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This article examines the Philippines' policy of critical neutrality in the face of the Ukraine–Russia War. This policy is characterized by the refusal to take any side in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, occasional criticism of Russia's handling of the war, and efforts to offer the U.S. military facilities in the Philippines if the war spreads and spills over to the East Asia. In conclusion, the article argues that the Philippines is taking advantage of the best of two worlds, namely (a) taking the moral high ground in criticizing Russia's war against Ukraine and (b) enhancing its alliance with the U.S. as a hedge to the possibility that China might take a page from Russia's playbook in Ukraine by pursuing its irredentist goals in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte government (2016–2022). During this period, Philippine foreign policy is widely acknowledged to have undergone dramatic shifts, with the government making friendly overtures towards China at the cost of its traditional alliance with the US. From a foreign policy analysis perspective, this paper explicitly focuses on the role of political leadership in guiding national foreign policy. This paper argues that the Duterte government made strategic use of political marketing in promoting its populist foreign policy. Thus, political marketing is used as an analytical lens with which to examine much of the rhetoric and behaviour of the Duterte government, particularly in regard to its response to the US–China rivalry. By engaging in this supposedly diplomatic game, the Duterte government tried to sell its foreign policy promises and outcomes as products even when its rhetoric was at times disconnected from its actual performance. Overall, this paper develops an alternative perspective from which to add to our understanding of the role of populist foreign policy initiatives in a fragile democratic setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Duterte presidency from June 2016 to June 2022, the government of the Philippines limited its affinity with the United States and pursued an ostensibly pro‐China policy. This bold move took place amid the ongoing US–China rivalry. This paper carries out a retrospective examination of Duterte's China policy from the perspective of Philippine domestic politics. Specifically, we assess the international relations literature on hedging as a foreign policy strategy and argue that domestic factors play a major role in filtering systemic influences and leaving state leaders with sufficient room for strategic discretion and maneuvering. This is particularly the case with the Philippines, where strong presidentialism gives clout to the president in foreign policy development. We argue that much of the "audacious" behavior in the foreign policy of the Duterte government can simultaneously be understood as pragmatic, as it was believed to better serve the regime's short‐term goals. While the alliance with the United States remained largely intact, the Duterte government emphasized its success in stabilizing Sino–Philippine relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the impact of the Ukraine-Russia War on Philippine foreign policy. It observes that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine created the widespread idea that China might emulate its strategic partner on how to deal with an irredentist claim by using force against Taiwan. This alarmed the Duterte Administration at the time it was shifting policy towards China from appeasement to limited hard balancing. This policy aims to constrain China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea by building up the Philippine military’s external defence capabilities, maintaining its alliance with the United States, and making security arrangements with other middle powers like South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The outbreak of the Ukraine-Russian War further pushed the Duterte administration to this policy of limited hard balancing towards China. This was shown by President Duterte’s decision to strengthen the country’s security relations with the U.S. In conclusion, the article notes that the current Marcos Administration has followed its predecessor’s footsteps in applying a policy of limited hard balancing policy towards the revisionist powers in the 20th century.

