Search

This paper starts with an evaluation of three common arguments against pluralism in economics: (1) the claim that economics is already pluralist, (2) the argument that if there was the need for greater plurality, it would emerge on its own, and (3) the assertion that pluralism means ‘anything goes’ and is, thus, unscientific. Pluralist responses to all three arguments are summarized. The third argument is shown to relate to a greater challenge for pluralism: an epistemological trade-off between diversity and consensus that suggests moving from a discussion about ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ towards a discussion about the adequate degree of plurality. The paper shows how the trade-off originates from two main challenges: the need to derive adequate quality criteria for a pluralist economics, and the necessity to propose strategies that facilitate the communication across different research programs. It concludes with some strategies to meet these challenges.

An intuitively appealing argument for pluralism in economics can be made on the grounds that schools of economic thought complement one another. Let us call this the complementarity-based argument for pluralism (CAP). The concepts of complementarity, pluralism, and school of thought are scrutinized in this paper to evaluate this argument. I argue that the complementarity of schools is relative to scientific goals, which implies that discussing complementarity of schools of economic thought requires discussing the goals of economic research. I also distinguish weak from strong complementarity and show that some alleged complementarity relations between schools are weak and thus provide little support for CAP. However, if strong complementarity relations, relative to a valuable goal, can be demonstrated to exist between specific schools, this is a strong reason for pluralism about those schools. Finally, I provide suggestions on how to distinguish strong from weak complementarity. An intuitively appealing argument for pluralism in economics can be made on the grounds that schools of economic thought complement one another. Let us call this the complementarity-based argument for pluralism (CAP). The concepts of complementarity, pluralism, and school of thought are scrutinized in this paper to evaluate this argument. I argue that the complementarity of schools is relative to scientific goals, which implies that discussing complementarity of schools of economic thought requires discussing the goals of economic research. I also distinguish weak from strong complementarity and show that some alleged complementarity relations between schools are weak and thus provide little support for CAP. However, if strong complementarity relations, relative to a valuable goal, can be demonstrated to exist between specific schools, this is a strong reason for pluralism about those schools. Finally, I provide suggestions on how to distinguish strong from weak complementarity.

Mainstream economics textbooks focus too much on neoclassical models (with perfect competition as reference model) while the mainstream research practice is much more diverse and closer to the real world and political issues. Progress was made in microeconomics by new insights particularly from behavioral and experimental economics and new tools such as simulations and network analysis. In macroeconomics, however, the dominant Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models have structurally failed to predict the global crisis. Their enhancement by the inclusion of an explicit financial sector is on top of the mainstream reform agenda. Islamic economics may benefit from the innovations in microeconomics, while the macroeconomic reform agenda is of limited relevance as long as the market share of Islamic finance remains quite low in most Muslim countries. A dialogue on reform between mainstream and Islamic economics should take into account that Islamic economists underline the importance of the Qur’ān and Sunnah as the primary sources of positive and normative knowledge, while secular mainstream rejects proofs of positive statements by reference to divine sources. This may become a severe methodological obstacle for more pluralism in economics.

This paper investigates whether specialisation in research is causing economics to become an increasingly fragmented and diverse discipline with a continually rising number of niche-based research programmes and a declining role for dominant cross-science research programmes. It opens by framing the issue in terms of centrifugal and centripetal forces operating on research in economics, and then distinguishes descriptive from normative pluralism. It reviews recent research regarding the JEL code and economics’ J. B. Clark Award that points towards rising specialisation and fragmentation of research in economics. It then reviews five related arguments that might explain increasing specialisation and fragmentation in economics: (i) Smith’s early division of labour view, (ii) Kuhn’s later thinking about the importance of specialisation, (iii) Heiner’s behavioral burden of knowledge argument, (iv) Ross’s innovation-diffusion analysis and Arthur’s theory of technological change as determinants of speci...

Al considerar la falta de pluralismo en la enseñanza de la ciencia económica y el predominio de una teoría económica con supuestos bastante alejados de la realidad y su postura excluyente, hermética e inmutable hacia cualquier contribución distinta a su perspectiva económica este artículo busca introducir al lector en las ideas Post Keynesianas, presentándole de manera concisa su postura económica y su estado actual del arte, como corriente crítica y alternativa del análisis económico. Se realiza una taxonomía de la Escuela Post Keynesiana para diferenciarla del enfoque ortodoxo dominante y se expone la postura de la economía monetaria de producción.

