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High-pay, high-status jobs are competitive and male-dominated and typically demand long work hours. The authors study the role of competition in producing the latter two outcomes using two field experiments. In the first, they find that paying tournament prizes for performance induces both men and women to work longer, but that men respond more than women to the high-prize tournament. In the second, men are more likely than women to choose tournament-based compensation over a wage rate for larger prizes. These results demonstrate that high-stakes workplace competition can fuel gender inequality both directly, because men are more likely to enter and win tournaments, and indirectly, by raising work hours, which hurts women who face greater time demands in household production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Group-based incentives are attractive in contexts where production is interdependent. Prior work shows such incentives increase group performance despite freeriding concerns, yet little is known about the effort response of individuals. Using individual-level data, the authors assess the introduction of group-based performance pay using difference-in-difference estimation. Overall, performance increased by 19%. Nearly all workers contributed to this effect. Further, two-thirds of this effect stems from increased efficiency (more output per unit of time) and one-third from higher attendance. Both incentive and selection effects are present. By leveraging individual-level data, the authors pose new questions and evidence to the group-based incentives literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with performance-pay worker compensation and occupational choice. We analytically and numerically examine the distributional effects of entrepreneurial talent and performance-pay contracts. Risk-neutral, more talented individuals become entrepreneurs, inducing workers to exert effort through incentive contracts. Entrepreneurial talent and worker effort significantly influence income inequality through complex general equilibrium channels. Economies with higher tariffs, more entrepreneurs, less skilled or more heterogeneous workers, and economies without worker effort, display higher income inequality measured by the top one percent income share and the Gini Coefficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major theoretical objection against employee share ownership is that workers are exposed to excessive financial risk. Theory posits that 10 to 15% of a typical worker's wealth portfolio can be prudently invested in employer stock. The authors analyze employee share ownership in US family portfolios using the 2004 to 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances. Overall, 15.3% of families with private-sector employees held employer stock in 2016, and one in six of these families exceeded the 15% threshold. Employee share ownership appears to generally add to, rather than substitute for, both pension and overall wealth. Employee share owners express higher risk tolerance and financial knowledge and greater understanding of the value of diversification. While financial risk does not appear to be a substantial problem for most employee share owners, a small minority may face excessive risk, and the authors suggest approaches to reduce such risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does pay-for-performance (P4P) impact productivity and the composition of workers in mission-oriented jobs when output has multiple dimensions? This is a central issue in the public sector, particularly in areas such as education and health care. We conduct an experiment, manipulating compensation and prosocial elements of the job, to answer these questions. We find that P4P has significantly smaller positive effects on productivity on the incentivized dimension in the prosocial setting relative to the non-prosocial setting. On the other hand, P4P generates no loss in performance on the non-incentivized dimension of effort in the prosocial setting, whereas it does so in the non-prosocial setting. In both settings, P4P attracts higher ability workers, but it does so at the expense of attracting prosocially-motivated workers in the prosocial setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the profit effects and interplay of two core accounting practices in a field experiment in a large retail chain. In a 2 × 2 factorial design, we vary (1) whether store managers obtain decision-facilitating information on a profit metric and (2) whether they receive performance pay based on the same metric. We find that both practices increase profits significantly. In contrast to reasoning based on standard economic theory, we do not find complementarity between both interventions. Rather, we detect evidence in line with an attention-directing role of both practices: the introduction of each raises attention to the underlying objective, which induces a countervailing substitution effect. JEL Classifications: J33; M52; C93. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether financial reporting quality affects worker wages using employer‐employee matched data in the United States. We find that low financial reporting quality is associated with a compensating wage differential—that is, a risk premium—using three distinct approaches while controlling for worker characteristics by (1) regressing wages on firm‐year–level and firm‐level reporting quality, (2) documenting wage changes when workers switch firms, and (3) estimating a structural approach that separates reporting quality from performance‐related volatility. We find evidence consistent with two channels: performance pay and turnover risk, where workers bear risks from noise in performance measurement and unemployment, respectively. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we show that—after the accounting scandals in 2002 and after the announcements of an internal control weakness (ICW)—former Arthur Andersen clients and ICW firms pay wage premiums to employees, with magnitudes between 0.9% and 2.8% of annual wages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether collective wage bargaining impedes the implementation of variable pay systems is uncertain. The authors argue that much of this uncertainty is attributable to the fact that research neglects differences in the institutional structure of bargaining. Using representative company-level data for all member states of the European Union, the authors investigate the incidence of variable pay systems in general as well as pay types that include payment-by-results, performance-related pay, and team-related pay under various bargaining arrangements. Findings show that the institutional structure of collective bargaining matters: Variable pay systems thrive under company and multilevel collective bargaining, whereas their implementation is limited under national-level collective wage bargaining. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the causal effect of performance pay and conversations about performance in 224 stores of a retail chain implementing a field experiment with a 2x2 factorial design. In the performance pay treatments, managers receive a bonus, which is a simple linear function of the profits achieved above a threshold value. In the performance review treatments, managers have to report their activities undertaken to increase profits in regular meetings. We find that whereas performance pay did not yield significant profit increases, performance review conversations increased profits by about 7%. However, when additionally receiving performance pay, the positive effect of performance reviews vanished. We provide evidence from surveys and meeting protocols that performance pay changes the nature of conversations, leading to a stronger self-reliance of store managers, which undermines the value of the performance reviews. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: Funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy [Grant EXC 2126/1 390838866] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4431. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the local wage setting that is when companies in their collective agreements with unions formulate local rules for determining wage increase criteria, in contrast to central wage setting where the industry agreement specify the rules for all companies covered. Topics include considered the HR-managers should promote local wage practices more than they currently do.

Xi Jinping’s government has curtailed some of the ways that China’s workers formerly influenced the management of their workplaces while promoting other forms of rank-and-file participation in enterprise governance. Numerous studies have documented the forms of worker activism that have been curbed but few have discussed the state’s efforts to bolster alternative forms of participatory management. This article addresses this imbalance with evidence that the Staff and Worker Representative Congress system has been empowered under the Xi government in ways that amplify the voice of China’s workers within their enterprises. In advancing this argument, the example of school congresses and the determination of teachers’ performance pay is used. Based on interviews, the study suggests that congresses further the ability of teachers to deliberate, decide and manage the metrics that determine the distribution of performance pay and resolve milder forms of workplace grievances. The findings lend credence to commentators who have suggested the congress system may emerge as a substantial feature of China’s industrial relations system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using linked employer‐employee data for Britain, we find a robust association between the share of female managers in the workplace and the size of the gender wage gap. In workplace fixed‐effects estimates, the gap is eradicated when more than 60% of workplace managers are women, a scenario that obtains in around one fifth of all workplaces. The association between the share of female managers and the gender wage gap is more pronounced when workplace managers set pay at the workplace, and where employees are paid for performance. These findings are consistent with the proposition that women are more likely to be paid equitably when managers have discretion in the way they set pay or reward performance and those managers are women. They suggest that a stronger presence of women in managerial positions can help tackle the gender wage gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While performance pay can benefit firms and workers by increasing productivity and wages, it has also been associated with a deterioration of worker health. The transmission mechanisms for this deterioration remain in doubt. We examine the hypothesis that increased stress is one transmission mechanism. Using unique survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we find performance pay consistently and importantly associates with greater stress even controlling for a long list of economic, social and personality characteristics. The finding also holds in instrumental variable estimations accounting for the potential endogeneity of performance pay. Moreover, we show that risk tolerance and locus of control moderate the relationship between performance pay and stress. Among workers receiving performance pay, the risk tolerant and those believing they can control their environment suffer to a lesser degree from stress. : J33, I31, J32 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conduct a lab‐in‐the‐field experiment with 318 finance professionals to investigate the effects of incentives on misconduct in the finance industry. We examine the inclusion of compliance, as well as transaction volumes, for determining performance pay. This is proposed by regulators to reduce misconduct, despite the