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BACKGROUND: In recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a rise in political violence. Prior research has found that an individuals social network is associated with their likelihood of engaging in various forms of violence, but research on social networks and political violence in the US context is limited. This study examined associations between social network size and endorsement of political violence in a recent nationally representative survey and explored how the relationship varied by use of social media as a major news source, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and membership in a marginalized or privileged racial or ethnic group. METHODS: This was a nationally representative cross-sectional survey study of adults aged 18 and older in the US, administered from May 13-June 2, 2022. The exposure was social network size, defined by the number of strong social connections. We examined three violence-related outcomes: support for non-political violence, support for political violence, and personal willingness to engage in political violence. We estimated prevalence ratios for associations using survey-weighted Poisson regression with robust standard errors, adjusting for hypothesized confounders and including interaction terms to examine effect measure modification. RESULTS: The sample included 8,620 respondents. Median age was 48.4 years (95% CI = 47.9-48.8), 51.5% were female (95% CI = 50.4-52.7%), and 62.7% self-identified as non-Hispanic White (95% CI = 61.4-65.9%). In adjusted models, those with zero strong connections were more likely than those with 1-4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in general (PR = 2.43, 95% CI = 1.47-4.01). Those with 50 + strong connections were more likely than those with 1-4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in at least one situation (PR = 1.19, 95% CI = 1.03-1.37) and were more likely to report being willing to personally use political violence (PR = 1.52, 95% CI = 1.13-2.04). Associations varied somewhat by social media use, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and racialized identity. CONCLUSIONS: Individuals who reported very few and very many strong social connections were more likely than others to support political violence or be personally willing to engage in it in one form or another. Findings point toward potential intervention and prevention opportunities.

OBJECTIVE: This study investigates the association between replacement thinking, status threat perceptions, and the endorsement of political violence among non-Hispanic white adults in the United States. It explores how perceived threats to social status can drive support for extreme measures aimed at preserving white hegemony, addressing a gap in research on factors contributing to political violence, a public health concern. METHODS: The 2022 Life in America Survey provided data for this cross-sectional study, focusing on status threat and replacement thinking among non-Hispanic white respondents. Status threat was inferred from relative income, education level, and racial segregation in residential census tracts, while replacement thinking was derived through agreement with the statement in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants. The outcome was the endorsement of political violence. Analysis utilized a survey-weighted robust modified Poisson model. RESULTS: Among 5,976 non-Hispanic white respondents, 18.7 % supported political violence in at least one scenario. A U-shaped relationship was observed between racial segregation and political violence endorsement: respondents from more diverse communities were less likely to support political violence. Those endorsing replacement thinking were 233 %-229 % more likely to endorse political violence than those who did not, dependent on income levels. White respondents without a high school degree were 29 % more likely to endorse political violence. CONCLUSION: The study found a positive association between replacement thinking, markers of status threat, and political violence endorsements among non-Hispanic white Americans. These findings emphasize the need for research and interventions to mitigate these perceptions and prevent political violence.

BACKGROUND: Surveys have found concerningly high levels of agreement that the United States will experience civil war soon. This study assesses variation in expectation of and perceived need for civil war with respondent sociopolitical characteristics, beliefs, firearm ownership, and willingness to engage in political violence. METHODS: Findings are from Wave 2 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May 18-June 8, 2023. All respondents to 2022s Wave 1 who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, half the sample was female (50.7%, 95% CI 49.4%, 52.1%); the weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. Approximately 1 respondent in 20 (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly or very strongly that in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States. About 1 in 25 (3.8%, 95% CI 3.2%, 4.4%), and nearly 40% (38.4%, 95% CI 32.3%, 44.5%) of those who strongly or very strongly agreed that civil war was coming, also agreed strongly or very strongly that the United States needs a civil war to set things right. Expectation of and perceived need for civil war were higher among subsets of respondents who in Wave 1 were more willing than others to commit political violence, including MAGA Republicans, persons in strong agreement with racist beliefs or statements of the potential need for violence to effect social change, persons who strongly approved of specified extreme right-wing political organizations and movements, firearm owners who purchased firearms in 2020 or later, and firearm owners who carried firearms in public all or nearly all the time. CONCLUSIONS: In 2023, the expectation that civil war was likely and the belief that it was needed were uncommon but were higher among subsets of the population that had previously been associated with greater willingness to commit political violence. These findings can help guide prevention efforts.

