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Scope 3 emissions of non-state actors are increasingly relevant. These emissions are becoming more significant in the legal debate regarding climate change mitigation and liability. There are various reasons for this trend, such as increasing attention for these emissions in litigation, IPCC reports and (legal) literature. This contribution focusses on the legal questions that arise in cases concerning scope 3 emissions. However, the focus in this contribution is primarily on the Milieudefensie/Shell case in which a significant best-efforts obligation has been imposed to reduce scope 3 emissions. A reduction order that seems to be unique worldwide.

The way humankind has changed the environment has been of grave concern in recent years. The call for environmental rights and justice for the environment has grown as a consequence. However, political theo- ries for environmental justice has fallen short until now. The Rawlsian framework seems promising, due to its full methodology and the large body of literature Rawls has written on the subject; however, Rawlsian justice is not without problems when scaled up to include the problem of environmental change. Rawlsian justice is necessarily anthropocentric and is based on rational maximisation. Within this thesis, the question will be posed as to whether a less anthropocentric, non-speciesist theory of environmental justice can be formulated within the Rawlsian framework. This has been done by integrating the difference principle posi- ted in A Theory of Justice with the proxy-entities proposed in The Law of Peoples. With a small extension of the definition of proxy-entitiy, the desires of non-human species could be taken into account within the ori- ginal position, which will require a fair conception of justice to take the environment into account. When considering Rawlsian justice as inclusive of non-human species, the original position in addition to the diffe- rence principle will provide ample grounds for a more full environmental justice. While it will be requiring from current society, this will be necessary when the current destruction of the environment is to be mitiga- ted.

Is the Pitcher-Feinberg approach in defence of posthumous harm convincing, when applied to ethical theory and practical cases of supposed harm against the dead? Because of semantic issues, the debate about the treatment of the dead can be quite unclear. However, one critique against the Pitcher-Feinberg approach proves to be one of the most influential inside of the debate: Joan Callahan's theory. In this thesis I will defend the Pitcher-Feinberg approach against her critiques, by showing that her counterarguments have fallacies both from a theoretical viewpoint, and a practical viewpoint. The Pitcher-Feinberg approach has one main problem: its formulation can be quite vague. However, if we introduce the additional notions of autonomy, informed consent, and dignity (which are mainly used as a moral basis for the justice system, when debating the rights of the dead), we will see that these can corroborate the approach. Finally, I will test the Pitcher-Feinberg approach by applying it to four real life cases of posthumous harm: (a) Body Worlds and Bodies: the Exhibition, (b) the Negro of Banyoles, (c) Doris Stauffer and (d) Jennifer Gable. Confronting the approach, through the help of the additional notions aforementioned, with these four real life cases, shows that the Pitcher-Feinberg approach is consistent both with ethical theory and practical cases of posthumous harm.

Scriptie.; Met lit. opg.