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After intervention and occupation lasting for two decades, the US and their allies left Afghanistan hastily and precipitately. Afghanistan is again ruled by the Taliban who do not seem to be able to provide minimum guarantees of stability and basic human rights protection. These events put into question pivotal international law concepts, such as the Responsibility to Protect or the requirement to provide for transitional justice, brought forward as a justification for intervention and occupation in the first place. This article aims to evidence that these concepts, independently from the terminology chosen, are expression of overarching aims of the State community. Interventions directed at these goals are associated with broader responsibilities both by the interveners as by the State community as a whole. In view of limited intervention and administration capacity, it is crucial to return ownership to the affected populations as soon as possible. Protracted intervention and foreign rule undermines self-determination and the capacity to find a self-reliant way to justice. More attention has also to be devoted to the long-term effects of measures of intervention and the reciprocal interaction between rebuilding activities in the larger sense. It is submitted that attempts to re-engineer a societal fabric as a fighting tool in an ideological struggle creates enhanced responsibility as it undermines self-determination and ownership. A glaring example is the purposeful radicalization of students in Afghan refugee camps.

Human rights are perceived more and more as a set of norms of all-encompassing effects determining all international action, in particular also those by the United Nations. The recent icj Opinion in the Chagos case seems to suggest, however, that the field of self-determination is not yet really affected by this development. The icj has dealt with this case in a very traditional manner declaring, as it was foreseeable, that the de-colonisation process of the Chagos Islands has not been lawfully completed. At the same time, the icj widely ignored the direful lot of the Chagossians. This article investigates whether it is still tenable to deal with a decolonisation case exclusively from the perspective of ‘classic colonial self-determination’ while barely considering the lot of the people directly affected by these events. The main proposition of this article is that the process of humanization of international law must not stop short from affecting also the law of self-determination. It is suggested, on the contrary, that in the 21th century the law of self-determination has to set the individuals composing the people in the forefront.

Bruno Kreiskys Leistung, das Südtirol-Problem vor die Vereinten Nationen gebracht zu haben mit dem Ergebnis, dass die UN-Generalversammlung in den Jahren 1960/1961 die Streitparteien Italien und Österreich aufforderte, eine einvernehmliche Lösung dieses Problems zu suchen, bleibt ein epochaler Erfolg. Unmittelbares Ergebnis der auf dieser Grundlage nachfolgend einsetzenden Bemühungen war das „Paket“ von Autonomie-Reformmaßnahmen aus dem Jahr 1969, die sukzessive umgesetzt werden sollten. Am Ende dieses Prozesses sollte eine Streitbeilegungserklärung stehen, mit welcher Österreich den Streit für beendet erklären sollte. Österreich konnte diese Erklärung am 11. Juni 1992 abgeben. Mit dieser Erklärung ging Österreich allerdings nicht seiner Schutzmachtfunktion für Südtirol verlustig, sondern nach 1992 bildete sich ein Konsultationsmechanismus heraus, auf dessen Grundlage weiter reichende Umgestaltungen der Südtirol-Autonomie zwischen Italien und Österreich abgestimmt werden sollten. Die vor einigen Jahren vertretene Auffassung, damit habe sich ein „asymmetrisches“ Rechtsverhältnis herausgebildet, wonach die Regelungen aus 1992 auf jeden Fall beizubehalten wären, während Verbesserungen nicht mit Einschränkungen „gegengerechnet“ werden dürften, entbehrt jeglicher rechtlichen Grundlage und ist erst recht nicht unter Verweis auf Völkerrecht oder internationalem Minderheitenrecht zu begründen. Vielmehr ist 1992 das Südtiroler Autonomierecht definitiv in seiner Substanz als fortschrittlicher, zukunftsorientierter Schutzmechanismus etabliert worden, der - wie der Menschenrechtsschutz im Allgemeinen - ein „lebendes“ Instrument („living instrument“) darstellt.

