Search

Complexity is not 'the same as simply complicated'. This is because its advocates present it as a theoretical approach to explaining major aspects of the social order, usually at the macro level, whereas many social phenomena, at any level, can be full of complications (such as the incidence of road accidents) without a unifying theoretical key. Thus, the latter have a strong tendency to remain at the level of events and their study to be confined to a 'variables' approach, statistically combining the most variable of potentially contributory factors, without being troubled by the absence, in particular cases of one or more common contributors to accidents (such as drivers' alcohol consumption). But 'the Complexity Turn' does much more than leaving empiricism behind, like Critical Realism from its earliest beginnings, and in some hands is seen as the senior partner of these two approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay identifies and explores three dominant intellectual traditions that critique and theorize about ideology: Marxist, prudentialist, and social scientific. For these traditions, the word 'ideology' names interest-serving rationalizations, pseudoscientific totalitarian zealotry, or political outlooks. The blending of these three specialized meanings has generated a colloquial sense of ideology that is philosophically untenable and damaging to political discourse. According to this colloquial sense, all thinking is ideological and we are all ideologues. In response, I instead offer in this essay an adverbial account of ideology. In this account, "ideology" names a kind of epistemic vice. Admitting that this is something we all may do sometimes, I describe how we think when we think ideologically. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions about how education might help us avoid the epistemic vice of ideological thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Caste is a multidimensional reality in history and society, and it has manifested itself through varieties of structures of domination which are simultaneously cultural, economic, political and ideological as caste has also been related in complex ways with structures of class and gender domination. These structures of domination have led to the annihilation of self and society. This led Ambedkar to challenge us for annihilating caste. For Ambedkar, annihilation of caste calls for the realization of each person as an individual and not just a caste person. It also calls for the destruction of caste privileges, discrimination and their scriptural legitimation. However, this call for annihilation mainly has been a structural project without enough attention to the project of transformation of consciousness—self and social. There is a hint of this in Ambedkar's Annihilation of Caste when he urges us to realize each one of us as unique individuals beyond the holes of caste which is further deepened in his Buddha and His Dhamma. Transformation of consciousness is also suggested in Adi Shankara's treatise on self, Atmastakam. The essay engages itself with Ambedkar, Shankara, Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo, among others, as they help us in the transformation of caste domination and present a new hermeneutics of self-realization and social liberation. It deals with the simultaneous challenges of structural transformation of caste as well as consciousness of caste at the levels of both self and society which can draw on multiple sources of critique, creativity and transformations in India and the world. Brahminism is the poison which has spoiled Hinduism. You will succeed in saving Hinduism if you will kill Brahminism. There should be no opposition to this reform from any quarter. It should be welcomed even by the Arya Samajists, because this is merely an application of their own doctrine of guna-karma. Whether you do that or you do not, you must give a new doctrinal basis to your religion—a basis that will be in consonance with liberty, equality and fraternity; in short, with democracy. I am no authority on the subject. But I am told that for such religious principles as will be in consonance with liberty, equality and fraternity, it may not be necessary for you to borrow from foreign sources, and that you could draw for such principles in the Upanishads. Whether you could do so without a complete remoulding, a considerable scraping and chipping off from the ore they contain, is more than I can say. (Ambedkar, 2002[1936], p. 303) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Macroeconomic traditions disagree on the policies needed for the economy to properly function and how to assess them. In this paper, we contend that these disagreements originate from the social ontological commitments of a theory. The ontology of money underlines these disagreements between Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and mainstream economics. First, we assess MMT's ontology of money. Next, we identify MMT's normative commitments and classify MMT's ontology as a taxonomic definition with thick concepts. Finally, we offer reasons why MMT's ontology of money leads to rivalries with other economic traditions. We argue disagreements on policy are expected, given the ontological differences elaborated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, philosophers have developed an extensive literature on social ontology that applies methods and concepts from analytic metaphysics. Much of this is entirely abstracted from, and unconcerned with, social science. However, Epstein (2015) argues explicitly that analytic social metaphysics, provided its account of ontological ‘grounding’ is repaired in specific ways, can rescue social science from explanatory impasses into which he thinks it has fallen. This version of analytic social ontology thus directly competes with radically naturalistic alternatives, in a way that helps to clarify what makes some metaphysics genuinely scientific (that is, part of the scientific enterprise and worldview). I consider this competition, marshal considerations against the value to social science of analytic metaphysics, and sketch a contrasting scientific metaphysics for understanding the implications of revisionist social ontology in unified scientific ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoclassical economics is sometimes said to overlook the institutional character of markets, treating them as 'natural.' I address whether this criticism applies