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In my paper, I use Jon Stewart's recent analysis of the relationship between Hegel's and Marx's philosophy concerning the issues of alienation and recognition as a starting point for tackling the issue of alienation within civil society. I present key issues in Hegel's presentation of civil society in the Philosophy of Right and Marx's critique of this presentation. I argue that although both accounts are deficient, together they eloquently present the contradictory features of civil society once it attains political character. Ultimately, I concur with Stewart's thesis about the long-term Hegelian influence, and I argue that the rival explanations of civil society of Hegel and Marx are still revealing even today and can significantly contribute to self-understanding within contemporary liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In “The Phenomenology of Spirit” and “Philosophy of Right”, Hegel gives a detailed specification of the theses about the war that were claimed in earlier papers and manuscripts, but his position is not fundamentally changed. In the “The Phenomenology of Spirit” Hegel advocates governments’ need and right to initiate a war from time to time in order to prevent both the isolation and atomization, and let individuals feel the death. As in the past, the war, as Hegel says, has a moment of ethical life. In the “Philosophy of Right” Hegel introduces final deliberations about war that rely on ideas of his earlier paper about natural law even more than in the “The Phenomenology of Spirit”. Hegel emphasizes the ethical role of sacrifice in the war and expresses opinions critical of not an abstract perpetual peace but a concrete philosophical project of Kant. Due to Hegel, Kant’s perpetual peace does not resemble a perpetual deception, since the required union of states is elusive and none except the world spirit in the world history can be a praetor. In line with Heraclitus, Hegel maintains that wars underlie the nature of things. I contribute to the discussions of Hegel scholars if Hegel’s philosophy glorifies a war or not as follows: I substitute the term “glorification” with the term “bellicisme” that suits better to measured, not snobbish and deprived of certain historical implications Hegel’s theses about reasonableness, necessity, the ethicality of war and ethicality of perpetual peace illness.

In my paper, I use Jon Stewart’s recent analysis of relationship between Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophy concerning the issues of alienation and recognition as a starting point for tackling the issue of alienation within the civil society. I present key issues in Hegel’s presentation of civil society in Philosophy of Right and Marx’s critique of this presentation. I argue that although both accounts are deficient, together they eloquently present the contradictory features of civil society once it attains political character. Ultimately, I concur with Stewart’s thesis about long-term Hegelian influence, and I argue that the rival explanations of civil society of Hegel and Marx are still revealing even today, and can significantly contribute to self-understanding within contemporary liberal democracy.

Public international law is concerned with the relationship between human dignity and human rights. Concepts such as person, freedom and justice occur in legal texts, often without an accurate definition. To solve these ambiguities, thus contributing to developing a virtuous legal and political debate, a philosophical clarification might be helpful. In this article, my aim is to provide an analysis of the notion of human dignity in Kant's works and in Islamic thought and to evaluate how Kant's approach can offer tools that are relevant to the current debates on dignity in both Western and non-Western traditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to explore and lay out crucial aspects of the interpretation of the Hegelian philosophy offered by the American thinker Richard Dien Winfield. Winfield works out an innovative line of interpretation that decisively ties Hegel to a non-foundational type of philosophical epistemology with significant consequences concerning the concept of objectivity in both theoretical and practical philosophical investigation. The article attempts to reconstruct this line of interpretation and assess its argumentative force, in view of an array of epistemological problems regarding theory construction in political philosophy. On this account, the principal question is whether the special brand of epistemological non-foundationalism ascribed by Winfield to Hegel is actually in a favorable position to successfully tackle with these problems.

