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DOD has emphasized innovative and low-cost approaches to build the defense capacity of foreign partners, and it uses its five Regional Centers to administer programs to foster partnerships and deepen foreign officials' understanding of U.S. objectives. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 112-705) mandated GAO to conduct a study of the Regional Centers. GAO's report does the following: (1) describes how the Regional Centers' activities compare with those of other DoD training and education organizations, and (2) evaluates the extent to which DoD has developed and implemented an approach to oversee and assess the Regional Centers' progress in achieving DoD priorities. This report also provides information on the process used to approve Regional Center requests to waive reimbursement of the costs for nongovernmental and international organizations that participate in the Regional Centers' activities. GAO reviewed public law and departmental directives and conducted an analysis comparing aspects of the Regional Centers with other selected DoD training and education institutions. GAO recommends that DoD develop measurable goals linked to key programming priorities for the Regional Centers, metrics for assessing performance against these goals, and a methodology to assess the Regional Centers' progress in achieving DoD priorities. DoD generally agreed with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD spends billions of dollars each year to maintain key business operations intended to support the warfighter. In 2005, GAO identified DOD s approach to business transformation as high-risk because DOD had not established management responsibility, accountability, and control over business transformation-related activities and resources, and it lacked a plan with specific goals, measures, and mechanisms to monitor progress. GAO previously reported that DOD has taken steps to develop a management approach. This report addresses DOD s progress in (1) incorporating key strategic planning elements into its transformation plan; and (2) developing and implementing an approach for assessing DOD-wide progress toward business goals. GAO analyzed relevant DOD documents, reviewed prior and ongoing GAO work; and interviewed DOD officials. GAO recommends that DOD add information to its SMP, such as a description of key challenges and context for why goals were chosen. GAO also recommends that DOD further define its performance management approach. DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation and concurred with our second recommendation. DOD stated that it would add information to the SMP as appropriate, and continue to improve and institutionalize DBC operations. As part of these efforts, GAO believes that DOD needs to identify specific steps it will take to integrate and regularly review performance data from various sources to assess progress towards its business goals., Rept. to Congressional Committees.

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the ability of U.S. military personnel to communicate and interact with multinational partners, security forces, and local indigenous populations can be critical factors to mission success, as evidenced by operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD utilizes language professionals and regional experts within its ranks of military personnel to provide foreign language support, such as foreign language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness capabilities needed to execute missions, as well as contracted interpreters and translators who provide this support. To meet increased demands on the need for foreign language support from ongoing contingency operations, DOD has relied on contractors to supplement the capability provided by military personnel. For example, the number of contractor personnel required to provide foreign language translation and interpretation services for contingency operations more than tripled from 2004 to 2010 (from about 4,000 to about 14,000). As of November 2012, the number of contractor personnel required by DOD was approximately 9,000. As a result, DOD has made considerable investments in providing contract support. For example, DOD obligated about $6.8 billion from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 to acquire a variety of foreign language-related services and products to support its forces. We have identified opportunities for DOD to improve its approach to contracting from a broad perspective as well as in areas related to foreign language support. For example, DOD contract management is on our list of high-risk areas in the federal government. In 2013, we noted that DOD needed to take steps to strategically manage the acquisition of services, including developing the data needed to define and measure desired outcomes to improve outcomes on the billions of dollars that DOD spends annually on goods and services., Rept. to Congressional Addressees.

Since 2002, the United States and other nations have worked to develop ANSF. In 2010, the United States, NATO, and other coalition partners agreed to transition responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government by the end of 2014. According to NATO, a successful security transition requires ANSF capable of addressing security challenges in Afghanistan. To support its development, the United States has allocated $43 billion to train, equip, and sustain ANSF from fiscal years 2002 to 2011, appropriated $11.2 billion in fiscal year 2012, and requested about $5.8 billion for fiscal year 2013. To assist Congress in its oversight, GAO has issued over 20 reports and testimonies on ANSF since 2005. This testimony discusses findings from GAO reports and ongoing work that cover (1) progress reported and tools used to assess ANSF capability, (2) challenges affecting the development of capable ANSF, and (3) use of U.S. Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams to advise and assist ANSF. To perform this work, GAO reviewed DOD and NATO documents, and met with officials in Washington, D.C.; Tampa, FL; Brussels, Belgium; and Kabul, Afghanistan., Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives.

