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There are many different kinds of models, and they play many different roles in the scientific endeavour. Neuroscience, and biology more generally, has understandably tended to emphasise empirical models that are grounded in data and make specific, experimentally testable predictions. Meanwhile, strongly idealised or ‘toy’ models have played a central role in the theoretical development of other sciences such as physics. In this paper, we examine the nature of toy models and their prospects in neuroscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the possibilities and limitations of Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism on the problem of structure and agency. Bhaskar’s realist perspective on the problem starts from discussions in the philosophy of science and extends to social theory. In this regard, Bhaskar, building upon the layered reality concept in the philosophy of science, attempted to construct a naturalistic social theory, starting with the concept of ontological stratification and continuing with the theory of causal powers, reinforced by discussions of emergentism. Through this conceptual framework, he offered an explanation beyond the reductionist and synthesist approaches around the mentioned debate. On the other hand, the criticisms of Bhaskar’s naturalistic perspective, especially by contemporary representatives of the critical realist tradition through cognitive neuroscience, have shown the limitations of Bhaskar’s naturalistic view. The article discusses these criticisms and then lays out the grounds for both Bhaskar and his critics. Finally, the similarities between the seemingly conflicting approaches, the sources of these similarities, and the questions they fail to answer are addressed. In addition, it has been argued that the theoretical diversity on the structure-agency problem around these questions is merely an expansion within critical realism itself, and that a paradigmatic solution to the problem could not be produced. For a paradigmatic solution, it is argued that new theoretical considerations based on human nature and human singularity/subjective experience are essential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disputes about the scientific validity of the amyloid‐β hypothesis of Alzheimer's disease have been held since the early 1990s, with little constructive progress made between opposing sides despite recent therapeutic progress. Here, I argue that philosophy of science can improve the chance of constructive debate by giving researchers technical language to describe and assess scientific progress. To do so, I interpret the amyloid hypothesis using a modified version of the research programme concept from philosopher of science Imre Lakatos. I first outline the amyloid‐β hypothesis and study critiques of its central place in Alzheimer's research. Then, I draw on the complexity of amyloid‐β and Alzheimer's research to discuss the limits of using concepts from popular philosophers of science Karl Popper or Thomas Kuhn, before finally arguing that an adaptation of the research programme concept can foster constructive debates about the science of Alzheimer's and within it. I will argue that the amyloid‐β hypothesis has contributed to significant progress in the Alzheimer's field based on what Lakatos called the "positive heuristic" (motivating the programme to test its predictions) and the "negative heuristic" (protecting the programme from refutation). I consider the amyloid research agenda to be progressive despite the fact that its claims about disease aetiology could be wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economists use a variety of normative empirical concepts because the economy and morality are intertwined. Often, this normativity is intended and widely acknowledged, signaling the relevance and meaning of research. Sometimes, the objectivity of research and the findings obtained by using normative concepts is problematic. Written from the perspective of a practicing economist, the article offers a practical guiding tool to economists, suggesting how to be responsible in developing and using normative empirical concepts. It is based on valuable insights from the philosophy of science and codes of conduct. It illustrates the use of the guiding tool with the example of a normative empirical concept that is widely used in development economics: 'ethnic fractionalization'. The conclusion is that applied economists should be more involved in being accountable for the normativity in our work and that we should ensure that, by using the tool, the normative concepts that we use are acceptable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the question of the reliability of Machine Learning (ML) methods has acquired significant importance, and the analysis of the associated uncertainties has motivated a growing amount of research. However, most of these studies have applied standard error analysis to ML models—and in particular Deep Neural Network (DNN) models—which represent a rather significant departure from standard scientific modelling. It is therefore necessary to integrate the standard error analysis with a deeper epistemological analysis of the possible differences between DNN models and standard scientific modelling and the possible implications of these differences in the assessment of reliability. This article offers several contributions. First, it emphasises the ubiquitous role of model assumptions (both in ML and traditional science) against the illusion of theory-free science. Secondly, model assumptions are analysed from the point of view of their (epistemic) complexity, which is shown to be language-independent. It is argued that the high epistemic complexity of DNN models hinders the estimate of their reliability and also their prospect of long term progress. Some potential ways forward are suggested. Thirdly, this article identifies the close relation between