This chapter explains why there is little pluralism in economics. Mainstream economists believe that journal rankings and citation measures are strong indicators of research quality and that science is like a free market of ideas. Roos and Hoffart argue that these beliefs are wrong and lead to a systematic bias against non-mainstream economics. Neoclassical economics desires to emulate the ‘hard science’ of physics leading to a very restricted methodology. Since most mainstream economists have little training and interest in theory of science, they avoid methodological discussions and are unable to engage in a fruitful exchange with non-mainstream researchers. Such exchange is a main element of interested pluralism. The authors argue that strongly standardised teaching based on textbooks is a major hindrance for pluralism.

The history of modern economics abounds with pleas for more pluralism as well as pleas for more unification. These seem to be contradictory goals, suggesting that pluralism and unification are mutually exclusive, or at least that they involve trade-offs with more of one necessarily being traded off against less of the other. This paper will use the example of Paul Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) to argue that the relationship between pluralism and unification is often more complex than this simple dichotomy suggests. In particular, Samuelson's Foundations is invariably presented as a key text in the unification of modern economics during the middle of the twentieth century; and in many ways that is entirely correct. But Samuelson's unification was not at the theoretical (causal and explanatory) level, but rather at the purely mathematical derivational level. Although this fact is recognized in the literature on Samuelson, what seems to be less recognized is that for Samuelson, much of the motivation for this unification was pluralist in spirit: not to narrow scientific economics into one single theory, but rather to allow for more than one theory to co-exist under a single unified derivational technique. This hidden pluralism will be discussed in detail. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for more recent developments in economics.

In this paper the main developments in post-Keynesian macroeconomics since the mid 1990s will be reviewed. For this purpose the main differences between heterodox economics in general, including post-Keynesian economics, and orthodox economics will be reiterated and an overview of the strands of post-Keynesian economics, their commonalities and developments since the 1930s will be outlined. This will provide the grounds for touching upon three important areas of development and progress of post-Keynesian macroeconomics since the mid 1990s: first, the integration of distribution issues and distributional conflict into short- and long-run macroeconomics, both in theoretical and in empirical/applied works; second, the integrated analysis of money, finance and macroeconomics and its application to changing institutional and historical circumstances, such as the process of financialisation; and third, the development of full-blown macroeconomic models, providing alternatives to the mainstream ‘New Consensus Model’ (NCM), and allowing us to derive a full macroeconomic policy mix as a more convincing alternative to the one implied and proposed by the mainstream NCM, which has dramatically failed in the face of the recent crises.

From the two premises that (1) economies are complex systems and (2) the accumulation of knowledge about reality is desirable, I derive the conclusion that pluralism with regard to economic research programs is a more viable position to hold than monism. To substantiate this claim an epistemological framework of how scholars study their objects of inquiry and relate their models to reality is discussed. Furthermore, it is argued that given the current institutions of our scientific system, economics self-organizes towards a state of scientific unity. Since such a state is epistemologically inferior to a state of plurality, critical intervention is desirable. JEL Codes: A1, A2, B4

There is a strong consensus view in mainstream macroeconomics, that monetary institutions must be depoliticized and independent from governments. A further economic conviction is that money could be mainly conceived as a neutral means of exchange. This paper argues that the consensus view, that central banks must be independent, has its roots in the paradigm of neutral money. As I will show from a heterodox perspective that there is no such thing as money neutrality, the theoretical foundations and conceptual roots of central bank independence are controversial and its political economic narrative is shaky. To overcome these contradictions, pluralism in economics teaching is necessary. In order to grasp and understand the implications of the non-neutrality of money, the curriculum of monetary theory and policy has to consider heterodox theoretical approaches to money.

In the context of ongoing criticisms of the lack of pluralism in economics, the present article aims to discuss the development of ‘heterodox’ economics since the 1970s. Following Lakatos’s concept of scientific research programs (srp), and concentrating on the situation in Germany, the article will discuss classifications of economics, and will specify the understanding of diversity in the light of ‘axiomatic variations’ of the economic mainstream. This will form the basis for the subsequent description of the development of heterodoxy in Germany, with special reference to the founding of new universities and the reform movements in the 1970s. It can be shown that the heterodox scene flourished in this period, but that this pluralization remained fragmented and short-lived; by the 1980s at the latest heterodoxy was again on its way to marginalization. The history of heterodoxy in Germany thus presents itself as an unequal ‘battle of the paradigms,’ and can only be told as the story of a failure.