In 2010, the Navy concluded that decisions it made to increase the efficiencies of its surface force had adversely affected ship readiness and service life. To improve ship readiness the Navy developed a new strategy, which includes several initiatives. House Report 112-78, accompanying a proposed bill for the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.1540), directed GAO to review the recent Navy initiatives. GAO assessed the following: (1) how the Navy evaluates the material readiness of its surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships and the extent to which data indicate trends or patterns in the material readiness of these ships; and (2) the extent to which the Navy has taken steps to improve the readiness of its surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships, including implementing its new readiness strategy. GAO analyzed Navy policies, material, and readiness data from January 2008 -- two years prior to the release of the Navy's 2010 report on the degradation of surface force readiness -- through March 2012, two years after the release of the report, and interviewed headquarters and operational officials and ship crews. GAO recommends that the Navy conduct a comprehensive assessment of the risks the new strategy faces and develop alternatives to mitigate these risks. DoD partially concurred, but felt that current assessments sufficiently identify risks. GAO continues to believe that a comprehensive assessment that takes into account the full range of risk to the overall strategy is needed., Report to Congressional Committees.

Citing long-term fiscal challenges affecting the federal government, in May 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to undertake a departmentwide initiative to assess how the department is staffed, organized, and operated with the goal of reducing excess overhead costs and reinvesting these savings in sustaining DOD s current force structure and modernizing its weapons portfolio.1 1 Remarks as delivered by former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Abilene, Kansas, May 8, 2010. The Secretary s initiative targeted both shorter- and longer-term improvements and set specific goals and targets for achieving cost savings and efficiencies. The initiative was organized along four tracks, each of which had a different focus (see enc. I). The fourth track focused on specific areas where DOD could take immediate action to reduce inefficiencies and overhead, in particular, to reduce headquarters and support bureaucracies and to instill a culture of cost consciousness and restraint in the department. As part of the fourth track, the Secretary of Defense announced a number of specific initiatives, including actions intended to address the need to reduce or eliminate reporting requirements for DOD reports and studies. For example, in his August 9, 2010, speech announcing the overall efficiency initiative, the Secretary of Defense stated that the department is awash in taskings for reports and studies and directed several specific actions, Remarks as delivered by former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Abilene, Kansas, May 8, 2010.

In 2008, the Army issued a field manual that identified the need to expand its training focus so units would be trained and ready to operate across a full spectrum of operations, including offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations. To support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has focused its ground force training on preparing units for counterinsurgency operations. With the withdrawal from operations in Iraq, fewer units are engaged in counterinsurgency operations and now have more time to train for full-spectrum operations. To reflect the shift in training focus, the Army, in April 2011, updated its training strategy and also established a new metric to measure training activity -- referred to as the full spectrum training mile metric. This metric replaced the Army's traditional tank mile metric, which represented the average number of miles the Army expected to drive its tanks while conducting training. In its fiscal year 2012 budget materials, the Army provided background information on its transition to the new metric, and starting in fiscal year 2012, began using the new metric. House report 112-78 directed GAO to review the Army's transition to the full-spectrum training mile metric and report its findings by February 28, 2012. To address this mandate, we determined the following: (1) how the Army's full-spectrum training mile metric differs from its traditional tank mile metric; (2) the key assumptions associated with the full-spectrum training mile metric and to what extent these assumptions reflect actual conditions; and (3) to what extent the Army uses the full-spectrum training mile metric to measure training execution and develop training cost estimates. This report includes information on how training is reflected in the Army's operation and maintenance budget-justification materials. We briefed the congressional defense committees in January 2012 and have included the briefing in enclosure 1 of this report.

