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Many studies have documented the negative effect of corruption on development, economic growth, and democracy. Independent anti-corruption agencies are often recommended as the tool to curb corruption. However, their efficiency depends on the political will to allocate authority, powers, and resources. Moreover, setting up new institutions is always costly and accordingly problematic to low and middle income countries. The present study suggests that public administration processes in their own right are a tool to combat corruption. The article uses a survey with responses from 1706 public employees in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Using OLS regression, the study confirms others findings that strengthening meritocracy is an important factor in curbing corruption. It adds to this that enhancing monitoring is a factor just as effective against corruption as meritocracy. It adds attention to the reverse effect associated with hierarchical organizations, norms accepting rule bending, and network decisions. Finally, addressing salaries’ and performance payment’s impact on corruption the study finds no relation.

Citizen participation is disputed; some see it as enhancing democracy while others see it as undermining representative government. Some find it increases administrative efficiency, and others find it creates additional costs. Studies argue that the outcome depends on the value which civil servants place on inclusion. Echoing Miles’s law, “where you stand depends on where you sit,” we discuss how administrative structures and processes—“how you sit”—shape civil servants’ values on citizens’ participation. Using survey data from more than 1,700 civil servants in the Baltic countries, the article contributes by placing the discussion in the context of extreme social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corruption and political favouritism is a pervasive and persistent problem in the Lithuanian public administration. A possible solution to the problem is the Human Resource Reform of 2013, which creates a rooster of eligible civil service candidates through qualifying exams. However, the authority to employ at the discretion of each department falls between the two stools of a unified and a departmentalized civil service. The risk is that the reform will fail to fulfil its purpose if authority is not clarified and the reform continues to be politicized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Criminal Investigation & Criminology / Revija za Kriminalistiko in Kriminologijo is the property of Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia, Police and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Social Sciences Bulletin / Sociālo Zinātņu Vēstnesis is the property of Socialo Zinatnu Vestnesis and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Corruption is a problem of collective action. The fight against corruption came on the international agenda in the 1990s. The core of the recommendations from International organizations and scholars is to establishment of anti-corruption agencies with the aim of increasing the risk of detection and punishment to individual who engage in corrupt affairs. However, despite condemnation by all cultures, individuals and societies can be socialized into a culture of corruption where the benefits of partaking in corruption will exceed those of being honest. It is thus not sufficient to change individual incentives without also seeking to change behavioural norms. Through a comparison of Estonia, Poland and Bulgaria it is shown that there is no ’miracle cure’. Anti-corruption agencies are important but effectiveness presumes economic reform, a well functioning system of justice and a credible public condemnation of corruption. An efficient anti-corruption policy is multi-faceted employing instruments simultaneously with each instrument conditioned on the others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]