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"Reaching for the Heights: The inside story of a secret attempt to reach an Israeli-Syrian peace" by Frederic C. Hof is a book that sheds light on the little-researched topic of Israel-Syria negotiations over the Golan Heights. The author, who was a special coordinator for regional affairs in the US Department of State, provides a factual and thoughtful analysis of the failed negotiations that took place from 2010 to 2011. The book highlights the progress made in overcoming obstacles and the potential for a breakthrough, while also acknowledging the uncertainties surrounding the seriousness of the parties involved. It is a valuable resource for academics, policymakers, and students interested in the Arab-Israeli conflict. [Extracted from the article]

In contemporary Israel, the apparently negative consequences of the 2005 "unilateral disengagement" from the Gaza Strip have fueled a perception that leaving territory harms national security. Three claims underlie this framing: (1) domestic Israeli political considerations—not national security concerns—caused the disengagement; (2) Israel abandoned territory without receiving any compensation; and (3) leaving Gaza only precipitated further terrorist attacks. This article challenges these claims. It argues that domestic dynamics alone do not explain the withdrawal. Instead, Israel withdrew to mitigate its casualties, yield foreign policy gains, deter and deny terrorist groups, and avert a perceived demographic threat. The disengagement did not seek to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Instead, through a limited territorial exit, it sought to stabilize the conflict and stymie negotiations with the Palestinians. In contrast to dominant perceptions, Israel achieved all of these objectives. Furthermore, it was Israel's post-disengagement policies that precipitated most of the recent security threats, not the withdrawal itself. These findings reassess the disengagement's goals and efficacy. They demonstrate that in contrast to popular perceptions in Israel today, the Gaza disengagement neither was a strategic blunder nor does it exemplify that territorial withdrawal constitutes a flawed policy choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines what factors cause states to withdraw from foreign territorial interventions. Scholarly analyses of withdrawal are rare, whilst within the broader research area of territorial conflict, studies are often dichotomized into neorealist or constructivist-inspired works, emphasizing a select few variables and one level of analysis alone. We argue these excessive simplifications of international politics lack utility for understanding territorial withdrawal. Instead, we employ the principles of strategic theory informed by a Clausewitzian paradigm, and construct a framework of three "arenas of bargaining," spanning multiple variable-types and levels of analysis, to explain territorial withdrawal. In so doing, the analysis delineates a comprehensible and novel theoretical framework for understanding an under-researched policy problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the Syrian civil war, a number of regional and global actors have embarked on international initiatives that seek a political solution to the conflict. These initiatives differed significantly from each other in terms of their objectives, scope, and the identity of those leading them. This article describes and compares the most prominent international initiatives, assesses the effectiveness of each, and defines the enduring obstacles facing any diplomatic solution. Much has been written about the virtues of "soft power" and one of its leading tools, diplomacy. However, this article argues that in the Syrian civil war, the distribution of "hard power" among the actors involved is what lays the foundations for the future of Syria, rather than any international peace process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon in May 2000 and the Gaza Strip in August-September 2005 represented paradigm shifts in Israeli territorial policy. In Israeli political discourse, both withdrawals have been heavily criticized for lack of strategic planning that ultimately harmed the national interest by surrendering territory "unilaterally," without negotiations with opposing forces. By contrast, this paper seeks to delineate contributing factors and the logic engendering both withdrawals: ultimately, neither was strictly "unilateral," nor was either withdrawal a simple response to excessive casualties. Rather, established patterns of territorial control were undermined by declining strategic utility, with policy recalibration long overdue and essential for the pursuit of national goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]