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In this paper I ask whether mathematicians should swear an oath similar to the Hippocratic oath sworn by some medical professionals as a means to foster morally praiseworthy engagement with the ethical dimensions of mathematics. I individuate four dimensions in which mathematics is ethically charged: (1) applying mathematical knowledge to the world can cause harm, (2) participation of mathematicians in morally contentious practices is an ethical issue, (3) mathematics as a social activity faces relevant ethical concerns, (4) mathematical knowledge itself may be ethically charged. I present a conceptual framework for oaths and discuss some empirical results on the effectiveness of oath-taking to foster morally praiseworthy behaviour. My findings suggest that enforcing oath-taking practices in mathematics is not currently a suitable means to foster ethically praiseworthy behaviour amongst mathematicians. Oaths can, however, provide needed edifying narratives about how to act ethically when acting as a mathematician. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I explore how intellectual humility manifests in mathematical practices. To do this I employ accounts of this virtue as developed by virtue epistemologists in three case studies of mathematical activity. As a contribution to a Topical Collection on virtue theory of mathematical practices this paper explores in how far existing virtue-theoretic frameworks can be applied to a philosophical analysis of mathematical practices. I argue that the individual accounts of intellectual humility are successful at tracking some manifestations of this virtue in mathematical practices and fail to track others. There are two upshots to this. First, the accounts of the intellectual virtues provided by virtue epistemologists are insightful for the development of a virtue theory of mathematical practices but require adjustments in some cases. Second, the case studies reveal dimensions of intellectual humility virtue epistemologists have thus far overlooked in their theoretical reflections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we argue that the choice of research methods reflects the theoretical framework even before these methods have been put to use in case studies. We understand the term 'case study' broadly in this paper and argue that neither thinking of them as cherry-picked cases to support preconceived ideas about mathematical practices nor thinking of them as inductive leaps from (too) few cases to general features is suitable. By realising the deep entanglement of our case studies with our theoretical framework we propose to view case studies as an invitation for critical reflection upon one's own assumptions. We discuss an example taken from the philosophy of mathematical practices. The upshot is threefold: (1) we provide an argument that case study based research strategies can be successful; (2) we delineate how an awareness of the methodological difficulties of case study based research strategies can positively influence the way case studies are conducted; (3) we suggest that case studies are not dispassionate examinations that deliver cold facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]