For Hegel, poverty is not simply a misfortune, but, rather, a kind of injury inflicted on one class by another. Though Hegel rejects Marx's theory of class, he nevertheless anticipates Marx's idea of the exploitation of one class by another. How, though, do we align this proto-marxist dichotomy between rich and poor with Hegel's official theory of class; his tripartite theory of estates? I argue that Hegel's wealthy are chiefly found in the 'mercantile' estate, and that they are those intellectual labourers who manage, oversee, and organize the production process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Regulation of Drugs in Plato's Laws". In the standard manuscript of the Laws --the Parisinus Graecus 1807 of the 9th Century AD-- this dialogue is placed between the Minos and the Epinomis. While in the Minos the pupil refers to the diversity of rites and traditions that can be observed amongst different peoples, the Epinomis stresses the unity of the law. The regulation of symposia, the access to drugs, to intoxicating drinks and to medicine is a fundamental theme of the Laws. This is evident already from the composition of the dialogue, since this theme is discussed in its first books. The art of regulating communal life is shown as a technique that can be perfected through dialogue. Communal drinking can be beneficial, says the anonymous Athenian foreigner, since wine encourages citizens to sing, and through the confrontation with pleasure citizens are able to exercise temperance. Since the consumption of wine may also produce excesses and loss of constraint, its consumption should be regulated. The Athenian proposes a minimal age limit for wine drinking: 18 years old (Laws, 2.666a-e). The position of the Athenian foreigner concerning the regulation of drugs is a message that might be called "antiprohibitionist", although not in the contemporary sense (individualist and liberal), but in the sense that an absolute prohibition of drug consumption for the citizens is not defended: the proposal is to allow its consumption, but under a legal and communitarian regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Limite is the property of Universidad de Tarapaca, Departamento de Filosofia y Psicologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this paper is to offer a concise and faithful account of Rawls’ theory of international justice, in an effort, first, to elucidate the structure of the argument that is advanced in that theory and, second, to present a critical assessment of it. The critical assessment section attempts, on the one side, to cope with crucial methodological issues, which have a more general bearing upon Rawls’ overall political philosophical position, including the constructivist perspective of theory making and the division between a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine; on the other side, to weigh up a set of substantive claims made in the Rawlsian theory of international justice, including the recognition of peoples as the fundamental subjects of international law, the toleration of the so-called decent peoples and the considerably thin construal of human rights encompassed in The Law of Peoples. The paper attempts to provide a series of reasons that could be well-suited to explicate its author’s doubts about the soundness of the Rawlsian theoretical perspective with regard to both its formal methodological features and its more content-oriented convictions.

This article aims to explore and lay out crucial aspects of the interpretation of the Hegelian philosophy offered by the American thinker Richard Dien Winfield. Winfield works out an innovative line of interpretation that decisively ties Hegel to a non-foundational type of philosophical epistemology with significant consequences concerning the concept of objectivity in both theoretical and practical philosophical investigation. The article attempts to reconstruct this line of interpretation and assess its argumentative force, in view of an array of epistemological problems regarding theory construction in political philosophy. On this account, the principal question is whether the special brand of epistemological non-foundationalism ascribed by Winfield to Hegel is actually in a favorable position to successfully tackle with these problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Hegel's idea of nation and its significance for his theory of the modern state, namely, the role that 'the national' plays for his justification of right in the Philosophy of Right. It is argued that Hegel strikes a balance between historicism and a rational justification of state and law. He bases the state on a notion of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) that is both national and subjected to a world historical development toward rationality and universal right. Consequently, 'nation,' in the sense of a group of people invoking identity and rights based on a primordial common language, culture, and territory, does not cover what Hegel means by the modern nation state. 'Ethical life' is national, but it also constitutes a historically changeable community of values supported by citizens' conscious participation in communal life (patriotism). Today, Hegel's idea undermines the legitimacy of nationalistic invocations of primordial ethnic cultures within politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Praktyka Teoretyczna is the property of University of Wroclaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper makes a parallel between Francisco de Vitoria's Relectio De Matrimonio and Hegel's view on matrimony in his Philosophy of Right. Although the principles were different, the scholastic Thomist, based on Natural Law, agrees with the German idealist in many aspects, being on monogamy, prohibition on consanguinity, essentiality of the freedom from both sides and even some circumstances of dissolubility of the matrimonial bound. Even though both were theoretical and not jurists in the practical sense, their reflections have in common the unity between theory and practice that may be the true key to discover the reason why they get to many similar conclusions in different periods of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article deals with researching the meaning and importance of the right of necessity (Notrecht) in Hegel's philosophy of right. The first part of the paper introduces the basic motifs of Hegel's abstract and legal category of possession, as well as the debate with Savigny - the fundamental historical and philosophical framework of this right. The second part of the paper provides an overview of Kant and Fichte's understanding and definitions of the right of necessity within practical philosophy. A socio-political dimension will be underlined as a topic of analysis in the third part of the paper, as a key characteristic that differentiates Hegel's notion of the right of necessity from those of his predecessors.

