Search

Although the detrimental effects of the opioid epidemic on individuals’ health and well-being have been well documented, we know little about how it has affected the family contexts in which children live. We assess how the opioid epidemic, as measured by a rise in the opioid overdose death rate, has affected the rates at which children live in different family arrangements: two married parents, two cohabiting parents, single mother, single father, or another configuration. Our local fixed-effects models show that higher local overdose death rates are associated with fewer children living with two married parents and with an increase in children living in family structures that tend to be less stable, such as those led by cohabiting parents or a single parent. These changes in family arrangements have potential long-term implications for the well-being of future generations.

The variability of age at first marriage has implications for the destandardization of life course and the deinstitutionalization of marriage institution in recent decades. Previous studies, based on Western societies, suggest a more dispersed variability in recent cohorts. However, despite the rise in women’s education, the universal ideology of formal marriage, the powerful link between formal marriage and childbearing, and collectivism in East Asian societies may constrain variability in marriage timing. Also, women with different levels of education experience different life course sequences and interactions with marriage, leading to heterogeneous changes in the variability. Using the Women’s Marriage, Fertility, and Employment Survey in Taiwan, this article presents a representative case of changing marriage and childbearing behaviors in East Asia. Our results show that the variability among women without a high school degree has become more dispersed in more recent birth cohorts. In contrast, variability of age at first marriage among highly educated women has remained consistent. The educational differences became more salient in recent cohorts, especially in women born after 1960. Our findings contribute to the literature on how the life course and the institution of marriage have diverged across education levels over birth cohorts in East Asia.

This study examines changes in variability of age at first marriage for women across birth cohorts and education levels in Taiwan. Taiwan may have experienced a destandardization in the life course and the second demographic transition after World War II, leading to a more dispersed age at first marriage; however, collectivism, the ideology of formal marriage, and the strong association between marriage and fertility may constrain this variability. In addition to estimating each cohort-education group’s dispersion in age at marriage, this study employs logistic and multinominal regression models to investigate how women’s birth cohort, education level, employment experience and occupational status before marriage affect the relative timing of first marriage. The results from a pooled nationally representative survey show that, unlike in Western societies, age variability is not widening across birth cohorts in Taiwan. However, education level and employment status play an important role in the variability of age at first marriage. The findings suggest that the variability of women’s age at first marriage in Taiwan is still significantly affected by the strong association between marriage, fertility, and economic resources. Destandardization in the life course and the second demographic transition in Taiwan differs from that seen in Western societies.

Using the panel samples from the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (L.A. FANS), this paper examined the associations of extended household structures—the entry, stay, and exit of grandparents (vertical kin) and other extended adults (horizontal kin)—with child behavioral problems across US-born, documented and undocumented Latinx families. Difference-score regression models showed differential associations of extended kin by different types of transitions. For children of US-born Latina mothers, gaining grandparents was associated with higher (worse) levels of internalizing (i.e. withdrawn) behaviors, whereas losing grandparents was associated with lower (better) levels of internalizing and externalizing (i.e. disobedient) behaviors. For children of documented Latina mothers, gaining grandparents had no effect, but losing grandparents and keeping horizontal kin were associated with lower levels of internalizing behaviors. For children of undocumented Latina mothers, gaining grandparents was associated with higher levels of externalizing behaviors, but keeping grandparents was associated with lower levels of internalizing behaviors, and keeping horizontal kin was associated with lower levels of both internalizing and externalizing behaviors. The association between the household transition of extended kin and children's behavior reflects selection rather than causation in the context of family life course and US immigration policy.

Preprints catalyze rapid and open communication of research. A frequent criticism of preprints, however, is their lack of peer review. In recent years, myriad new initiatives have enabled review of preprinted research to be coordinated, collected, and displayed alongside preprints. This provides evaluation and context for readers, as well as feedback for the authors. The processes behind preprint review are diverse and may differ from journal peer review, which can be a challenge for readers seeking to compare and interpret the reviews. To address this, the ASAPbio organized a working group that set out to define key features of preprint review processes. Here, we describe Preprint Review Features (PReF) as descriptors and provide an implementation guide. PReF captures the key elements of preprint review processes using 8 standard key-value pairs. PReF can serve within the descriptions of individual preprint review processes, and act as search filters on indexing services. Widespread adoption of PReF will promote understanding and categorization of preprint review and improve its discoverability.