a model’s epistemic complexity and its interpretability, as introduced in the context of responsible AI. This clarifies in which sense—and to what extent—the lack of understanding of a model (black-box problem) impacts its interpretability in a way that is independent of individual skills. It also clarifies how interpretability is a precondition for a plausible assessment of the reliability of any model, which cannot be based on statistical analysis alone. This article focuses on the comparison between traditional scientific models and DNN models. However, Random Forest (RF) and Logistic Regression (LR) models are also briefly considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on pluralism in economics has focused on the benefits expected from the plurality of theories, methods, and frameworks. This overlooks half of the picture: the costs. Neither have the multifarious costs been systematically analyzed in philosophy of science. We begin rectifying this neglect. We discuss how the benefits of plurality and diversity in science presuppose distinct types of plurality and how various benefit and plurality types are associated with different types of costs. Finally, we ponder how the general mechanisms that give rise to the costs of plurality and diversity are aggravated by various disciplinary characteristics of economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs network theory, mining data and bibliometric analysis when mapping the scientific contribution of Nobel Prize candidate; Manuel Sandoval Vallarta, the first and most renowned Mexican physicist and important figure in Latin American science. Vallarta died in 1977, and the existing literature is about his life and contributions to science but not about how those are still valuable today. This paper is the first to highlight, with mapping tools, that his contributions are relevant to the international community of cosmic rays (as he was pioneer and leader), quantum mechanics and relativity. These tools delivered three findings: Identify how he built his own field of study, same as universal knowledge. Unveil that the backward and forward Vallarta citations follow a scale-free network distribution. Determine social factors that benefited or affected his scientific activities—such as World War II interrupting Vallarta's successful productivity at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Furthermore, this study confirmed the interdisciplinary nature of the mapping studies of the scientist's contributions using scientometric tools. As a result, several interesting questions arose throughout our research, some of which were answered from the history and philosophy of science. However, others need to be analyzed by experts in the fields of Vallarta. Mapping research sends an invitation to interdisciplinary dialogue/research between experts in different areas of study to better understand the process of knowledge production both, individual and collective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to natural curiosity, science is characterized by a number of psychological processes and perceptions. Among the psychological features, scientific enquiry relates to uncovering—or discovering—aspects of a world perceived as hidden from humans. A speculative theoretical model is presented, suggesting the evolution of science reflects psychological repercussions of wearing clothes. Specifically, the natural world is perceived as hidden due to the presence of clothing. Three components of scientific enquiry may arise from clothing: detachment from sensual experience, a perception that the world is veiled in mystery, and an intellectual desire to uncover the hidden structure of nature. Rather than beginning with the emergence of Homo sapiens, the proposed connection with clothing implies that psychological foundations for science began to develop during the last ice age, with the invention of complex clothes that fully covered the human body. After the end of the last ice age, elements of scientific thinking began to emerge in societies where clothing was worn routinely for psychosocial reasons, including modesty. Notably, a scientific attitude was essentially absent in hunter-gatherer communities where nakedness remained the norm. This novel perspective aims to advance the history and philosophy of science, revealing the emergence of science as a situated phenomenon contingent on humans being covered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the preceding Part 1 of this two-part paper, I set out the background necessary for an understanding of the current status of the debate surrounding the relationship between science and religion. In this second part, I will outline Ian Barbour's influential four-fold typology of the possible relations, compare it with other similar taxonomies, and justify its choice as the basis for further detailed discussion. Arguments are then given for and against each of Barbour's four models: conflict, independence, integration and dialogue. In contradiction of the recent trend to dismiss the conflict model as overly "simplistic", I conclude that it is the clear front-runner. Critical examination reveals that theology (the academic face of religion) typically proceeds by first affirming belief in God and then seeking rationalisations that protect this belief against contrary evidence. As this is the very antithesis of scientific endeavour, the two disciplines are in unavoidable and irreconcilable conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science and religion have been described as the "two dominant forces in our culture". As such, the relation between them has been a matter of intense debate, having profound implications for deeper understanding of our place in the universe. One position naturally associated with scientists of a materialistic outlook is that science and religion are contradictory, incompatible worldviews; however, a great deal of recent literature criticises this "conflict