inherent difficulty of measuring compliance. Relative to fixed remuneration, the performance pay structures that incorporate compliance measures produce significantly worse compliance outcomes with mixed results in terms of productivity gains. Anticipating relative peer information on both criteria leads to increased productivity; the number of participants choosing to consistently comply remains unchanged, but those who sometimes violate policy are less compliant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this research is to analyze the opinions of secondary and high school teachers and administrators regarding the performance evaluation of teachers in the context of performance-based payment policies. In this research, in order to learn about participant views about the subject, basic qualitative research design which is one of the qualitative research methods, was used. The study group is made up of a total of 38 participants, 16 of which were school administrators and 22 teachers from different branches working in secondary and high schools in Gaziantep, Turkey in the academic year of 2018-2019. Maximum variation sampling method as one of the purposive sampling methods was adopted. The data was collected through focus group interviews and individual interviews by using semi-structured interview forms and data were analyzed with content analysis. Based on the research findings, it is understood that most of the teachers and administrators have positive perspectives on performance evaluation process provided that teacher performance evaluation policies are applied democratically. On the other hand, some of the participants showed negative attitude toward the subject. They think that teachers will have difficulty accepting performance system and resist to it. In addition to these findings, participants stated that authorities who will implement this system should be experts in their fields to be able to prevent teachers from experiencing any difficulties. The participants were also asked about the criteria and qualifications to be used in the evaluation of teacher performance, and they offered a variety of ideas that could be applied in teacher performance evaluation system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using panel data from 2004 and 2011, the authors find an elevated incidence of work-related ailments (associated with bones, muscles, and joints) in U.K. establishments that use individual performance pay, even after accounting for establishment fixed effects. Fixedeffect estimates also confirm a positive relationship between absence due to illness and performance pay. The elevated rates of ailments associated with performance pay appear to reduce financial performance and product quality, even though performance pay has a positive net influence on financial performance. Thus, a hidden cost of performance pay is occupational health deterioration. Parallel results are absent for labor productivity and, in a smaller sample, for profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a model of how the retention motive shapes managerial compensation contracts. Once employed, a risk-averse manager acquires imperfectly portable skills whose value is stochastic because of industry-wide demand shocks. The manager's actions are uncontractible, and the perceived fairness of the compensation contract affects the manager's motivation. If the volatility of profits is sufficiently large and outside offers are sufficiently likely, the equilibrium contract combines a salary with an own-firm stock option. The model's predictions are consistent with empirical regularities concerning contractual shape, the magnitude of variable pay, the lack of indexation, and the prevalence of discretionary severance pay. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses the legitimacy of different pay determination principles in Swedish public sector organisations. The aim is to explore what dimensions of worth exist in pay determination and to analyse the extent to which differences in legitimacy can be explained by organisational position, professional identity and organisational context. Theoretically, the article is influenced by "valuation studies" and the "institutional logics" and "orders of worth" approaches in analysing the existence of multiple dimensions of pay determination. Empirically, the study is based on surveys to employees and managers. The main results are that individual performance is the most legitimate dimension of worth, although job requirements and employee behaviour also have a high level of legitimacy. Formal individual competence and market value have a somewhat lower level of legitimacy, while organisational results is the dimension that has least legitimacy. In addition, the perceptions of legitimacy are shown to vary somewhat with position, profession and organisational context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report the results of two field experiments in a retail chain and show that the effectiveness of performance pay crucially hinges on prior job experience. Introducing sales-based performance pay first for district managers and later for store managers, we find negligible average treatment effects. From surveys and interviews, we develop a formal model demonstrating that the effect of performance pay decreases with experience and may even vanish in the limit. We provide empirical evidence in line with this hypothesis—for instance, finding positive treatment effects (only) in stores with low job experience. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that couples sort on performance pay with dual receipt couples much more likely than predicted by random. In addition, we show that the return to performance pay appears largely invariant to whether one's spouse earns performance pay. The major exception is that among the college educated, the return to performance pay is larger for women when their spouse also receives performance pay. Thus, dual receipt households concentrate the returns to performance pay hinting that performance pay may influence the distribution of household income. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between labour market flexibility and efficiency and social protection expenditures. Building on the theories of government expenditures and the empirical literature on the determinants of social protection, the article examines empirically the relationship between flexible labour market and social protection expenditures. The empirical model explains social protection mainly in terms of the demand and supply of social protection, modernization theory and political institutions, namely democracy. Labour market flexibility and efficiency indicators include hiring and firing policies, labour-employer cooperation, wage determination flexibility, redundancy costs, linking pay to productivity, reliance on professional management, and the ratio of women in the labour force. We use a sample of 44 developed and emerging economies for the period 2007–2014 and adopt instrumental variables and two-step generalized method of moments estimation methodologies to account for endogeneity. Estimates show that linking pay to productivity, wage flexibility, and redundancy costs reduce social protection expenditures, while the ease of hiring and firing increases them. The article draws attention to the positive impact that flexible and efficient labour markets and organization-level human-resource policies have on reducing social protection expenditures and increasing fiscal space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using US panel data on young workers, we demonstrate that those who receive performance pay are more likely to consume alcohol and illicit drugs. Recognizing that this likely reflects worker sorting, we first control for risk, ability, and personality proxies. We further mitigate sorting concerns by introducing worker fixed effects, worker-employer match fixed effects, and worker-employer-occupation match fixed effects. Finally, we present fixed effect IV estimates. All of these estimates continue to indicate a greater likelihood of substance use when a worker receives performance pay. The results support conjectures that stress and effort increase with performance pay and that alcohol and drug use is a coping mechanism for workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a novel financing mechanism for public services delivery. This special issue about SIBs in the UK argues that they necessitate closer examination to understand the implications for all stakeholders. This introductory paper critically explores and challenges dominant practitioner narratives of SIBs as "win-win" solutions for governments and service providers. While SIBs may foster innovation it is unclear if they deliver better value given the complexity of public services. SIBs are a strategically ambiguous policy tool and policymakers should be cautious about SIBs due to contractual complexity and issues with ethics, governance, accountability and transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Policymakers and health care leaders search for a payment model to balance the interests of providers, patients, and payers. This has shifted reimbursement from a fee-for-service (FFS) to pay-for-performance (P4P) model. The FFS model of reimbursement may lead to provider overuse. The P4P model incentivizes quality, not quantity, of care. However, the payer's reimbursement shift to P4P has not affected compensation of individual providers. Objectives: To explore the effects of payment compensation models on provider behavior and employment. Data sources: CINAHL, Cochrane, and EBSCO databases were searched. To ensure accuracy, a PRISMA flow diagram was used. A thematic analysis was performed using 52 articles. Conclusions: Four themes emerged: health care as an economic anomaly, the ability to incentivize value, ethics, and provider-employer-payer alignment. Basic economic principles are distorted in health care because of payment layers and competing goals. Although payment structure affects health care provider (HCP) performance, the correlation is not understood. There is a lack of knowledge on several key areas: 1) HCP behavioral research, 2) how employment may be influencing existing HCP attitudes and actions, 3) how nurse practitioners (NPs) differ from physicians, and 4) P4P outcome data. There is also a lack of literature involving NP's and reimbursement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine executive compensation data from 78 major U.S. oil and gas companies over a 24-year period. Perhaps in no other industry are the fortunes of so many executives so dependent on a single global commodity price. We find that a 10% increase in oil prices is associated with a 2% increase in executive compensation. This oil price effect holds for both CEOs and non-CEOs and separately for several different individual components of compensation, including bonuses. We find that the oil price effect is larger in companies with more insiders on the board, and asymmetric, with executive compensation rising with increasing oil prices more than it falls with decreasing oil prices. We then discuss potential mechanisms drawn from the broader existing literature on executive compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insufficient incentive has been cited as one of the reasons that public sector performance pay policy failed. In the public sector, this can be resolved by increasing the proportion of performance pay without increasing the total budget for compensation. However, this adjustment in pay scale has both pros and cons. This study analyzes the data obtained from a South Korean public enterprise in which the proportion of performance pay has substantially increased. The result indicates that the increased proportion of performance pay policy may result in motivational gains: Work efforts are increased when they perceive that the proportion of performance pay is substantial. Although it increased emotional exhaustion, it did not significantly decrease helping behavior. This result implies that performance pay may be an effective resolution if managers are prepared to address some negative side effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subjective performance evaluation (SPE) combined with rewards and penalties is a new field of teacher incentive research in recent years. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, the study adopts the multi-case study approach to explore the teacher incentive contract design with subjective performance evaluation in teacher performance pay system, which includes the degree of application, the influencing factors and the effectiveness of SPE. It finds that the comprehensive evaluation system, which combines objective performance evaluation (OPE) with SPE, tends to give higher weight to OPE, that the degree of application of SPE is restricted by internal and external environments, including the degree of decentralization of school salary by the educational administrative department, the school scale and development stage, that the technical arrangement of the school evaluators' self-interest in the salary distribution affects the effectiveness of SPE, and that the main costs of SPE come from leaders' preference and teachers' ingratiating behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this study was to evaluate health outcomes for workers subject to piece rate historically to better understand the implications of pay type in the modern-day gig economy. While piece rate occurring in the 1980s and 1990s predates recent platform-based employment, it introduced and normalized patterns of economic precariousness that are instrumental in the current gig economy. Evidence suggests that such pay types may result in poor health outcomes; however, cross-sector evidence of its long-term effects on US workers is lacking. This article represents the first longitudinal cross-sector analysis relating health outcomes to this performance pay type in US workers. This is a longitudinal cohort study. Data from six survey waves of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth collected between 1988 and 2000 are used in a random-effects logit model to predict self-reported health limitations related to piece rate, while controlling for worker, work environment, lifestyle, time, and location trends. Pay tied to piece rate in current or prior periods significantly increases the odds of self-reported health limitations compared with salaried work (odds ratio [OR]: 1.4–1.8). These effects are elevated for the subgroups of low-wage (OR: 1.5–1.8), female (OR: 1.8–1.9), and non-white (OR: 2.0–2.1) workers compared with their high-wage, male, and white peers. The results suggest that piece rate pay designed to promote efficiency may have important negative implications for worker health, especially for the most vulnerable members of the US workforce such as women, minority, and low-income workers. Given the growing popularity of performance-based pay to the gig economy, more research is needed to determine if the practice is justified from a public health perspective. • Piece rate significantly increases the odds of self-reported health limitations compared to salaried effort. • Piece rate has the greatest negative effect on health for low-wage, female, and non-white workers. • Pay designed to promote efficiency may have important deleterious impacts on worker health, especially for vulnerable workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BackgroundPiece rate pay remains a common form of compensation in developing-world industries. While the piece rate may boost productivity, it has been shown to have unintended consequences for occupational safety and health, including increased accident and injury risk.ObjectivesThis paper explores the relationship between worker pay and physical and emotional health, and questions the modern day business case for piece rate pay in the developing world.MethodsThe relationship between piece rate and self-reported measures of physical and emotional health is estimated using a large survey of garment workers in 109 Vietnamese factories between 2010 and 2014. A random effects logit model controls for factory and year, predicting worker health as a function of pay type, demographics, and factory characteristics.FindingsWorkers paid by the piece report worse physical and emotional health than workers paid by the hour (OR = 1.38-1.81). Wage incentives provide the most consistently significant evidence of all demographic and factory-level variables, including the factory’s own performance on occupational safety and health compliance measures.ConclusionsThese results highlight the importance of how workers are paid to understanding the variability in worker health outcomes. More research is needed to better understand the business case supporting the continued use of piece rate pay in the developing world.

The present research examined the influences of pay for performance programs on employee performance in the Romanian context, by comparing a sample of employees in companies in which such programs are implemented to a sample of employees in organizations in which performance is not used as a criterion in deciding financial rewards. Results show that the work performances of the former, as evaluated by the direct supervisors of each employee, are significantly higher than those of the latter, and that this effect of performance pay is partly mediated by its positive effects on employee perceptions of distributive and procedural justice. Furthermore, results indicate that the individual – level financial incentive systems are more efficient in fostering work performance than the team – level performance pay programs in the Romanian employee sample, and that they also have stronger effects on the two dimensions of organizational justice.