BACKGROUND: A 2022 survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, of beliefs associated with such violence, and of belief that civil war was likely in the near future. It is important to determine the durability of those findings. METHODS: Wave 2 of a nationally representative cohort survey was conducted May 18-June 8, 2023; the sample comprised all respondents to 2022s Wave 1. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions; changes from 2022 to 2023 are for respondents who participated in both surveys, based on aggregated individual change scores. RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, 50.7% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.4%, 52.1%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. About 1 in 20 respondents (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly/very strongly that in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States, a 7.7% decrease. In 2023, fewer respondents considered violence to be usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives [25.3% (95% CI 24.7%, 26.5%), a 6.8% decrease]. However, more respondents thought it very/extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they consider political violence justified, I will be armed with a gun [9.0% (95% CI 8.3%, 9.8%), a 2.2% increase] and I will shoot someone with a gun [1.8% (95% CI 1.4%, 2.2%), a 0.6% increase]. Among respondents who considered violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 political objective, about 1 in 20 also thought it very/extremely likely that they would threaten someone with a gun (5.4%, 95% CI 4.0%, 7.0%) or shoot someone (5.7%, 95% CI 4.3%, 7.1%) to advance such an objective. CONCLUSIONS: In this cohort, support for political violence declined from 2022 to 2023, but predictions of firearm use in political violence increased. These findings can help guide prevention efforts, which are urgently needed.

Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been embroiled in decades-long conflict that has resulted in the forced displacement of millions of people and extremely high rates of gender-based violence (GBV). While much attention has understandably focused on conflict-related sexual violence, intimate partner violence (IPV) is in fact one of the most pervasive forms of GBV, including in conflict settings. This paper presents results of a large, randomised survey looking at both sexual and intimate partner violence. Formerly displaced women had 11 per cent greater odds of reporting past-year IPV (p < 0.05), and currently displaced women reported 20 per cent greater odds of IPV in the past-year (p < 0.001). Women who reported ever being displaced also reported 8.5 per cent greater odds (p < 0.001) of past-year sexual violence. Both displacement and war-related experiences are highly and significantly associated with lifetime and past-year IPV and sexual violence. By acknowledging and creating programs that explicitly address the high risk of violence faced by displaced women, we may more effectively break the cycles of violence in fragile settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractWhile much attention is paid to what happens to dead bodies after political violence, disaster, or atrocity, less attention has been paid to body parts, despite the wide-ranging efforts, both material (often forensic) and discursive, to reconstitute or resuscitate the whole dead body. Materializing the whole body is often considered key to truth-telling mechanisms and for closure for family members of the missing and dead, thus the body part is often posited as a problem in need of a solution. We are seeing, largely due to advances in forensic technologies, an increasing belief that all body parts can be identified and distinguished from other materials, and should, therefore, be recovered and repatriated to the whole body in its death. To explore this dynamic, I make two key arguments. First, I suggest that reassembling bodies is framed as a mechanism of re-subjectification that is key to reconciliation and justice after political violence. A body part is an object, but a dead body is in most contexts still considered a subject, even dead, so putting a dead body back together is considered re-humanizing and gives the dead body back its political agency. Second, I suggest that when this cannot be done materially due to the obstacles posed by modern warfare, we often see governance techniques that seek to do so discursively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do cyberattacks elevate perceptions of threat even as they fail to generate truly destructive effects? We argue that people employ motivated reasoning to align cyberattacks with their preconceptions. Fielding a two-wave panel survey immediately before and after a cyberattack on an Israeli hospital, we confirm that motivated reasoning plays a crucial role in how people interpret cyber events. Results show that people already predisposed to perceive cyberattacks as threatening experience a significant increase in perceptions of threat, while those initially viewing cyberattacks as harmless also have their beliefs reinforced. The data reveals how even minor incidents bolster cyber doom convictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the results of fieldwork carried out in France and Algeria in the spring of 2019 with survivors of the Algerian civil war (the so-called black decade of the 1990s). Interviews were filmed, thus allowing close analysis of not only verbal testimony (including narratives, tropes, and pronouns) but also gestures and body language, amounting to what Wetherell (2012) calls 'affective practice'. Analysing closely participant reactions to the amnesty and reconciliation policies of President Bouteflika, as well as their own representations of political violence, the article moves beyond Taylor's (2004) definition of the social imaginary as 'the ways in which people imagine their social existence'. Focusing on constructions of conflict, the article argues for a definition of conflict imaginaries as the following: the production and reproduction of constructions around violence mobilised through shared stories, tropes and vocabularies which are inflected by time, place, multiplicity, and evident across all of these, affective value. This facilitates an understanding of how those who have survived political violence in the past experience its legacy in the present. While this paradigm is generated from Algerian data, it is hoped that it may prove applicable to other conflict zones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can the legacy of state violence undermine participation in transitional justice services designed to consolidate peace after conflict? We argue that, in the aftermath of armed fighting, state-perpetrated violence leads to reduced uptake of government reconciliation policies. We leverage spatial and temporal variation in levels of civilian victimization by perpetrator and find that, in contrast