thesis" as simple-minded, essentially ignorant of the nature of religion and its philosophical and theological underpinnings. In this first part of a two-part article, I set out the wide-ranging background required for a proper understanding of the debate as a preliminary for the second part, in which Ian Barbour 's influential four-fold typology of science-religion relations is critically assessed, leading to the conclusion that the conflict model is not to be so easily dismissed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different species of realism have been proposed in the scientific and philosophical literature. Two of these species are direct realism and causal pattern realism. Direct realism is a form of perceptual realism proposed by ecological psychologists within cognitive science. Causal pattern realism has been proposed within the philosophy of model-based science. Both species are able to accommodate some of the main tenets and motivations of instrumentalism. The main aim of this paper is to explore the conceptual moves that make both direct realism and causal pattern realism tenable realist positions able to accommodate an instrumentalist stance. Such conceptual moves are (i) the rejection of veritism and (ii) the re-structuring of the phenomena of interest. We will then show that these conceptual moves are instances of the ones of a common realist genus we name pragmatist realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of philosophers claim that realism about dark matter in cosmology is unwarranted because there has been no empirical confirmation of a dark matter particle. This demand is misguided. I argue that we should take the theoretical concept of dark matter as described in our best cosmological model (ΛCDM) at face value. Since there is no theoretical or nomological requirement that dark matter be a particle, we should better assess the implications of dark matter detection via gravitational lensing. The result is that realism about dark matter is a viable position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractHenri Poincaré is well known for his work in mathematics, physics, and the philosophy of science. From 1900 onwards, Poincaré had the opportunity to become a forerunner of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), a concept that was formally developed 65 years later, but he never seised it. We show that Poincaré’s view on randomness was incompatible with the EMH framework. Although he did not work directly on financial topics, his work has helped to understand the limits of random walks in asset pricing; a way to reconcile the mathematician with the field of finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Reparations after Species Extinctions: An Account of Reparative Interspecies Justice" by Anna Wienhues and Alfonso Donoso explores the concept of reparations in the context of species extinctions. The authors argue that there is a moral obligation to provide reparations for the harm caused by human-induced extinctions. They propose a framework for reparative interspecies justice that includes measures such as habitat restoration, species reintroduction, and the recognition of the rights of the biotic community. The article emphasizes the importance of considering the perspectives and interests of non-human beings in discussions of justice and reparations. [Extracted from the article]

Abraham Flexner's 1910 report on medical education is widely regarded as a watershed moment in the history of modern medicine in the US and beyond. Most commentators focus on its administrative and managerial impact, despite Flexner dedicating a sizeable portion of his report to a theoretical account of the kind of medicine that he seeks to implement. Close attention to these sections reveals a surprisingly coherent account of medicine that, based on a Deweyan Pragmatist philosophy of science, unites scientific investigator and medical practitioner in a new experimental paradigm of science. Flexner can develop an account that goes beyond a mere epistemic redefinition of medicine, providing the profession with a social, cultural, and ethical identity that avails itself of the extremely wide purview that Dewey granted to modern science. Due to the subsequent narrowing of philosophy of science to a delimited academic subdiscipline, these broad Pragmatist philosophical commitments at the roots of Flexner's scientific medicine remained a largely unexplored intellectual legacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is devoted to the problem of describing reality in the language of mathematics and logic in connection with intellectual intuition. The question raised is how the basic requirements of mathematical theory and logic will change if some of the multiverse models of modern physics are taken as the basis. Mathematics is considered in the context of various historical approaches. It is shown that some of the well-known requirements of a formal theory (such as consistency) may begin to play a different role if the multiverse hypothesis is accepted. In the framework of theories based on the idea of multiple worlds, the logical consequence, the natural law of Duns Scotus, the law of excluded middle, and other well-known facts of classical logic which in some cases cause controversy due to their intuitive unacceptability are resolved. The paper discusses an approach based on paraconsistent logics: such logics can be considered the first to correspond to multiverse theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review examines complexity science in the context of Heliophysics, describing it not as a discipline, but as a paradigm. In the context of Heliophysics, complexity science is the study of a star, interplanetary environment, magnetosphere, upper and terrestrial atmospheres, and planetary surface as interacting subsystems. Complexity science studies entities in a system (e.g., electrons in an atom, planets in a solar system, individuals