To support ongoing operations, the Army gives priority to providing personnel to its operating forces over its support organizations, including Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC performs various functions, such as developing warfighting doctrine and providing training. To help manage its workforce, TRADOC has taken certain actions, such as relying more on contractors and reassigning other staff to be instructors. In a February 2010 memorandum, the TRADOC Commander stated that because of various factors TRADOC's ability to successfully perform its core competencies and functions was increasingly at risk. House Armed Services Committee report 111-491 directed GAO to evaluate the availability of Army trainers. GAO assessed the extent to which TRADOC has done the following: (1) identified the number and type of personnel needed to carry out its training mission, and (2) evaluated the impact of its workforce management actions on the quality of training. GAO interviewed key Army and TRADOC officials and reviewed relevant doctrine, guidance, curricula, personnel requirements data, and training survey results. GAO recommends that TRADOC establish a plan to do the following: (1) update its personnel requirements models, doctrine, and curricula; (2) complete a personnel mix assessment; and (3) establish metrics to evaluate its workforce management actions. DoD concurred with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it reduced the workforce requirements for some of its ships and transitioned away from instructor-led training programs to more computer-based training. In June 2010, we reported the Navy lacked a firm analytical basis for some of the reductions it made to ship crew sizes and therefore could not be assured it had appropriately sized its crews to maintain material readiness and accomplish necessary tasks aboard its ships. We also reported the Navy lacked outcome-based performance measures to evaluate the impact of changes to training on trainees? job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to their ships and therefore could not fully determine the effectiveness of the training changes it implemented and whether further adjustments were necessary. We recommended the Navy validate the underlying assumptions and standards it uses to calculate workforce requirements and, as necessary, based on this assessment, reevaluate its cruiser and destroyer workload requirements. We also recommended the Navy develop additional metrics to measure the effectiveness of its training. The Navy concurred with our recommendations.

Current Army and Marine Corps guidance has generally improved the quantity and objectivity of readiness information available to decision makers. As in the past, Army Regulation 220-1 and Marine Corps Order 3000.13 direct units to report on two types of missions--the core missions for which units were designed as well as any other missions they may be assigned, but recent changes to the guidance also added new requirements. Units must now provide objective, personnel and equipment data to supplement commanders' assessments of their units' assigned mission capabilities. The updated service guidance also provides additional criteria, which are intended to help unit commanders consistently assess their units' mission capabilities. The new data and additional mission assessment criteria improve the objectivity and consistency of readiness information provided to decision makers. However, to clearly identify units that recently returned from deployment, the Army regulation now requires units to uniformly report a specific service directed readiness level rather than assess and report the unit's actual readiness level. As a result, decision makers lack a complete picture of the readiness of some units that could be called upon to respond to contingencies. While the Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to implement the revised readiness reporting guidance, units are inconsistently reporting readiness in some areas. GAO site visits to 33 Army and 20 Marine Corps units revealed that units were using inconsistent reporting time frames, and GAO data analysis showed that 49 percent of Marine Corps reports submitted between May 2010 and January 2011 were late. Furthermore, units are reporting equipment and personnel numbers differently, and some units are not linking their two types of mission assessments, in accordance with current guidance.

Today, and in the foreseeable future, military operations require U.S. personnel to work alongside multinational partners and among local populations. The Department of Defense (DoD) has placed a greater emphasis on transforming language and regional proficiency capabilities, which includes cultural awareness. GAO's prior work has found that integrated strategic plans with measurable goals and funding priorities linked to goals can help guide organizational transformations. Decision makers also require complete information to identify capability gaps and assess risk. This testimony summarizes GAO's prior work and recommendations on DoD's efforts to develop language skills and regional proficiency and the steps DoD has taken to implement our prior recommendations. Specifically, it addresses the extent to which DoD has done the following: (1) developed a strategic plan to guide its language and regional proficiency transformation efforts, and (2) obtained the information it needs to identify capability gaps and assess risk. GAO's statement is based on a June 2009 report and work conducted during May 2010 through June 2010 to update the status of GAO's recommendations., Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it has reduced crew sizes on some of its surface ships and has moved from instructor-led to more computer-based training. In House Report 111-166, which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the House Armed Services Committee directed GAO to review the training, size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy's ship crews. This report assesses the extent to which the Navy did the following: (1) used valid assumptions and standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers; and (2) measured the impact of changes to its training programs, including on the time it takes personnel to achieve various qualifications. To do so, GAO analyzed Navy procedures for determining crew size compared to guidance, analyzed current Navy metrics to measure training impact, and interviewed relevant officials and conducted visits to 11 ships. GAO is recommending that the Navy validate the underlying assumptions and standards it uses to calculate workforce requirements, and as necessary, based on this assessment, reevaluate its cruiser and destroyer workload requirements. GAO is also recommending that the Navy develop additional metrics to measure the effectiveness of Navy training. DoD agreed with these recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Department of Defense (DOD) requested about $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 for new unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and for expanded capabilities in existing ones. To support ongoing operations, the Air Force and Army have acquired a greater number of larger systems. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) plans were in place to account for the personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure needed to support Air Force and Army UAS inventories; (2) DOD addressed challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations; and (3) DOD updated its publications that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to reflect the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing operations. Focusing on UAS programs supporting ongoing operations, GAO reviewed the services' program and funding plans in light of DOD's requirements definition and acquisition policy; interviewed UAS personnel in the United States and in Iraq about training experiences; and reviewed joint, multiservice, and service-specific publications.

Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DoD) with $893 billion in supplemental and annual appropriations, primarily for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). DoD's reported annual obligations for OCO have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $162.4 billion in fiscal year 2008. For fiscal year 2009, Congress appropriated $151 billion in war-related requests. DoD has reported obligations of about $744 billion for OCO from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2008 and through the third quarter of fiscal year 2009 (October 2008 through June 2009). The $149 billion difference between DoD's appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to the remaining fiscal year 2009 appropriations; multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous OCO-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated; and obligations for classified and other items that DoD considers to be non-OCO related that are not reported in DoD's cost-of-war reports. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20067 requires GAO to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DoD's monthly cost-of-war reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains GAO's analysis of DoD's reported obligations for overseas contingencies through June 2009. Specifically, GAO assessed the following: (1) DoD's cumulative appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of overseas contingencies; and (2) DoD's fiscal year 2009 reported obligations from October 2008 through June 2009, the latest data available for OCO by military service and appropriation account.

The Department of Defense (DoD) reports data about the operational readiness of its forces. In 1999, Congress directed DoD to create a comprehensive readiness system with timely, objective, and accurate data. In response, DoD started to develop the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). After 7 years, DoD has incrementally fielded some capabilities and, through fiscal year 2008, reported obligating about $96.5 million. GAO was asked to review the program, including the extent to which DoD has done the following: (1) effectively managed and overseen DRRS acquisition and deployment, and (2) implemented features of DRRS consistent with legislative requirements and DoD guidance. GAO compared DRRS acquisition disciplines, such as requirements development, test management, and DRRS oversight activities to DoD and related guidance, and reviewed the system's current and intended capabilities relative to legislative requirements and DoD guidance. GAO did not evaluate DoD's overall ability to assess force readiness or the extent that readiness data reflects capabilities, vulnerabilities, or performance issues. GAO is making recommendations to address the risks facing DoD in acquiring and developing DRRS and increase the chances of success. DoD agreed or partially agreed with three of GAO's eight recommendations, and disagreed with the remaining five because it stated that it was already taking actions in these areas., Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate.

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the involvement of large numbers of Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel and demands on the Army's reserve component forces are expected to continue for the foreseeable future. In addition, the high demand for ground forces has led DOD to retrain some units for missions that are outside of their core competencies. Our past reports have noted a number of personnel, equipment, and training challenges that the Army's reserve component forces have faced since the start of the global war on terrorism in 2001. For example, we have noted that preparation for ongoing operations has often required different types of training as units are being tasked to perform assigned missions such as convoy security or detainee operations, which may differ significantly from their primary missions, such as artillery.

Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20067 requires us to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly cost-of-war reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through December 2008. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's cumulative appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2009 reported obligations from October 2008 through December 2008, the latest data available for GWOT by military service and appropriation account., Report to the Congressional Committees.

