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How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.

Primary sensory areas constitute crucial nodes during perceptual decision making. However, it remains unclear to what extent they mainly constitute a feedforward processing step, or rather are continuously involved in a recurrent network together with higher-order areas. We found that the temporal window in which primary visual cortex is required for the detection of identical visual stimuli was extended when task demands were increased via an additional sensory modality that had to be monitored. Late-onset optogenetic inactivation preserved bottom-up, early-onset responses which faithfully encoded stimulus features, and was effective in impairing detection only if it preceded a late, report-related phase of the cortical response. Increasing task demands were marked by longer reaction times and the effect of late optogenetic inactivation scaled with reaction time. Thus, independently of visual stimulus complexity, multisensory task demands determine the temporal requirement for ongoing sensory-related activity in V1, which overlaps with report-related activity.