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Bernard Williams once posed the awkward question, What is the point of doing philosophy if you're not extraordinarily good at it? The problem is that you can't, by sheer hard [...]

University of Alberta (27) (27) (10) PETER ANDES, 'The Ethics of Procreation and Parenthood in Affluent Nations.' Advisers: Jennifer Welchmann and Howard Nye. LUKE McNULTY, 'Resolution's Realism: Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard [...]

Bare-difference Methodology and the Scientific Analogy, ZAK A. KOPEIKIN The bare-difference methodology is considered a powerful tool in ethical reasoning. The underlying idea is that we can identify the intrinsic [...]

Metasemantic Ethics, DEREK BELL The idea that experts (especially scientific experts) play a privileged role in determining the meanings of our words and the contents of our concepts has become [...]

A Sperm and Ovum Separately! Contra Marquis on Abortion and Contraception, TIM BURKHARDT Don Marquis argues that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong because it deprives the fetus of a [...]

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 94, No. 1, Winter 2020 What Newman Can Give Catholic Philosophers Today, JOHN F. CROSBY In this article, the author explains various points of contact [...]

Relevance and Verification, BEN BLUMSON A. J. Ayer's empiricist criterion of meaning was supposed to have sorted all statements into nonsense, on the one hand, and tautologies or genuinely factual [...]

Iblis, Abraham, and Teleological Suspensions, HUD HUDSON In this essay, the author scolds a Jinn, recommends a position in Islamic theology to my Muslim neighbors, explores a famous dilemma recounted [...]

Fix, Express, Quantify: Disquotation after Its Logic, CARLO NICOLAI Truth-theoretic deflationism holds that truth is simple, and yet that it can fulfil many useful logico-linguistic roles. Deflationism focuses on axioms [...]

Bryan W. Van Norden's Taking Back Philosophy is a long-awaited and much-needed manifesto on multicultural curricula in the academic discipline of philosophy, which has up to now been stubbornly persistent [...]

Alethic Pluralism and Truth-Attributions: A Dilemma CHASE WRENN The core of alethic pluralism is the idea that truth is a different property in some discourses from others. Orthodox pluralists such [...]

Empowering Rationality: Rethinking the Limits of Rational Choice, CHRISOULA ANDREOU This paper defends a version of the view that, sometimes, rational choice between two options can be grounded on a [...]

The Paradox of Decrease and Dependent Parts, ALEX MORANCan we be responsible for our attention? Can attention be epistemically good or bad? Siegel tackles these underexplored questions in 'Selection Effects,' [...]

Murdoch's Morality: An Ontological Analysis, JANE DURANThis paper argues that Murdoch's views possess a structured ontology. As some of her critics note, her philosophical stance is one that must be [...]

Aristotelian Naturalism vs. Mutants, Aliens and the Great Red Dragon, SCOTT WOODCOCKIn this paper Woodcock presents a new objection to the Aristotelian Naturalism (AN) defended by Philippa Foot. He describes [...]

In ordinary philosophical contexts, it is customary to abide by due processes. For example, we engage the particularities of arguments rather than contenting ourselves with cursory approximations of claims and [...]

The Cowherds We thank Amy Donahue for her attention to our work, and we thank the editors of Philosophy East and West for an opportunity to reply. We confess that [...]

The value of developing philosophical thinking among young children and its pedagogical possibilities has been discussed in the Philippines in the recent years. One such possibility is the pedagogy of Philosophy for Children (P4C) which allows children to participate in a dialogue in the context of a community of inquiry. The community of inquiry is a specific kind of classroom environment where children would feel welcome, motivated and secure to express their wonderment, to share their opinions and intuitions and to appraise one another's reasons and propositions (Haynes, 2007; Johnson, 2007; Jackson, 2004; Nicoll, 1993). Considering the necessity to maintain the organic nature of the community of inquiry and of the process of the dialogue itself, it is a major concern as to how teachers will become effective facilitators of such a classroom environment. This paper aims to better understand the craft of facilitating the community of inquiry and the role of the facilitator by attempting to answer the following questions: a) How must a facilitator regard the pedagogy of philosophical dialogue? b) How must a facilitator see young children? c) How should a facilitator approach and acknowledge children's questions and ideas? d) What thinking skills and behaviors should a facilitator be able to model to them? The answers provided are derived from my familiarity with the pedagogy of philosophical dialogue and from my personal experiences as a facilitator of the community of inquiry. Some implications to the field of teacher training are also discussed. Key Words: Facilitation, Philosophy for Children, Community of Inquiry, Philosophical Dialogue, Introduction The value of developing philosophical thinking among young children and its pedagogical possibilities has been discussed in the Philippines in the recent years (Lee, 2009; UNESCO, 2009). As educators [...]

