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Narratives and pragmatic arguments maintain a tight but complex relation. Narratives are a proto-scientific method to empirically investigate actions. In narratives, actions are explored, explained, interpreted, and evaluated. The action is a central element in a causal chain of events: motive – action – consequences. Storytelling is a way to summarize, share, preserve and accumulate narrative investigations. Pragmatic argumentation is another method to evaluate actions. Pragmatic arguments evaluate actions in terms of their observed or predicted consequences. Therefore, pragmatic argumentation is an abstract, intellectual complement of the narrative. Rhetorically, storytelling is supposed to appeal to reason, just as a pragmatic argument appeals to reason. Both devices are employed to support standpoints in which an action is positively or negatively evaluated, encouraged or discouraged. The rhetorical dynamics, however, differ. The justifying force of the narrative is primary, its causality is direct, motivated, embodied. The justifying force of the pragmatic argument is apodictic, grounded on abstract generalized regularities. We see this complex relation reflected in creating a documentary. In this chapter, I elaborate on the connection between narrative and pragmatic argument and illustrate its application to Joris Ivens’s 1939 documentary The 400 Million.

This paper addresses the question how to analyze multimodal public discourse in such a way that the resulting reconstruction of the rhetor’s accountability either obliges the rhetor to acknowledge the argumentative reconstruction as valid or to refute its validity in a meta-discussion. This is a challenge for discourse theory as well as for argument theory because multimodal discourse seems far removed from the ‘standard’ propositional format of an argument. We argue that multimodal discourse should be analyzed as a coherent and relevant discourse, assuming the possibility of instant interactions between all modes. We introduce a method that allows us to account for an argumentative reconstruction in a systematic way. We illustrate our method by analyzing the ABC news item titled Hu Jintao Visit: Economics and Panda Bears of January 20, 2011, holding ABC news as a rhetor accountable for several far reaching standpoints that are implied in the multimodal format.

E. Feteris, B. Garssen and F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds): Keeping in Touch with Pragma-Dialectics. In Honor of Frans H. van Eemeren

An analysis of a broad sample of Dutch judicial and semi-judicial decisions shows similar structures as the ones Bhatia and Mazzi found before. The question is posed what explains this seemingly unchangeable judicial format. From a perspective of argumentative and communicative efficacy and comprehensibility, the format is certainly not the optimal choice. The explanation is that the format is a sign of an ideology. The format suggests an objectivity of the decision taken. This is actually a myth. This makes a decision to change the format an ideological one.

A pragma-dialectical analysis departs from an idealized model of a well-organized, fully explicit argumentative discussion. Some argumentative activity types come closer to this ideal than others. It is useful and important to apply the ideal model to reconstruct relatively well-organized and explicit practices as is done for example in argumentation in legal proceedings. But it is great fun to explore what happens when you confront the seemingly anarchistic and chaotic practices of Internet political forum discussions with such a model, at least when you do this with the subtlety and intelligence of Marcin Lewinski. He reports his findings in a wellwritten, very interesting study. The first four chapters of this doctoral dissertation are somewhat perfunctory, working towards an introduction of the concepts of a critical discussion (shared knowledge for the readers of this journal), strategic maneuvering (a more recent, but also well-known concept) and argumentative activity type in the pragma-dialectical theory (relatively new). ‘‘[B]y manoeuvring strategically arguers try to make an advantageous use of the many options open to them at various junctures of a reasonable dialectical discussion’’ (p. 55). Van Eemeren & Houtlosser characterize argumentative activity types as ‘‘conventionalized entities that can be distinguished by ‘external’ empirical observations of the communicative practices in the various domains [...] of discourse’’. Lewinski states that ‘‘pragma-dialectical activity types are empirically recognisable types of communicative practices approached from the perspective of a normative model’’ (p. 60). Chapter 5 characterizes Internet discussion forums as a technology for informal political deliberation. On the basis of a technological and institutional analysis of

An argumentative text can be reconstructed as an argumentative discussion between a protagonist and an antagonist. However, such a text is usually not a literal report of a discussion. It is the author of the text who determines how issues are presented, how claims are modeled, how the development of the discussion is presented. Especially when a text has embedded discourse voices that can fulfill the roles of protagonist or antagonist, the author of the text can strongly suggest a specific assignment, suppressing alternatives. In this article examples are presented that show how an author exploits linguistic means—a strategic choice of causal connectives—to suggest a specific reconstruction. The question is raised whether a derailment of this behavior of the author should be characterized as committing the fallacy of the straw man.

In modern argument theory argumentative practice is often analyzed and evaluated in terms of its correspondences with or deviations from a normative model. Such a methodology implies that there are three moments at which evaluations takes place which are not guided by the norms of the model itself because they imply an interpretation of the model by the analyst. This is demonstrated by an analogy with legal practice. this implies that an evaluation of an argumentative practice is not only relative to choice of the normative model as such, but also relative to the threefold interpretation of the model.

What I sought to demonstrate was that the relations between (a) how a case fits into the system, (b) what the main structure of the justification is, and (c) whether discretionary authority is used, are not as simple as suggested in the literature. What we saw is that if the justification for a decision in a particular case is a practical syllogism with an established legal rule as its major premiss, there are many possibilities: (a) the case did or did not raise a conflict for the judge between his intuitions about reasonableness and his interpretation of the legal system; (b) the case had or had not a clear solution in conformity with the legal system; (c) the case was or was not decided according to what the system seemed to prescribe. Therefore, the main structure of a justification cannot inform us about questions as: Did the case fit into the system? Is discretionary authority used? The opposition between hard cases and clear cases is much too complex to be of any use to clarify such issues.