The judgment by the German Constitutional Court (‘BVerfG’) of 5 May 2020 has caused a stir all over Europe. The relationship between the BVerfG and the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) has never been an easy one, especially after the Solange judgment of 1974. The Solange jurisprudence has, however, not only been synonymous with conflict and rivalry but also for dialogue and, eventually, mutual respect. With the PSPP judgment, this dialogue seemed to have found an end, while by the order of 29 April 2021 the BVerfG appears to have returned to a more conciliatory tone. Nonetheless, the disruption between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg persists.In this article, the PSPP judgment will be examined in detail, presenting it as the last step of long, contorted jurisprudence. It will be shown that the rupture that occurred in May 2020 was technically unnecessary and rather the result of deep-rooted cultural conflict with a clear economic background. The legal reasoning on both sides—that of the BVerfG and that of the PSPP judgment's most outspoken critics—is problematic at best. While for the time being the BVerfG seems to have learnt the lesson from the conflict provoked by its own judgment, the underlying, substantive conflict is still unresolved.It will be shown that this conflict can only be solved on a political level. Thereby, cultural pre-concepts will have to be overcome. Uncompromising reliance on a national ‘popular spirit’ (Volksgeist) will not offer a way out but neither will, for the time being, exclusive reference to a European Volksgeist ignoring Member State realities. The ‘weighing and balancing’ the BVerfG has missed in the previous Weiss ECJ preliminary ruling (again on the PSPP programme) will have to take place on a far broader scale.

Das Institut des Gebietsreferendums steht in engem Bezug mit Fragen des Minderheitenschutzes. Bereits in der weit zurückliegenden Vergangenheit wurde einzelnen Volksgruppen die Möglichkeit eingeräumt, über die territoriale Zugehörigkeit ihres Siedlungsgebietes zu entscheiden und damit letztlich auch eine Entscheidung darüber zu treffen, ob eine Minderheitensituation überhaupt entsteht bzw. welche Gruppe zur Mehrheit und welche zur Minderheit gehören würde. Vielfach wurden diese Verfahren manipuliert. Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg sollte das Gebietsreferendum - in Verbindung mit Minderheitenschutzvorkehrungen - zum maßgeblichen Instrument der territorialen Neuordnung Europas werden. Die Ergebnisse waren aber nur partiell zufriedenstellend. Immerhin wurden dabei aber Regeln geschaffen, die auch im modernen Völkerrecht noch Beachtung finden. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wurde das Gebietsreferendum von den Vereinten Nationen auf breiter Ebene zur Anwendung gebracht. Dabei wurden immer anspruchsvollere Kriterien entwickelt, die sicherstellen sollen, dass Gebietsreferenden Ausdruck genuiner Selbstbestimmung sind. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird aufgezeigt, dass dieses Instrument nach wie vor von Nutzen sein kann, dass aber auch Alternativen angedacht werden sollten und dass insbesondere auch die mit diesem Institut verbundenen Gefahren berücksichtigt werden müssen. Es bedarf eines modernen Blicks auf das Referendum, der sich von den - vielfach unerfüllt gebliebenen Hoffnungen und Erwartungen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts - löst. Eine stärker auf den Menschen (selbstverständlich auch in seiner kollektiven Identität) - und nicht auf den Staat, das Territorium und Kollektive - fokussierte Völkerrechtsordnung muss das prioritäre Ziel sein.

Mit dem Vertrag von Maastricht (07.02.1992, in Kraft seit 01.11.1993) wurde die Rechtsgrundlage fur die gegenwartig geltende EWWU begrundet. Die Stabilitat der EWWU sollte durch ein detailliertes Regelungssystem zur Vermeidung „ubermasiger Defizite“, verbunden mit einem Sanktionensystem im Falle einer Verletzung dieser Vorgaben, abgesichert werden. Der insbesondere auf Betreiben Deutschlands geschaffene und am 1. Januar 1999 in Kraft getretene „Stabilitats- und Wachstumspakt“ wurde nachfolgend aber wieder aufgeweicht. Die Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise ab 2007 machte wiederum weitreichende Korrekturmasnahmen erforderlich.

