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President George H. W. Bush assumed office at a critical juncture, as the Cold War came to an end and the world shifted to a new era of international relations. In The Gulf War, Spencer Bakich argues that Bush fashioned a grand strategy to bring about a New World Order designed to transform international politics by focusing on great power cooperation through the United Nations. The Persian Gulf War became the chance for Bush to put his strategy into action. This latest volume in the Landmark Presidential Decision series offers a fresh and concise look at President Bush's strategic decision making and his choice to wage war against Iraq.Bakich, an expert in wartime strategy, traces the ideas and actions of Bush's new world order strategy between 1989 and 1991, which had a profound impact on the diplomacy of Desert Shield and the warfighting of Desert Storm. Bush's strategic beliefs contained core elements of Wilsonian internationalism—specifically its goals of promoting democracy, conducting multilateral diplomacy through international institutions, and transforming the United Nations into the collective security institution that its founders envisioned. His “New World Order” was not mere political sloganeering intended to bolster support for the Persian Gulf War among a skeptical American public. Rather, Bush intended the Gulf War to exercise and firmly establish the UN's collective security function in the post–Cold War era.In this bold new interpretation of George H. W. Bush's foreign policy, Bakich challenges conventional wisdom, arguing that Bush's New World Order was carefully defined and had a comprehensive logic. He shows how Bush's strategic beliefs oriented American statecraft in peace and war. Bush's grand strategy was remarkably coherent, powerfully affecting how his administration decided to go to war to evict Iraq from Kuwait, how it waged war in the Persian Gulf, and ultimately the reasons why the fighting was terminated before the coalition's war aims were completely achieved. In the end, the Gulf War's outcome exposed faulty assumptions about the international system that underpinned the strategy, weakening the president's fidelity to his own approach. Ultimately, the Gulf War did usher in a New World Order, but not the one Bush had envisioned.

How did United States-Iraq relations deteriorate into a double-feature war that destroyed Iraq's Ba'th regime, a secular sovereign government, and dragged the United States into an unforeseen chaos that has limited its willingness and ability to take part in other world affairs? The facts are well known, but until now there has been no serious academic study of the fundamental mutual misunderstandings between Iraq and the United States. Here Binah examines the perceptions, preconceptions and misunderstandings of both sides over a period of twelve years, from 1967 (the Six Day War) to 1979 (the emergence of the Khomeini Islamic Republic in Iran). This history provides the background to the fatal 1990 deaf-dialogue between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and American ambassador April Glaspie, which led to the first Gulf war. The book deals with three main issues which are the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf, the Kurdish rebellion and the Arab-Israeli conflict - including the increasing political involvement of the American Jewish community in matters relating to Israel and Jews in the Arab lands, as the influence of their organizations grew. While examining these issues, Binah bears in mind the over-arching concerns at that time of the Cold War and the international oil market. This thorough study provides a detailed and exact report of'what happened'alongside the broader discussion of'why did it happen', giving the reader the framework for such an examination. [Subject: Politics, Middle East Studies, Foreign Relations, Public Policy, Israel, Iraq, History]

The invasion of oil-rich Kuwait by its neighbor Iraq in the summer of 1990 posed a strategic and political problem for the United States, as well as American allies in the Middle East. Through thoughtful narrative supported by fully documented quotes this title begins with A Brief History of the Persian Gulf War, and then examines these questions: How Did Oil Politics Fuel the Gulf War? How Did the Cold War's End Influence the Persian Gulf Conflict? What was the Result of Basing US and Coalition Troops in Saudi Arabia? What Followed from Allowing Saddam Hussein's Regime to Survive?

In the decade following the first Gulf War, most observers regarded it as an exemplary effort by the international community to lawfully and forcefully hold a regional aggressor in check. Interpretations have changed with the times. The Gulf War led to the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia, an important contributing cause of the 9/11 attacks. The war also led to a long obsession with Saddam Hussein that culminated in a second, far longer, American-led war with Iraq. In Into the Desert, historian Jeffrey Engel has gathered an all-star cast of contributors to reevaluate the first Gulf War: Michael Gordon of the New York Times; Sir Lawrence Freedman, former foreign policy advisor to Tony Blair; American Ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan Ryan Crocker; Middle East specialist Shibley Telhami; and Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Engel and his contributors examine the war's origins, the war itself, its impact within the Arab world, and its long-term impact on military affairs and international relations. All told, Into the Desert offers an astute reassessment of one of the most momentous events in the last quarter century.

Richard Haass, a member of the National Security Council staff in the George H. W. Bush administration and the State Department director of policy planning for George W. Bush, reviews the causes and strategies of the first and second Iraq wars while providing a thoughtful examination of the means and ends of U.S. foreign policy.War of Necessity, War of Choice—part history, part memoir—provides invaluable insight into some of the most important recent events in the world. Additionally, this book provides a much-needed compass for how the United States can apply the lessons learned from the two Iraq wars so that it is better positioned to put into practice what worked and avoid repeating what so clearly did not. In this compelling, honest, and challenging book by one of the country's most respected voices on foreign policy, Haass's assessments are critical yet fair and carry tremendous weight.

Focusing on the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Hamdi Hassan offers a balanced examination of the motivation of the Iraqi polity and the conditions which accelerated and facilitated the decision to invade. Critical of the traditional approach of most Middle East studies, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait offers a counterpoint to Western interpretations of this key event in the contemporary history of the Middle East. Hassan examines how Saddam Hussein assessed and responded to American and Israeli intentions after the invasion, the reaction of other Arab states, and the unprecedented grassroots support for the Iraqi leadership. In this context, the author examines the social structure of Iraqi society - families, clans and regional alliances - and the importance of Ba'athism. Hassan also examines the political structure of the country, relating the identity of Arabism - the religion and language which is associated closely with the Pan Arabist ideals - to Iraqi foreign policy.