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Shadows bring a sense of animated vitality to any building, and their representations on drawings add a sense of depth and believability to that which is being illustrated. Nat Chard, Professor of Experimental Architecture at University College London (UCL), has a longstanding interest in movement, optics, photography and the intangible spaces in between them. His Institute of Paradoxical Shadows cleaves the shadow from its material datum, leaving it hanging, a suspended spectral entity, encountered through a séance‐like trance of cognitive confusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Book I of Plato's Republic, Thrasymachus' proposal opens an important field of analysis within political philosophy, as it is through his discourse that justice becomes associated with the existing government policy in cities, given that, regardless of the political constitution, force always belongs to the governments and it is these who make the laws that it is fair for the governed to obey. This work aims, first, to analyze Thrasymachus' proposal for the whole of political philosophy and, second, to relate this proposal with Machiavelli's The Prince.

In the Republic , Plato's Socrates argues that the wealthy feel contempt for the poor, and the poor feel hatred for the rich. But why is Socrates, leading a life of scandalous poverty, without taking wages for philosophical work, an exception to this rule? Instead of hatred, envy, or no emotion at all, Socrates consistently treats wealth and the wealthy with ridicule and kataphronēsis – active looking-down or contempt – while meditating on the temptation of the poor to appropriate the excess flesh of the wealthy (Resp. 556d). It is contempt that allows Socrates to remain free and wageless, away from the tempting distortion wealth has on the soul (Resp. 330c, 554a–b). Socrates therefore insists his philosopher-kings should be paid only in food, the same reward he proposes for himself in the Apology. Instead of securing freedom from murderous epithumia through moderate property, Socrates implies only contemptuous poverty can safeguard a philosophic life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant criticizes Plato for his interest in positing ideas that are entirely purified from any sensible elements, but which, nonetheless, exist in some supra-sensible reality. I argue that Kant’s criticism can be repositioned and even countered if, in our assessment of Plato, we assign a wider scope of significance and greater value to the senses. In order to lend focus to my article, I analyze Socrates’ presentation of what I translate as the “look of the Good” (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, 508e) in the Republic so as to show the proximity between Plato and Kant on the question of sensibility. I also draw on the Phaedo and extant literature that goes against the traditional view regarding the status of Ideas or Forms, including the Idea of the Good. I further discuss an affinity between the Good that is “beyond being” (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, 509c) in the Republic and Kant’s view of God as an Ideal of Reason. Given my articulation of the importance of the sensible dimension in Plato, there is a continuity between Kant and Plato on the question of the illegitimacy of certain ideas. In other words, in my reading (and contrary to Kant’s view of Plato), Kant does not so much overturn Plato’s metaphysics, but develops further the view that is already inscribed in Plato.

In a way, there is nothing surprising about Plato's promotion of sport for women in Republic and Laws; it is logically implied by his philosophical theories. In another way, Plato's vision of female athletes is among the most radical proposals he makes. The purpose of this paper is to examine Plato's arguments for women in sport and reflect on its relevance in our modern world. His texts include as many misogynist as feminist comments, but Plato's consistent view in Republic and Laws is that females deserve equal education in gymnastics (i.e. movement activities) and equal opportunity to participate in athletic contests. This position derives from the convictions that athletics serves as training for virtue and communities need to maximize the virtue of all their members. It is his vision of women in civic and military roles, specifically their need for aretē (virtue, excellence) to perform those roles, that motivates Plato to include them in sport. In our modern world, where women are citizens and rulers – and regularly participate in sport – it is worth exploring the educational link Plato saw between the two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Answering articles by Smith (PJ 18) and Matoso (PJ 22) about the Divided Line, I argue that the problems Smith raised and Matoso pretended to solve don’t exist in a proper reading of the analogy and the ensuing allegory of the cave in light of one another and stem from a misunderstanding of the expression ἀνα τὸν αὺτον λόγον at Rep. VI, 509d7: the λόγος to be used to split both segments is not the one used to split the line in the first place, and it is not a numerical ratio, but a logical rationale.