Shortly after becoming the Philippines' 16th president in mid-2016, Rodrigo Roa Duterte had unraveled his predecessor's agenda of standing up to China's expansive claims in the South China Sea. He distanced his country from its long-time treaty ally and gravitated toward China which is resolute in reconfiguring the global commons in the Asia-Pacific region. He also set aside the 2016 UNCLOS decision on the South China Sea dispute favorable to the Philippines. His appeasement toward China contrasted sharply with the late President Benigno Aquino III's balancing strategy. President Duterte reoriented Philippine policy alarmed both the US and Japan. Consequently, Washington and Tokyo shored up their respective security ties with the Philippine military. The effort was aimed to prevent the Philippines from being pulled into China's orbit. Moreover, the US is the hub while Japan and the Philippines are spokes in the San Francisco System of alliances. This article concludes that the 1950 San Francisco Peace Conference not only established the series of US bilateral alliances in Asia, but also laid down the foundation of regional order and security which outlives the Cold War, and prevailed way beyond the second decade of the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When great powers such as the United States and China grow especially hawkish with more uncertainties, how does a smaller state react to such a complex and dangerous territorial conflict? Given the competing frames of influence between China and the United States, what are the underlying reasons for the shift in the Philippines' foreign policy? This paper focuses on the Philippines' changing foreign policy on the South China Sea dispute and examines the main rationale for its shift in strategy towards China. We use the perspective of neoclassical realism to unpack the constraining factors that underlie the Philippines' domestic politics and ongoing global exigencies. With changes in its domestic politics and the security challenges posed by the evolving geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, the Philippines is in a difficult situation, having to choose between a territorially hostile trading partner and its historical security guarantor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article situates the Philippines-U.S. alliance within the changing U.S. grand strategies from Barrack Obama's rebalancing to Asia to President Joe Biden's continuance of the Trump Administration's strategic competition with China. Upon President Obama's announcement of the rebalancing policy in 2011, the Philippines already figured prominently in the American security agenda in Asia, particularly with the intensification of the Philippines-China territorial dispute in the South China Sea. In 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte effected a major shift in Philippine foreign policy by distancing the country from the U.S. and gravitating toward China. The Trump Administration, however, saw the Philippines as a crucial ally in its geostrategic competition with China. Consequently, Washington adopted a policy of strategic patience to bring Duterte onside the U.S. rather than pushing him to China's embrace. This scheme stabilized the two countries' security relations and ensured the Philippines' commitment to the U.S. system of bilateral alliances. In conclusion, the article argues that given the Philippines' close security ties with the U.S. that often clash with China's strategic interests and close Philippines-China diplomatic/economic relations, it will be difficult and challenging for President Duterte to pursue an independent foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After five years of pursuing a policy of appeasement towards China, the Philippines is incrementally and reluctantly shifting to "limited hard balancing." The goal is to constrain China's revisionist agenda in the South China Sea. This strategy entails building up the Philippine military's territorial defence capabilities, maintaining its alliance with the U.S., and forging security partnerships with other middle power like South Korean, Japan, and Australia. During his six-year term, the late President Benigno Aquino III stood up to China's expansive claim in the South China Sea. When Rodrigo Roa Duterte assumed the presidency in June 2016, he unravelled his predecessor's balancing policy towards China. Nonetheless, recent developments such as the People's Liberation Army Navy's hostile moves against the Armed Forces of the Philippines units on Philippine-occupied islands in the South China Sea and the delays in the promised Chinese public investments in the country prompted the Duterte Administration to review the appeasement approach and to mull over on a limited hard balancing policy. In conclusion, this article contends that the Duterte Administration is at the crossroads, figuring out if it will continue its appeasement stance or adopt a limited hard balancing policy towards China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Philippines is internationally recognized as a best practice in advancing migration governance despite its complex, yet comprehensive landscape of migration policies, norms and structures, and institutions. More recently, the rise of social media has created ripples across sectors and actors due to its transformational power. The country’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) acknowledged this development and commenced its social media adoption process in 2011 and has rapidly evolved to keep up with the changing environment. Key informant interviews with officials and staff from the DFA reveal, that the agency has opened accounts in key social media platforms and that, this undertaking was positively received by its employees. According to the Mergel and Bretschneider model, it can be characterized as belonging to Level 3: Institutionalization and Consolidation upon the release of DO No. 16-2014, which prescribes “Guidelines on the Use of Social Media Use by All Units and Personnel of the DFA”. The cited document laid out specific rules and regulations on key facets of social media practices, such as access, content management, personal use of SM by DFA personnel, compliance mechanism, and administrative liability. Nevertheless, the DFA's social media adoption process is still challenged by inadequate resources and lack of a central sub-office, absence of success metrics, and spurious reports.