This paper responds to arguments presented by the four contributors to the symposium on The Economist's Oath, concerning the failure of the economics profession to recognize and respond appropriately to the daunting ethical questions that arise in the context of its work. The essay first explores the paternalistic sensibilities of many economists, who believe that their expertise grants them authority to decide for others. Second, the essay acknowledges the risks associated with the project to bring professional ethics into economics but expresses the hope that ethical awareness of the right sort will undermine the extraordinary hubris now on display in the profession. Third, the paper endorses assertive pluralism in economics and the view that “monotheoreticism” is cause for grave concern. Finally, the paper explores the complexity of the matter of harm as well as econogenic harm, the harm economists cause as they presumably try to do good.

As a social science, economics studies social interactions. What ostensibly distinguishes it from the other social sciences is, firstly, its focus on interactions involving the management of scarce resources and the social provising process and, secondly, its conception of itself as generating traceable, verifiable findings that are free of normative judgements but instead yield 'objective knowledge'. Some regard this methodological foundation of positivist fallibilism as the feature that makes economics the 'queen of the social sciences'. Others are critical of these core assumptions, which they believe have no place in a social science. Interestingly, both critiques and defences of economics often make reference to ideology: defenders claim that economics is as free of ideological bias as possible, while critics deny economics' status as a science and instead regard it as an 'ideology that serves to uphold power relations'. This article explores the relationship between ideology and economics with special reference to German academia, asking whether a pluralist approach to economics could help make the discipline less vulnerable to the charge of being ideological.

Quantitative measures of supposed scientific ‘quality’ (or ‘impact’) based on bibliometric indicators are used as the primary or exclusive tools of research evaluation in a growing number o...

For a long time, France was a country in which various approaches to economics coexisted. This pluralism began to dwindle in the mid-1990s. Since then, France has witnessed the increasing and now overwhelming domination of mainstream economics. This article, drawing on a study of the evolution of the recruitment of professors of economics in France, documents the situation and links the observed trends to the changing institutions governing the discipline (a centralized system evolving under the influence of international norms and instruments). It is demonstrated that far from being fair and neutral devices, the rules and instruments governing economics—notably the ranking lists of economic journals—incorporate specific worldviews strongly biasing the assessment of research toward the mainstream. This article documents the tentative use of ‘voice and exit’ by the French Association of Political Economy to reform the economics discipline. Furthermore, it discusses the arguments proclaimed by Jean ...

In the context of ongoing criticisms of the lack of pluralism in economics, the present article aims to discuss the development of ‘heterodox’ economics since the 1970s. Following Lakatos’s concept of scientific research programs (srp), and concentrating on the situation in Germany, the article will discuss classifications of economics, and will specify the understanding of diversity in the light of ‘axiomatic variations’ of the economic mainstream. This will form the basis for the subsequent description of the development of heterodoxy in Germany, with special reference to the founding of new universities and the reform movements in the 1970s. It can be shown that the heterodox scene flourished in this period, but that this pluralization remained fragmented and short-lived; by the 1980s at the latest heterodoxy was again on its way to marginalization. The history of heterodoxy in Germany thus presents itself as an unequal ‘battle of the paradigms,’ and can only be told as the story of a failure....

This paper describes the contributions made by the nine articles constituting this proceedings issue for the 2017 conference of the International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE). Following the descriptions of the articles, the paper identifies some common themes as a first step in finding the essence of modern pluralistic economics. Drawing on these papers and other key materials, the paper then offers an initial attempt at constructing 10 principles of pluralistic economics, and 2 principles regarding the economics profession. The paper concludes with a call for unity among pluralistic economists.

In 2014, the International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics, consisting of more than sixty-five associations of economics students from over thirty different countries, issued an open letter, with these opening lines: “It is not only the world economy that is in crisis. The teaching of economics is in crisis too, and this crisis has consequences far beyond the university walls. What is taught shapes the minds of the next generation of policymakers, and therefore shapes the societies we live in.… [I]t is time to reconsider the way economics is taught. We are dissatisfied with the dramatic narrowing of the curriculum that has taken place over the last couple of decades.”