to violence committed by non-state groups, violence carried out by state forces against civilians is associated with lower levels of enlistment in Colombia's state-run victims' registry. We replicate this relationship using survey data and present evidence linking victimization by the state to lower levels of trust in the government overall. Together, our analyses demonstrate that disaggregating the identity of armed actors can provide significant theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding of peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. In the Colombian case, the legacy of state violence leads to the systematic exclusion of certain types of victims from transitional justice and undermines trust in the institutions responsible for building durable pathways to peace. Consequently, our findings have implications for the design of transitional justice policies, the study of the legacies of conflict on political and social outcomes, and processes of post-conflict peacebuilding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 2014 and 2018 there was an unprecedented wave of jihadist terrorist activity in Austria that was mostly related to the "Islamic state." Meanwhile, many individuals have been or are gradually being released from prison. While many were able to disengage, two prevented and sentenced foreign fighters planned attacks in Vienna, one of them succeeded. In order to better understand this type of perpetrator, files of a cohort of 56 convicted jihadist terrorist offenders were analyzed. Half of this cohort were foreign fighters or attempted to become foreign fighters, while others contributed for instance by spreading propaganda, recruiting and assuming leadership. Additionally, a focus group with probation officers and an interview were conducted. The results shed light on various sociodemographic variables showing that there was not one specific profile. Rather, the cohort appeared to be very diverse, being comprised of all genders, age groups and socioeconomic backgrounds. Furthermore, a considerable crime-terror nexus was found. Thirty percent of the cohort had had a criminal past before their engagement in violent extremism. A fifth of the cohort had a prison experience before the arrest for the terrorist offense. The criminal offenses of the cohort were typical for the general population of probation clients which backs the notion that many terrorist offenders belonged to the same population and had switched from "traditional" crime to terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are partisans more likely to endorse political violence when politicians accuse their rivals of election improprieties? I theorize that for Republican partisans in the United States, the answer to this question is yes. Republican partisans are primed to believe allegations of cheating by Democrats and view election improprieties through the lens of racial and xenophobic resentments. Allegations of Democratic election fraud prompt them to eschew nonviolent norms of political behavior and endorse political violence. I test these propositions using an original, online survey experiment involving 140 self-identified Republican subjects. I find that exposure to allegations by politicians that Democrats engage in election fraud prompts Republican partisans to increase their support for political violence. Furthermore, using mediation tests, I find that exposing Republicans to allegations of electoral fraud by Democrats reduces their trust of people of different races and religions which, in turn, increases their support for political violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its early months, the Syrian uprising included a diverse array of participants, including many from communities that the regime had previously assumed to be loyal, whether because of their sectarian identity, where they lived, or family ties to the military. The experiences of women from these communities can shed light on important aspects of the Syrian uprising, and test some of our key assumptions about women's participation in contentious politics and the gendered aspects of political violence. Based on interviews, this article engages with the work on gender and conflict in examining family connections and political grievances that drew many women to the opposition, the specifically gendered risks that they faced, and the advantages that some women felt their gender and sectarian identities gave them as organizers and activists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do militant groups decide to escalate or deescalate their use of violence in conflict? Examining the case of the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland, we analyze groups that adopt violence as a political strategy and evaluate factors that influence its application. To do so, we adopt a novel empirical approach to the study of militant groups. Drawn from information science, this approach enables estimation of variable influence and uncertainty within structured case studies, and is thus ideal for topics such as militant decision-making where systematic data collection is difficult. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although banks occupy a central role in most (post-)conflict situations, there is a perplexing lack of attention to them in studies of political violence. As a case experiencing domestic conflict with varying degrees in the last decades, Turkey offers opportunities to understand how the banking sector, including state deposit banks, responds to such political violence. We focus on the short-term impact of political violence and address the following questions: Do all actors in the sector respond in similar ways to security threats? Is there variation according to conflict intensity? We shed light on these puzzles with an analysis of original data on bank ownership, bank branches, bank deposit amounts, and bank credits. We show that banks with profit incentives respond to conflict by lowering their presence in provinces hit by these attacks. In comparison, our finding that deposits in high conflict intensity areas are not affected suggests that it is indeed economic actors outside high intensity regions that are more sensitive to short-time changes in security compared to local ones. Overall, the results demonstrate that political violence hurts banks' presence in conflict locations and their presence matters through credit provision to these areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined how educational inequity and political violence exposed young single mothers in the Ethiopia town of Awaday to a distinct disadvantage. Adopting a case study design, a total of 50 single mothers were selected based on convenience sampling. Questionnaire, structured depth interview, and focus group discussion were used to collect data which were analyzed in descriptive statistics and qualitative content analysis. Most of the participants were young, below 30, having 1–5 