in a society) and their interactions, and is the nature of what emerges from these interactions. It is a paradigm that employs systems approaches and is inherently multi- and cross-scale. Heliophysics processes span at least 15 orders of magnitude in space and another 15 in time, and its reaches go well beyond our own solar system and Earth's space environment to touch planetary, exoplanetary, and astrophysical domains. It is an uncommon domain within which to explore complexity science. After first outlining the dimensions of complexity science, the review proceeds in three epochal parts: 1) A pivotal year in the Complexity Heliophysics paradigm: 1996; 2) The transitional years that established foundations of the paradigm (1996-2010); and 3) The emergent literature largely beyond 2010. This review article excavates the lived and living history of complexity science in Heliophysics. It identifies five dimensions of complexity science, some enjoying much scholarship in Heliophysics, others that represent relative gaps in the existing research. The history reveals a grand challenge that confronts Heliophysics, as with most physical sciences, to understand the research intersection between fundamental science (e.g., complexity science) and applied science (e.g., artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML)). A risk science framework is suggested as a way of formulating the grand scientific and societal challenges in a way that AI/ML and complexity science converge. The intention is to provide inspiration, help researchers think more coherently about ideas of complexity science in Heliophysics, and guide future research. It will be instructive to Heliophysics researchers, but also to any reader interested in or hoping to advance the frontier of systems and complexity science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The need for fair and just AI is often related to the possibility of understanding AI itself, in other words, of turning an opaque box into a glass box, as inspectable as possible. Transparency and explainability, however, pertain to the technical domain and to philosophy of science, thus leaving the ethics and epistemology of AI largely disconnected. To remedy this, we propose an integrated approach premised on the idea that a glass-box epistemology should explicitly consider how to incorporate values and other normative considerations, such as intersectoral vulnerabilities, at critical stages of the whole process from design and implementation to use and assessment. To connect ethics and epistemology of AI, we perform a double shift of focus. First, we move from trusting the output of an AI system to trusting the process that leads to the outcome. Second, we move from expert assessment to more inclusive assessment strategies, aiming to facilitate expert and non-expert assessment. Together, these two moves yield a framework usable for experts and non-experts when they inquire into relevant epistemological and ethical aspects of AI systems. We dub our framework 'epistemology-cum-ethics' to signal the equal importance of both aspects. We develop it from the vantage point of the designers: how to create the conditions to internalize values into the whole process of design, implementation, use, and assessment of an AI system, in which values (epistemic and non-epistemic) are explicitly considered at each stage and inspectable by every salient actor involved at any moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amalgamation of evidence in statistics is conducted in several ways. Within a study, multiple observations are combined by averaging, or as factors in a likelihood or prediction algorithm. In multilevel modeling or Bayesian analysis, population or prior information is combined with data using the weighted averaging derived from probability modeling. In a scientific research project, inferences from data analysis are interpreted in light of mechanistic models and substantive theories. Within a scholarly or applied research community, data and conclusions from separate laboratories are amalgamated through a series of steps, including peer review, meta-analysis, review articles, and replication studies. These issues have been discussed for many years in the philosophy of science and statistics, gaining attention in recent decades first with the renewed popularity of Bayesian inference and then with concerns about the replication crisis in science. In this article, we review the amalgamation of statistical evidence from different perspectives, connecting the foundations of statistics to the social processes of validation, criticism, and consensus building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text provides a personal account of James E. Trosko's scientific journey in the field of stem cell research and radiation biology. Trosko discusses his experiences with stem cell research, including the challenges he faced due to lack of scientific knowledge and opposition from religious and ethical concerns. He also describes his work with the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where he studied the health consequences of atomic bomb survivors. Trosko reflects on the role of nutrition and diets in influencing disease states and concludes that both radiation and chemical carcinogenesis can be influenced by environmental and lifestyle factors. [Extracted from the article]