The opioid epidemic has had devastating effects for the health and wellbeing of the U.S. population. However, we know little about how it has affected the structure of families where children are raised. Using the 5 percent sample of the 2000 Census, 2005-2018 American Community Survey (ACS) data and restricted Vital Statistics we assess the effect of the opioid epidemic at the local level on the rates of children living under different types of family arrangements: two married parents, two cohabiting parents, mother only, father only, or another configuration. Local fixed-effects models show that a greater intensity of the opioid epidemic, as measured by a higher opioid-overdose death rate, is associated with a lower rate of children living with two married parents, and a higher rate of children living with two cohabiting parents, with only a father, and with adults other than their parents. The opioid epidemic appears to increase the rates of children living in family structures that tend to be less stable, which has potential long term implications for the wellbeing of future generations.

Key Points Question Were there changes in pregnancy intentions among women who were mothers of young children around the peak of the first wave of COVID-19 in New York City? Findings In this cross-sectional study of 1179 women in New York City who were mothers of young children, nearly half of those who had been attempting to become pregnant and more than a third who had been thinking about trying before the COVID-19 pandemic stopped in the first few months of the outbreak. Women who responded to a survey during the lockdown were more likely to cease attempts or plans to become pregnant. Meaning The results of this study suggest that the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic was associated with fewer women planning or attempting to become pregnant; these findings may have long-term effects on fertility rates., Importance Early evidence shows a decrease in the number of US births during the COVID-19 pandemic, yet few studies have examined individual-level factors associated with pregnancy intention changes, especially among diverse study populations or in areas highly affected by COVID-19 in the US. Objective To study changes in pregnancy intention following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and identify factors possibly associated with these changes. Design, Setting, and Participants A cross-sectional, population-based study was conducted among women who were currently pregnant or had delivered a live infant and responded to a survey emailed to 2603 women (n = 1560). Women who were mothers of young children enrolled in the prospective New York University Children’s Health and Environment Study birth cohort were included; women who were not currently pregnant or recently postpartum were excluded. Exposures Demographic, COVID-19–related, stress-related, and financial/occupational factors were assessed via a survey administered from April 20 to August 31, 2020. Main Outcomes and Measures Pregnancy intentions before the COVID-19 pandemic and change in pregnancy intentions following the outbreak. Results Of the 2603 women who were sent the survey, 1560 (59.9%) who were currently pregnant or had delivered a live infant responded, and 1179 women (75.6%) answered the pregnancy intention questions. Mean (SD) age was 32.2 (5.6) years. Following the outbreak, 30 of 61 (49.2%) women who had been actively trying to become pregnant had ceased trying, 71 of 191 (37.2%) women who had been planning to become pregnant were no longer planning, and 42 of 927 (4.5%) women who were neither planning nor trying were newly considering pregnancy. Among those who ceased trying, fewer than half (13 [43.3%]) thought they would resume after the pandemic. Of those pre–COVID-19 planners/triers who stopped considering or attempting pregnancy, a greater proportion had lower educational levels, although the difference was not statistically significant on multivariable analysis (odds ratio [OR], 2.14; 95% CI, 0.92-4.96). The same was true for those with higher stress levels (OR, 1.09; 95% CI, 0.99-1.20) and those with greater financial insecurity (OR, 1.37; 95% CI, 0.97-1.92. Those who stopped considering or attempting pregnancy were more likely to respond to the questionnaire during the peak of the outbreak (OR, 2.04; 95% CI, 1.01-4.11). Of those pre–COVID-19 nonplanners/nontriers who reported newly thinking about becoming pregnant, a smaller proportion responded during the peak, although the finding was not statistically significant on multivariable analysis (OR, 0.52; 95% CI, 0.26-1.03). Likewise, fewer respondents who were financially insecure reported newly considering pregnancy, although the finding was not statistically significant (OR, 0.69; 95% CI, 0.46-1.03). They were significantly less likely to be of Hispanic ethnicity (OR, 0.27; 955 CI, 0.10-0.71) and more likely to have fewer children in the home (OR, 0.62; 95% CI, 0.40-0.98) or self-report a COVID-19 diagnosis (OR, 2.70; 95% CI, 1.31-5.55). Conclusions and Relevance In this cross-sectional study of 1179 women who were mothers of young children in New York City, increased stress and financial insecurity owing to the COVID-19 pandemic paralleled a reduction in pregnancy intention in the early months of the pandemic, potentially exacerbating long-term decreases in the fertility rate., This cross-sectional study examines the intentions on becoming pregnant of women in New York City who were mothers of young children during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Using data from the 2012 International Social Survey Program (n = 8,269), this study investigated how couples integrate and manage their income across 20 countries with varying degrees of gender inequality. Couples were more likely to report that one person managed the shared pot of money in countries with high gender inequality compared with couples in more gender equal countries. This pattern was not moderated by within-couple earnings equality. We found a cohabitation—marriage gap in income arrangements that is largest where national-level gender equality is high. In more gender equal contexts, married couples were more likely to pool and manage their money together, whereas a larger proportion of married couples assigned one money manager in countries with less gender equality. Cohabiting couples were more likely to keep some money separate than to take-up a pooled, jointly managed approach in more gender equal countries. Findings demonstrate the need to consider both management and pooling dimensions of couples’ treatment of money to understand the influence of contextual factors on couples’ income arrangements.