to Léon Walras. Walras's position is complex. Walras insists that market institutions are 'artificial' and that a purely naturalistic view of them reduces persons to mere things. However, he simultaneously characterizes market laws as natural. Specifically, he argues that exchange value is natural because it is determined by the natural property of scarcity. This argument is wanting: scarcity as defined by Walras is not exclusively natural, and, by Walras's own logic, only accounts for exchange value given the non-natural institution of the market. I suggest that Walras's attempts to give exchange value a natural foundation can be understood as a form of commodity fetishism. I further suggest two complementary explanations for this fetishism. First, Walras infers exchange value's naturalness from its autonomy with respect to individual agents in a competitive market. Second, he assumes that the use of the natural sciences as a formal model implies that the market has some natural cause. I additionally discuss his Baconian view of economics as an example of naturalistic reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores some of the possible links between community psychology and critical realism, a relatively new approach to the philosophy of science that has received little attention from community psychologists. Critical realism is presented in relation to seven key insights that can be linked to fundamental tenets of the ecological approach in community psychology. These insights are: (1) A complex reality exists independently of our ideas about it, and this reality is knowable, although imperfectly. (2) Reality is composed of a complex and stratified hierarchy of open systems. (3) Causality is best understood in terms of causal processes that may or may not be directly observable or generalizable; these processes involve complex interactions among generative mechanisms and contextual conditions. (4) Theory and theorizing about causal processes are central to both scientific explanation and practical action. (5) Theory exists at multiple levels of abstraction, ranging from models to metatheory. (6) A diversity of methods can provide evidence in the search for causal processes operating in context. (7) As social scientists, we have an obligation to use social science knowledge to promote human flourishing. Although these insights may be familiar to many community psychologists who adopt an ecological approach to their work, we suggest that clearly articulating these principles can provide more solid foundations for inquiry in the field. We conclude the article by highlighting how critical realism may help to bridge the research-practice gap in community psychology and similar social sciences., (© 2023 The Authors. Journal of Community Psychology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

This paper argues that ethical propositions can legitimately be used as evidence for and against empirical conclusions. Specifically, I argue that this thesis is entailed by several uncontroversial assumptions about ethical metaphysics and epistemology. I also outline several examples of ethical-to-empirical inferences where it is extremely plausible that one can rationally rely upon their ethical evidence in order to gain a justified belief in an empirical conclusion. The main upshot is that ethical propositions can, under perfectly standard conditions, play both direct and indirect evidential roles in (social) scientific inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a reassessment of the main import of Peter Winch's philosophy of the social sciences. Critics argue that Winch presented a flawed methodology for the social sciences, while his supporters deny that Winch's work is about methodology at all. Contrary to both, the author argues that Winch deals with fundamental questions about methodology, and that there is something substantial to learn from his account. Winch engages methodological questions without being committed to social ontology. Instead, Winch's work on methodology is best described as a descriptive metaphysics of social inquiry. This alternative reading clarifies the close link between Winch's argument for the autonomy of the social sciences and R. G. Collingwood's philosophy of history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that Robert Elgie's late political leadership duology makes a remarkable contribution to the debate on political science methodology and the philosophy of social science. It demonstrates that a wide range of methodologies are consistent with scientific realism can speak to the same research question. I draw out implications for the methodology and organisation of political science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Setting out from Okakura Kakuzō and Ernest Fenollosa's famous "discovery" of the Yumedono Kannon, this article will trace the contested construction of the categories of "religion" (shūkyō) and "fine art" (bijutsu) in Meiji Japan. In religious studies circles, it has become commonplace to think of "religion" as the only disciplinary master category with issues. However, not only was "religion" invented in Japan, but "fine art" was invented there too. Indeed, categories from "culture" to "society" to "politics" have similar issues. Attending to these will help refocus crucial debates away from an obsession with translation and onto more fundamental issues about "cultural categories" as such. This paper will advance the debate by explaining the attendant constructions of "religion" and "fine art" as process social kinds. In doing so, it will showcase the museum and the temple as central sites of materialized disputation over global categories and their local instantiation. It will show how assimilation to the world-system in the long nineteenth century was a complex multi-generational process of negotiation and contestation, producing new hybrid spaces, returns, transformations, and innovations that then reflected back on global systems, changing them in subtle but profound ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ontology of social objects and facts remains a field of continued controversy. This situation complicates the life of social scientists who seek to make predictive models of social phenomena. For the purposes of modelling a social phenomenon, we would like to avoid having to make any controversial ontological commitments. The overwhelming majority of models in the social sciences, including statistical