Author(s): Michael Stocker Gundula Bosch's argument for putting the philosophy back into the PhD is a breath of fresh air (). It is interesting to look back and see how [...]

The purpose of this study was to investigate the changes in pre-service student teachers' ability to articulate a philosophy education during the field experience. Educational philosophy change for the participants [...]

INCREASINGLY MANY CONTEMPORARY philosophers accept metaphysics as essential to philosophy, and address metaphysical issues. This is a significant and welcome development, but it raises the pressing question of what, exactly, [...]

IN MODERN TIMES, it has become virtually a natural assumption that before one can truly think what is, one first must investigate knowing to certify its objectivity. This assumption issues [...]

In Nietzschean philosophy, human existence is, in and of itself, a tragedy. Conversely, the nuances of Nietzsche's views on tragedy as an art form are inextricably linked to his philosophy [...]

The author believes that philosophy courses should be made compulsory in Indonesia because a good state requires rulers who are philosophers. Indonesia is committed to religious pluralism, which is different from West, which reflects flexibility of Islam and Indonesians working hard to have a peaceful coexistence of different religious communities.

In this essay, I investigate our understanding of what counts as philosophical. Using the life and work of Wittgenstein as a test case, I take a close look at how various Wittgenstein scholars relate to work other than the principal and accepted philosophical texts (such as the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations), and suggest that there is an inconsistency in the criteria of what we can and should be taking seriously for philosophical purposes; sometimes there is inconsistency of use (one thing is said, another is done), and sometimes there is inconsistency in the form of occlusion (the scholar simply avoids the chance (or responsibility) to define terms). Guarding against advocacy for essentialism, I argue that philosophers might benefit from a more direct and explicit engagement with the criteria they use when writing about the philosophical significance of material other than dominant texts. That engagement, however, reveals that the pursuit of criteria is at odds with the spirit of Wittgenstein's philosophy. As a result, we stand in need of an alternative method of discerning what counts. I suggest that, in the context of Wittgenstein's work, such a method is a matter of approach, not criteria. Perhaps this method can extend beyond Wittgenstein's work to a general view of what counts as philosophical.

The first professorship in philosophy at Johns Hopkins University was contested in the early 1880s by two of the most prominent and influential scholars in America: Charles Sanders Peirce and George Sylvester Morris. A third figure also vied for the position, although he was much less well known at the time: Granville Stanley Hall. Through a series of unexpected circumstances, Hall ultimately won the professorship and then used it to leverage an extraordinary career that included his opening the first American research laboratory in psychology, establishing the American Journal of Psychology, becoming president of Clark University, founding the American Psychological Association, and profoundly affecting the character of developmental psychology in America.

Abstract The overwhelming commitment of philosophers is not to crossing arms over some technical problem but to the education of the young. This is not to deny the merit of [...]

In the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, learning is not a paradox, as suggested by Plato's Meno, but the fundamental form of experience. To experience is precisely to be permeable and open to being reshaped by one's experiences. I explore the reconceptualization of the human subject within Merleau-Ponty's philosophy that allows us to understand how the body-subject can be a learning subject. Fundamentally this involves consideration of the nature of habit, and the way in which habit simultaneously locks us into a repressive attachment to a specific past and opens us up to the possibilities of meaningful engagement with the world. Through an analysis of the temporality of habit, I conclude that understanding habit as the fundamental launching-place of learning also allows us to see how essential learning is to the experience of human freedom.

Byline: Kieran Mathieson (001) Keywords: education; empirical; enroll; intention; learning; philosophy; PLS; survey; TPB Abstract: This research examined factors predicting university students' intentions to enroll in a philosophy of life course. One hundred and ninety subjects participated in two surveys. The first was qualitative, identifying factors students considered in forming intentions, but without ranking the factors. The second study used a quantitative model to predict student intentions from their beliefs about the course, themselves, and other people. The model was based on Ajzen's theory of planned behavior, a theory that successfully predicts many different behaviors. Analysis was done using partial least squares, a robust structural equation modeling technique. The results show that students focused primarily on personal outcomes from the course. They wanted the course to help them understand life and themselves. To a lesser extent, students' perceptions of other people's views affected their intentions, especially the opinions of parents, friends, and religious people. Some students thought all beliefs are subjective, and discussing them would be pointless. Recommendations are given for designing and promoting philosophy of life courses. Author Affiliation: (001) Oakland University, Rochester, MI, 48309, U.S.A. Article History: Registration Date: 05/04/2005 Online Date: 11/11/2005