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars to maintain key business operations that support the warfighter. The GAO has reported on weaknesses in DOD's business operations that result in billions of dollars being wasted annually, reduced efficiencies, ineffective performance, inadequate accountability, and a lack of transparency. Currently, DOD has sole responsibility for 8, and shares responsibility for another 7, of the federal government's 27 programs or activities GAO has identified as being at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In 2005, GAO 3 added DOD's management approach to business transformation to our high-risk list because 1) DOD's improvement efforts were fragmented, 2) DOD lacked an integrated and enterprise wide transformation plan and investment strategy, and 3) DOD had not designated a senior management official at an appropriate level with the authority to be responsible and accountable for enterprise-wide business transformation. From August 2008 through December 2008, the GAO reviewed DOD's progress in transforming its business operations under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative., Briefing presented to Congress on 9 Jan 2009.

Section 402 of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2009 required us to report to the appropriate congressional committees by the end of the 110th Congress regarding the Department of Defense's (DOD) progress in implementing GAO's recommendations over the last 7 years. During this period of time, we issued 637 reports to DOD or its components that included 2,726 recommendations. By law, agencies, including DOD, are required to submit written statements to Congress explaining actions taken in response to recommendations we have made. We follow up on the implementation status of each recommendation at least annually to determine whether DOD has instituted sufficient corrective actions. This report, which responds to this mandate, contains the results of our analysis on the implementation status of the 2,726 recommendations we made to DOD or its components in reports issued during fiscal years 2001 through 2007. Based on discussion with congressional staff, we are also providing examples of related financial accomplishments reported for the period, based on DOD-related work., Report to the Congressional Committees.

The Department of Defense's (DoD) use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) continues to increase. In 2000, DoD components had fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in their inventory. By May 2008, they had more than 6,000. However, DoD faces challenges, such as UAS acquisition and the integration of UAS into joint combat operations. GAO has made a series of recommendations to address challenges, including the need for a UAS strategic plan. To improve upon the management and use of UAS, DoD has implemented several actions, such as establishing new task forces. GAO was asked to do the following: (1) identify key DoD efforts to improve the management and operational use of UAS, and (2) assess the extent to which these efforts constitute an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee UAS efforts. GAO reviewed DoD documents such as directives and memorandums, and interviewed agency officials. GAO recommends DoD designate a single entity accountable for integrating efforts related to UAS; define roles, responsibilities, and relationships among UAS-related entities; and develop a UAS strategic plan to align and integrate efforts and funding with long-term goals. DoD partially concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with two recommendations, citing actions it has already taken. GAO recognizes DoD's efforts to date, but continues to believe additional actions are needed., Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