In the social upheaval arising from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, we do not yet know how union formation, particularly marriage, has been affected. Using administration records—marriage certificates and applications—gathered from settings representing a variety of COVID-19 experiences in the United States, the authors compare counts of recorded marriages in 2020 against those from the same period in 2019. There is a dramatic decrease in year-to-date cumulative marriages in 2020 compared with 2019 in each case. Similar patterns are observed for the Seattle metropolitan area when analyzing the cumulative number of marriage applications, a leading indicator of marriages in the near future. Year-to-date declines in marriage are unlikely to be due solely to closure of government agencies that administer marriage certification or reporting delays. Together, these findings suggest that marriage has declined during the COVID-19 outbreak and may continue to do so, at least in the short term.

In this interdisciplinary roundtable discussion, five scholars interested in political communication work through the democratic dilemmas created when privately owned social media platforms are used as digital public squares by elected officials in the United States. This conversation unfolds in the context of ongoing legal cases that challenge politicians’ efforts to block select interlocutors and bar them from participation. We grapple with the tension between politicians’ use of social media to broadcast their own messages as a form of publicity with the desire by some members of the public that politicians be transparent online by allowing the electorate to question or even criticize them. Through this discussion, we weigh the importance of the right to criticize the government and its leaders alongside the realities of contentious content on social media platforms that are rife with abusive content, in a cultural context marked by social inequalities.

Having first reached epidemic proportions in coastal metropolitan areas, COVID-19 has spread around the country. Reported case rates vary across counties from zero to 126 per thousand population (around a state prison in the rural county of Trousdale, Tennessee). Overall, rural counties are underrepresented relative to their share of the population, but a growing proportion of all daily cases and deaths have been reported in rural counties. This analysis uses daily reports for all counties to present the trends and distribution of COVID-19 cases and deaths in rural counties, from late March to May 21, 2020. I describe the relationship between population density and case rates in rural and non-rural counties. Then I focus on noteworthy outbreaks linked to prisons, meat and poultry plants, and nursing homes, many of which are linked to high concentrations of Hispanic, American Indian, and Black populations. The growing epidemic in rural counties is apparently driven by outbreaks concentrated in these institutional settings, which are conducive to transmission. The impact of the epidemic in rural areas may be heightened due to their weaker health infrastructure and more vulnerable populations, especially due to age, socioeconomic status, and health conditions. As a result, the epidemic may contribute to the ongoing decline of health, economic, and social conditions in rural areas.

