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Abstract One Health is a ground-breaking philosophy for improving health. It imaginatively challenges centuries-old assumptions about wellbeing and is now widely regarded as the ‘best solution’ for mitigating human health problems, including pandemic zoonotic diseases. One Health’s success is imperative because without big changes to the status quo, great suffering and ill-health will follow. However, even in its more ambitious guises, One Health is not radical enough. For example, it has not embraced the emerging philosophical view that historical anthropocentrism is an unfounded ethical prejudice against other animals. This paper argues that One Health should be more imaginative and adventurous in its core philosophy and ultimately in its recommendations and activities. It must expand the circle of moral concern beyond a narrow focus on human interests to include nonhuman beings and the environment. On this bolder agenda, progressive ethical and practical thinking converge for the benefit of the planet and its diverse inhabitants—human and nonhuman.

Freedom of speech has traditionally been a cause championed by the left and liberal side of the political spectrum, against conservatives who have tried to limit the expression of radical ideas. Here are three examples from the United States: 1) When I was appointed to Princeton University in 1999, Steve Forbes, whose father had endowed the university’s Forbes College, called for my appointment to be rescinded, and pledged that he would not donate to the university as long as I was on the faculty. Forbes was, at the time, running for the Republican nomination for president.

We present evidence from a pre-registered experiment indicating that a philosophical argument – a type of rational appeal – can persuade people to make charitable donations. The rational appeal we used follows Singer’s “shallow pond” argument (1972), while incorporating an evolutionary debunking argument (Paxton, Ungar and Greene, 2012) against favoring nearby victims over distant ones. The effectiveness of this rational appeal did not differ significantly from that of a well-tested emotional appeal involving an image of a single child in need (Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007). This is a surprising result, given evidence that emotions are the primary drivers of moral action, a view that has been very influential in the work of development organizations. We found no support for our hypothesis that combining our rational and emotional appeals would have a stronger effect than either appeal in isolation. However, our finding that both kinds of appeal can increase charitable donations is cause for optimism, especially concerning the potential efficacy of well-designed rational appeals. We consider the significance of these findings for moral psychology, ethics, and the work of organizations aiming to alleviate severe poverty.

The Covid-19 pandemic put the views of bioethicists on the allocation of scarce health care resources to the test. We consider positions taken by medical organizations and national ethics councils in Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden. In several statements from these bodies, the concept of human dignity plays a central role. We argue that the use of this concept does not stand up to ethical scrutiny, and instead defend the view that decisions on the allocation of scarce resources should be guided by the goal of maximizing the net benefits to those affected. We conclude by asking whether the fact that, in some regions, after vaccination became widely available, the scarcity of hospital beds was largely caused by members of the community choosing not to be vaccinated against the virus that causes Covid-19 should play a role in allocating resources to unvaccinated people who subsequently became ill from that virus.