children, and school dropouts. The finding indicated political violence, which is directly or indirectly related to educational inequity and the social norm, is the fundamental factor for becoming single mothers. Almost all experience abject poverty, substance abuse, sexual violence, social stigma, adverse maternity health, and disorientation as to their future life. Their children are equally victims of the unjust system. The insignificant number of participants who managed to complete junior and secondary school education is in much better condition, which shows the huge negative impacts of educational inequity. While a complete overhaul of the violent and unjust socio-educational system of Ethiopia is decisive for durable change, vital short-term and middle-term policy and research implications of being single mothers in education and empowering them were suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines identity politics and marginalisation in post-1991 Ethiopia, focusing on the genesis of ethnicity as a political mobilising mechanism during the ‘nationalities questions’ in the 1960s. Despite the presence of Marxism in the political culture of that era, ethnicity eventually became the dominant political reality in post-1991 Ethiopia, now enshrined in the constitution. The study analyses theoretical perspectives and employs a qualitative approach using secondary data to explore contemporary political culture. The study analyses the theoretical perspectives of instrumentalism, primordialism, and constructionism to explore the contemporary political culture of Ethiopia based on identity. The study recognises the role of the politicisation of ethnicity in ongoing ethnic conflicts and political violence. Finally, it concludes with lessons learned regarding the politicisation of ethnicity in a multi-national, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual state like Ethiopia, emphasising the importance of organising civic programmatic political parties over the proliferation of ethnic non-programmatic parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the interplay between memory, history, nationalism, and visual cultures by focussing on a framed photograph of a revolver gifted to Kamala Dasgupta’s family by the Calcutta (Now Kolkata) police after Indian independence. Once used in an attempted assassination during the anti-colonial struggle, the revolver has become an anomaly in the nation’s collective memory – a ‘floating signifier’ with an unfixed meaning. Analysing the photograph as a media spectacle and a symbol within national myths, I argue that it disrupts linear narratives of progress that dominate nationalist historiography. The article shows how Kamala’s act of procuring the revolver has been overshadowed by her comrade Bina Das’s violent act. Drawing on theories of the spectacle, national temporality, and subaltern studies, I illustrate the selective commemoration of revolutionary violence in India. The research in this paper demonstrates how precarious and subaltern histories such as Kamala’s can destabilise established national narratives and pluralise temporal orders of the nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the effects of civil war violence on individual attitudes regarding the acceptability of the use of violence in politics after civil wars end? Using data from Nepal, we test several hypotheses about the relationship between the exposure to civil war violence and the acceptability of the use of violence for a variety of political goals after civil wars end (namely noble political causes, equal rights, and electoral advantage). Overall, we find that individuals more exposed to civil war violence are less likely to embrace the use of violence than the individuals who were less exposed to civil war violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically examines the historical trajectory and contemporary manifestations of Kurdish anti‐colonialism. The analysis unfolds in two parts, dissecting the intricate relationship between theory and action within the Kurdish struggle. The historical dimension delves into Ottoman‐era Turkish‐style colonization, elucidating the displacement strategies employed by the Ottoman state. The study underscores the delayed integration of the colonialism concept into the Kurdish intellectual framework, shedding light on the challenges faced by the oppressed in articulating their anti‐colonial narrative. The second part scrutinizes the ideological challenges within the Kurdish anti‐colonial discourse. The instrumental use of the slogan "Kurdistan is a colony" is explored, emphasizing the dominance of socialist objectives over national liberation aspirations. The impact of socialism and pan‐Islamism on Kurdish politics and the linguistic complexities that obscure the colonial difference through language are examined. Contemporary dynamics, such as the Peace and Democracy Process and political violence, are analyzed to provide insights into the evolving nature of the Kurdish struggle. The resurgence of colonial theory within Kurdish society, particularly through techno‐Kurdishness, is explored, highlighting the role of modern communication technologies in reshaping the narrative. The article concludes by reflecting on the potential of the Kurdish struggle to inspire global resistance movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conflict between Malay-Muslim insurgents seeking secession from Thailand and security forces of the Thai government has been a long-lasting affair. According to the latest data, over 7,581 people have died and 14,082 have been injured as a result of political violence from January 2004 until March 2024. Ethnic and religious issues are central to this conflict. This Special Issue of Asian Affairs: An American Review looks at the continuing conflict and why it has persisted unabated. In this Introduction, the authors discuss the history of the conflict up until 2024. The article tracks indicators of the conflict's chronology. The rest of the Special Issue investigates different dimensions of the conflict in this part of Thailand to raise awareness about continuing challenges in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alleged practices of magical assault and vampirism are a recurrent feature of popular explanations of misfortune in Tuva, South Siberia. Based on a field study of healing practices in an "Association of Shamans", this article analyses rituals of redressing curse afflictions in the context of Russian political domination. A central purpose of this discussion is to foreground the centrality of kinds of parasitical worship and occult threat to structures of political power in—and beyond—the territory of Tuva. Focusing on a "cursescape", which develops from the combative practices of shamans, occult specialists, and office-holders, the article probes a repertoire of shamanic healing symbols. It is argued that healing efficacy is constructed in the process of engaging with hunting