Recent debates about the nature and desirability of pluralism in economics suffer from a lack of clarity about the meaning of pluralism. This paper attempts to remedy some aspects of this problem by distinguishing between different dimensions of pluralism, that is, epistemological, ontological, methodological, normative and prescriptive dimensions. Although, in principle, these dimensions are distinct, they are difficult to keep apart because of the relations that exist in terms of choices made in the different dimensions. It is argued that the recognition of these distinctions and relations allows for a resolution of some of the debates about pluralism.

This short paper examines a possible connection between religion and economics in terms of the parallelism between the atomistic individual doctrine and the individual soul doctrine. The paper explores whether resistance to pluralism in economics as a methodological practice might be illuminated in terms of this connection. On this view, resistance to pluralism in economics is not a matter of economists holding methodological views about economics practice that are contrary to pluralism, but is rather a kind of anti-pluralism reflecting an intransigent defense of the atomistic individual view as a kind of core or ‘untouchable’ deep doctrine. Two arguments are advanced to demonstrate the parallelism between the atomistic individual doctrine and the individual soul doctrine.

The current economic crisis has undoubtedly strengthened the case for pluralism in economics education and thought, but excessive reliance on recent developments for bolstering that case threatens to render it irrelevant once recovery sets in. This paper focuses on what a pluralist approach to economics education has had to offer over the past decade – with or without the crisis. We discuss the results of a recent survey of graduates of a pluralist undergraduate economics program from the classes of 2000–2010 at a liberal arts college in the United States. We first describe how the faculty and curriculum incorporate principles of a pluralist approach. We then discuss the results of the alumni survey, focusing on the careers or educational paths graduates have pursued, and their evaluation of how well different aspects of their economics education prepared them for life after college. We argue that the results of the survey provide evidence to support the claim that a pluralist approach is highly effective in providing the opportunity for students to develop critical thinking and problem solving skills, both of which remained of high importance to graduates in their life after college.

Revised in October 2012, this is the text of the Third Biennial Keith Hancock Lecture, presented as part of the outreach programme of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia (ASSA) on Tuesday 7 August 2012 at the State Library Victoria, on Tuesday 18 September at the University of Sydney, and on Tuesday 25 September 2012 at Curtin University. Professor King argues that economics is unique among the social sciences in having a single monolithic mainstream, which is either unaware of or actively hostile to alternative approaches. He presents a case for pluralism in economics, derived from the complex and ceaselessly changing nature of the world in which we live. He argues first, that economic reality is very complicated, so that the questions that economists ask are unlikely to have simple answers. Second, he argues that economic reality is fluid and subject to continuous change, so that the quest for a single, 'general' theory applicable to human behaviour in all societies, at all points in time, is a delusion. To illustrate the case for pluralism, Professor King will draw on the recent history of the global economy, the problems encountered in understanding it and the dangerous policy implications that have been drawn from mainstream theory.

E-learning vs. “talk and chalk”: this binary opposition presents a conflict that has dominated existing pedagogical research. That technological innovation offers an alternative for pressured educationists to improve efficiency and question the cost-effectiveness of traditional teaching methods creates a false dichotomy. This paper addresses the influence of the erroneous “either/or” position and discards it. It claims that there is no fundamental antagonism between the two methods of instruction and proffers the alternative found in blended learning methods. The meticulous splicing of e-learning and traditional lectures liberates the Economics lecturer to deliver a pluralist perspective. Thus, technology becomes a vital tool enabling educators to escape from the limitation of monist teaching methods and guarantees that economics students can fully engage with the discipline’s vibrant debates. “Contest and controversy; orthodoxy and heterodoxy; critique and reject”: technology’s real role is to facilitate a workable space for the free thinking mind.