Military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to provide needed ground forces. Section 354 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report on a number of military readiness issues. In this report, GAO addresses (1) the extent to which DOD's use of nonstandard forces to meet ground force requirements has impacted the force and (2) the extent to which DOD has faced challenges in managing the training and use of these forces, and taken steps to address any challenges. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed DOD polices, guidance, and data and interviewed department, joint, combatant command, and service officials as well as trainers and over 300 deploying, deployed, and redeploying servicemembers., Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DoD) has established guidance for making and documenting solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan and to determine factors commanders consider when deciding whether to make payments and appropriate payment amounts, GAO obtained and reviewed guidance for these payment programs in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003 to the present and assessed changes in guidance over time. GAO also interviewed knowledgeable officials at commands in Afghanistan and Iraq -- including the former Commander of Multinational Corps Iraq -- as well as at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, among other organizations, regarding changes in guidance over time, processes for making and documenting payments, and the tracking and reporting of payment information. Also, GAO interviewed commanders, judge advocates, comptrollers, and civil affairs teams from selected units that were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005 and 2006 regarding changes in guidance over time, processes for making and documenting payments, and the tracking and reporting of payment information. GAO selected these units for the following reasons: (1) based on their dates and locations of deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) to ensure that they obtained information from officials at the battalion, brigade, and division levels that had direct experience approving, documenting, and making payments; and (3) because unit officials had not yet redeployed or been transferred to other locations within the United States. Enclosure I describes Scope and Methodology. Enclosure II contains briefing charts for a Briefing to Congressional Requestors on February 28, 2007: "Preliminary Observations on the Department of Defense's Use of Condolence and Solatia Payments in Iraq and Afghanistan." Enclosure III contains comments from the DoD. Enclosure IV contains GAO contact information and staff acknowledgments., Report to Congressional Requesters.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has relied on special operations forces to conduct military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and to perform other tasks such as training foreign military forces. To meet the demand for these forces, DoD established a Marine Corps service component under the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to integrate Marine Corps forces. Under the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO assessed the extent to which the following have been accomplished: (1) the Marine Corps special operations command has identified its force structure requirements, (2) the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital approach to manage personnel in its special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has determined whether Marine Corps training programs are preparing its forces for assigned missions. GAO performed its work with the Marine Corps and USSOCOM and analyzed DoD plans for this new command. GAO recommends that the Marine Corps conduct an analysis of the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations command and that USSOCOM establish a basis to ensure they are trained to be fully interoperable with DoD's special operations forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, DoD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted that actions consistent with the recommendations are underway., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Army considers modular force transformation its most extensive restructuring since World War II. The Army has estimated that restructuring units from a division-based force to a more agile and responsive modular brigade-based force will require a significant investment through fiscal year 2011. To facilitate this transformation, Public Law No. 109-163, Section 353, directs the Army to develop and implement a training strategy for the modular brigades. This law also directs GAO to report on the implementation of the strategy. This report discusses the following: (1) the extent to which the Army's training strategy addresses the five elements specified in the public law, and (2) the actions the Army has taken to implement its training strategy and the implementation challenges it faces. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Army training strategy documentation and interviewed Army training personnel. GAO recommends that the Army do the following: (1) take a series of actions to improve its ability to assess unit training and identify funding needs for training by clarifying specific goals, metrics, and its funding model; and (2) revise the training strategy, clarify capacity, and complete testing of the exportable training capability. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense generally concurred with four recommendations and did not concur with two., Report to the Congressional Committees.

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to fully coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed a Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.5 This guidance represents an important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations and DOD officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD learns more about the capabilities of UAS and other ISR assets and their application in combat operations. However, the guidance does not address, on a DOD-wide basis, the issue of advance coordination, which CENTCOM has recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling efficient deployment and utilization of assets and by allowing the combatant commander time to plan to support incoming assets. In the absence of such guidance, CENTCOM has established procedures for the services to coordinate system requirements prior to ISR assets arriving into CENTCOM s theater of operations. These procedures apply only to CENTCOM s theater of operations. However, we found that CENTCOM s procedures for advance coordination were not always followed because the services indicated that they were not aware of the requirement. According to CENTCOM officials, they distributed these procedures to each of CENTCOM s service components, such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, but were not aware if they were distributed further, and the service officials we interviewed were not aware of the requirement.

We found that DOD has established guidance for making and documenting solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that guidance has changed over time primarily in Iraq in terms of condolence payment amounts, approval levels, and payment eligibility. Within parameters established by guidance, commanders exercise broad discretion for determining whether a payment should be made and the appropriate payment amount. While guidance does not require commanders to make payments, commanders may do so if they choose. When determining whether to make payments and payment amounts, commanders told us they consider the severity of injury, type of damage, and property values based on the local economy as well as any other applicable cultural considerations. According to unit officials with whom we spoke, units generally follow a similar process for making solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Officials told us that they generally make payments to civilians at Civil Military Operations Centers ad hoc organizations established by military commanders to assist in the coordination of civilian-related activities or during personal visits., Presented to Congressional Requestors. Document contains briefing charts in addition to text.

As operations overseas continue, the Department of Defense (DoD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide valuable information in support of military operations. While the 2006 Quadrennial Review emphasized the need for the ISR community to improve the integration and management of ISR assets, DoD plans to make significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future. Congress has been interested in DoD's approach for managing and integrating existing assets while acquiring new systems. This testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAO's ongoing work regarding the following: (1) the status of DoD initiatives intended to improve the management and integration of ISR requirements and challenges DoD faces in implementing its initiatives, (2) DoD's approach to managing current ISR assets to support military operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development and the potential for synergies between them. GAO's ongoing work included document review, interviews with officials at relevant organizations, observations of some U.S. Central Command operations, and review of 13 airborne ISR development programs., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.