models, are built upon ontological assumptions that can be questioned. Recently, however, artificial neural networks (ANNs) have made their way into the social sciences, raising the question whether they can avoid controversial ontological assumptions. ANNs are largely distinguished from other statistical and machine learning techniques by being a representation-learning technique. That is, researchers can let the neural networks select which features of the data to use for internal representation instead of imposing their preconceptions. On this basis, I argue that neural networks can avoid ontological assumptions to a greater degree than common statistical models in the social sciences. I then go on, however, to establish that ANNs are not ontologically innocent either. The use of ANNs in the social sciences introduces ontological assumptions typically in at least two ways, via the input and via the architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Questions of objectivity involve many general philosophy of science issues; when directed toward the social sciences, even more complex issues surface about the status of the social sciences, e.g. can they be sciences as are the natural sciences? This paper does not take on this mass of issues directly, but instead argues for more restricted theses, in particular that questions about objectivity in the social sciences are often usefully seen as local empirical issues. I look at arguments around underdetermination, value ladenness, the indeterminancy or nonquantitative nature of social science categories or attributes, and traditional ontological debates over materialism and idealism. I show that in all these cases some of the key issues about objectivity are specific empirical issues in the social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nominalism, while significantly affecting the history and development of modern western thought since the fourteenth century, has unfortunately been neglected in much recent social theory. In this article, we offer an introduction to this Special Forum on nominalism to help redress this circumstance. In addition to this introductory piece, the Forum consists of three articles respectively covering: questions of nominalism, relativism and universalism in relation to Enlightenment debates over China; tensions over nominalist and realist theoretical visualities in Durkheim and Weber; and a critique of nominalist sensibilities in the sociology of finance combined with the articulation of a novel sociologically realist alternative. Specifically, in this piece, we contextualize the emergence of nominalism, adumbrating how it affects a variety of metatheoretical judgments, especially concerning the nature of social reality and what can possibly be known about it. Michel Foucault's nominalism and Ian Hacking's conception of 'dynamic nominalism' are also discussed. Finally, it invites critical realists to consider how commitments to humanism might implicate them in nominalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If a human subject knows they are being measured, this knowledge may affect their attitudes and behaviour to such an extent that it affects the measurement results as well. This broad range of effects is shared under the term 'reactivity'. Although reactivity is often seen by methodologists as a problem to overcome, in this paper I argue that some quite extreme reactive changes may be legitimate, as long as we are measuring phenomena that are not simple biological regularities. Legitimate reactivity is reactivity which does not undermine the accuracy of a measure; I show that if such reactivity were corrected for, this would unjustifiably ignore the authority of the research subject. Applying this argument to the measurement of depression, I show that under the most commonly accepted models of depression there is room for legitimate reactivity. In the first part of the paper, I provide an inventory of the different types of reactivity that exist in the literature, as well as the different types of phenomena that one could measure. In the second part, I apply my argument to the measurement of depression with the PHQ-9 survey. I argue that depending on what kind of phenomenon we consider depression to be (a disease, a social construction, a harmful dysfunction, or a practical kind), we will accept different kinds of reactivity. I show that both under the harmful dysfunction model and the practical kinds model, certain reactive changes in measuring depression are best seen as legitimate recharacterizations of the underlying phenomenon, and define what legitimate means in this context. I conclude that in both models, biological aspects constrain characterization, but the models are not so strict that only one concept is acceptable, leaving room for reactivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pragmatism, especially the works of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, is in the midst of a revival in American sociology. American sociologists have drawn on these authors in their addressment of contemporary debates in the wider disciplinary field. Placing these contemporary applications of pragmatist thought alongside the broader intellectual tradition of pragmatic philosophy, however, demonstrates tensions associated with this revival. This paper draws on the work of John Dewey as a particularly stark case of the conflict between the philosophy of social science espoused by the original pragmatist philosophers and the use of their ideas in American sociology today. This treatment affords the opportunity to recover a vision for social science which has been overlooked in the contemporary pragmatist revival with deep implications for the practice of social science today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The leitmotif of Mario Bunge's work was that the philosophy of science should be informed by a comprehensive scientific philosophy, and vice versa; with both firmly rooted in realism and materialism. Now Bunge left such a big oeuvre, comprising more than 70 books and hundreds of articles, that it is impossible to review it in its entirety. In addition to biographical remarks, this obituary will therefore restrict itself to some select issues of his philosophy: his scientific metaphysics, his philosophy of physics, his concept of mechanismic explanation, his philosophy of social science and technology, and his approach to the demarcation problem. The final section will