Capturing the emotion of the March for Racial Justice

Although the decline in marriage has been cited as a possible contributor to the “despair” afflicting marginalized White communities, these studies have not directly considered mortality by marital status. This paper uses complete death certificate data from the Mortality Multiple Cause Files with American Community Survey data to examine age-specific mortality rates for married and non-married people from 2007 to 2017. The overall rise in White mortality is limited almost exclusively to those who are not married, for men and women. By comparison, mortality for Blacks and Hispanics has fallen or remained flat regardless of marital status (except for young, single Hispanic men). Analysis by education level shows death rates have risen most for Whites with the lowest education, but have also increased for those with high school or some college. Because mortality has risen faster for unmarried Whites at all but the lowest education levels, there has been an increase in the marriage mortality ratio. Mortality differentials are an increasingly important component of the social hierarchy associated with marital status.

Scholars have largely overlooked the significance of race and socioeconomic status in determining which men traverse gender boundaries into female-dominated, typically devalued, work. Examining the gender composition of the jobs that racial minority men occupy provides critical insights into mechanisms of broader racial disparities in the labor market—in addition to stalled occupational desegregation trends between men and women. Using nationally representative data from the three-year American Community Survey (2010–2012), we examine racial/ethnic and educational differences in which men occupy gender-typed jobs. We find that racial minority men are more likely than white men to occupy female-dominated jobs at all levels of education—except highly educated Asian/Pacific Islander men—and that these patterns are more pronounced at lower levels of education. These findings have implications for broader occupational inequality patterns among men as well as between men and women.

This article analyzes U.S. divorce trends over the past decade and considers their implications for future divorce rates. Modeling women’s odds of divorce from 2008 to 2017 using marital events data from the American Community Survey, I find falling divorce rates with or without adjustment for demographic covariates. Age-specific divorce rates show that the trend is driven by younger women, which is consistent with longer term trends showing uniquely high divorce rates among people born in the Baby Boom period. Finally, I analyze the characteristics of newly married women and estimate the trend in their likelihood of divorcing based on the divorce models. The results show falling divorce risks for more recent marriages. The accumulated evidence thus points toward continued decline in divorce rates. The United States is progressing toward a system in which marriage is rarer and more stable than it was in the past.

To help explain variation in Asian immigrant women’s employment, we examine the association between women’s employment and the presence and characteristics of adult extended household members for seven Asian immigrant groups: Chinese, Korean, Asian Indian, Pakistani, Filipina, Vietnamese, and Japanese. Using the American Community Survey 2009-2011 pooled data, we find that married, first-generation Asian immigrant women’s employment rates are higher when they live with parents or parents-in-law. Furthermore, hampered by housework and care work, these women apparently receive some support in particular from female extended adults providing child care assistance—especially in families with young children. On the other hand, we find a negative association between the presence of disabled adults and employment, but only for Koreans, and employed extended adults’ support varies across nationality groups. Variations in these dynamics across Asian groups suggest the need for further study.

This article addresses the argument that there is variation between races in the biological basis for social behavior. The article uses Nicholas Wade’s popular book, A Troublesome Inheritance, as the point of departure for a discussion of attendant issues, including the extent to which human races can be definitively demarcated biologically, the extent to which genetics is related to contemporary definitions of race, and the role of natural selection as a possible mechanism for change in modern societies. My critical review of the theory and evidence for an evolutionary view of racial determinism finds that genetics does not explain the relative status and well-being of today’s racially identified groups or their broader societies.