Since late 2016, the Philippine and U.S. military establishments have effectively circumvented the crisis in the two countries' alliance stemming from the Duterte Administration's appeasement policy toward China. This appeasement policy was designed to foster closer diplomatic and economic relations with China and to distance the Philippines from the United States and its allies (Japan and Australia) relative to the South China Sea dispute. Despite the refocusing of the alliance agenda from external defense and maritime security to counter-terrorism and HADR, the U.S. military succeeded in strengthening the pro-American elements in the Philippine government and the AFP and averted the crisis. This was evidenced by the resumption of warfighting scenarios in the 2019 Balikatan exercises, and Manila's outrage over the persistent Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. In February 2020, however, President Duterte unilaterally abrogated the 1999 Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This move triggered another crisis in the alliance. Recently, the Philippines and the United States adopted the November 16, 2021 Joint Vision for a 21st Century United States-Philippines Partnership which reaffirmed their commitment to a security relationship between sovereign equals despite President Duterte's ambivalent attitude towards the alliance. Its urgent task is to ensure that the Philippine-U.S. alliance remains intact, and vibrant in the face of the changing nature of the 21st century Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leader-driven Change from Aquino to Duterte: Towards a Redirection or Restructuring in Philippine Foreign Policy? Andrea Chloe Wong Abstract The global perceptions of leaders have significant influence in a state’s foreign policy. In the Philippines’ case, the striking contrast between Presidents Benigno Aquino III, who possesses a moralist and liberalist views, and Duterte, who holds a legalist and realist global perceptions, led to significant changes in their foreign policies. These are evident in their conflicting stance on two cases involving the death penalty of a Filipino worker in Indonesia in 2013; and the country’s maritime arbitration case with China filed in 2013 and eventually won in 2016. Their divergence caused important leader-driven changes, which may result in either a redirection or a restructuring in the country’s foreign policy.

The Philippines is internationally recognized as a best practice in advancing migration governance despite its complex, yet comprehensive landscape of migration policies, norms and structures, and institutions. More recently, the rise of social media has created ripples across sectors and actors due to its transformational power. The country's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) acknowledged this development and commenced its social media adoption process in 2011 and has rapidly evolved to keep up with the changing environment. Key informant interviews with officials and staff from the DFA reveal, that the agency has opened accounts in key social media platforms and that, this undertaking was positively received by its employees. According to the Mergel and Bretschneider model, it can be characterized as belonging to Level 3: Institutionalization and Consolidation upon the release of DO No. 16-2014, which prescribes "Guidelines on the Use of Social Media Use by All Units and Personnel of the DFA". The cited document laid out specific rules and regulations on key facets of social media practices, such as access, content management, personal use of SM by DFA personnel, compliance mechanism, and administrative liability. Nevertheless, the DFA's social media adoption process is still challenged by inadequate resources and lack of a central sub-office, absence of success metrics, and spurious reports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the shift in Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte Administration, and how this development unravels the volatility of Southeast Asia’s open, global, and liberal maritime order. His predecessor, President Benigno Aquino, challenged China’s expansive territorial claim in the South China Sea throughout his six-year term. However, President Rodrigo Duterte’s actions and pronouncements are undoing the former president’s geopolitical agenda of thwarting China’s expansive design in the disputed waters. He distances the Philippines from the U.S., its long-standing treaty ally, and gravitates toward China. This stance aims to earn China goodwill so that the Philippines can avail itself of Chinese economic largesse particularly the enormous aids and loans from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Nevertheless, by appeasing an expansionist power, the Philippines becomes complicit in China’s long-term strategy of maritime expansion to ease the U.S. out of East Asia. In conclusion, the paper warns that the Duterte Administration might end up jeopardizing the country’s territorial rights in the South China Sea and losing the trust and confidence of its security partners. More significantly, its appeasement policy on China might eventually lead to the erosion of Southeast Asia’s global, open, and liberal maritime order.