explore why Bunge, despite the extent and depth of his work, has not achieved a more prominent status in the philosophical community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article responds to Richard Lauer's (2019) "Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?" The article concurs that "social ontology matters" for the conduct of research and theory in social science. It argues, however, that neither of the interpretations of the status of social ontology offered by Lauer is satisfactory (either apriori philosophical realism or pragmatist anti-realism). The article argues for a naturalized, fallibilist, and realist interpretation of the claims of social ontology and presents the field of social ontology as the most abstract edge of social-science theorizing, subject to broad empirical constraints. The approach taken is anti-foundationalist in both epistemology and metaphysics. Ontological theorizing is part of the extended scientific enterprise of understanding the social world. Claims about the nature of the social world are not different in kind from more specific sociological claims about social class or individual rationality, to be justified ultimately by the coherence and explanatory success of the theories they help to create. At the same time, it is justified to treat the claims of social ontology as provisionally true, which supports a realist interpretation of the findings of social ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fifty years ago and still relevant today, C.P. Snow argued that the university is divided into two cultures, with humanities on the one side and the sciences on the other. This paper proposes a model of mutuality to overcome this ongoing divide as applied specifically to political philosophy and its cognate scientific disciplines of political science and political psychology. On the model of mutuality, not only can political philosophy inform theorizing and hypothesis-formation in political science and psychology, the latter fields also serve as data for political philosophy. More importantly, collaboration between philosophers and scientists can inform a conceptual dialectic that significantly benefits both areas of inquiry. The second half of the paper develops the example of democratic virtues as a case study. Capitalizing on existing work in philosophical virtue theory and related areas of psychology, I propose that the topic of democratic and not merely civic virtues is a novel area of inquiry that would profit from mutual engagement between political philosophers and political scientists and psychologists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to show ways in which analytic eclecticism can be strengthened to encourage hybrid theorizing capable of yielding more practically useful principles for foreign policy decision-makers. The paper also seeks to show that some of the advantages of analytic eclecticism are overstated, notably the ability to sidestep difficult questions in the philosophy of social science. Nevertheless, with a proper deepening of their discussion of pragmatism, the core of the practical consequences of analytic eclecticism can be advanced with greater force and with a strengthened methodological rationale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent should we focus on implicit bias in order to eradicate persistent social injustice? Structural prioritizers argue that we should focus less on individual minds than on unjust social structures, while equal prioritizers think that both are equally important. This article introduces the framework of transactive memory into the debate to defend the equal priority view. The transactive memory framework helps us see how structure can emerge from individual interactions as an irreducibly social product. If this is right, then debiasing interventions are structural interventions. One upshot is that the utility of the individual versus structural distinction is not apparent for the purposes of intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A political epistemology that enables us to determine if political actors are likely to know what they need to know must be rooted in an ontology of the actors and of the human objects of their knowledge; that is, a political anthropology. The political anthropology developed in Power Without Knowledge envisions human beings as creatures whose conscious actions are determined by their interpretations of what seem to them to be relevant circumstances; and whose interpretations are, in turn, determined by webs of belief built from somewhat heterogeneous streams of incoming ideas. This anthropology, then, has two components. Ideational heterogeneity undermines the aspiration of technocracy to predict human behavior and the aspiration of social science to arrive at lawlike generalizations about it. Ideational determinism, however, which is less important than ideational heterogeneity to the critique of technocracy, may be more important to generating epistemological approaches to other forms of politics, all of which involve the actions of human beings who, as such, are largely at the mercy of the fallible ideas to which they have been exposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the beginning of the 21st century, the field of political psychology; like the social sciences more generally, is being challenged. New theoretical direction is being demanded from within and a greater epistemological sophistication and ethical relevance is being demanded from without. In response, direction for a reconstructed political psychology is offered here. To begin, a theoretical framework for a truly integrative political psychology is sketched. This is done in light of the apparent limits of cross-disciplinary or multidisciplinary inquiry. In the attempt to transcend these limits, the theoretical approach offered directly addresses the dually structured quality of social life as the singular product of both organizing social structures and defining discourse communities on the one hand and motivated, thinking individuals on the other. To further this theoretical effort, meta-theoretical considerations are addressed. The modernist-postmodernist debate regarding the status of truth and value is used as a point of departure for constructing the epistemological foundation for a truly political psychology. In this light, structural pragmatic guidelines for theory construction, empirical research and normative inquiry are presented.