Rereading the young Karl Marx's "Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'" in light of a broader range of scholarship enables a more accurate understanding of the historical and intellectual significance of this work. Shlomo Avineri's pioneering treatment is deficient in important respects. A return to Marx's and Hegel's texts may help determine more exactly what Marx was trying to figure out through Hegel, and why he saw the need to move beyond Hegel to accomplish it. In Marx's mature writings, as Postone has shown, Marx's concept of "capital" purports to identify the real basis of Hegelian Geist. Recognizing this enables an analysis that provides a fuller view of both young and mature Marx as they relate to Hegel and to one another than is typical in the literature, which often either divides Marx into young-humanist and old-economist, or else inter-collapses old and young Marx too readily. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tópicos is the property of Asociacion Revista de Filosofia de Santa Fe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Although school is an ideal location for teaching forgiveness because it mediates between the family and society, forgiveness education has been relatively neglected in schools. Most research and pedagogical models on forgiveness education to date are based on the psychological perspective which is individualistic in nature. Although empirical support for effectiveness of these models has been found, the individualistic foundation of these models ignores the collective aspect of forgiveness and forgiveness education. Hegel's philosophy provides insights that can complement the individualistic perspective. Hegelian philosophy suggests that forgiveness enables mutual recognition to occur and the collective human consciousness to progress to higher stages of development in a dialectical manner. This paper proposes the major elements for forgiveness education from an Hegelian perspective that complement existing theories, research and practice forgiveness education: the importance of narrowing the reality-virtue gap, the renunciation of self, mutual recognition, reconciliation, awareness of one's duty to others, and finally the use of language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes Hegel's conception of bureaucracy in Philosophy of Right, especially in relation to its characteristic as universal class. As universal class. It is argued that's function of bureaucracy as universal class transcends its particular practical function and it has emancipatory function as well. This view is then briefly criticized via the criticism raised by young Marx. Finally, it is argued that philosophical validity Hegel's conception is intentionally and inherently linked to, in principle, contingent historical development. This is then related to current bureaucratic apparatus of European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (0185-3481) is the property of Universidad Iberoamericana Cuidad de Mexico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, I defend the stance that republicanism --in comparison to other central notions-- has not been interpreted as one of the main traits that characterize Kant's legal and political philosophy. A plausible reason for this is that Kantian republicanism has not occupied a prominent place in the republican narratives, historiographical or systematic, that are dominant in contemporary discussions. To my mind, the reason for this is that some innovative characteristics in the Kantian republican enterprise are at odds with other republican philosophical projects. Here I discuss some distinctive traits of Kant's project regarding his conceptions of the rule of law, citizenship, political authority, free speech, and international law with the aim of showing that they are an integral part of a political and legal theory that is still attractive and compelling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article I compare the theories of legal punishment found in Kant's and Hegel's philosophy of right. The thesis I defend is that, at least in this subject matter, the positions of Kant and Hegel should not be read as standing in direct opposition, but rather as belonging to the family of retributivist penal theories. The comparative analysis I put forward aims to shed light both on structural aspects of their philosophy of right as a whole and on some of their customary strategies of judicial-philosophical justification. The discussion hereby presented will show, however, some limitations of both theories and broadly sketch, as a systematic solution to such difficulties, a reading in which Kant's and Hegel's philosophical conceptions of legal punishment are deemed as complementary ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present paper we analyze a number of institutions that are fundamental for the mediation between the state and civil society, according to Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Such analysis is limited to the private sphere of civil society, and for that reason we explain especially the mediatory nature of the system of necessities, the social estates, and the corporation. We approach Hegelian civil society from the point of view of the private interest and consequently we analyze firstly the system of necessities and secondly the corporation. The analysis of the system of necessities leads us to explain the mediation of labor, the social states, and the role that the administration of justice and the "police" have, in accordance with the Hegelian Rechtsphilosophie. The exposition of the corporation as an ethical mediation in the private sphere, leads us to explain the kind of intersubjective recognition which is produced in this area, as well as the political dimension that is inherent to corporative practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concepts and phenomena of civil society, political economy and labour are ambivalent matters in Hegel’s political philosophy. They simultaneously contain productive and destructive potential in the realization of the political community. This article investigates Hegel’s concept of labour against the backdrop of his theory of civil society in order to bring forth the ambiguous role of labour in relation to the ’capitalism’ of civil society. According to Hegel, labour is both economically productive and the activity by which the society and its members can transcend the mere capitalistic dimensions of society. Labour can therefore simultaneously be understood as capitalistic and non-capitalistic in Hegel’s political philosophy. The cultivating dimensions of labour in Hegel’s theory offer a counterpart to the mere capitalistic forms of labour. Labour can therefore be used as a promising platform for the discussion of the relation between economy and culture and for the revitalization of capitalism critique.

