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As the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission concluded, "Despite ongoing political frictions and concerns about discriminatory treatment, many U.S. companies remain committed to the Chinese market."[296] Indeed, one estimate concludes that the level of U.S. investment in China likely exceeds $1 trillion.[297] Consequently, alternative approaches must be developed to satisfy U.S. importers and manufacturers so that the impact on U.S. industries from the prospective loss of China's market can be minimized to the greatest extent possible. Neither variations in the repeated U.S. affirmations of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan - including more or less ambiguity - nor new labels for U.S. deterrence strategies can address the structural challenge to U.S. deterrence goals posed by the shifting correlation of forces and the political background of the Taiwan Question. This deterrence threat must be credible or, as Herman Kahn said, at least "not incredible", i.e. it must not entail likely costs to the United States that are so great that the U.S. deterrence position itself lacks sufficient credibility.[133] The political aims of U.S. Strategy What then are the U.S. political goals relative to the Taiwan Question? The fundamental deterrence questions that must be addressed by the United States are: is there space for deterrence to operate in principle and, if so, what deterrence posture might the United States preserve, or more likely regain, to support the credible deterrence strategy needed to uphold the U.S. position expressed in the 1979 TRA? At a time of considerable U.S. strategic nuclear advantage, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev raised the fundamental question about U.S. will and deterrence credibility when the potential U.S. suffering for carrying out its deterrent threat could easily have been intolerable for the United States. [Extracted from the article]