Die Griechenland-Krise ab dem Jahr 2009 gab den Anstos fur einen systematischen Umbau der EWWU. Zuerst geschah dies durch spontane Hilfsmasnahmen auf der Grundlage von Art. 122 AEUV. Ab dem Jahr 2011 wurde der Stabilitats- und Wachstumspakt (SWP) adaptiert. Mittlerweile waren die MS der EU insgesamt in eine schwere Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise geraten, die weiterreichende Reformen erforderlich machten. Dieser Reformprozess ist nach wie vor im Gange. Der SWP hat einen enormen Komplexitatsgrad erlangt. Gleichzeitig waren zahlreiche grundsatzliche Fragen zur europaischen Verfassung zu klaren, die Ausdruck eines Richtungsstreits sind, in welchem Mase die EWWU zur Solidarunion umgestaltet werden kann und soll.

The provisions on EU citizenship have been introduced in EU law by the Treaty of Maastricht (Articles 8 to 8c EC). These provisions have been subject to some minor revisions by the subsequent Treaties of Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007). The Treaty of Amsterdam clarified that citizenship of the Union “shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship” while by the Treaty of Lisbon Union citizenship was regulated not only in the TFEU (Articles 20 to 25) but additionally in the TEU (Articles 3 and 9 TEU), thereby emphasising the high symbolic and inspirational value of this concept.

Die Bemuhungen zum Aufbau einer Bankenunion sind unmittelbare Folge der grosen Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, die im Jahr 2007 ihren Ausgang genommen hat. Rasch wurde erkannt, dass Staatsschuldenkrise und Bankenkrise eng miteinander verwoben waren. Angesichts der zentralen Rolle des Bankensystems fur die Finanzinfrastruktur der Mitgliedstaaten bedeuten systemische Schwachen in diesem Bereich eine Gefahrdung der Stabilitat der Volkswirtschaftsordnung insgesamt.

The chapter “What Are and to What Avail Do We Study European International Law Traditions?” written by Peter Hilpold was originally published as a non-open access chapter, but is hereby changed to an open access publication under a CC BY 4.0 license. The indication of the copyright holder has been adjusted accordingly to “©The Author(s)”. The book has also been updated with the changes.

Die deutsche Initiative des Jahres 1995 fur den Stabilitats- und Wachstumspakt (SWP) ist im Wesentlichen auf zwei Grunde zuruckzufuhren: • Das in Art. 126 Abs. 2 vorgesehene Verfahren bei ubermasigem Defizit ist fur sich allein zu schwerfallig. Die Anwendung von Sanktionen ist von politischen Entscheidungen abhangig, die die Sachproblematik zu wenig berucksichtigen. • Ist ein EU-MS im Euro-Raum, konnen wesentliche Anreize fur die Budgetstabilisierung entfallen.

There is some discrepancy between the strong idealistic nature and the considerable potential outreach of this article on the one hand and its limited practical relevance on the other. As to the idealistic ideal of this provision, it must be noted that this provision gives expression, first, to the concept of solidarity as it is enshrined in several articles of the Treaties and as it undergirds a series of further provisions of EU law. As it was said, this article (like others in the TFEU) gives expression to “everyday small solidarity”, while Article 222 TFEU creates the basis for “big solidarity”. Article 23 TFEU is designed to create a specific bond between the Union citizen and both the other MS and the Union itself. On this basis each Union citizen as well as each MS can rely on help and protection by other MS in third countries and thereby perceive European integration as a reality when he is in most urgent need for help. The practical relevance of this norm suffers most by the fact that it regards a very specific subject and it concerns a possibility that is widely unknown by large parts of the population. This provision was of most immediate advantage for the MS themselves which were thereby enabled to reduce expenditure for their missions abroad, secure in the knowledge that their citizens would find protection by other MS. The European Commission has taken a strong commitment to further publicise this provision to enhance protection of Union citizens abroad.

