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The Horn of Africa’s arduous environment and distinctive culture have long challenged scholars, geopolitical diplomats, and the Somali people who make a living in the deserts of the Ethiopian Ogaden, the Somali coastal cities, and on the trade routes of the region. Going well beyond the received academic theories that elevated clanship to explain everything in pastoral life, Saȉd Samatar’s deep experience in his community led him to see the importance of poetry, diplomacy, and Islamic jurisprudence in Somali affairs. The fates of fortune that brought Samatar to Rutgers University and prominence as an Africanist historian are almost stranger than fiction. This chapter details both the romance of English teacher Lydia with camel herder Saȉd, their marriage, and their respective careers. The backdrop to this remarkable story were the Mennonite programs in education, development, and health care in newly independent Somalia’s cities of Mogadishu, Chismaio, and Jamama that brought the two together.

This article is a tour de horizon of the origin myths that were recorded in the Chinese dynastic and other historical works written during the Türk era (552–ca. 744) and in subsequent official histories (e.g., the Zhoushu, Suishu, Beishi, Jiu Tangshu and Xin Tangshu), historical handbooks (the Tongdian) and historical collections (e.g., the Youyang zazu [and the Taiping Guangji] and the recent translations of and scholarship on them). Also included is a discussion of a Uyğur-origin Tibetan ‘report’ on the ‘Northern Peoples’. The article focuses on the Ashina-Türk grouping that became the founding and ruling clan of the Türk Qağanate. The shaping of the Ashina-Türk took place in a range of areas extending from the Chinese border zones of Gansu and Xinjiang to Mongolia and Southern Siberia. The Ashina-Türks appear to have been a ‘composite’ of peoples with a variety of ethno-linguistic affiliations. A lupine ancestor figures in most of the origin accounts.

Les Khazars furent les principaux opposants a l'expansion omeyyade au nord du Caucase et au-dela. L'un des domaines les moins connus des relations entre Arabes et Khazars concerne le role joue par les ghulâms d'origine khazare dans le califat abbaside. La nature du systeme des ghulâms demeure un sujet de discussion: ce systeme etait-il base sur l'esclavage ou n'etait-ce qu'un moyen d'exprimer une loyaute personnelle et politique? Est-il ne au Proche-Orient ou provient-il d'Asie centrale? (cf. le systeme sogdien des Châkars)? L'auteur considere que la notion de comitatus si importante dans les mondes turcs et iraniens a joue un role cle dans la constitution du systeme des ghulâms. Les ghulâms, dans un nouvel environnement social et politique, separes du reste de la population, ont pu former des groupes de solidarite a base ethnique. On a quelques indices de l'existence d'une faction khazare. Certains ghulâms khazars (Itâkh, Bugha al-Kabir, Ishâq b. Kundâjiq) sont parvenus a de hautes positions. Ils etaient recrutes parmi les prisonniers de guerre et les esclaves commercialises via la Khazarie, la Bulgarie de la Volga, le Khorezm et l'empire samanide. Leur nombre declina passe le debut du dixieme siecle, periode des raids Rus' par la Volga et la Caspienne.

The ruling house and core tribes of the Khazar empire did not share the same tribal or, in many instances, ethnic origins as those of the Qaganate’s diverse subject population. The Khazar rulers were heirs of the Turk qaganal charisma. Although aspects of sacral rule and dual kingship can be seen in the Turk and other Inner Asian nomad-based empires, it was only in Khazaria that the Qagan became a sacralised, tabuised figure. This transformation occurred in the 9th century and may reflect the influence of the Ors, the Khwârazmian-Iranian guard of the Qagan and the chief minister drawn from their ranks.