Recession may increase divorce through a stress mechanism, or reduce divorce by exacerbating cost barriers or strengthening family bonds. After establishing an individual-level model predicting U.S. women's divorce, the paper tests period effects, and whether unemployment and foreclosures are associated with the odds of divorce using the 2008-2011 American Community Survey. Results show a downward spike in the divorce rate after 2008, almost recovering to the expected level by 2011, which suggests a negative recession effect. On the other hand, state foreclosure rates are positively associated with the odds of divorce with individual controls, although this effect is not significant when state fixed effects are introduced. State unemployment rates show no effect on odds of divorce. Future research will have to determine why national divorce odds fell during the recession while state-level economic indicators were not strongly associated with divorce. Exploratory analysis which shows unemployment decreasing divorce odds for those with college degrees, while foreclosures have the opposite effect, provides one possible avenue for such research.

Occupational gender segregation remains one of the defining elements of gender inequality in modern societies. Recent trends for the United States show that occupational segregation remains high and did not substantially decline in the decade of the 2000s for the first time since 1960. Men and women work in different occupations because of a combination of forces, including culturally defined choices by workers themselves, discrimination by employers, and differences in skill levels and qualities. Research has shown that occupational segregation is an important aspect of gender inequality in earnings and contributes to other forms of inequality as well. The prospects for reducing gender segregation in the short term appear slim, based on the weak effects of educational attainment, cultural attitudes, and state intervention in the current period.

In a widely publicized and controversial article, Regnerus (2012a) seeks to evaluate what he calls the “‘no-differences’ paradigm” with respect to outcomes for children of same-sex parents. We consider the scientific claims in Regnerus in light of extant evidence and flaws in the article's evidence and analytical strategy. We find that the evidence presented does not support rejecting the no-differences claim, and therefore the study does not constitute evidence for disadvantages suffered by children of same-sex couples. The state of scientific knowledge on same-sex parenting remains as it was prior to the publication of Regnerus.

Using the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (L.A. FANS), this paper examines the association between the presence of co-resident extended kin and children's internalizing and externalizing behaviors. The paper demonstrates the differential role of extended kin by family structure, as well as across parental immigrant status – specifically, nativity and documentation status. Children in the sample were found to be disadvantaged in extended family households, especially with regard to internalizing behaviors. This disadvantageous association was found mostly among married-parent extended family households, whereas there was no association between the presence of extended kin and behavior problems in children from single-parent families. This pattern emerged more clearly among children of documented immigrants, compared to those with native-born parents and those whose parents were unauthorized immigrants. These findings suggest a need to modify previous theories on extended family living arrangements; they also provide policy implications for immigrant families.

This paper examines gendered housework in the larger context of comparative social change, asking specifically whether crossnational differences in domestic labor patterns convergeovertime.Ouranalysisofdatafrom13 countries (N = 11,065) from the 1994 and 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) confirmed that social context matters in shaping couples’ division of labor at home, but also showed that context affects patterns of change. Ourresultssuggestedthat,comparedtothemost egalitarian countries, the shift in housework patternswasgreatestamongthemosttraditional countries. This provides support for the thesis of cultural convergence, but the evidence did not suggest that such convergence will lead to complete equality in the foreseeable future. Compared with trends in other aspects of social life, change in the domestic division of labor has been slow, and traditional patterns remain prevalent. Nevertheless, there is a broad trend toward more gender equality in housework and a decline in the burden shouldered by women. A

We examine workplace-level sources of gender inequality to explore the link between organizational change and levels of workplace gender integration over time. To do so, we analyze the gender division of labor and key structural aspects of U.S. private-sector work establishments, using longitudinal data from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from 1975 to 2005. We find that women's presence in managerial positions is positively related to gender integration, as is both establishment size and growth. Additionally, the results show that trends toward gender integration are due to change within workplaces rather than new, relatively integrated workplaces entering the population overtime. Our results also provide compelling evidence that the effect of female managers varies dramatically across organizational contexts, with the strongest desegregating effects in larger and growing establishments. Finally, the effect of women's access to organizational power structures has sharply diminished overtime.

