains whether DeLay and his legal woes will still loom large as a partisan emblem in the November 2006 congressional contests across the nation. Democrats contend that it is highly speculative to project what Delay's impact will be in the ensuing elections, also whether there are other lawmakers involved in the lobbying scandal.

The Labour backbenchers at Westminster have extracted concessions from the government in late 2005 on high-profile elements of its legislative programme. It is seen that the ability of backbenchers to influence legislation in a parliamentary is partly related to the size of the government's majority and the level of intra-party disagreement within the governing party.

A study was conducted to assess the effects of mortality salience on evaluations of political candidates as a function of leadership style. On the basis of terror management theory and previous research, we hypothesized that people would show increased preference for a charismatic political candidate and decreased preference for a relationship-oriented political candidate in response to subtle reminders of death. Following a mortality-salience or control induction, 190 participants read campaign statements by charismatic, task-oriented, and relationship-oriented gubernatorial candidates; evaluated their preferences for each candidate; and voted for one of them. Results were in accord with predictions. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are considered.

We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to influence the outcome by entering or exiting the election. KEYWORDS: Strategic candidacy, voting procedures, candidates, voting rules.