symbols and animal spirits, which appear in Indigenous Siberian cosmologies. The analysis shows that ideas of ritual risk underpin the process of symbolic resolution. Whereas shamanic practices provide refuge to spirits evicted from their natural landscapes, Tibetan Buddhism—the unifying religion of Tuva—offers an alternative path of healing the effects of the shamans' propagation of spirits. The article highlights indigenous perceptions of a "cursed" landscape as a space where the agencies of "darkness" and their political sponsors are confronted with an emancipating religious modality emerging from local Buddhist rituals. The analysis displays the unsolved drama of itinerant spirits and shamanic ancestral souls, whose agency is revealed through successive—yet inauspicious—forms of reincarnation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emphasis in recent decades on weak state capacity as an explanation of civil war detracts from an important fact: some of the deadliest and most protracted rebellions since WWII arose not where the state was weak, but rather in areas of significant state power. This study challenges the predominance-of-peripheral-conflict paradigm by disentangling rebel formation from civil war onset and emphasizing the urban origins of numerous rebel groups. Quantitative analyses show that three group types—military-, social interest-, and political party-based groups—are far more likely to form in large cities, especially the capital, and far less likely to form in the rural countryside. Case studies then illustrate the constraints and opportunities nascent rebel groups of each type face. This study advances the field's understanding of a surprisingly large number of violent rebellions that current mainstream approaches and the emphasis on weak states and conflict opportunities cannot effectively explain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the United States, France, and Germany, political violence has been rising. Three factors are salient: Polarization convinces some people that violence is acceptable to keep opponents from power; extreme political parties normalize polarization and violence, leading to attacks from—and against—their supporters; and the democratically disillusioned use violence, not votes, to express themselves. Political violence can be reduced if: 1) leaders insist on nonviolence; 2) governments and politicians support the rule of law, accountability, and equitable policing; 3) voting systems dampen extremism; 4) communities organize across difference against violence; and 5) activists insist on nonviolence within their movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent terrorist attacks such as the Christchurch mosque attacks in 2019 renew the discussion of whether right-wing attacks are reported less negatively than Islamist attacks. To clarify this point, our study is the first to combine the selection of media inside and outside the West with a distinction between Islamist and right-wing attacks. We compare coverage given to thirty-two right-wing and forty Islamist attacks from 2015 to 2019 in nine Western and eight non-Western English-language media outlets, tapping the differential use of the "terrorist/terrorism" label and textual sentiment. Both (many) Western and (some) non-Western media use this label more frequently in the coverage of Islamist attacks. Importantly, public diplomacy channels from non-Western countries such as China Daily and Sputnik also demonstrate this pattern. Delegitimizing Islamist attacks more than right-wing attacks thus cannot be explained as merely a Western phenomenon alone. We point to alternative explanations and call for greater standardization of coverage across Islamist and right-wing attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Lesan-on Mobeen-on is the property of Imam Khomeini International University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose: The paper aims to understand how state and non-state domestic terrorism impacts MNEs in foreign markets. Despite the burgeoning literature on terrorism within international business (IB), most research has focused on international terrorism, or terrorism generally. Consequently, there has been limited research examining how domestic or local based terrorism impacts foreign firms. Design/methodology/approach: This is a conceptual paper. Findings: Domestic terrorism is the most common form of terrorism in the world today and involves the state and non-state actors. Non-state domestic terrorism can be low intensity or high intensity. High intensity non-state-domestic terrorism typically involves regular and protracted political violence, along with inter-communal violence. This can expose MNEs to considerable operational, governance and legitimacy pressures. Originality/value: The paper contributes to the gap in IB terrorism research with regards domestic or local based terrorism. Drawing on IB theory and critical terrorism research, the paper addresses the nature and impact of domestic terrorism within IB. The authors' paper shows the operational, governance and legitimacy pressures of both state and non-state domestic terrorism for MNEs in host markets. While most IB scholars consider the threat of non-state terrorism for international firms, this study shows how domestic state terrorism benefits and constrains foreign firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I argue that the resurge of political violence by Renamo combatants in central Mozambique in the period 2013–2016 should not be merely understood in terms of a remobilisation of former combatants. Rather, the trajectories of Renamo's combatants are better understood when considered in relation to the continuation of Renamo as a political party, an armed movement, and a social and economic network, all at the same time, over the course of war and peace. Based on ethnographic research in the district of Maringue in central Mozambique, I show how Renamo maintained its armed wing from 1992 onwards; how former combatants remained part of so-called 'Renamo networks' in multiple ways; how the wider social context of Maringue was intertwined with Renamo during the war and how in post-war Maringue people, places, and institutions became politically divided between the Frelimo state and Renamo. Considering Renamo in terms of an armed political party within wider social and economic networks, offers new outlooks on the more recent armed conflict and the position of combatants. Conceptually this process is not easy to capture in terms of demobilisation and remobilisation (hence the title – renamobilised). Theoretically, this analysis of the trajectories of former combatants in Mozambique contributes to literature on the continuation of wartime networks and details the manifold ways by which these are intertwined with social life after war's end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seeking to fill a void in the existing scholarship since no scholar has yet to