In this article I examine the relation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right with the Aristotelian practical philosophy. My aim with this is to show, on the one hand, that some of the theses and central motifs of the Hegelian philosophy of right are better understood if one brings certain Aristotelian ideas to the forefront of the discussion and, on the other hand, that these ideas are subjected to a reinterpretation by Hegel due to the historical and philosophical demands of the Modern Age. In particular, the relationship between these two authors is analyzed by examining two specific subjects: the holistic methodology of a practical philosophy-broadly construed-and the theory of ethical motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: An assessment of Axel Honneth's reception and appropriation of Hegel's theory of normative reconstruction as presented in his Freedom's Right (Columbia University Press, 2014). Methodology/approach: A comparative assessment of Honneth's and Hegel's approach to normative reconstruction focusing on three basic issues: general methodology, understandings of the logic and program of the Philosophy of Right, and analyses and assessments of modern market societies as detailed in Hegel's account of civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft). Findings: For Honneth, normative reconstruction consists in reworking modes of social rationality already realized in modern institutions. By contrast, Hegel is shown to advance an approach to reconstruction in which an account of social rationality is properly fashioned only in the reconstruction process itself. In this way Hegel is also shown to proffer an approach to normative reconstruction that is at once more robustly reconstructive and more robustly normative than is the case with Honneth. Originality/value: The paper demonstrates the ongoing value of Hegel's thought for social and political theory. It illuminates Hegel's uniquely dialectical approach to immanent social critique, dedicated not only to explicating existing tensions and "bifurcations" (Entzweiungen) but - with the help of a distinctive account of Bildung (cultivation or formation) - to engaging those tensions and bifurcations in order to delineate the conditions for their constructive supersession. It also elucidates different ways in which critical social theorists, committed to notions of "immanent transcendence," draw on the resources of market societies to mount normative challenges to the aporias of those societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the famous book on political philosophy of Karl Popper and in support of the liberal doctrine titled" Open society and its enemies", the most famous theory of John Rawls, the university of Harwaed professor in political philosophy in, which a book titled" A theory of justice "was published in 1971. This book includes several articles that eventually, has formed like a book has increased a wide audience in the university and professional journals, particularly in English –speaking countries. Rawls book, based on ethical approach –the political challenge with common issues, including comments utilitarianism payment. Rawl's theory of john Stuart Mill, David Hume and the ethical discussion sidgwick quit common and was considered beyond established based tradition of ethical contractivism and deontological ethics theory of Kant and Hegel's philosophy of right to and re-design concepts of his theory in the tradition of normative political philosophy west restored. "Theory of justice" due to the boroad variety of social sciences, audience many attracted. Readers of this theory found a wide variety of disciplines ranging from psychology and economic to ethical issues. Selected topic for which it repeatedly Rawls in his book and his theory named the Kantian and did not name in Hegel, the Hegelian's philosophy of Right theory of the hidden angles of this article will focus on, as well as his abut influence on some views Interpreters