Taiwan expanded its college access significantly over the past two decades by converting 2-year junior colleges to 4-year colleges and relaxing entrance standards. The share of college graduates in the 22–24 years old population rose from 12 to 71% between 1990 and 2014. This should have suppressed returns to schooling and lowered household income inequality. Instead, Taiwan's Gini coefficient rose. We show that rising use of performance pay and positive assortative mating in the marriage market jointly increase the household income inequality by 46.5% between 1980 and 2014. Our results suggest that uneven quality of the most recent cohorts of college graduates led to two sources of rising household income inequality: the increased use of bonus pay which increases residual inequality among college graduates; and matching on unobserved skills in the marriage market which increases inequality among married couples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Performance pay has been one of the main trends in public sector reform over the last decade and aims to increase employees' motivation. However, positive results are sparse. In a majority of cases, pay scheme designers neglect that intrinsic motivation may be distorted by the introduction of extrinsic rewards (crowding out). Nevertheless, under certain conditions, performance pay schemes may also enhance intrinsic motivation (crowding-in). The perception of rewards has proven to be an especially crucial factor for the outcome of performance pay. Based on psychological contract theory, this paper analyzes the relationships between intrinsic motivation, public service motivation (PSM), personality characteristics, and the design of the performance- appraisal scheme. The empirical analysis relies on a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach. Model findings reveal that a fair, participatory, and transparent design reduces the controlling perception while fostering the intrinsic motivation of employees. In addition, participants who score high on neuroticism perceive performance pay schemes to be more controlling and have lower values of intrinsic motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the academic circles at home and abroad have had some controversy about the effect of teacher performance pay, including both the recognition and questioning of performance pay. The positive effects of implementing performance pay lie in improving the quality of teachers, enhancing the level of teaching practice, and improving students爷achievements. However, the performance pay of teachers has not fully achieved the expected effect due to the insufficient support of the performance鄄based pay system, the unfairness of performance evaluation, the difficulty in objective and comprehensive individual performance evaluation and the limitation of monetary incentives. Based on the experience of the United States and other countries, this paper explores the enlightenment for China爷s current reform of the performance pay policy in compulsory education schools: the priority objectives of teachers爷performance pay policy ought to be clarified; teachers爷performance pay must be guaranteed clearly and continuously; the reform of teachers爷 performance pay should be conducted by combining the characteristics of education with teachers爷perform鄄 ance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

vThe theoretical and empirical studies on the effectiveness of performance pay for primary and secondary school teachers in the past 20 years have been sorted out and analyzed. It finds that some scholars believe that the incentives of teachers爷performance pay need to be combined with the teachers爷work scenes, and the degree of incentive, availability of coping strategies and information variables need to be increased. As an intervention in the teaching process, the cause鄄and鄄effect relationship between teachers爷performance pay and students爷academic performance needs to introduce more mediating variables. Some scholars also deny that the teacher profession applies to market incentives, and that the characteristics of the teaching profession determine that performance pay cannot buy teachers爷performance. Most of the existing studies in China focus on the problems in the implementation of performance pay, but pay insufficient attention to the combination of rational choice behavior and workplace characteristics, as well as the modification of the rational choice framework, and the basic theory embodied in the study of teachers爷performance pay is also insufficient. In the empirical study, the experimental study based on the behavior study paradigm is lack of methodological breakthrough. In the follow鄄up study, first, solid basic study is needed to provide the support for effective teacher performance pay design; second, study that combines teacher professional development and salary growth is needed to provide the support for teachers爷professional growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the efficacy of sustainability-related performance conditions in executive pay schemes at listed companies in the U.K. as perceived by the individuals involved in setting those conditions. It will be demonstrated that it is common practice in the U.K. for senior executives to receive part of their pay in the form of bonuses and share awards, the value of which awards will be determined by some degree of performance. The performance targets are generally related to financial performance but there is some evidence that performance conditions are increasingly being related to sustainability in some way. This paper considers a number of issues, including a key systemic issue of whether using incentive pay will have a material impact on the behaviour of U.K. listed companies regarding sustainability issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the effects of three factors on the firm-size wage premium which have not been considered in previous studies: the worker compositions within firms, the wage differentials between contractors and subcontractors, and the performance pay and rent-sharing behaviors of firms. The main results are as follows. First, even after controlling for the various worker characteristics, the differences in shares of highly educated workers, managers, and professionals between large and small firms make the size-wage premium larger. Secondly, wage differentials between contractors and subcontractors also affect the size-wage premium in the manufacturing sector. Thirdly, high performance pay and active rent-sharing behaviors of large manufacturing firms make the size-wage premium larger. These results imply that a positive matching effect among skilled workers, a structural problem between contractors and subcontractors, and differences in rent-sharing behaviors between large and small firms have affected the firm-size wage premium in the South Korean labor market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]