The author claims that this work is a “preliminary argument for a new approach” (p. xxi) to the history of the Muslim East, one that runs counter to older Indo-centric views of the Mughals and the contrived “national” histories produced by British and Russian imperial historians (p. 154). Two central themes run through this study. The first is that “tripartite Muslim Asia” (Iran–Turan–Hindustan) of the 16th and 17th centuries was, in terms of the dominant elite culture, one world and not several. The Muslims of Central Asia and northern India in the 16th and 17th centuries “appear not to have thought of each other mainly as foreigners or as subjects of another king. Rather, they considered each other foremost as Muslims and secondarily in terms of family connections or other loyalties” (p. 31). This in part contributed to and permitted the large-scale movement of talent from Iran and Central Asia to the Mughal domain, “where opportunities were perceived as being better” (p. xix). This notion and the elements of “shared economy” and “mental geography of Asian Muslims” are briefly explored in the first chapter and returned to repeatedly throughout the book. The second chapter, “Timurid Legacy and Turko-Mongol Identity,” focuses on one very particular aspect of this special relationship. The Mughal dynasty was founded by Babur, a descendant of Tamerlane and heir to the extraordinary Turko-Iranian culture that flourished under Timurid rule in Central Asia. Having been evicted from his patrimony in Central Asia by the Uzbeks and having failed to regain his ancestral lands, Babur (who viewed India as “inhospitable, uncivilized and heathen” [p. 127]) and his descendants had to make do with Muslim South Asia. This was their “consolation prize.” That is not bad as “consolation prizes” go, especially because the new territory, which Babur's descendants, after a shaky start, soon expanded to include much of the Indian Subcontinent, quickly outpaced their Central Asian patrimony in power and wealth. Uzbek Central Asia, decreasing in importance militarily, strategically, and economically, never constituted a threat to the Mughal regime and was no longer a core zone of world trade. “In strictly material terms the Mughals had little to gain by reconquering the land of their forebears,” Foltz writes, “yet it remained an obsession. Simple nostalgia appears to have been a major factor in determining the Mughal's foreign policy, and may well provide historians with an example of psychology overriding economics” (p. 6). This is the second major theme of this work. Babur, understandably, always dreamed of returning to his Central Asian homeland. Foltz, however, contends that his “obsession was to be the inheritance he bequeathed to his own descendants, which would haunt them mercilessly despite their successes and glories in India for two centuries to come” (p. 14). Another psychological factor, the author suggests, was the need of the Mughals to prove to the Uzbeks and the rest of the world that they had “made good in exile” (p. 68). By the late 16th century, the Mughals controlled a state with some 60 million to 90 million subjects, while Uzbek Turan could only muster some 5 million—and not always under stable rule. In addition to the psychological factors, which, with the exception of Babur's memoirs (a unique source) are difficult to document, there were also very good political reasons for the Mughals to maintain this Central Asian link. They were Timurids, after all, and Timurid descent was an important component of their ideology, especially when facing the Shibanid Uzbeks. Although they considered the Shibanid Uzbeks barbarians, the Shibanids' Chinggisid descent gave them even higher standing. Foltz correctly notes that “in a world where lineage was nearly everything, the Mughal descendants of Timur could not, ideologically speaking, abandon their paramount claim to Central Asia no matter how firmly established in India they became” (p. 22). Viewing themselves as the lawful rulers of Central Asia, the Mughals “were content to let the Uzbeks ‘house sit’ for them” (p. 33), sometimes referring to Uzbek rulers as “governors” or the Wali-yi Turan (p. 127). Although many Uzbeks eventually came to seek their fortunes in Mughal service, they were stereotyped as simpleminded and pious but obstinate ruffians and bigots, given to revolt. Foltz attributes their rebellious inclinations to the egalitarian traditions that they brought with them from the Turkic lands (p. 59).

Neighbours of the steppe The steppe, extending from the Danube to Manchuria, has been uncharitably termed the ‘inhospitable land of the barbarian’. These ‘barbarians’ were largely pastoral nomads whose neighbours viewed them as avaricious and violent marauders. In the west, this nomadic world was framed by Hungary and Rus', the latter an increasingly divided state contested by rival branches of the Riurikid ruling house. Both states included steppe lands and pastoral nomadic populations that had taken service with the Hungarian and Rus' rulers. South of the steppe lands and the fabled Silk Road cities of its southern rim (Samarqand, Bukhara, Kashghar) were the petty states of the Balkans, the fading Byzantine Empire, the Seljukid state of Rūm (Anatolia), Georgian-dominated Transcaucasia, and the fragmented ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and post-Seljuk polities of the Near East. In the east, China was also politically divided. In the north-west were the Tanguts (Chin. Xixia, 1038–1227) in Ningxia, Shaanxi and Gansu, extending to Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. They spoke a language related to or a branch of Tibeto-Burmese. South of the Yangtze River was the ethnically Chinese Southern Song state (1127–1279), with its capital at Hangzhou. The Manchu-Tungusic Jurchen dominated the north-east, its ruling elite moving between five capitals (including Beijing). In 1125, the Jurchen had toppled the Khitan-Liao dynasty (907–1125), another Inner Asian people of Mongolic, or perhaps ‘para-Mongolic’, ethno-linguistic affiliations and took the Chinese dynastic name Jin (‘Golden’, 1115–1234).