This article discusses recent moves in political science that emphasise predicting future events rather than theoretically explaining past ones or understanding empirical generalisations. Two types of prediction are defined: pragmatic, and scientific. The main aim of political science is explanation, which requires scientific prediction. Scientific prediction does not necessarily entail pragmatic prediction nor does it necessarily refer to the future, though both are desiderata for political science. Pragmatic prediction is not necessarily explanatory, and emphasising pragmatic prediction will lead to disappointment, as it will not always help in understanding how to intervene to change future outcomes, and policy makers are likely to be disappointed by its time‐scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a given research question. In response to this uncertainty about the relative merits of different methods, W. E. B. Du Bois advocated for and applied "methodological triangulation". This is to use multiple methods simultaneously in the belief that, where one is uncertain about the reliability of any given method, if multiple methods yield the same answer that answer is confirmed more strongly than it could have been by any single method. Against this, methodological purists believe that one should choose a single appropriate method and stick with it. Using tools from voting theory, we show Du Boisian methodological triangulation to be more likely to yield the correct answer than purism, assuming the scientist is subject to some degree of diffidence about the relative merits of the various methods. This holds even when in fact only one of the methods is appropriate for the given research question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discourse analysis offers an extremely diversified landscape, spanning time and disciplines far beyond the field of international relations (IR). With a rich lineage, it comes as no surprise that under the label "Discourse Analysis" (DA) one cannot find a unified theoretical family within IR but rather a plurality of heterogeneous ways of approaching discourse analysis. By leveraging the wealth of discourse analytical works accumulated over more than three decades, this article intends to discuss some of the main theoretical tenets of three competing perspectives on discourse analysis (PDAs): constructivism, critical realism and poststructuralism. It does so by tracing their links to their respective putative philosophical referents. Distinct from Milliken (1999), who consciously stresses the commonalities between various PDAs, this contribution identifies the differences between them. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it locates IR PDAs in the framework of debates over the core branches of the philosophy of social science. Constructivist, poststructuralist and critical realist PDAs will be located along both a foundational/nonfoundational ontological continuum and a positivist/post-positivist epistemological continuum. Secondly, it retraces the main tenets of post-structuralist, constructivist, and critical realist PDAs to discourse by identifying the relevant debates that have characterized the approach to discourse analysis in IR. Finally, it presents some methodological guidelines and provides examples on how DA endeavors have been practiced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stylized facts are empirical regularities in search of theoretical, causal explanations. Stylized facts are both positive claims (about what is in the world) and normative claims (about what merits scholarly attention). Much of canonical social science research can be usefully characterized as the production or contestation of stylized facts. Beyond their value as grist for the theoretical mill of social scientists, stylized facts also travel directly into the political arena. Drawing on three recent examples, I show how stylized facts can interact with existing folk causal theories to reconstitute political debates and how tensions in the operationalization of folk concepts drive contention around stylized fact claims.

The purpose of this research was the study of the philosophy of social science from the critical realism’s point of view and its role in the educational research. The main problem of this research was that considering the attitudinal difference of this viewpoint which is in the middle of the two spectrums of realism and anti-realism and special attention to the philosophy of social science, which attitudinal and functional changes will occur in the educational research? Overall, it was a qualitative research which started with qualitative content analysis of the authentic texts and then with inferring implications, the hints of this viewpoint for the research were extracted. Findings showed that the critical realism considers the distinction between the natural world and the social world justifiable and due to this, the social condition of actions and their structural background is of high importance in educational research. As a result, the interpretation of meaning distinct from the structure, unlike those who believe in hermeneutics, is unacceptable. Also in terms of epistemology, critical realism, on the one hand with reliance on the assumptions underlying positivism and on the other hand, with explanation of the features associated with the network of educational and social studies, considers mathematics as a powerful tool to identify the educational and social phenomena. And at the same time, it has a radical orientation toward building an all-round sensory experience and challenges the whole reliance on induction.

This article addresses Tuukka Kaidesoja’s critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Roy Bhaskar’s theories of critical realism. The article supports Kaidesoja’s naturalistic approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, including the field of social ontology. The article discusses the specific topics of fallibilism, emergence, and causal powers. I conclude that Kaidesoja’s book is a valuable contribution to current debates over critical realism.