examine the Islamic State Sahel Province's threat to China, this study utilizes a unique approach to examine two questions, namely does the Islamic State Sahel Province pose a threat to Chinese interests in the Central Sahel, and is it likely to impact Beijing's relations with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger? Part one of this study utilizes data from the Armed Conflict and Event Data Location Data (ACLED) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to construct the group's operational profile. The operational profile covers political violence and strategic developments in each country and across the subregion; the expanse of and shifts in areas of operations; and tactics and targets in each terrorism incident by country and the subregion. Findings from the data analysis are utilized in the second part in conjunction with additional data collected on the economy and China's economic relations to assess whether the group poses a threat to Chinese interests. The study concludes that in the short-term, the Islamic State Sahel Province does not pose a threat to those interests and recognizes the potential change of the threat in long-term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue des Lettres Modernes is the property of Classiques Garnier and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

ABSTRACT The article provides a qualitative analysis of the political discourse in highly polarized political environment and the role of political divisions in shaping the collective violence. The paper will summarize attitudes toward pogrom violence of key political parties in pre WW2 Poland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on three years of ethnographic fieldwork, this article examines face‐to‐face violent interactions in a high‐poverty squatter settlement in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Delving into the situational interactions and biographies of those who simultaneously exercise and suffer violence—victims and perpetrators—we illustrate in fine‐grained detail the concatenations of violence and their political dimensions. Violent concatenations are political in a twofold sense: (1) they are shaped by state (legal and illegal) interventions, and (2) they are understood by both victims and perpetrators as being caused by state actors either directly (in the form of police repression) or clandestinely (in the form of collusion with criminals). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How, when and where violence is deployed during periods of extreme regime crisis is determined by regime support expectations. Regimes use political geography to direct violence and ensure political compliance. Areas have ‘core’ high regime loyalty, ‘swing’ loyalty where government and opposition have supporters, or ‘costly’ and loyalty opposition support. During elections, regimes accommodate, suppress or force voters in each area. In runoffs, regimes use new information to increase vote share in core support areas, and use violence against suspected defecting voters. In Zimbabwe during 2008, violence patterns maximised the regime’s favourable political geography, placing typically safe communities in danger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: This article presents a model of political competition in which political parties, through clientelism strategies, vie for control of legislative seats. Parties exercise political violence to prevent potential rivals from gaining power and threatening their position within the hybrid political regime. The theory suggests that the degree of political violence exerted by parties in hybrid regimes will increase (decrease) as they concentrate more (less) power in the legislature. Methods: Using the methodology of analytical narratives, we examine the narrative on political violence in the Colombian political regime to identify key actors, strategies, information sets, and institutional changes. From these identified elements, we construct a theoretical model of political competition within the mathematical theory of games to explain the institutional changes highlighted in the narrative. Finally, we develop an econometric model to find statistical evidence supporting the predictions of the theoretical model derived from the narrative. Results: The narrative and the analytical narrative indicate that, in a hybrid regime, a higher degree of political power concentration causes a higher rate of political violence. The estimation of the Vector Auto-regression model allows us to analyze the response of the violence rate to a shock in the concentration index. Following an unexpected increase in the concentration of political power, the violence rate shows an initial increase of approximately 0.3 percentage points above its initial value. Subsequently, the effect attenuates slightly and stabilizes at around 0.2 percentage points above the baseline, maintaining this level throughout the period. Discussion/Conclusion: The theoretical model proposed in this paper suggests an explanation of political violence that diverges from the explanations offered by traditional theories. We suggest that the theoretical model proposed here captures the historical logic of the relationship between violence, political clientelism, and exclusion in Colombia, a country with a relatively long tradition as a formal democracy (since 1958), leading us to interesting conclusions that have not been proposed so far in the literature on violence in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: U.S. firearm sales surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, with many purchases by first-time firearm owners. The 2023 National Survey of Gun Policy sought to understand the public health implications of this surge by comparing the purchasing motivations and firearm policy views of pandemic-era first-time purchasers to prior gun owners. Methods: We fielded a nationally representative public opinion survey of U.S. adults (n = 3096) from 1/4/23 to 2/6/23. We oversampled for gun owners and Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans. Survey weights were applied to generate representative estimates. New gun owners were identified through affirmative responses to: "Have you bought any guns since January 1, 2020?" and "Did you buy your first gun after January 1, 2020?" Recent purchasers were additionally asked whether concerns of 1) political or 2) racial violence motivated their purchase. Purchase motivations and gun policy support were examined among new and prior gun owners (n = 1002) and compared using logistic regression and predictive probabilities. Results: Overall, 11% of respondents reported purchasing a gun since 1/1/20, 35% for the first time. Among recent purchasers, larger proportions of Democrat, Black, Asian, and Hispanic respondents were new gun owners than Republican or white respondents. Compared to prior owners, odds were 4.5-times higher that new gun owners' recent purchase was motivated by