In this paper the main developments in post-Keynesian macroeconomics since the mid-1990s will be reviewed. For this purpose the main differences between heterodox economics in general, including post-Keynesian economics, and orthodox economics will be reiterated and an overview over the strands of post-Keynesian economics, their commonalities and developments since the 1930s will be outlined. This will provide the grounds for touching upon three important areas of development and progress of post-Keynesian macroeconomics since the mid-1990s: first, the integration of distribution issues and distributional conflict into short- and long-run macroeconomics, both in theoretical and in empirical/applied works; second, the integrated analysis of money, finance and macroeconomics and its appli-cation to changing institutional and historical circumstances, like the process of financialisation; and third, the development of full-blown macroeconomic models, providing alternatives to the mainstream 'New Consensus Model' (NCM), and allowing to derive a full macroeconomic policy mix as a more con-vincing alternative to the one implied and proposed by the mainstream NCM, which has desperately failed in the face of the recent crises.

Introduction This article is a proposal to change the way economists are educated by applying the principle of "assertive pluralism" to the definition and concept of economics. This will equip the public to recognize bad economics, which I define as economics that takes no precautions against the possibility of error. It offers a remedy for what Colander et al. (2009) describe as a "systemic failure" of economics, prior to the crash of 2008. And it offers the profession a defense against the cause of this failure, which, following Turner (Tett 2009), I describe as its regulatory capture by financial interests. The objectives are intimately linked: a definition of good economics equips the public to demand good economists. By embedding this definition in the requirements placed on economics education providers, a supply of good economists will be created. Both will conspire to produce a generation of economists who can react, and prepare for, those changes in the world that their predecessors were so poorly placed to foresee or react to. The U.K. Context The methodology proposed--assertive pluralism--has wider implications for the reform of economics. It is a general principle, applicable equally inside and outside the United Kingdom and in all spheres of economic practice and theory including research, publication, selection, and promotion, the procurement of policy advice, and, not least, funding. I focus however on U.K. higher education. For the information of readers unfamiliar with the way this has evolved, at this point some context may be helpful. The article outlines the rationale for, and principles behind, a pluralist Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics (SBSE). It is an offshoot of a consultation (Freeman 2007) undertaken by the Association for Heterodox Economics (AHE) to provide input for a consultative review of the SBSE undertaken by the U.K. Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) in 2007. This led to an AHE-sponsored paper (Freeman 2009) in a special edition of the International Review of Economics Education (Denis 2009), a journal published by the Economics Network, the main practitioner body for developing economics teaching in the UK. The discussion it reflects is thus quite well advanced in the United Kingdom. In 2009 the AHE was asked to address the U.K. Committee of Heads of University Departments of Education (CHUDE), which is formally charged with establishing the SBSE. With CHUDE's support the AHE proposed a panel on pluralism in economics education to the 2010 conference of the Royal Economic Society (RES), effectively the profession's highest U.K. body. The RES however declined to accept. Such refusal, two years into the present crisis, to even consider a discussion on curriculum change, adds weight to the conclusions of this article that significant structural and institutional reforms are required in economics. Subject benchmarks were themselves introduced by the QAA, itself established following a review of higher education conducted at the request of the U.K. Labour government in 1997, headed by Ron Dearing. (1) The QAA, continuing the practice of "audits," which began in 1990, initially concentrated on the teaching and learning process as such, rather than content. However Dearing had recommended that "standards should be developed by the academic community itself, through formal groupings for the main areas of study." Accordingly in 1999, the first three subject benchmarks were released for consultation and a further 19 in 2000. By the middle of the last decade, benchmarks existed to cover almost all subjects. In consequence, imperceptibly but relentlessly, the content of teaching entered into the definition of "quality" of teaching in the United Kingdom. A latent conflict between standards and diversity was recognized from the outset. As Dearing (1997: 10.3) noted: Uniformity of programmes and national curricula, one possible approach to the development of national standards, would deny higher education the vitality, excitement and challenge that comes from institutions consciously pursuing distinctive purposes, with academics having scope to pursue their own scholarship and enthusiasms in their teaching. …

After the 2007–2008 financial crisis exposed the shortcomings of mainstream economic theory the need for pluralism in economics has become more acute. Pluralism appears as the main alternative to avoid the threat to economic science posed by the monopoly of an economic theory divorced from reality and real-world problems. This paper argues that rather than one unique economic theory, there is a collection of economic theories – our collective diversified intellectual portfolio – that compete with each other. Pluralism in economics education is a necessary precondition to enable a level playing field where students have equal access to different theories. However, the difficulties to implement such an approach should not be underestimated. From a practical point of view, it is suggested that implementing a unique digital platform would greatly help to present heterodox ideas and develop internal debate.