After the famous book on political philosophy of Karl Popper and in support of the liberal doctrine titled" Open society and its enemies", the most famous theory of John Rawls, the university of Harwaed professor in political philosophy in, which a book titled" A theory of justice "was published in 1971. This book includes several articles that eventually, has formed like a book has increased a wide audience in the university and professional journals, particularly in English –speaking countries. Rawls book, based on ethical approach –the political challenge with common issues, including comments utilitarianism payment. Rawl's theory of john Stuart Mill, David Hume and the ethical discussion sidgwick quit common and was considered beyond established based tradition of ethical contractivism and deontological ethics theory of Kant and Hegel's philosophy of right to and re-design concepts of his theory in the tradition of normative political philosophy west restored. "Theory of justice" due to the boroad variety of social sciences, audience many attracted. Readers of this theory found a wide variety of disciplines ranging from psychology and economic to ethical issues. Selected topic for which it repeatedly Rawls in his book and his theory named the Kantian and did not name in Hegel, the Hegelian's philosophy of Right theory of the hidden angles of this article will focus on, as well as his abut influence on some views Interpreters

Hegel desarrolla su teoría de la voluntad simultáneamente en dos contextos diferentes de su obra: por un lado, en las sucesivas ediciones de la Enciclopedia de las Ciencias Filosóficas, las lecciones berlinesas correspondientes y textos que pueden ser considerados como formulaciones incipientes de la Enciclopedia, y, por el otro, en los Lineamientos Fundamentales de la Filosofía del Derecho, las lecciones basadas en ellos y en textos previos sobre filosofía del Derecho en los que expone su teoría sobre la voluntad subjetiva. Ahora bien, la estructura sistemática y la consecuente periodización que Hegel confiere al proceso volitivo difiere en ambos grupos de textos. El presente artículo tiene por objeto reconstruir el sistema de la voluntad en la filosofía de Hegel asumiendo e integrando en forma orgánica los aportes de ambas fuentes.Hegel develops his theory of will simultaneously in two different contexts of his work: on one side, in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the corresponding Berlin lessons and in texts which can be considered as incipient versions of the Encyclopedia; on the other hand, in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, the lessons based on them and in previous texts on the Philosophy of Right in which Hegel exposes his theory of subjective will. Now, the systematic structure and consequent periodization of the volitive process differ in both cases. This article aims to reconstruct Hegel's System of the will by integrating organically the developments of both groups of texts.

This paper examines Heidegger's critique of Carl Schmitt during the Nazi period, focusing on Heidegger's notes for seminars on Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Taking up Heidegger's and Schmitt's critique of Hegel, Heidegger argues that the friend/enemy distinction Schmitt makes is still grounded in a humanistic liberalism, and so in the very Hegelian subjectivity that Schmitt claims to reject. Heidegger then turns to the question of dikē, and shows how there is a more originary grounding for the polis and the state in a concept Heidegger develops from his analysis of Anaximander. Grounding this is the question which concerns which God (or which goddess) grounds any past, present, or future "political theology". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, as its title announces, I intend to deal with the remains of the idea of δíκη in the original testimonies which we have from the archaic epoch of the world and of Hellenic thought, and how these origins, in one way or another, determine what more technically we could call a philosophy of right within the frame of a later reflection on political philosophy, whose horizon must also be located in the same Hellenic world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studying the history of philosophic thoughts, one finds out that more attention has been paid to “right” than its opposite term, “duty”. However, this issue has little been under discussion that if a single person comes to be subject to right and duty simultaneously or if ‘right’ is the only way to carry out duty, then how we can analyze the relations between right – duty holder and those who claim he is under obligation. The theory of right – duty tries to analyze this situation giving answers to the questions arise in this area. The impact of this theory on the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis the citizens is going to be under discussion too. مطالعه در تاریخ اندیشه‌های فلسفی بیانگر آن است که به «حق» بیش از واژة مقابل آن، یعنی «تکلیف»، توجه شده است. با این حال، این مسئله چندان مورد بحث نبوده که اگر عنوان حق و تکلیف, هم‌زمان در شخصی واحد جمع شود، یا اینکه حق تنها وسیلة انجام تکلیف باشد، آن‌گاه رابطة دارندة حق‌ـ تکلیف و مدعیان تعهد چنین شخصی را چگونه باید تحلیل کرد. «تئوری حق‌ـ تکلیف»، به دنبال تحلیل این وضعیت و پاسخ به مسائلی است که در این زمینه مطرح می‌شوند. اثر این تئوری در مسئولیت دولت در قبال شهروندان نیز موضوع بحث خواهد بود.