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Abstract The present work is the first to comprehensively analyze the gravity of the misinformation problem in Hungary, where misinformation appears regularly in the pro-governmental, populist, and socially conservative mainstream media. In line with international data, using a Hungarian representative sample (Study 1, N = 991), we found that voters of the reigning populist, conservative party could hardly distinguish fake from real news. In Study 2, we demonstrated that a prosocial intervention of ~ 10 min (N = 801) helped young adult participants discern misinformation four weeks later compared to the control group without implementing any boosters. This effect was the most salient regarding pro-governmental conservative fake news content, leaving real news evaluations intact. Although the hypotheses of the present work were not preregistered, it appears that prosocial misinformation interventions might be promising attempts to counter misinformation in an informational autocracy in which the media is highly centralized. Despite using social motivations, it does not mean that long-term cognitive changes cannot occur. Future studies might explore exactly how these interventions can have an impact on the long-term cognitive processing of news content as well as their underlying neural structures.

Abstract The present online intervention promoted family-based prosocial values—in terms of helping family members—among young adults to build resistance against fake news. This preregistered randomized controlled trial study is among the first psychological fake news interventions in Eastern Europe, where the free press is weak and state-sponsored misinformation runs riot in mainstream media. In this intervention, participants were endowed with an expert role and requested to write a letter to their digitally less competent relatives explaining six strategies that help fake news recognition. Compared to the active control group there was an immediate effect (d = 0.32) that persisted until the follow-up four weeks later (d = 0.22) on fake news accuracy ratings of the young, advice-giving participants. The intervention also reduced the bullshit receptivity of participants both immediately after the intervention and in the long run. The present work demonstrates the power of using relevant social bonds for motivating behavior change among Eastern European participants. Our prosocial approach with its robust grounding in human psychology might complement prior interventions in the fight against misinformation.

Abstract “Why do people believe blatantly inaccurate news headlines? Do we use our reasoning abilities to convince ourselves that statements that align with our ideology are true, or does reasoning allow us to effectively differentiate fake from real regardless of political ideology?” These were the questions of Pennycook and Rand (2019), and they are more than actual three years later in Eastern Europe (especially in Hungary) in the light of the rise of populism, and the ongoing war in Ukraine – with the flood of disinformation that follows. In this study, using a representative Hungarian sample (N = 991) we wanted to answer the same questions—moving one step forward and investigating alternative models. We aimed to extend the original research with the examination of digital literacy and source salience on media truth discernment. Most of the observations of Pennycook and Rand were confirmed: people with higher analytic thinking were better at discerning disinformation. However, the results are in line with the synergistic integrative model as partisanship interacted with cognitive reflection: anti-government voters used their analytic capacities to question both concordant and discordant fake news more than pro-government voters. Furthermore, digital literacy increased detection, but source salience did not matter when perceiving disinformation.

The STORMTOOLS Coastal Environmental Risk Index (CERI) has historically been used to assess the damage to residential and commercial structures from coastal flooding, including the effects of sea level rise (SLR) in RI. In the present study, CERI was extended to address the impact of flooding for 100 yr storm, including the effects of SLR, to the newly renovated Warren, RI wastewater treatment facilities (WWTF), located on the tidal Warren River, using FEMA HAZUS damage curves. The analysis shows that the average damage for 100 yr flooding, across all components of the facility, increases with sea level from 16% (0 ft SLR), 23% (2 ft SLR), 26% (3 ft SLR), to 28% (5 ft SLR). The primary settling and chlorination tanks are at most risk and the aeration and reaction tanks at least risk. In an effort to validate the FEMA HAZUS WWTF damage curves, CERI was applied to predict flood damage during the 3 day, March/April 2010 flooding event (500 yr) to the Cranston, Warwick, and West Warwick WWTF located on the Pawtuxet River, RI. The predictions of the damage to each WWTF from this event were compared to observations of the damage made by the plant operators. The percent damage was estimated by comparing the cost of the damage to the assessed value of the facility. Using the FEMA HAZUS damage curves for the observed level of inundation (7 to 8 ft) predicted that the Warwick and West Warwick facility damage ranged from 15 to 45% with an average value of about 30%. The Cranston WWTF damage was very low (

Similar to Poland, Hungary also experienced a peaceful transition from communism to democracy and market economy. The Hungarian Round Table Talks were organized in 1989, following the successful Polish model. While the Round Table Talks were similarly crucial in Hungary and in Poland in paving the way for institutional and political changes, and concluded in a very successful manner for the opposition parties, conspiracy theories similar to those seen in Poland (see Soral and Kofta in this issue) are proliferating in Hungary as well. The article argues that the rejection of the “compromises” around the transition is due to the very nature of populism: it likes black-and-white, Manichean logic. This article briefly introduces the process of the Round Table Talks and summarizes the literature’s findings on the general social psychological impacts of the transitions. Transitions always provide fertile ground for conspiracy theorizing as they are unexpected even with widespread consequences that fall beyond the control of most members of a society. But in Hungary, these conspiracy theories have been politically exploited in order to fuel discontent towards the democratic institutions - and in this way, they were instrumental in the “second transition”, the illiberal de-democratization after 2010.

Europe has witnessed a polarization of intergroup attitudes and action tendencies in the context of the refugee crisis of 2015 and the rise of right-wing populism. Participation in both pro-minority collective action and right-wing nationalist movements has increased among members of ethnic majority groups. We analyzed these collective action intentions toward Roma people and Muslim immigrants in Hungary related to concepts of citizenship. In an online survey relying on a probabilistic sample that is demographically similar to the Hungarian population (N = 1069), we tested whether relying on the concept of ethnic citizenship predicted higher intentions to engage in pro-majority collective action, and lower intentions to engage in pro-minority collective action, and whether the connection was mediated by fear and empathy. We expected that the connections would be the opposite for civic citizenship. Our results supported the hypotheses, but we found that the ethnic definition was a stronger predictor of intergroup action intentions toward the immigrant group, and the civic definition a stronger predictor in case of the Roma minority group. In a second study (N = 320) we collected experimental evidence to show that civic and ethnic citizenship affected both types of collective action tendencies. We found that the manipulation had an effect on the concept of citizenship only in the ethnic dimension. Nevertheless, it influenced pro-minority collective action intentions especially in the presence of high empathy and low fear in the expected direction, that is, pro-minority collective action intentions were higher in the civic citizenship condition than in the ethnic citizenship condition. The effect was not found with regard to pro-majority collective action intentions. These findings highlight the potential consequences of nationalist rhetoric on intergroup action intentions and point out both the scope and the limits of influencing its effect.

Conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs can be harmful. How is it possible to reduce them effectively? Three reduction strategies were tested in an online experiment using general and well-known CT beliefs on a comprehensive randomly assigned Hungarian sample (N = 813): exposing rational counter CT arguments, ridiculing those who hold CT beliefs, and empathizing with the targets of CT beliefs. Several relevant individual differences were measured. Rational and ridiculing arguments were effective in reducing CT, whereas empathizing with the targets of CTs had no effect. Individual differences played no role in CT reduction, but the perceived intelligence and competence of the individual who conveyed the CT belief-reduction information contributed to the success of the CT belief reduction. Rational arguments targeting the link between the object of belief and its characteristics appear to be an effective tool in fighting conspiracy theory beliefs.