Article 25 TFEU is a closing norm within a set of provisions (Part II of the TFEU ranging from Articles 18 to 25) that, up to a certain extent, necessarily have to remain open and incomplete as they concern a concept that is still in the making and which is of decisive importance for the future development of the Union and its resilience against new challenges. There is, therefore, a certain amount of tension between the different aspects of this norm.

In recent years, in parallel with the rising interest for the history of international law and the evolving of a separate discipline of “Comparative International Law”, interest for national international law traditions—and in particular for European international law traditions—has continuously grown. This process raises a series of questions, in particular whether the assumption of the existence of such traditions is compatible at all with the very nature of international law, about the meaning of “Europeanness” and about the end of such a comparative endeavour. The present book collects a series of analyses in this field undertaken by renowned international lawyers. Of course, such a project cannot claim to give definite, encompassing answers, but it can aim at providing a better understanding of why international law is as it is, evidence what may be at the roots of so many misunderstandings in the international law dialogue between nations and academics and also, on a more positive note, show to what extent a common language has evolved and what the different national contributions were to these achievements.For the time being, studies of such a kind cannot be but electrical. Nonetheless, the hope is that they might contribute to a broader understanding of international law, offer a better comprehension in the discussion between international lawyers and perhaps build the basis for further studies in this area. This introductory chapter describes the research project as a whole, offers some methodological considerations and provides a short glimpse into the chapters of this book.

EU Development Cooperation has evolved over half a century. In this time, this policy has undergone dramatic change. There can be no doubt that initially, the EEC and its MS started from a paternalistic and in a certain sense also egoistic attitude. By the way, in this attitude the EEC and its MS were not alone. It was a rather common relationship between “donor” countries and recipients. Now, this situation has changed. The respective process has taken place slowly, often even nearly imperceptibly, but over the years these changes were substantial. The focus is now on a truly egalitarian partnership. On a world-wide scale, the EU has now become one of the main actors in development cooperation and this holds true also when it comes to conceiving new instruments and avenues for this policy. At the moment, intense discussions are under way on how to re-conceive development cooperation for the future. In this, important contributions are coming from the EU. The development policy has become a highly valuable asset for the EU, in particular as far as its image on the international scene is concerned.This essay has been conceived as a stock-taking about past discussions and achievements in this field. At the same time, however, a focus is set on possible future developments in this area.

Starting with the year 2015 Europe has come under unprecedented migratory pressure that put into question the very structure of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). In fact, according to the so-called Dublin regime the country of first entrance is responsible for carrying out the asylum procedure leaving it open how the burden the granting of asylum involves should eventually be shared between the EU Member States (MS). Both the Geneva Convention on the Rights of Refugees of 1951 (GCR) as the CEAS are built upon the implicit assumption that refugee protection should be of a temporary nature but in reality protection has most often become permanent. In order to avoid excessive burdens for frontline states in Europe and for Europe as a whole the call for the introduction of burden-sharing mechanisms is becoming ever louder. In this context, quota systems have been presented as ideal problem solution instruments. The European Union has tried to establish such mechanisms but so far all these attempts proved to be insufficient and they met with considerable resistance by some EU MS. As a consequence, the insufficiencies of the GRC and the CEAS become evident and the international asylum system as a whole becomes imperilled. The growing resistance in Europe against the uncontrolled immigration both by asylum seekers and by economic migrants is strongly opposed by considerable parts of the population. Some countries like Austria consider therefore the unilateral introduction of a quota system for asylum seekers. Such a system would violate international and EU law but on the other hand the respective discussion has triggered a necessary debate about a reform of the international refugee system involving some form of a fairer burden-sharing.