Within the field of climate change adaptation research, "stories" are usually simply mined for data, developed as communication and engagement technologies, and used to envision different futures. But there are other ways of understanding people's narratives. This article explores how we can move away from understanding stories as cultural constructs that represent a reality and toward understanding them as the way in which adaptation is lived. The article investigates questions such as the following: As climate adaptation researchers, what can and should we do when we are told unsolicited stories? How can storytelling, as a way of life rather than as a source of data, inform and elaborate scientific approaches to adaptation research and planning? In this article, I move away from the literature that seeks to develop narrative methods in adaptation science. Instead, I focus on stories that we do not elicit and the world-making practice of storytelling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concepts of decision, choice, decision-maker, and decision-making are common practical tools in both social science and natural science, on which scientific knowledge, policy implications, and moral recommendations are based. In this article I address three questions. First, I look into how present-day social scientists and natural scientists use decision/choice concepts. What are they used for? Second, scientists may differ in the application of decision/choice to X, and they may explicitly disagree about the applicability of decision/choice to X. Where exactly do these disagreements lie? Third, I ask how scientists should use decision/choice concepts. What are they correctly and incorrectly used for? I argue that scientists must responsibly attend to a methodological demand: you have to have a principled, non-ad hoc, well-argued-for way of telling where decision/choice applicability ends. Thus, I aim to minimize the risk of conceptual stretching and foster responsible conceptual practices in a large body of scientific work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • Most recent attempts to define cognition dialectically lack the philosophical completeness necessary to explain neurocognitive and mental processes. > Problem • Under what conditions could neurophenomenology be thought of as dialectical and what would be the implications of such a conception for contemporary issues such as "social cognition" and phenomenological subjectivity? > M ethod • I assess dialectical approaches to neurocognitive processes and mind mostly within the recent neurophenomenological literature and provide reasons as to why these approaches could be further improved using Hegel's conception of dialectical processes. > R esults • As suggested in the context of research on extended cognition, mostly by Gallagher and Crisafi, a cognitively shaped understanding of Hegel's philosophy allows us to understand how neurophenomenology can be conceptualized dialectically. It allows us to conceive precisely of how dialectical processes can help shape our understanding of cognition from individual neurocognitive operations to socially embedded processes. A dialectical interpretation of Varela's conception of neurocognitive processes can help achieve the endeavor of recent sociological work to understand the "continuity" from individual to social "entities" through a "relational ontology." This amounts to expanding, through a neurodialectical framework, Gallagher's research on extended cognition as well as articulating it with his most recent conception of "decentered" cognition. > I mplications • Neurodialectics has straightforward implications for phenomenological understandings of subjectivity as well as for recent sociological research: in both cases, it can provide us with a philosophically meaningful and empirically sustainable framework. In particular, it could help philosophically expand Gallagher's "decentered" model of brainhood. > C onstructivist Content • I argue in favor of a general philosophical perspective, the neurodialectical one, stressing the "primacy of moulding on being.". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay draws on Antonio Gramsci's theoretical and philosophical insights to provide an alternative approach to mainstream Latino politics research that also introduces students to Gramsci. It contends that Gramsci provides a framework both for rigorously thinking about the challenges facing Latinos living in the United States and also for advancing an oppositional democratic politics in the face of the authoritarian turn in contemporary neoliberalism. Gramscian thought provides a theory and method for studying politics that can account for the structural conditions in which Latinos engage in politics, permitting the identification of dominant groups' methods of building consensus for authoritarian rule. Moreover, Gramscian theory provides analytical tools for conceptualizing an alternative approach to Latino politics research that is oppositional, theoretically driven, and grounded in a praxis focused explicitly on the empowerment of subaltern Latinos, such as the undocumented, refugees, indigenous "Latinos", Afro-Latinos, and LGBT Latinos, among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The approach of structuralism came to philosophy from social science. It was also in social science where, in 1950-1970s, in the form of the French structuralism, the approach gained its widest recognition. Since then, however, the approach fell out of favour in social science. Recently, structuralism is gaining currency in the philosophy of mathematics. Aft er ascertai ning that the two structuralisms indeed share a common core, the question stands whether general structuralism could not find its way back into social science. The nature of the major objections raised against French structuralism - concerning its alleged ahistoricism, methodological holism and universalism - are reconsidered. While admittedly grounded as far as French structuralism is concerned, these objections do not affect general structuralism as such. The fate of French structuralism thus does not seem to preclude the return of general structuralism into social science, rather, it provides some hints where the difficulties may lie. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]