OBJECTIVES: The objective of this study was to estimate disability rates for internationally adopted children in the United States. METHODS: We conducted an analysis of restricted-access data from the complete long form of Census 2000 for internationally adopted children aged 5 to 15 in 2000, estimating disability rates by country of origin, controlling for gender, age at adoption, current age, and parental characteristics. RESULTS: Internationally adopted children have disability rates similar to those adopted domestically (11.7% vs 12.2%, respectively) and more than twice the rate for all children in that age range (5.8%). The adjusted odds of disability relative to domestic adoptees range from one half or less (China and Korea) to twice as large or more (Romania, Bulgaria, other Eastern Europe, and other Western Europe). CONCLUSIONS: The population of internationally adopted children is relatively small and diverse, posing challenges for researchers who hope to reach generalizable conclusions. Nevertheless, health, education, and social service professionals, as well as adoptive and prospective adoptive parents, should be aware of the risk for disabilities among internationally adopted children to devote the resources necessary to addressing them.

Trends toward gender equality largely stalled in the 1990s, but the progress of women in management was mixed. Given the importance of managers as actors in the reproduction of inequality, and managerial positions as rewards in their own right, this study investigates the relative status of women in management over the past two decades, using U.S. Decennial Census data from 1980 to 2000. The authors find that women’s entry into management occupations slowed markedly in the 1990s. Furthermore, after decreasing in the 1980s, gender segregation among managers rebounded sharply upward in the 1990s. However, greater segregation coincided with a decreasing gender earnings gap, which largely resulted from narrowing gaps within integrated or male‐dominated managerial occupations. Finally, there remains a substantial earnings penalty for managers who work in female‐dominated occupations.

Relatively few quantitative studies have examined socioeconomic differences in time allocation among women, with the exception of Kahneman et al. (2006). This article presents a preliminary analysis of variation by earnings in women's time spent outside of paid work. We analyze women's time on leisure, housework, and with children. Recent studies of leisure have found that professionals and highly educated people have less free time than individuals of lower socioeconomic status (Aguiar and Hurst 2007; Gershuny 2000; Jacobs and Gerson 2004). However, diverse forms of leisure may have quite different implications for individuals' health and well being. Less time in active leisure is associated with negative health out comes, such as greater risks of obesity, heart disease, and reduced physical functioning. Most conceptualizations of leisure (Bittman and Wajcman 2000; Juster 1999) aggregate varied activities such as watching TV and physical exercise (e.g., Aguiar and Hurst 2007). By contrast, we analyze differences in women's time spent specifically on active, or health oriented leisure activities. With regard to housework, recent studies (e.g., Gupta 2007) have found a negative relationship between women's earnings and their time spent on housework, but based on retrospective estimate data rather than the diary data employed here. Unlike studies con fined to "core" household chores such as cooking and cleaning, we include time spent on stereotypically "male" or shared housework, such as outdoor chores and financial tasks. Finally, previous research has already established that women's time spent with children is positively associated with their education (e.g., Sayer et al. 2004). Here we consider the relationship between women's earnings and (1) routine care, and (2) recreational or

In the last several decades, pornography in the United States has become more mainstream, more accessible, more phallocentric, and more degrading to women. Furthermore, consumption of pornography remains a major difference in the sexual experiences of men and women. Yet research has not addressed how opposition to pornography has changed over the period, despite shifts in the accessibility and visibility of pornography as well as new cultural and legal issues presented by the advent of Internet pornography. We examine gender differences in opposition to pornography from 1975 to 2012, measured by support for legal censorship of pornography in the General Social Survey. Results show that both men’s and women’s opposition to pornography have decreased significantly over the past 40 years, suggesting a cultural shift toward “pornographication” affecting attitudes. However, women remain more opposed to pornography than men, and men’s opposition has declined faster, so the gender gap in opposition to pornography has widened, indicating further divergence of men’s and women’s sexual attitudes over time. This is consistent with the increasingly normative nature of pornography consumption for men, increases over time in men’s actual consumption of pornography, and its increasingly degrading depiction of women.