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This chapter continues both the substantive and theoretical agendas of the book. Substantively, sections of this chapter and the next complete the history of Lithuanian anti-Soviet resistance (the events in Vilnius, Lithuania, in January 1991 are the subject matter of the following chapter). Theoretically, this chapter continues the process of applying the template of resistance mechanisms across new and expanded contexts. Here, the same template of mechanisms used previously is employed to investigate resistance in the perestroika period. Does this approach yield insights in a more modern time? Let us consider first what is to be explained. Open anti-Soviet resistance resurfaced in the late perestroika period. It was not a violent rebellion involving community-based cells but rather took the form of mass rallies. This resistance was nonviolent, and loosely organized; individual participation meant moving from 0 to +1 on the spectrum. The essence of this participation was the same as in the 1940s: individuals accepting risk in resistance action against an opponent holding superior force. This chapter covers only a small part of the Eastern European “uprisings” of the late 1980s; the selection of cases rotates on the existence of clear risk in terms of personal safety and possible threats to jobs and careers. These conditions obtained in the USSR in 1987–1988 when the limits of glasnost were still untested and were present in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Rumania in the fall of 1989. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For any given threshold analysis, there must be a set of “first players” who begin the interactive “tipping” process. If the underlying logic of multiple-person assurance games is correct, these first players have an impact totally disproportional to their numbers. For example, in the preceding chapter covering 1989 Eastern Europe, the model represented by Figure 8.1 assumed a very small percentage of “first actors” in a dissident group, and then went on to explain how their action could trigger a strategic interactive process resulting in hundreds of thousands of participants. In cases fitting this model, the entire snowballing process leading to the downfall of regimes may never be catalyzed without these first actors. In many types of mass activities, only a very few individuals are needed to show that “the emperor has no clothes.” A small number of hecklers at Ceausescu's last rally revealed that resistance against his tyrannical regime was possible and helped lead to the end of his rule. In essence, first players hold 0 percent thresholds. They act in the absence of visible signals and actions that help to estimate risk. Their existence poses a fundamental challenge to some of the basic tenets of this work. From its opening sentence, this book has concerned itself primarily with “ordinary people” and how they become involved in resistance and rebellion. While incorporating norms and emotions, the analysis has placed strategic calculation and sensitivity to risk at the center of the explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This book has been about ordinary people and the roles they come to play during times of resistance and rebellion against powerful regimes. In pursuing this aim, the work has intertwined two agendas, one theoretical and methodological and the other substantive. In this conclusion, I discuss both in turn. A mechanism-based approach was developed to answer the question of how ordinary people rebel and resist against powerful regimes. Mechanisms are specific causal patterns that explain individual actions over a wide range of settings; they are intermediary between laws and description. Ten mechanisms were identified: four that triggered movement from neutrality to passive, unorganized resistance, two crucial in producing movement into armed community-based resistance organizations, and four that help to sustain these organizations. When possible, the mechanisms were linked to observable social structures. These ten mechanisms are seen as forming a process that originates, catalyzes, and sustains rebellion against strong regimes. This template of mechanisms was formed from an understanding of Lithuanian resistance, especially the events in the first Soviet occupation of 1940–1941, and knowledge of the theoretical literature on political violence. Because the mechanisms forming this process, and the process itself, should hold generalizable properties, the essential question asked throughout the case material is whether this template of mechanisms could apply across space and time. Could it help to explain puzzling variation? For example, could it help explain why one community develops an extensive rebellion organization while a neighboring community does not? Could it help explain why some, but few, urban communities develop organized, armed rebellion? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do ordinary people rebel against powerful and brutal regimes? The answer to this question has been sought by envisioning rebellion as a process involving a spectrum of roles. Explaining rebellion entails identifying the mechanisms and sequences of mechanisms that drive individuals across this spectrum. The introductory chapters specified ten mechanisms and how they create movement toward or from roles of resistance and rebellion. These ten mechanisms serve as a template for comparison. Thus far, this template has guided the analysis of rebellion in one nation across three successive occupations. The question becomes whether this approach can provide insight into other cases. The promise of a mechanism-based methodology lies in its generality. The sequences of mechanisms illustrated in the Lithuanian case should be operative in other cases as well. This chapter addresses four puzzles of resistance behavior, all in occupied Eastern Europe during the 1940s. For all four cases, the template of mechanisms suggests answers and testable hypotheses. The analysis proceeds from cases most similar to Lithuania to cases with major differences in important factors such as regime strategy or nature of society. This gradual stretching of the theoretical framework acts to define and specify its conceptual limits. Postwar Latvia and Estonia All three of the Baltic states experienced similar Soviet policies in the post-war period. All three developed anti-Soviet resistance organizations in response. Despite these similarities, all commentators agree that the level of resistance was much more intense in Lithuania than in Latvia and Estonia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Soviet postwar occupation of Lithuania was far different from the pre-war occupation. First, and perhaps foremost, the Soviets' primary tool in the latter period was out-and-out brutality. There was little of the “hearts and minds” propaganda campaign that accompanied threat and deportation in the earlier period. No doubt four years of savage fighting against the Germans, and the millions of dead produced by it, contributed to the formation and execution of savage pacification policies, especially when these policies were to be applied to a population considered guilty of collaboration. The Soviet effort in Lithuania, led by General Kruglov, combined the resources of the NKVD, SMERSH (military counterintelligence), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The overall strategy included five fundamental elements: the formation of locally based and recruited militias (−2 on the spectrum), called istrebiteli; the periodic combined operation of istrebiteli and NKVD forces in “sweeps” through the forested areas to surround and capture or kill Lithuanian partisans; the infiltration of partisan units with spies; periodic offers of amnesty; and, starting in 1948, collectivization accompanied by deportation, a policy that eliminated much of the partisans' +2 base. The Soviets employed several more specific devices to threaten or demoralize the population. For example, the Soviets punished the families of partisans. In an effort to uncover those related or connected to the rebels, the bodies of killed partisans were displayed in the town square. In addition to providing possible deterrence value, hidden Soviet agents would observe the reactions of passersby trying to gauge who might be the mother or brother of the deceased. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lithuanians have a reputation of being among the worst of the German collaborators during the Second World War. Given this reputation, one might expect to see a great deal of movement toward the negative side of the spectrum. There is no doubt that Lithuanians welcomed the invading Germans as liberators in the summer of 1941. As the German occupation continued, however, the bulk of the Lithuanian population maintained neutrality. Contrary to conventional opinion, the number of enthusiastic Nazi collaborators was not high; contrary to some Lithuanian claims, relatively few Lithuanians were involved in active resistance. This chapter unfolds into three sections: the first establishes movement on the spectrum (or, in this case, its absence) in a short historical review, the second specifies the reasons for the lack of resistance of the Lithuanian population, and the third addresses the lack of collaboration by outlining mechanisms that stymied German efforts to raise an SS division in Lithuania. Collaboration and Resistance during the German Occupation As discussed in previous chapters, the leaders of the Lithuanian Activist Front believed that by establishing a provisional government before the Germans arrived they could force, or at least persuade, the Germans to recognize their sovereignty. The leaders of the provisional government, and probably many other Lithuanians as well, were working from a model based on the events and outcomes of World War I. This point cannot be overem-phasized. Given the nature of Hitler's regime, this strategy really had no chance of repeat success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]