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This research examines whether consumers ascribe racial stereotypes to artificially intelligent (AI; nonhuman) agents and whether these stereotypes impact ratings of satisfaction, perceptions of competence and humanness, and outcomes of negotiated transactions. Drawing on the stereotype content model, expectation violation theory, and the humanness-value-loyalty framework, we investigate how consumers apply racial stereotype judgments in interactions with artificially intelligent agents in a controlled negotiation experiment. Results reveal that although Black people, in general, are more likely to be stereotyped as less competent than Asian or White people, the opposite is true for Black AI bots. Furthermore, perceptions of competence and humanness of Black AI bots supersede those of Asian and White AI bots, leading to increased ratings of overall satisfaction, and some evidence of more favorable negotiation behaviors. Implications for AI applications in marketing are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Monkey see, monkey do' is an old saying referring to imitating another's actions without necessarily understanding the underlying motivations or being concerned about consequences, such as propagating harmful behaviors. This study examines the likelihood of firms imitating and proliferating others' unethical, irresponsible practices thereby exacerbating harmful effects among even more firms; in doing so, irresponsible contagions can rapidly spread more broadly, negatively affecting even more consumers. Building upon rivalry‐ and information‐based imitation theories, we examine if harmful behaviors of others, in combination with misbehavior of referent firms, influences the likelihood of a firm to engage in irresponsible consumer‐related practices. After examining 25,824 firm‐year observations over 12 years, our findings suggest that imitation of harmful product‐related behavior occurs; with size an important factor related to proliferation of harmful behaviors. Testing the model against a holdout sample finds 94% accuracy. Implications for scholars, managers, and policy makers are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some firms engage in actions to reduce climate change? We propose two counterintuitive mechanisms: high levels of regulation and a firm's increased tolerance for risk. Drawing from insights on how institutional contexts constrain, and enable, prosocial firm behavior, we argue that external pressures, amplified internally by a firm's higher tolerance for risk, increase the likelihood that a greenhouse gas (GHG)‐intensive firm will engage in climate change actions that exceed regulatory requirements. An analysis based on 7,101 observations of U.S. publicly traded firms during the 2013 to 2015 period supports our hypotheses. Our models show high overall prediction accuracy (88.6%) using an out‐of‐time holdout sample from 2016. Moreover, we find that firms that have exhibited environmental wrongdoing are also more likely to engage in beyond‐compliance activities, which may be a form of greenwashing. Thus, more formal and informal regulatory oversight has the potential to spur positive environmental actions. This has implications for a firm's corporate social responsibility actions as well as for climate change regulatory policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the results of a study on the advertising content of prime and subprime mortgage offers in the U.S., focusing on the question of whether such advertising was misleading to consumers, and may have contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis which began in 2008. The ways in which information was framed in 5000 advertisements for mortgage products between 2005 and 2007 were analyzed, and clear differences were observed between the prime and subprime offers. It is argued that information asymmetry is a problem for consumers in this context, and regulators should address such issues, possibly by requiring the inclusion of standardized pricing information.