Smith and Smith and Wood proposed that the human fossil record offers special challenges for causal hypotheses because "unique" adaptations resist the comparative method. We challenge their notions of "uniqueness" and offer a refutation of the idea that there is something epistemologically special about human prehistoric data. Although paleontological data may be sparse, there is nothing inherent about this information that prevents its use in the inductive or deductive process, nor in the generation and testing of scientific hypotheses. The imprecision of the fossil record is well‐understood, and such imprecision is often factored into hypotheses and methods. While we acknowledge some oversteps within the discipline, we also note that the history of paleoanthropology is clearly one of progress, with ideas tested and resolution added as data (fossils) are uncovered and new technologies applied, much like in sciences as diverse as astronomy, molecular genetics, and geology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: Many strategy studies implicitly rely upon inference to the best explanation (IBE) or modern abduction. We leverage recent work in the philosophy of science to consider how we arrive at "best" explanations, explanations that are lovely, in the sense that they are useful, general, and provide meaning, and likely, in the sense that they are close to the truth. Interpretation of observational results requires an understanding of context that statistical analysis alone cannot provide. At that point of encounter, historical methods—hermeneutics, contextualization and source criticism—can improve IBE by helping scholars (1) generate new candidate explanations and (2) systematically judge, privilege, and balance the explanatory virtues that constitute the loveliness and likeliness of explanations. Managerial Summary: Many strategy studies iteratively use data and theory to inference to the best explanation of observed phenomena. We leverage recent work in the philosophy of science to consider how we arrive at best explanations that are useful, general, provide meaning, and, at the same time, are close to the truth. Interpreting observational results requires an understanding of the context that statistical analysis alone cannot provide. At that point of encounter, methodological tools from the field of history can improve the process of determining the best explanation by helping scholars (1) generate new candidate explanations and (2) systematically judge and privilege explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russo–Williamson thesis maintains that establishing a causal claim in medicine normally requires establishing both a correlation and a mechanism. In this paper, I present a dilemma for defenders of this thesis: a strong version of the thesis requires denying a plausible counterexample, but as the thesis is weakened, its defenders must give up their favoured account of the explanatory role of causal claims in medicine. I appeal to some recent work in epistemology on infallibilism to propose a way out of this dilemma, where this way out requires neither denying the plausible counterexample nor giving up the favoured account. I think this shows that even apparently abstract debates in epistemology can provide resources that may help to resolve debates in the philosophy of science and medicine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I attempt to broaden Feyerabend scholarship by asking whether and how Feyerabend's philosophy of science, in particular his commitments to realism and pluralism about scientific theories as well as anarchism about scientific methods, is borne out in multidisciplinary research concerning the Leggett–Garg inequalities. These inequalities were derived explicitly to be a temporal analogue to Bell's inequalities: the viability of macroscopic realism is tested against the predictions of quantum mechanics by performing a series measurements on a macroscopic variable of one system at different time intervals, then evaluating correlations among resultant values. In the nearly forty years since Leggett and Garg's paper, questions continue to be raised whether common tests of these inequalities reveal genuine violations or merely experimental disturbances. There is also much debate about what genuine violations in fact signify, if (as most agree) they are not straight-forwardly analogous to Bell tests. Taking this fascinating and as yet largely unsettled episode from physics as a case study, I derive three Feyerabendian lessons that demonstrate the relevance of his views even today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses two books, "Something Speaks to Me: Where Criticism Begins" by Michel Chaouli and "Criticism and Truth: On Method in Literary Studies" by Jonathan Kramnick, which offer different perspectives on literary criticism. Chaouli's book reflects on the power of aesthetic experience through a classroom experience where he struggled to articulate his thoughts on a passage from Kafka's "The Trial." Kramnick's book focuses on the techniques and conventions used by literary critics to effectively analyze and interpret texts. Both books explore the value of literary study and the role of teaching in shaping critical practices. The author of this article is a scholar who has written on texts from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as literary theory, with works that likely delve into topics such as romanticism, aesthetics, and the impact of utilitarianism on pornography. [Extracted from the article]

This essay interprets the poetry of A. R. Ammons through the mathematics of topology as theorized by Michel Serres. Focused on the bending, stretching and twisting of geometric forms to reveal new, unexpected shapes and areas of equivalence, topology provides Serres a conception of culture that challenges the static, Euclidian mindset that for him predominates Western thought. Viewed topologically, Ammons's poems, with their rapidly changing, seemingly incongruous, subject matter, meter, and diction, create surprising structural analogies or points of contact between discourses often regarded as separate, such as the literary and scientific. I trace the relations between science and poetry in two of Ammons's more ambitious works that span his mature period: the "Essay on Poetics" (1970) and the book-length Garbage (1993), examining the innovative strategies Ammons develops to locate the hidden passageways between disciplines that modern culture obscures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article