The maritime dispute in the South China Sea challenged the efficacy of Philippine government institution and the applicability of its policies. In 2011, President Benigno Aquino proposed the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation (ZOPFF/C) that provides a framework for separating disputed territorial features to be considered for joint activities from non-disputed waters. In the same year, President Aquino also employed the observance of Posse Comitatus (the principle of separating civilian and military authority and prohibiting the use of military in civilian law enforcement) as its first line of external defense to settle the issue peacefully. However, Posse Comitatus was not employed appropriately during the Scarborough Shoal incident on April 10, 2012, that resulted in the standoff. The Inter-agency Coordinating Committee on the West Philippine Sea (ICC-WPS) was created in 2014, together with the National Coast Watch Council (NCWC); these institutions were tasked to address maritime disputes. This study utilizes the framework of Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to focus primarily on the relationship of bureaucracies in the formulation of foreign policy and how these agencies influence the process of foreign policy formulation. Findings of the study reveal that; first, the initiative embarked by the Philippine government caused a shift on how enforcers defined the issue as a traditional security concern to non-traditional security. The demilitarization of the issue thereby limits the role of the defense agency particularly the Navy in securing Philippine maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. As a consequence, the Navy felt deprived of their traditional roles at sea. Secondly, despite the Aquino administration’s call for peaceful settlement of the dispute, inter-agency committees including the ICC-WPS and the NCWC that are tasked to monitor, propose and recommend policies concerning maritime security are dominated largely by the officials coming from the Department of National Defense. Therefore, the approach of the Philippines towards the issue is demilitarization in principle but there seems to have been a creeping militarization of policies as implied by the composition of these inter-agencies. Lastly, there is a main problem concerning government institutions that take part of these inter-agencies in their lack of archipelagic consciousness making them less committed to implement policies concerning territorial maritime concerns.

Focusing on the Philippines' changing foreign policy agendas on the South China Sea dispute, this article examines the limitations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) intergovernmental approach in addressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. It contends that former President Benigno Aquino III tried to harness this regional organisation in his balancing policy vis-à-vis China's maritime expansion in the South China Sea. On the contrary, President Rodrigo Duterte promoted his appeasement policy on China when he became the ASEAN's chairperson in 2017, and pushed for the elusive passage of the ASEAN–China Code of Conduct in 2019. In conclusion, the article scrutinises the implications of this shift in the Philippines' foreign policy for the ASEAN, and raises the need for this regional organisation to rethink its intergovernmental approach to the security challenges posed by the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the link between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Duterte Administration's appeasement policy on China. Relative to the South China Sea dispute, China uses the BRI as a means to ease and stabilize its strained relations with claimant countries like the Philippines. The BRI has enabled China to influence the Philippines in changing its policy on Chinese maritime expansion in the South China Sea. Lured by the BRI, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte is undoing his predecessor's policy of balancing China's expansive claim in the disputed waters. Based on his calculation, the Philippines will benefit from the BRI initiative—particularly in the revival of the maritime silk route—as it dovetails with his administration's massive infrastructure build-up program. In conclusion, the article contends that President Duterte is convinced that his appeasement policy toward China is worth pursuing because it makes the Philippines a beneficiary of the BRI. However, 3 years into his term, he has yet to see the implementation of BRI-funded infrastructure projects, which have been delayed by technical problems, the Philippine military, and the Filipino people's distrust of China because of the South China Sea issue in particular, and its behavior as emergent power in East Asia in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the reason behind the dramatic shift in Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte Administration. His predecessor, president Benigno Aquino, vigorously challenged China's expansive territorial claim in the South China Sea throughout his six-year term. However, president Rodrigo Duterte's actions and pronouncements are undoing the former president's geopolitical agenda of balancing China's expansion in the disputed waters. He distances the Philippines from the United States, its long-standing treaty ally, and gravitates toward China. This stance aims to earn goodwill with China so that the Philippines can avail itself of enormous aids and loans from China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This stemmed from this administration's fear that the Philippines would not benefit from China's emergence as an economic power. Nevertheless, by appeasing an expansionist power, the Philippines becomes complicit to China's long-term strategy of maritime expansion to push the United States out of East Asia. In conclusion, the article warns that the Duterte Administration might end up losing the country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea and the confidence and trust of its allies and security partners. This administration might also leave the public coffers empty and dry because of China's reneging on its commitment to fund the Philippines' massive infrastructure-building program, labeled "Build, Build, and Build." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte aims to resume joint development with China in disputed areas of the natural resource‐rich South China Sea. But will he be able to overcome the domestic factors that thwarted a previous attempt at such cooperation? This article will analyze why the short‐lived 2005–2008 Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking failed as a case study to appreciate the role of domestic politics in the Philippines' erratic policy on China and the South China Sea issue. The research will draw lessons learned from that experience to inform the administration's strategy to pursue joint development in the face of nationalism, legal restrictions, and popular mistrust of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ASEAN, no state's development has been as deeply affected by the United States and its policies as the Philippines, where colonial legacies have left lasting marks on its political institutions and security orientation. Today, uncertainties about the future role of the United States underscore questions about adopting any strategy that overly or exclusively relies on the United States. Moreover, new President Rodrigo Duterte has created uncertainties of his own by reversing the very U.S.-oriented strategy pursued by his predecessor, Aquino. This confluence suggests impending shifts in the national security orientation of each country and a potential turning point in U.S.-Philippine relations. As this Special Issue of APP makes clear, however, for a variety of material, geopolitical, institutional, and domestic reasons, the U.S. alliance is likely to remain an important Philippine foreign policy priority, but changing strategic trends also compel ongoing recalibrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the Philippines' two approaches to China's emergence as a power. The first is the Philippines' strategy of equi-balancing the United States and China in the early years of the 21st century. During this period, the country revived and strengthened its security arrangements with the United States while at the same time, it obtained economic and politico-diplomatic concessions from East Asia's emergent power, China. The second is the Philippines' strategic balancing policy on China. Since 2011, the Aquino Administration has been conducting a delicate balancing act vis-à-vis China, which has become aggressive in asserting its sovereignty over the South China Sea. Currently, the Philippines seeks U.S. diplomatic support and security guarantees in relation to its territorial row with China. In the process, President Aquino has discarded his predecessor's policy of equi-balancing the great powers and tilted the balance in favor of the United States. This policy shift that entails American and Japanese strategic backing doubtlessly enhances the Philippine-U.S. alliance but strains Philippine-China bilateral relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines why and how small powers balance big powers. One such small power is the Philippines, which--despite its military weakness--applies a balancing policy on an emergent China relative to the South China Sea imbroglio. Largely, this balancing policy is the upshot of three developments: a) the present Aquino administration's efforts to disassociate itself from the previous Arroyo administration's policy of equi-balancing China and the US; b) China's heavy-handed behaviour in the South China Sea dispute; and c) the willingness of the US to assist the Philippines in constraining an assertive China. In conclusion, the article offers two reasons why this balancing policy is risky and difficult. First, the Philippines needs time and resources to develop the military capability to back its territorial claim in the South China Sea; and second, the US, though supportive of the Philippine position, is wary of triggering a full-blown geo-strategic rivalry with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how China's soft-power diplomacy has dramatically improved Philippine-China relations, a scenario unthinkable ten years ago. Since 2005, the two countries have significantly increased bilateral trade and investment relations as well as conducted close and intense security cooperation. Such developments in bilateral relations have been initiated by China to serve its changing strategic interests in South-east Asia. Arguably, the general improvement in Philippine-China bilateral relations is part and parcel of China's efforts to shape Southeast Asia's view of its emergence and to apply soft power to erode American strategic preponderance and influence in the region. However, despite its growing economic and political ties with Beijing, Manila has not totally succumbed to China's soft-power diplomacy Instead of jumping on the Chinese bandwagon, the Philippines continues to foster closer political/security ties with the United States and Japan to balance China's growing political and economic clout in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]