This paper reconsiders some controversial aspects of Plato's characterization of justice as psychic health. It rejects three prevailing interpretations of Plato's 'medicalization of justice', while providing a new reading that exonerates Plato from the charges raised by his critics. I argue that Plato's account articulates an unprecedented theory of mental health in the history of Western philosophy and medicine. This account is put forward as an alternative to the bio-medical model of mental health developed by Hippocratic doctors. Finally, I discuss the practical implications of Plato's account of justice for his ethical and political theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas More's 1516 Utopia describes a 'fictitious' republic on an imaginary island, and draws heavily on ancient political ideas. This paper explores the difficulties of applying the term 'utopia' to Plato's political thinking, given that More's term is anachronistically applied to ancient texts. The projects of the Republic and Laws should not be interpreted as 'utopian', but as blueprints for a foundation such as a new city, rather than as imagined ideal cities after More's model. Support for Plato's practical involvement in matters of political foundation is drawn from the Seventh Letter. The Republic and the Laws are discussed not as utopias, but political manifestos. The political context in which Plato lived, and his objectives, gives his political writings a wholly different dimension. The goal of the Republic and the Laws is not to describe unrealizable constitutions, but to exchange the Athenian constitution of Plato's time for another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Discusiones Filosóficas is the property of Universidad de Caldas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The utopian character of Plato’s city in The Republic has been a main subject of discussion, centred especially on the characteristics of the proposed community and its incoherencies when assumed as a concrete political project. The aim of this paper is to analyse which parameters are used by Plato in his view of the best constitution and how these parameters became the criteria assumed by Aristotle in his general classification of political thought. Through Plato’s representation of Socrates’ activity when describing the city of the Republic it is possible to trace a genealogy of the modern concept of utopia.

Law, often neglected in treatments of the Republic , is essential to the philosopher-kings' rule. Only law accomplishes the partial divinization of citizens at which philosophical politics aims. Socrates' interrogation of Thrasymachus and Glaucon reveals law to be a command whereby citizens participate in philosophical knowledge and limit the pleonexia congenital to humanity. Law does so primarily by instilling in souls a true opinion resistant to pleonectic passion, producing a state of political virtue. This primary work is supported by the musical and poetical education, itself shaped by law for the sake of law. Law persuades and compels the soul by appealing to both reason and spiritedness, enabling them to overcome the appetites. The soul's consequent acceptance of truth and resistance to the passions indeed makes it resemble divinity. In so transforming the citizens through the law, the philosopher-king also unifies the city and makes it happy under his rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the complex relationship between the logical and the analogical dimension in the Republic of Plato, focusing synchronically on three analogies: polis-soul, polis-body and soul-body. The aim is to demonstrate first how the analogies help Plato to give strength to his political description, and second how the power relationships provide intelligible models for the description of the human being. The analogical value of the power relationships and the political value of the analogies emerge as inseparably linked. The article proves at the same time how the analogy between the ideal polis and a timeless image of the soul is only possible due to the medical analogy between the polis and the body, which separate clearly the Greek culture from the «barbaric» populations.

This article analyses the complex relationship between the logical and the analogical dimension in the Republic of Plato, focusing synchronically on three analogies: polis-soul, polis-body and soul-body. The aim is to demonstrate first how the analogies help Plato to give strength to his political description, and second how the power relationships provide intelligible models for the description of the human being. The analogical value of the power relationships and the political value of the analogies emerge as inseparably linked. The article proves at the same time how the analogy between the ideal polis and a timeless image of the soul is only possible due to the medical analogy between the polis and the body, which separate clearly the Greek culture from the «barbaric» populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that the strict account of techne agreed to by Socrates and Thrasymachus in Republic I provides a useful framework for addressing a central question of the dialogue as a whole: how philosophy might belong to the polis. This view depends upon three positions: 1) that Plato invites us to interpret the relationship between techne and polis outside the terms of the city-soul analogy, 2) that the strict account contributes to a compelling description of vocational work, and 3) that this description determines what Socrates means by a true polis, and thus frames the problem of philosophy’s political inclusion.

Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article is a critical review of the most important modern interpretations of the Platonic postulate of expelling poets from the polis, formulated in two works of the thinker, the Republic and the Laws. The reflections presented in the article focus on two fundamental questions, namely the reasons behind Plato’s refusal to allow poets into his ideal state and, secondly, the aim he was going to attain by expelling artists from the community of citizens. To try to explain the reasons behind these statements, so embarrassing to present-day readers of Plato, involves considerations of Plato’s concept of the nature of poetry (art as flawed, defective and secondary reflection of the sensual world), as well as of ethical questions (art as a perfidious tool to facilitate malevolent designs towards human characters). Any investigation as to the intentions of the philosophers that preceded the formulation of the postulate concentrates thus inevitably on his vision of utopian realism. It further aims to provide sufficient arguments that Plato, oscillating in his presentation between authoritarian diagnosis and protreptic provocation, makes recipients redefine the mutual relationship between literature and philosophy.

The thirty-five year minimum age requirement for U.S. presidents was set late in the Constitutional Convention. The reasons for that choice must be inferred because so little survives from the contemporary record. The only source attaching significance to thirty-five that the Founders had access to was Plato's Republic. The Founders did not want to be governed by Plato's guardians, but they did expect their presidents to possess some of the guardians' attributes. Simply put, however much they looked ahead to the future, they were still anchored to the past. It is difficult to say much more than that because so much of the Founders' intellectual world eludes us--a reminder, as Laurence Tribe put it, that there is more to the Constitution, and to the men who wrote it, than meets the eye. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alain Badiou refers to his translation of Plato's Republic as a "hypertranslation." In Plato's Republic: A Dialogue in 16 Chapters (2012), Badiou contemporizes Plato's Republic, and reinvents Socrates into a Maoist philosopher who constantly quotes Mao. This paper conducts a textual analysis of Badiou's references to Mao and Maoist Revolution and discusses these quotations as part of his philosophical speculation. Badiou's deployment of Mao reveals his post-structuralist understanding of revolution, echoing Lacan's notion of the forever-negating "void" and Foucault's "thinking from the outside." By contemporizing Plato's Republic with a Maoist Socrates, Badiou claims that the essence and relevancy of Mao's Revolution lies in its consistent defiance of any institutional stabilization, and in its incessant drive for social, political, and spiritual renewal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Book II of Plato's Republic, after the praise of justice as part of the most beautiful class of goods by Socrates, Glaucon responds by saying that this is not the opinion of the majority (δοκεῖ ... πολλοῖς). Our work aims to investigate who are the polloi presented by Glaucon as a counter-argument to Socrates. For this we will use a specifi c part of his speech: the myth of Gyges' ring. As a hypothesis for our investigation, we draw a parallel with ancient Greek lyrics, which in its poetry spoke for the fi rst time Gyges of Lydia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three problems threaten any account of philosophical rule in the Republic. First, Socrates is supposed to show that acting justly is always beneficial, but instead he extols the benefits of having a just soul. He leaves little reason to believe practical justice and psychic justice are connected and thus to believe that philosophers will act justly. In response to this problem, I show that just acts produce just souls. Since philosophers want to have just souls, they will act justly. Second, Socrates' alleged aim is to demonstrate that justice is beneficial, but philosophers, who have to give up a life of philosophy to rule, actually appear to be harmed by ruling. I explain that, since the founders of the city justly command them to rule, philosophers cannot, in fact, obtain a better life, and so ruling does not harm them. Third, it seems incongruous that philosophers, who should, as just people, jump at the opportunity to rule Kallipolis, must be compelled to rule. I show that Plato carefully constructs an educational system that produces rulers who do not want to rule, since such rulers alone will rule best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Albeit Homeric epics, tragedy and comedy be the main targets of Plato's critique of poetry, we aim to show that it also comprehends lyric poetry, embodied in the inovative figure of Simonides of Ceos, such as practised in Plato's time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resumo: O Livro II da República de Platão se inicia com um desafio de Gláucon para Sócrates, onde este deve provar que o homem justo é, de toda maneira, melhor do que o injusto. Para isso, pedirá que Sócrates defenda a justiça por si mesma e censure a injustiça. O discurso de Gláucon pode ser dividido em três partes, sendo a primeira dedicada à origem e à natureza da justiça; a segunda irá indicar a justiça como algo necessário, mas não como um bem; e a terceira, na qual ele irá tentar provar que a vida do injusto é melhor do que a do justo. Neste trabalho, iremos nos centrar em seu primeiro argumento e de que maneira Gláucon defende a justiça através de um contrato.