employs conceptual tools from the philosophy of science to shed new light on prolonged Iran-US hostility. Iranian and American elites evidently have negative attitudes towards the other nation, but these attitudes lack systematic and theoretical analysis. We apply the post-positivist concepts of theory-laden perception and judgement to anticipate the impact of established attitudes on foreign policy experts. After considering the cognitive training of each foreign policy community in the 1980s, the article hypothesises each group's perceptions of and judgements about the other's behaviour during Operation Desert Storm (1991), Operation Enduring Freedom (2001), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003). The concurrence of theory-laden judgements with each nation's actual decisions indicates the likely contributions of American and Iranian foreign policy experts to the lack of substantial long-term bilateral cooperation, while the instance of a lack of concurrence indicates the possibility of future change. Our cross-disciplinary methodology demonstrates the utility of venturing outside the traditional boundaries of international relations scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Pleistocene Social Contract: Culture and Cooperation in Human Evolution" by Kim Sterelny explores the origins and survival of human cooperation in an unequal world. Sterelny argues that early human societies were egalitarian and cooperative, but inequality emerged and stabilized over time. The book examines the role of culture in solving the challenges of cooperation, such as the generation and distribution of benefits. Sterelny presents a four-phase model of human cooperation, tracing its evolution from the suppression of dominance hierarchies to the establishment of sedentary societies with hierarchies. The book provides a detailed and empirically grounded account of human social evolution, drawing on a range of disciplinary fields. However, some caveats include the need for further exploration of factors such as cooperative breeding and the limits of ethnographic analogy. Overall, "The Pleistocene Social Contract" offers a comprehensive and insightful analysis of the evolution of human cooperation. [Extracted from the article]

This paper describes the main features and goals of the speculative work in modern sciences that has greatly accelerated since World War II due to the exponential increase in computing power and newly available theoretical and conceptual tools. It points to the long historical strand of speculative philosophical work in symbiosis with the sciences, suggests the reasons for its unexpected neglect in contemporary professional philosophy of science, why it should be a major approach, and why such pursuit is not inevitable. Finally, the paper outlines potential topics, fields, and tools for such collaborative work and argues it is likelier to be more fruitful today than at any point in the past hundred years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kuhnian philosophy of science implies that progress in the study of open-ended evolution (OEE) would be accelerated if the OEE science community were to agree on some examples of striking success in OEE science. This article recounts the important role of scientific paradigms and scientific exemplars in creating the productivity of what Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, calls "normal" science, and it describes how the study of OEE today would benefit from exhibiting more of the hallmarks of normal science. The article concludes by describing five proposed projects that would help create a consensus in the OEE community on some good examples of the scientific study of OEE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Eidos magazine, from the University of the North, presents its 40th issue with a variety of essays and a review. Highlights include an article that reinterprets the concept of community based on everyday connections, an analysis of the dialogue between Rosmini and Tocqueville in search of a third political way, and two articles on the philosophy of science. Topics such as text and experience, art as a map of intensity, the concept of death from Kierkegaard's thinking, memory in alternative museums, and the case of violence in El Salado are also addressed. The issue concludes with a review of the book "The Swimmer of Paestum" by Tonio Hölscher. [Extracted from the article]

Arnaud Dandieu (1897–1933), a Personalist transdisciplinary thinker, joined up with Claude Chevalley (1909–84), cofounder of the Bourbaki group of mathematicians, to conduct a phenomenological study of the scientist's activity over several articles. It shows the current development of "carnal hermeneutics" already present among the earliest manifestations of French phenomenology, in a tactile approach to the sense of depth as key to the search for knowledge, from the sorcerer to the scientist, building on the phenomenological psychology of Eugène Minkowski (1885–1972). Dandieu and Chevalley's "rational act of exclusion" takes the irrational concrete as the fulcrum of a heroic psychological breakthrough to purely logical abstraction, inseparable from its existential ground in embodied personhood. The present article will use their little-known articles to document the conscious emergence of a distinctly French school of phenomenology, eschewing from the start, twenty years before Merleau-Ponty, the neglect of multisensory experience in the flesh decried by critics of its German tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The report addresses a complex problem for artificial intelligence (AI) as self-connected signification, design of selfadjoint operators and semiotic reality, issue and perspective of self-connected digital reality of different types of identity, systems of information infrastructure and digital pesrsonalisation. In addition, AI is also presented as a digital issue of strategic reality and