racial violence and 3.2-times higher for political violence. Majority support was found for protective gun policies, with few differences by purchase recency or motivations. The only policy for which support by new and prior gun owners differed significantly was the permit-to-purchase policy (76% v. 63%, respectively). Similarly, few significant differences in support were observed when stratifying by purchase motivation. Notably, both those who reported recent purchase motivations of racial violence and of political violence expressed significantly higher support for a "stand-your-ground" policy compared to those who did not report such motivations. Conclusions: Racial and political violence appear to be larger concerns among new gun owners, motivating purchasing among demographic groups with traditionally lower gun ownership rates. These findings suggest a need for safety assurances amid racial and political tensions and growing gun ownership. Gun owners' support for such policies remains strong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: We consider how the Peruvian government's responses to natural disaster events shaped political violence patterns from 1989 to 2020. Methods: We gather data on government disaster response and compare the effect of positive disaster responses, such as reconstruction and regulation of domestic/international aid, and negative disaster responses, such as neglect or placing restrictions on movement near the affected areas, on violent conflict. To address the endogeneity between armed conflict and disaster responses, we estimate a structural equation model where we allow armed conflicts and disaster responses to be fully endogenous. Results: Using a structural equation model at the province‐year level, we show that negative disaster responses increase the risks for political violence, while positive disaster responses do not affect the risks for armed conflict. Armed conflict in turn makes negative policy responses to disasters more likely but has no effect on positive disaster responses. Conclusions: The results suggest that poor government response to natural disasters can foster grievances and aid rebel recruitment, increasing the risks for armed conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do states engage in violence against marginalized social groups? State violence is typically explained as a calculated response to dissent or as a means of preventing dissent. However, many instances of state violence against members of marginalized groups appear to be unconnected to dissent or anti-state mobilization. We examine this dimension of state violence and connect it to control of the government by nationalist political parties and the preferences of their voting bases. We argue that governments in which nationalist parties hold substantial influence are more likely to adopt policies that lead to abuse. Such policies include more aggressive policing of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and lax oversight and punishment of agencies responsible for policing. To test our argument, we examine the Ill-Treatment and Torture data, which record allegations of state violence and also information about the victim's identity. We find that states with nationalist governments are more frequently accused of abuse against marginalized groups. Our results suggest that, rather than constraining abusive behavior through electoral accountability, the public in democratic countries sometimes prefer leaders who create a more abusive environment for marginalized groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The January 6, 2021 Insurrection at the United States Capitol has renewed concerns that American citizens are becoming more tolerant of political violence, a phenomenon that fits within broader fears that partisan-induced motivated reasoning is driving democratic backsliding within the U.S. and across the Western world. Given the rural origins of many right-wing militia groups, and the widespread set of grievances circulating in rural America, questions and fear abound as to whether rural America is more supportive of political violence. In this paper, we investigate whether there is a substantial geographic component to support for violence against the state or ordinary citizens. Drawing on original survey data collected in the fall of 2021, we present two studies that explore the association between rural geography, rural resentment, and support for political violence. We find that, contrary to popular belief, rural Americans may actually be less likely to support political violence than their non-rural counterparts. Importantly, however, we find that some rural individuals – namely those who harbor higher levels of rural resentment – are more likely, on average, to support violence against the state. The same result is not replicated when looking at support for violence against ordinary citizens. These results provide important insight into the relationship between geographic attitudes and political violence and have noteworthy implications for American national security in our contemporary age of hyper-polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines social media discourses to unravel how moral evaluation can be used to legitimize and delegitimize state violence. Based on a Colombian case of police violence targeting protesting students at the University of Cauca, this study unravels the role of moral evaluation of social actors and their actions in affirming or contesting state violence. It underlines the use of dichotomies (i.e., "bravery-cowardice," "honesty-dishonesty," and "evilness-goodness"), the attribution of immoral character traits, and inciting negative emotions as ways of attributing morality or immorality to victims and perpetrators to legitimize or delegitimize political violence. It especially underlines the use of religious references in moral evaluations. By examining social media discourses about state violence, this article aims to contribute to a greater understanding of how political violence can be legitimized and delegitimized based on morality and emotions, which can help in developing ways to promote a culture of nonviolence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aggressive rhetoric was part and parcel of the rising Tea Party and the related anti-Obama conspiracy theories. The argument here is that Donald J. Trump, as the leading public promoter of Birther rumors, first-time presidential candidate, and U.S. president, played a starring role in bringing hate speech, violent threats, and political violence into the political mainstream. As a result, political violence increased significantly and several violent far-right extremist groups, domestic terrorist entities, were newly founded after Trump announced his presidential campaign in mid-2015. As ex-president and once again presidential candidate, Trump glorified the criminally convicted participants in the violent breach of the U.S. Capitol on 6 January 2021 and honored violent far-right fringe groups that were active in the late 20th century while threatening revenge against his political enemies. To assess, whether Trump, as 47th U.S. president, would be able to have his political foes investigated and jailed upon his return to the highest office, we looked for answers in the Heritage Foundation's "Project 2025," the most detailed blueprint for the dismantling of the "deep state" and the best-laid plan for a takeover by Trump and vetted conservative "Make America Great Again" loyalists in January 2025. 