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Bølstad and Dinas (2017) propose a model of spatial voting, based on social identity theory, that suggests supporting a candidate/policy on the other side of the ideological spectrum has a disutility that is not accounted for by common spatial models. Unfortunately, the data they use cannot speak directly to whether the disutility arises because individuals perceive their ideology as a social identity. We present the results of an experimental study that measures the norm against crossing the ideological spectrum; tests the cost of doing so, controlling for spatial effects; and demonstrates that this cost increases with the salience and strength of identity norms. By demonstrating the norm mechanism for the disutility of crossing the ideological spectrum, we provide strong support for B&D's model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monte Carlo simulations are commonly used to test the performance of estimators and models from rival methods, under a range of data-generating processes. This tool improves our understanding of the relative merits of rival methods in different contexts, such as varying sample sizes and violations of assumptions. When used, it is common to report the bias or the root mean squared error of the different methods. It is far less common to report the standard deviation, overconfidence, coverage probability, or power. Each of these six performance statistics provides important, and often differing, information regarding a method's performance. Here, we present a structured way to think about Monte Carlo performance statistics. In replications of three prominent papers, we demonstrate the utility of our approach and provide new substantive results about the performance of rival methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the aftermath of the Dobbs decision, which overturned Roe v. Wade, and the need for pro-life politicians to reconsider their strategies. Topics discussed include the suggestion of establishing a "central command structure," the role of ultrasound in changing perceptions of unborn children, and the importance of protecting medical conscience in the fight against abortion.

How should ideology be understood, and should we be concerned if Americans lack it? Combining widely used survey questions with an incentivized coordination game, we separately measure individuals' own policy preferences and their knowledge of what other ideological group members expect them to believe. This allows us to distinguish knowledge of ideological norms—what liberals and conservatives believe ought to go with what—from adherence to those norms. We find that a nontrivial portion of those reporting ideologically inconsistent preferences do so knowingly, suggesting their lack of ideological constraint can be attributed to pragmatism rather than innocence. Additionally, a question order experiment reveals that priming ideological norms before measuring policy preferences promotes ideological adherence, suggesting ideological constraint is at least partially attributable to norm‐conformity pressure. Together, these findings raise the question whether ideology is actually desirable or if it instead allows elites to reverse the direction of accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is understood that ensuring equation balance is a necessary condition for a valid model of times series data. Yet, the definition of balance provided so far has been incomplete and there has not been a consistent understanding of exactly why balance is important or how it can be applied. The discussion to date has focused on the estimates produced by the general error correction model (GECM). In this paper, we go beyond the GECM and beyond model estimates. We treat equation balance as a theoretical matter, not merely an empirical one, and describe how to use the concept of balance to test theoretical propositions before longitudinal data have been gathered. We explain how equation balance can be used to check if your theoretical or empirical model is either wrong or incomplete in a way that will prevent a meaningful interpretation of the model. We also raise the issue of " $I(0)$ balance" and its importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is the start of a new relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU). As the consequences of Brexit unfold, there will be pressure to change the TCA, either in a "softer" or "harder" direction. To determine the potential medium-term direction of the EU–UK relationship, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment with a sample of British voters, where we asked them to choose between different hypothetical package deals. When faced with such choices, British citizens overall mostly support a softer relationship in which the UK applies EU regulatory standards in return for greater access to the single market. However, Leave voters most often support a much harder trade-off of full regulatory sovereignty but continued restrictions on UK exports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]