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Evidence suggests that firms frequently over-comply with U.S. sanctions—a process also known as "de-risking." We argue that U.S. enforcement of its economic sanctions has contributed to this phenomenon to the extent that we can observe a systematic relationship between U.S. sanctions enforcement and third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets. Specifically, we theorize that, the greater the frequency and severity of sanctions enforcement penalties imposed by the U.S. against sanctions violators, the more third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets will decline. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that U.S. sanctions enforcement actions correlate with significant declines in dyadic trade between third-party states and U.S. sanctions targets, even when enforcement actions target parties external to that dyad. This suggests that the U.S.'s enforcement of its sanctions magnifies the harm that U.S. sanctions inflict on target economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do US citizens express greater support for economic intervention abroad in response to violations of international norms? Under what conditions do they express greater support for punitive sanctions or positive inducements? We know little about whether and to what extent citizens offer greater support for sanctions compared to positive inducements and how contextual factors might alter support for each. We design a conjoint survey experiment to gauge support for an intervention—i.e. sanctions or inducements—using comparable counterfactuals. We compare long-enduring bad behavior to recent shocks, differently framed consequences of inaction, as well as varying expertise levels among policy proposal authors. We also consider preexisting attitudes about the target country. In a US sample, we find that policy proposals are supported to a greater extent when they involve sanctions as opposed to inducements, but that preexisting affinity toward the country has a strong conditioning impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has explored how US sanctions affect subsequent behavior by sanctioned states as well as third parties, with particular attention to whether states change the policies that led to US sanctions. In this paper, we argue that US sanctions also affect lobbying of the US government. States experiencing US sanctions over security and political issues will lobby the US government less than other states because this scenario suggests that lobbying is unlikely to influence US policies. States experiencing sanctions over economic issues, on the other hand, will lobby the US more as these targets would see a negotiated settlement as more feasible. We also maintain that third-party states that are similar to US sanction targets will lobby the US government more than dissimilar third parties, as lobbying in this scenario could be aimed at preempting future episodes of US sanctions—regardless of the issue that led to sanctions. We find support for our expectations in auto-regressive models spanning 1975–2005. Our findings suggest that sanctions in some cases lead states to find means other than policy concessions by which to satisfy US policy-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can the government agencies responsible for enforcing economic sanctions enhance their effectiveness? This study explains how and why sanctions enforcement actions undertaken by sender governments can discourage their firms from trading with the states they sanction. Specifically, we examine how the penalties imposed against sanctions violators by the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) affect U.S. firms' trade with target states. We argue that because U.S. firms are responsive to the risk of being penalized and the disruptions that penalties create, U.S. trade with sanctioned states will be lower in the aftermath of OFAC enforcement actions. The penalties' frequency and severity will magnify those negative effects. We hypothesize that OFAC enforcement actions taken against both U.S. and foreign sanctions violators will negatively impact U.S. trade with targets. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that OFAC's sanctions enforcement actions decrease U.S. trade with sanctioned states in numerous ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ostensibly bilateral US foreign policy actions, such as sanctions, can influence third-party compliance with US policy preferences. US sanctions simultaneously signal US preferences and demonstrate leverage, which can motivate third parties to avoid or change proscribed behavior proactively. Empirical testing of this strategic behavior typically is difficult given that it predicts non-events in a noisy signaling environment. However, I argue that the global trade of dual-use commodities—those with both civilian and military purposes—is a phenomenon where we can observe this process systematically. I isolate US sanctions that provide relevant context both by stigmatizing the target and signaling that third-party dual-use exports to the target would directly undermine US policy goals. Using newly-coded bilateral data spanning the post-Cold War period, I find evidence that relevant US sanctions are associated with lower third-party dual-use exports to US-sanctioned states. My findings have implications for scholars and policy-makers, suggesting a broad yet shrouded ability of sanctions to advance US foreign policy goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]