guidelines that the European Commission undertakes for safety and security in the use of this instrument in digital society and markets in the EU and globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop the notions of resistance and points of entry in the context of alternative written textual formats used in physics teacher education. Studies point out that textbooks have played an important role in undergraduate physics courses, which can be part of the initial training of physics teachers. On the foundation of theories in the philosophy of science, it is possible to verify that there are philosophical reasons for the privileged use of this textual format in physics undergraduate courses. However, alongside the transformation of the educational field in terms of its theoretical-methodological approaches, there is a growing body of research and educational practices that highlights the importance and possibilities of incorporating others written textual formats in all levels of physics education. The notions of resistance and points of entry can enhance the awareness of these dynamics of physics education. To produce such an understanding, we put the philosophy of science in dialogue with the philosophy of action, which provides an overview of the interactions of life, including physics pedagogy - in which actions promote transformations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review essay discusses recent Aristotelian interventions in the philosophy of science and biology, focusing on the recovery of formal and final causes. The essay examines four books that explore these topics, emphasizing the role of mathematics in each. One of the books argues that Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics is presupposed by scientific methods and various scientific disciplines. However, the reviewer questions the logical dependence between science and metaphysics proposed by the author and suggests that a different mode of mathematical modeling may offer a more comprehensive approach to understanding morphological change and form. Another book explores the reconciliation of Aristotelianism with emergentist approaches to science, particularly biology. The author argues for a dispositionalist metaphysics and critiques classical and dynamic emergence theories. While the book presents a comprehensive survey of relevant literature and offers a synthesis of ideas, it falls short in addressing conflicts between emergence and hylomorphism. Additionally, another book examines the tension between evolution and hylomorphism, proposing a neo-Aristotelian theory of biological natural kinds essentialism that incorporates dispositionalism. The author challenges the traditional understanding of eidos and explores the role of dispositional properties in ontogenesis and developmental pathways. The article discusses two books that explore the concept of final and formal causality in relation to evolution and biology from an Aristotelian perspective. The first book reconstructs teleology as an environment-sensitive energy that is not directed towards any specific instance or collection of gene expression. The second book aims to restore final [Extracted from the article]

Orality, literacy, and digitality are forms of knowledge and communication based on speech, reading and writing, and electronic technologies using binary formats, respectively. This article reviews four possible relationships between them: Is literacy (and by extension digitality) the superior form, is orality superior, are all three mostly interchangeable, or do they all change each other as they emerge historically? These different positions imply different histories: linear, contingent, and epochal. This article considers the future of digitality by reviewing these relationships, past and present. These four intellectual positions did not arise neutrally. In fact, the superiority of literacy is rooted in Eurocentric views of technological progress and colonial power. Because this positionality is crucial to understanding the historical relationship among them, the article draws on the philosophy of science of dialectical realism to look for the similarities and differences between the positions, as well as the contradictions. It is a bold call for the comparative historical sociology of digitality (and everything else). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sophia, Colección de Filosofía de la Educación is the property of Universidad Politecnica Salesiana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Filosofija, Sociologija is the property of Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Scholars have long debated the definition of social entrepreneurship, but disagreement persists. Despite sustained efforts to craft a universal definition, social entrepreneurship has been characterized as an ʻessentially contested concept'. However, little is known about the root causes of this ongoing contestation. Therefore, we delve into the literature's social entrepreneurship definitions to examine this complex issue. Our systematic literature review leverages insights from the philosophy of science and formal logic—specifically, a theory of definition—to present four rules for definitional evaluation in the social sciences. Accordingly, definitions should convey the essence of a concept (Rule 1: essence), differentiate between their defining and defined terms (Rule 2: expression), be phrased positively (Rule 3: explication), and avoid figurative and obscure language (Rule 4: eloquence). Using these rules to analyse 156 original social entrepreneurship definitions reveals varying interpretations of the concept's essence and sheds light on epistemological issues, such as tautological definitions. Integrating these findings into a practical ʻrulebook' for definitional evaluation significantly contributes to the social entrepreneurship literature and other highly contested fields by helping to understand different sources of