The Khazar Empire was one of the major states of medieval Eurasia. Drawing on a variety of disciplines (history, linguistics, archaeology, literary studies), the papers in this volume shed new light on many of the disputed topics in Khazar history.

The Khazar conversion to Judaism, an unusual, but not unique occurrence, must be viewed within several larger contexts. Conversion probably took place in stages. It began, as so often was the case, at the top, with the ruling house, perhaps episodically as early as the mid-eighth century, but not extending at that stage much beyond the ruling strata. Some important stage must have been reached by the era of Harun ar-Rasid, as reported by al-Masʿudi. The "Moses coins" clearly reflect the growing weight at the top political levels of society. This was also a period of conflict with Byzantium which was trying to strengthen the Christian presence in Khazaria. The now overt movement towards Judaism may have represented a critical shift in foreign policy. The Byzantines had failed to bring the Khazars into Christendom. This was a foreign policy defeat and undoubtedly the source of some resentment in Constantinople. Keywords: Byzantium; Christian; Constantinople; conversion; Harun ar-Rasid; Judaism; Khazars; Moses coins

The Khazar Qaganate was, indeed, one of the great powers of the age. It played an important role in Rus' history, in early Hungarian history and the history of the Caucasus. This chapter presents some idea as to what Khazarology has accomplished thus far and to perhaps suggest some future directions. Even a quick glance at modern Khazar studies will show that scholars are far from universal accord on many fundamental issues although there are also some broad grounds of agreement. Any presentation, of the achievements of Khazar studies is necessarily idiosyncratic, inevitably reflecting personal interests, languages, political and cultural education. The chapter begins with some remarks about the Hungarian School . This may strike some as an odd point of departure, but the Hungarians scholars, with their long-standing and understandable interest in the Altaic and Uralic languages of Eurasia, are a logical starting point. Keywords: Altaic languages; Eurasia; Hungarian School ; Khazar Qaganate; Khazar studies; Uralic languages

The Arabic, Persian, Turkic, Greek, Armenian and Mongol languages in the 14th century King's Dictionary were the most important tongues of the Eastern Mediterranean. The famous Rasulid Hexaglot shows the depth of connections among several Eurasian cultural areas in the aftermath of the Mongol conquests. Authoritative guide to the dictionary, with translation, commentary, and a chapter on the cultural context.

Cette these porte sur l'histoire des principaux marchands internationaux d'asie centrale du haut moyenage, les marchands sogdiens. Ce travail fonde principalement sur l'etude des textes a beneficie de l'apport de l'archeologie sovietique sur la sogdiane (l'ouzbekistan et le tadjikistan actuels), et des decouvertes des archeologues chinois. Elle etablit l'existence d'un monopole sogdien sur le grand commerce terrestre entre l'asie centrale et la chine d'une part et dans la steppe d'autre part entre le veme siecle et le viiieme siecle. Le commerce sogdien est alors le principal maillon de ce commerce, relie aux autres par une serie d'interfaces (merv, la crimee, la haute volga, les capitales chinoises. . . ). Le commerce sogdien nait tres progressivement sur les marges du commerce entre la chine et l'empire kouchan au iieme siecle de notre ere. Un reseau commercial se constitue, tourne a la fois vers la chine et l'inde. Passees les grandes invasions du iveme siecle, la sogdiane beneficie de la fusion qui a lieu entre nomades (huns puis turcs au vieme siecle) et sedentaires. Le commerce sogdien se detourne de l'inde pour jouer le role d'intermediaire privilegie a la lisiere sud de la steppe. Le role crucial joue par les sogdiens et leur culture dans le premier empire turc assure aux marchands sogdiens une rente de situation liee aux tributs de soie que la chine verse aux nomades et que les sogdiens se chargent de revendre jusqu'a byzance. L'expansion de l'empire chinois vers l'asie centrale au viieme siecle profite encore aux sogdiens qui approvisionnent les armees. Le dynamismecommercial persan par la mer, la conquete de la sogdiane par les armees musulmanes, et surtout l'effondrement de l'economie imperiale chinoise apres la rebellion du general turco-sogdien an lushan mettent fin a l'importance economique du commerce sogdien dans la seconde moitie du viiieme siecle, meme si les contacts avec la chine sont encore faiblement attestes jusqu'au debut du xeme siecle.