1 Although the sole focus here is on the rhetoric of far-right extremism and violence in the past 15 years, there were no similarly extreme far-left hate speech patterns and violent extremism related to the Democratic Party during the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay briefly discusses accounts of violence in India before reviewing three recent books that examine the place of violence in Indian political thought. All three books provide insights into the minds of some of the thinkers who have shaped modern India. While two of the authors focus on Mahatma Gandhi and V. D. Savarkar, respectively, the third is more wide-ranging in focus. All three books are important contributions to the study of violence in India, but also a reminder that India's founding figures remain the objects of contestation and appropriation by political parties and movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increased proportion of youth aged 15–24 or 15–29 in total or adult population has long been shown to influence the intensity of sociopolitical destabilisation in general and political violence in particular. Youth bulges played an important role in the destabilising processes of the Arab Spring. We show that the influence of youth bulges in Egypt (and North Africa in general) is far from being limited to historical events. The demographic dynamics of Egypt (and a number of other North African countries) implies the emergence of new youth bulges in the future. We proceed to discuss this phenomenon and its sociopolitical implications. The period of the eve of the Arab Spring and the beginning of the 2010s was accompanied by the strengthening of the influence of Islamists in all countries of North Africa and in many Arab countries of Asia, which was likely associated with a period of significant growth of fertility rates in these countries. This surge in fertility rates generated those youth bulges that are confidently forecasted in these countries for the 2030s. It cannot be ruled out that in the 2030s Egypt (and North Africa in general) will experience a new destabilisation wave, which will be a kind of echo of the wave of the late 2000s – early 2010s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last decade has given rise to substantial concern about democratic backsliding in the U.S. Manifestations include decreased trust in government, conspiratorial beliefs, contentious protests, and support for political violence. Surprisingly, prior work has not explored how these attitudes and behaviors relate to gun-buying, an action that provides people with the means to challenge the state. We address this topic by focusing on the unprecedented gun-buying surge during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a survey with over 32,000 respondents, we find that—relative to pre-existing gun owners (who did not buy during the pandemic) and the non-gun-owning public—pandemic gun-buyers are more likely to distrust government, believe in conspiracies, protest, and support political violence. These anti-government views and protest behaviors are especially likely among those who bought guns for political reasons. Our findings highlight a crucial dynamic underlying the recent spike in gun sales with consequences for American democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages-Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the concept of nihilism in contemporary American culture, arguing that beneath the apparent polarization of politics, there is an emerging nihilistic common culture driven by a destructive will to power. Topics discussed include the growing cultural divide between progressive and conservative ideologies, the decline of compromise in political discourse, and the increasing normalization of political violence and dehumanization.

In a bid to transform social and political circumstances by instilling outsized fear, terrorists orchestrate atrocities that are unsettling, unanticipated and preclude effective countermeasures. Utilising the critical case of explosive devices – the leading method of 'pure' terrorism – this article analyses an important, yet underexplored, dimension of this process: the weaponisation of the familiar and everyday. By repurposing ubiquitous, banal artefacts to conceal, manufacture or serve as destructive instruments, terrorists nurture vulnerability, inflict psychic trauma and produce conditions of ontological and social entropy where the surrounding environment appears unstable, corrupted and on the brink of rupture. Rather than a subsidiary dimension of asymmetrical conflict, it is argued that these dynamics are central to terrorism's organising logic. Accentuating them can, therefore, deepen understanding of the phenomenon's fearsome effectuation and ability to produce extreme discrepancy between risk and response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past few years, political killings have become a recurring phenomenon in the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa. These killings have significantly impacted the region's political landscape and people, rendering its political climate volatile and fraught with tension. This explores the impact these political killings have had in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). One of the province's most significant consequences of political killings is the loss of human life. These senseless killings have resulted in the deaths of many individuals, including citizens who are not actively involved in politics. Hence creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity the province has never experienced. Families have lost their loved ones, with many communities thrown into mourning, leading to a loss of trust among people. This article discusses how political violence affected innocent people through the killings before and after the 2016 Local Government Elections (LGE) in KZN. The study employed a qualitative research method, thus engaging with published work on the impact of political killing in KwaZulu Natal. The author consulted E-books, Moerane commission documents, online news articles, and other internet sources. The political leaders and activists have expressed their grievances, especially when disgruntled about the election results or the selection of candidates. There are concerns that some political factions may not accept the outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]