contestation. Guided by our rulebook, we suggest future research avenues and highlight diverse theorizing styles, the engagement of opposing and paradoxical definitional views and the role of academic language in shaping the social entrepreneurship field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I recontextualize Weber's ideal type in the philosophy of natural science and economics in terms of idealization. The goal is to promote the appreciation of this methodology in contemporary social science and improve upon some Weberians' underdeveloped interpretations. Drawing on Weber's methodological writing and study of the Protestant ethic, I argue that the philosophy of idealization and Weber's ideal type share methodological characteristics: both support the selection of a research topic by isolating a particular component of reality and then constructing an imagination based on empirical materials and thought experimentation. By using the imagination as a benchmark, investigators counterfactually and contrastively explain why a particular case was observed as it was, as opposed to other possible outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the significance of F.A. Hayek's work in understanding the nature and practice of science. It discusses Hayek's critique of scientism and his understanding of the relationship between natural and social sciences. The article emphasizes Hayek's theory of mind and evolutionary epistemology, which highlight the fragmented and tacit nature of human knowledge. It also discusses the role of rules in scientific domains and the importance of adaptation and orderliness. The article concludes by discussing the limitations of constructivist approaches and the need for methodological liberty in scientific discovery. [Extracted from the article]

In the Harvard lectures of 1924–1925, Alfred North Whitehead proposed that our various intellectual activities amounted to an attempt to understand the world and our experiences through hypothesizing. He explained the importance of hypothesis in scientific research and extended the idea of hypothesis to the philosophical method called "speculative philosophy." For Whitehead, philosophy was the attempt to formulate general hypotheses that can transcend disciplines. This paper is intended to explore the possible influence of Victorian philosophers on Whitehead. Victorian philosophers such as John Herschel, William Whewell, and John Stuart Mill discussed the role of hypothesis in scientific discovery. Was Whitehead aware of this tradition? Was he influenced by it? This article indicates that Whitehead at least indirectly inherited the Victorian idea of hypothesis, notably in the thought of Whewell, as mediated by Charles Darwin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the history of science and to science and technology studies, the value discourse in the philosophy of science has not provided a thorough analysis of the material culture of science. Instruments in science have a special characteristic, namely that they explicitly and clearly emerge from and remain embedded in social contexts, and are thus imbued with values. We argue that the materials (in most cases they are artifacts) used in science are necessarily influenced by both epistemic and non-epistemic considerations. A consequence of this is that a descriptive term cannot give sufficient information whether an artifact is performing in an acceptable way. Instead of the prevailing descriptive approach, we therefore advocate a normative notion of values in the material culture of science. To this end, we connect the material culture of science to the so-called “new demarcation problem”, in order to lay the foundations for a value-sensitive approach to the analysis of instruments. By assessing the five approaches of demarcation concerning value-influences, it will be shown that they break down at various points if the material aspects of science are taken seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of innovation in achieving common prosperity in Asia and globally. It emphasizes the need for a holistic approach to understanding innovation, including its antecedents, processes, and consequences, as well as its relationship with diverse management practices. The article also highlights the importance of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches, as well as the inclusion of insights from history, humanities, and the arts. Additionally, the article addresses the challenges and opportunities presented by disruptive technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence, and the need for responsible and ethical governance. It concludes by emphasizing the importance of culture, humanities, and value-driven innovation, as well as the urgent quest for responsibility, ethics, and better governance in the age of AI. [Extracted from the article]

This article investigates the analogy of the “laws of nature” through Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and Gilbert Simondon’s ontogenetic naturalism (ON). Both thinkers challenge the literalist interpretation of scientific knowledge by emphasizing the indirect nature of relation and the primacy of the autonomy of discrete beings over pre-established physical laws. Harman’s OOO defends this autonomy as the irreducible independence of objects from their relations, while Simondon focuses on the modulation of information in shaping the laws of nature through individuation. The article argues that while science remains the best recursive triangulation between logic and empirical evidence, its grasp of an ultimate, literal Truth is constricted by an epistemological relation to autonomous realities, grounded in analogy. Consequently, the laws of nature are considered as legislated by discrete autonomies, with space and time emerging from the things themselves. The article concludes by discussing the consequences of this reframing in light of the ancient conception of díkēkosmos (cosmic justice).