At the core of the pluralist argument in economics is the rejection of the logical positivists' reductionist 'one size fits all' approach to scientific research. Instead, pluralists argue that there are multiple ways of constructing knowledge and that we cannot decide on the one best methodology or epistemic principle; in short, pluralistic knowledge is all there is. Yet, epistemic pluralism implies the absence of a single conclusive final methodology or epistemological principle, and consequently choice of methods, theories and concepts risk becoming relativistic under pluralism. In the light of the absence of objective choice criteria this paper argues: 1) that choices can be justified through consensuses in intellectual exchanges; 2) that MacIntyrian epistemological crises are a suitable basis for consensus under pluralism; 3) choice under pluralism, understood as migration between different frameworks, becomes necessary for the development of framework-dependent narratives and resulting policy implications.

In a post-truth world of alternative facts pluralism is back in vogue, but for all the wrong reasons. Narrative and story-telling are important to our understanding of the world: facts are placed within a context, and the consistency of the narrative can be tested by appeal to the presuppositions and plausibility of the story. Since the enlightenment, and probably before, the prevailing worldview has tended to assume that there was just one correct narrative, and that determining the truth was via the methods of empirical science. A plea for pluralism in economics, therefore, at first sight seems rather odd. This paper argues for a new meta-narrative for economics - a new framework within which different narratives can thrive. The advantages of such an approach are explained, along with a consideration of the challenges of policy formation within a pluralistic world.

What is the role of science in water management? It is argued that science cannot claim value neutrality when dealing with policy or political issues. The scholar is better understood as a political person and actor in a democratic society. Technocracy has a role but should be subordinated to normal ideas of democracy. Experiences from humanities and social sciences are relevant for water policy and management. These issues are discussed in relation to the discipline of economics. The monopoly position of neoclassical economics at university departments of economics is challenged and regarded as part of the problems faced. This monopoly position has strongly influenced the thinking and mental maps of more or less influential actors in our societies. The fact that a specific theoretical perspective in economics is not only science but at the same time ideology suggests that only pluralism in economics research and education is compatible with a democratic society.

O presente artigo destaca os principais aspectos teóricos desenvolvidos por Bruce Caldwell em seu Pluralismo Crítico. A escolha de Caldwell advém de sua importância como precursor do Pluralismo na Economia, o que possibilitou abrir caminho por apelos em prol de uma ciência econômica pluralista, presentes em publicações e movimentos em universidades pelo mundo há aproximadamente quatro décadas.

This Editorial introduces the special issue of IREE on pluralism in economics education. It draws out the pedagogical consequences of the contradiction between the plurality of the discipline and the singularity of student induction into it. Economics education should instead be based on controversy, benefiting students, staff, employers and the polity, via the development of students′ intellectual independence. Pluralism does not entail lowering standards, but itself constitutes a demanding standard. On pluralist criteria, the current subject benchmark statement for economics is seriously deficient, but an appropriately edited version would constitute a step towards the pluralistic reorganisation of economics education.

This chapter argues that the precept “first tell no untruth” is the initial premise of an ethical code for economists. Unjustifiable claims of truth for economic statements cause harm when people act on them, when different actions could have produced better outcomes. The harm is avoidable if known critical practices give grounds to doubt the claim of truth. This harm arises from not from the malign intent of economists but from their relation with society, which introduces “misleading bias” by expecting them to certify as true assertions that benefit their employers. This gives rise to “monotheoretic practice,” the production of single answers by means of single theories. The alternative is “systematic pluralism”—the provision of a range of possible answers derived from relevant legitimate theories. This code would be mutual, recognizing the joint responsibility of economists and society, and collective, holding economists ethically responsible for their profession’s output.

International audience; There have been many student calls for more pluralism in economics classrooms. The paper outlines the reasons for which such a call is unlikely to be heard. Orthodox economists believe that there is already enough pluralism and debates within the orthodoxy, and they do not realise that heterodox economists can make a positive contribution to the field, believing instead that their contribution is mostly made up of various criticisms of mainstream economics. In addition, the present situation is not conducive to more pluralism because there is an excess supply flow of PhDs in economics willing to pursue an academic career. More pluralism in the classroom may thus necessitate the creation of a new field, distinct from economics.