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Inequality is perpetuated, in part, by the psychological and behavioral tendencies that arise from the social context of inequality. Cognitive biases lead most people to see themselves as middle class, even when that perception does not align with economic reality. Those who perceive themselves as economically advantaged tend to view inequality as fair and legitimate, often dismissing proponents of redistributive solutions as ill-informed. And unequal contexts increase risky behaviors that can be profitable to some but are more likely to be costly for most. This research program suggests an inequality cycle, in which inequality experienced today tends to reproduce itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-Black racism in America renders Black people both invisible and hypervisible, at times. Here, we draw on previous research on inattentional blindness, a phenomenon whereby people fail to perceive something or someone (e.g., a person walking about) in their environment when attending to another feature of their environment (e.g., other people playing a ball game). We sought to replicate past work examining the conditions under which heterosexual White women fail to perceive a Black man walking through a complex scene. Specifically, we investigated whether selective inattention to a task-irrelevant person walking through a scene of two teams passing basketballs may depend on two factors: (a) the race of the person walking through the scene (Black vs. White), and (b) the interpersonal goal of the viewer (searching for a coworker, neighbor, friend, romantic partner, or a control condition)—hence the reason we recruited heterosexual White women participants. Consistent with the original work, across three studies, we found a main effect of target race such that heterosexual White women participants were more likely to notice the White (vs. Black) man walking through the ball-passing scene. Inconsistent with the original work, we did not find that this effect was moderated by the interpersonal goal condition. We discuss the implications of the current findings and future directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does implicit bias contribute to explicit prejudice? Prior experiments show that concept knowledge about fear versus sympathy determines whether negative affect (captured as implicit bias) predicts antisocial outcomes (Lee et al.). Concept knowledge (i.e., beliefs) about groups may similarly moderate the link between implicitly measured negative affect (implicit negative affect) and explicit prejudice. We tested this hypothesis using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008 Time Series Study (Study 1) and Project Implicit (Study 2). In both studies, participants high in implicit negative affect reported more explicit prejudice if they possessed negative beliefs about Black Americans. Yet, participants high in implicit negative affect reported less explicit prejudice if they possessed fewer negative beliefs about Black Americans. The results are consistent with psychological constructionist and dynamic models of evaluation and offer a more ecologically valid extension of our past laboratory work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evidence for whether intentional control strategies can reduce automatic stereotyping is mixed. Therefore, the authors tested the utility of implementation intentions--specific plans linking a behavioral opportunity to a specific response--in reducing automatic bias. In three experiments, automatic stereotyping was reduced when participants made an intention to think specific counterstereotypical thoughts whenever they encountered a Black individual. The authors used two implicit tasks and process dissociation analysis, which allowed them to separate contributions of automatic and controlled thinking to task performance. Of importance, the reduction in stereotyping was driven by a change in automatic stereotyping and not controlled thinking. This benefit was acquired with little practice and generalized to novel faces. Thus, implementation intentions may be an effective and efficient means for controlling automatic aspects of thought. Keywords: automatic stereotyping; control; conscious intentions; process dissociation; goals

Implicit and explicit attitude tests are often weakly correlated, leading some theorists to conclude that implicit and explicit cognition are independent. Popular implicit and explicit tests, however, differ in many ways beyond implicit and explicit cognition. The authors examined in 4 studies whether correlations between implicit and explicit tests were influenced by the similarity in task demands (i.e., structural fit) and, hence, the processes engaged by each test. Using an affect misattribution procedure, they systematically varied the structural fit of implicit and explicit tests of racial attitudes. As test formats became more similar, the implicit--explicit correlation increased until it became higher than in most previous research. When tests differ in structure, they may underestimate the relationship between implicit and explicit cognition. The authors propose a solution that uses procedures to maximize structural fit. Keywords: implicit, attitude, automatic, measurement, prejudice

Defensive projection is the process of perceiving one's undesirable qualities in others. The present research shows how stereotypes guide and justify the projection of specific traits onto specific group members. In four studies, the authors demonstrated that people who experienced a threat to a specific dimension of their self-concept selectively activated this dimension in a stereotype and derogated stereotyped others on this dimension. They further showed that stereotyped individuals are more likely to serve as targets of projection than are nonstereotyped individuals. These results demonstrate the functional role of stereotypes in guiding and constraining motivated self-enhancement. Keywords: projection; stereotyping; accessibility; self-threat; compensatory self-enhancement